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Abstract 
This thesis examines the role of General Practitioners (GPs) as purchasers within the 
National Health Service (NHS). 
The GP purchasing role is considered in the fight of two market policy objectives 
which are explored within the broader context of the nature of the purchaser-provider 
relationship in terms of both its content and process. The two policy objectives, 
outlined in the Government's White Paper "Working for Patients" (Department of 
Health 1989), are that GPs would stimulate: (1) improved efficiencies in secondary 
care services; and (2) a transfer of resources from secondary to primary care. 
The study adopts a qualitative approach, gaining insight into purchasing relationships 
by way of interviews and non-participant observation, and by interpreting the data both 
inductively and deductively. Economic and social theories, in particular transactions 
cost theory and network theory, are used as a framework for the fieldwork and to 
inform the analysis and discussion. 
This thesis argues that GPs have fulfilled the two original market policy objectives of 
stimulating secondary care efficiencies and resource transfer from secondary to primary 
care. The means by which they have achieved this, however, is not via neoclassical 
contracts negotiated in a competitive market context, as market proponents envisaged, 
but through economically efficient, relational contracts within ideologically/culturally 
and socially embedded networks, for which the market policy has been a catalyst. 
These networks have developed at an inter-GP practice and at a purchaser provider 
level, and are characterised by knowledge creation, innovation, learning, service 
(re)design, partnering and the pursuit of economic and social goals, in particular the 
enhancement of professional autonomy. 
The study affirms the need for a socio-econornic perspective in organisational studies, 
and suggests directions for theory development and future research which can follow 
from this study and which will further tinderstanding and analysis of network relations 
and of the NHS context in particular. 
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Introduction 
In 1990, Great Britain's National Health Service (NHS) was the subject of 
fundamental market reform. The creation of a market for health services, as 
articulated in the white paper "Working for Patients" (Department of Health 1989), 
represented one of the most important developments in social policy in recent years 
(Wistow and Hardy 1996) and served as one of the most fundamental changes ever to 
the 'business' of general practice (Bevan and Marinker 1989; NHS Management 
Executive 1992; Duggan 1995). 
Two central objectives of the reform were to improve the efficiency of secondary 
health care services (ie, improved efficiency of resource utilisation), and to encourage 
the transfer of resources from secondary care into primary care. These objectives 
were to be achieved through competitive pressures brought to bear by the 
discretionary purchasing activities of health service purchasers who were expected to 
seek out providers offering the cheapest services. 
Two types of purchasing agent were created to enact this purchasing role: large district 
purchasers and small general practice purchasers. General Practitioner (GP) 
purchasing, the focus of this study, was exercised, in the first instance, through a 
voluntary budget-holding scheme (GP fundholding) (Department of Health 1989). 
Practices who entered the scheme received budgetary control over staff costs, 
prescribing costs and certain secondary care services. They were then expected to 
engage in annual contracts with secondary care providers and to "negotiate the best 
deals they can" (Department of Health 1989: 5 1) for their patients. 
In 1994, the GP purchasing role was augmented in two ways (NHS Executive 1994): 
(1) the GP fundholding scheme was extended in order to embrace smaller practices and 
to offer fundholding schemes which differed in terms of the scope of their budgetary 
control (community/primary care fundholding and total fundholding); and (2) non- 
I 
fundholders were embraced in the purchasing process by being given a role in 
contributing to Health Authority (HA) (or in Scotland, Health Board (HB)) 
commissioning'. 
The creation of this NHS market, and in particular the purchasing role, not only 
presented health service practitioners with a weighty and ongoing agenda for change, 
but posed interesting macro and micro level challenges to the discipline of health 
services research (Ham 1994a; Ham and Maynard 1994; Coulter 1995; Laing et al. 
1996) and also to other disciplines such as social policy (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993; 
Bartlett et al. 1994), economics (Donaldson 1993; Propper 1993; Matsaganis and 
Glennerster 1994; Maynard 1996), management (strategy and marketing) (Ferlie 1992; 
Prowle 1992; Freemantle, Watt, and Mason 1993; Ashburner, Ferlie, and FitzGerald 
1996; Laing and Cotton 1996) and accounting and finance (Ellwood 1995,1996)- 
Lapsley, Llewellyn, and Grant 1997). At a macro level, debates ensued concerning 
issues such as the structure of the market (Bartlett 1991; Ham and Maynard 1994; 
Hunter 1995), the extent to which purchasers would have sufficient degrees of power 
to negotiate with providers (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993; Ham 1994a; Ham and 
Maynard 1994), the availability of purchasing information (Propper 1993; Deakin and 
Walsh 1996) and the transactions costs of a market-based contracting system (Ham 
1994b; Deakin and Walsh 1996). At a micro level, issues included the ethics of the 
fundholding scheme (Glennerster et al. 1994), whether GPs had appropriate purchasing 
skills (Bowie and Harris 1994; May and Robinson 1995), and whether patients of 
fundholders would be given preferential treatment (Bartlett et al. 1994; Glennerster et 
al. 1994). 
Attempts to research, evaluate and reflect on these issues have needed, however, to 
contend with several difficulties. The government, for example, was opposed to 
conducting any formal evaluations of fundholding (Robinson 1994). 
Simultaneous 
policy changes (Le Grand 1994) and ongoing injections of resources 
into the NHS 
(Petchey 1993) then made it impossible to isolate market factors from other influences. 
I Commissioning and purchasing are terms which have differing definitions and are explained 
in 
Chapter 2 (sec: 2.6). 
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Nevertheless, despite these problems, a body of evidence began to grow. The 
evidence as it relates to GP purchasing suggested, however, that GPs had not changed 
their referral patterns and were not concerned with stimulating hospital efficiencies but 
had managed to initiate some transfers of resource from secondary to primary care and 
were active in improving service quality. Furthermore, GPs were proving to be non- 
price sensitive, reluctant to exercise buyer power and to switch provider, and were 
actively loyal to traditional, usually local, providers with whom they collaborated. 
Whilst the research evidence revealed consistent findings, it also raised a number of 
questions about the underlying rationale for GP purchasing behaviour and the nature of 
their purchasing role. It was not clear, for example, whether GPs were disinterested 
in improving hospital efficiency or whether they might be creating pressures for 
efficiencies through some means other than formal contracting. It was also unclear 
how GPs were improving service quality and the nature of their relationship with their 
providers, the rationale for provider loyalty and their opposition to switching were only 
partially understood. 
In response to these questions and the original policy objectives, this research aimed to 
explore the role GPs are performing as purchasers and to identify which of the 
purchasing-Imarket-related issues are of particular concern to them. More 
specifically, it sought to consider whether GPs are seeking to stimulate efficiency in 
secondary care, to find out whether GPs are seeking to initiate the transfer of resources 
from secondary to primary care and to understand the relationship between GPs (as 
purchasers) and hospital Trusts (as providers). 
The pursuit of this research aim using a qualitative methodology, enables this thesis to 
make a number of empirical, methodological and theoretical contributions. Personal, 
local and NHS system-level socio-economic goals which motivate GPs are identified 
which contribute to previous explanations of purchasing behaviour. Insights gained 
through non-participant observation go on to show the ways in which pursuit of these 
goals has an effect upon efficiency and quality improvements as well as resource 
transfer. Exploration of the purchasing relationship in terms of content and process 
further identifies important collaborative processes and network properties which 
3 
contribute to innovation, learning and knowledge creation within purchasing 
relationships and thus allows a more informed evaluation of the purchasing function. 
This study also makes a contribution to organisation theory by integrating economic 
and social theory in order to understand GP purchasing relationships. In so doing, it 
identifies network characteristics which encourage collaboration and which render 
networks an efficient form of organisation, and identifies certain limitations in the use 
of transactions cost theory, suggesting ways in which the theory needs to be further 
developed. 
Other contributions concern the methodology and directions for future research. The 
thesis demonstrates the importance of observation techniques in the study of 
individual/organisational interaction and dynamic processes, and suggests two 
perspectives which could be developed directly from this study and adopted in future 
studies of general practice organisation and GP networks. 
This thesis begins by explaining the historical and theoretical development of the NHS 
market and the purchasing models which were adopted, and emphasises the ways in 
which the role of the GP as an agent for change has become a central tenet of health 
service policy (Chapter 1). Key issues arising from market implementation and its 
social context are then discussed: firstly as they are dealt with in the NHS context 
(Chapter 2) and secondly as they can be understood from the perspective of particular 
social and economic theories (Chapter 3). Attention then turns to consider the 
empirical evidence concerning GP purchasing and fundholding and the research 
questions which arise from reviewing the evidence (Chapter 4). 
Following these background and theoretical discussions, consideration is then given to 
the qualitative methodology employed in this research (Chapter 5). The interview, 
observation and analysis processes which were adopted are explained and attention is 
given to the limitations of the research before progressing to discuss the study's 
findings. The findings are presented as they relate to three relationship dimensions: 
the GPs' views of their purchasing role (Chapter 6); the interaction between GPs and 
their providers (Chapter 7); and the relationship between GP practices (Chapter 8). 
4 
These discussions identify motives behind purchasing behaviour and characterise the 
content of, and processes within, inter-organisational purchasing relationships. 
Key findings are then reintegrated with the economic and social theory introduced 
earlier (Chapter 9). These discussions identify important theoretical issues which arise 
from the study and suggest ways in which the theory can be developed. The study is 
then drawn to its conclusion by way of a summary of the findings as they relate to the 
research aim and to the research gaps identified earlier (Chapter 10). The concluding 
discussion is integrated with a presentation of the study's contribution in terms of 
policy, managerial, methodological and theoretical implications, after which the thesis 
closes with suggestions for future research directions. 
5 
Chapter I 
nry- 
-i ne 
Casefor Market Reform - Policy & 
Economics 
6 
Introduction 
In 1989 the government published "Working for Patients" (Department of Health 
1989b), the policy which brought the NHS market into being and heralded the most 
radical reform to have been brought to bear upon the NHS in its entire history. The 
market was introduced in response to growing financial pressures on public spending. 
In order to stem the flow of funds into the NHS, a split was created between 
purchasing and providing functions. Purchasing became the responsibility of district 
health authorities/health boards and the newly created budget holding General 
Practitioners. These purchasing agents were to be the engine to drive the reforms. 
They were expected to stimulate competition between providers thus creating 
efficiencies, driving down costs and improving quality. They were also expected to 
stimulate a more efficient allocation of resources between primary and secondary care. 
This introductory chapter explains the theory behind the market and in particular 
behind the purchasing models adopted, whilst emphasising the underlying importance 
of improving NHS efficiency. It does so by presenting an historical perspective on 
the reforms which traces the formulation of the market notion and the origins and 
development of the purchasing models. The chapter places particular attention on the 
contribution of a non-government think tank, the Office of Health Economics, to the 
market ideas; a contribution not generally recognised in reviews of the reforms. 
Within this context, the chapter also discusses the central role of the GP as a 
purchaser in the market place and as an agent for change. 
LI The Climatefor Market Reform 
The 1990s have been a time of radical change within the NHS during which a health 
care market was established and subsequently dismantled. The market was created in 
order to stimulate improved efficiencies in the allocation and utilisation of resources 
(Spurgeon 1993). The underlying philosophy represented a belief by the Conservative 
government that the NHS contained pockets of inefficiency and needed to be subjected 
to economic incentives and competitive forces in order to make efficiency gains and 
contain the level of public spending on health services (Spurgeon 1993, Maynard 
1994). 
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1.1.1 The Resource 'Problem' 
Since the creation of the service in 1948, demands for increased public funding have 
grown, contrary to the expectations of the service's founder, Aneurin Bevan. Bevan 
had believed that there was a fixed pool of ill health which would disappear if 
treatment was provided and that the cost of the NHS would thus reduce after initial 
backlogs of ill health had been eliminated (Teeling Smith 1984a; Vaizey 1984). On the 
contrary, however, demands for health services have increased. The LJK has been 
faced with a growing elderly population, consumers have become increasingly 
educated about their rights to health care, and the costs of medical technology 
continue to increase (Teeling Smith 1984a; Enthoven 1985). 
Two arguments have emerged in response to this increased demand and the 
Government's desire to contain costs. The first is that the NHS is under-resourced 
and cannot cope with demand without continued investment. The second is that it is 
inefficient in the way in which resources are allocated and utilised. Such claims were 
made as early as 1956 when, for example, the Guillebaud Comi-nittee (commissioned 
by Sir Winston Churchill) reported that the NHS was under-resourced because its 
founders had failed to take proper account of the impact on costs of demographic 
change and inflation (Klein 1989). However, there was little strategic response to the 
committee's observations. Instead, the government at the time placed its emphasis 
upon "keeping the machinery running, on care and maintenance rather than innovation 
and change" (Klein 1989: 44). 
Despite a subsequent period of rapid growth in public expenditure during the 1960s 
and early 1970s, debates about allocative efficiency and resource utilisation increased. 
The period became marked by an "emphasis on efficiency and rationality in the use of 
resources... the development of an ideology of efficiency and the idea that policy 
should be directed towards squeezing the greatest possible output of health care ... out 
of an inevitably limited input of resources. " (Klein 1989: 64). The then health minister 
Enoch Powell (within the Macmillan government) also acknowledged that the NHS' 
capital stock had become run down due to a lack of modernisation since the war and 
there was no mechanism by which strategic priorities could be identified and 
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implemented. Enoch Powell's reflections and his proposed solution marked the 
beginning of administrative/structural reforms which in turn were the prelude to the 
managerial reforms of the 1980s (Mein 1989). 
1.1.2 Administrative Reform 
In 1974, an administrative arrangement was put in place whereby in England there 
were 14 Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) who were responsible for planning, 
finance and buildings. Below the RHA were smaller Area Health Authorities (AHAs). 
A separate agency, the Family Practitioner Committee (FPC) was set up to manage the 
4 branches of primary care: general practice, dentistry, pharmacy and optometry. The 
arrangements in Scotland were slightly different. The regional functions (eg building 
division, ambulance and blood transfusion services) were performed by the Common 
Services Agency (CSA), District Health Authorities (DHAs) were known as Health 
Boards (HBs) and there was no separate FPC. Responsibility for primary care was 
contained within the HB ren-k. A new formula for allocating funding was then 
developed in 1976 and funding targets were set based on demographic data. This 
structure was altered in 1982 under the Thatcher government. AHAs were abolished 
and 190 DHAs were set up under the existing RHAs. A review system was also 
implemented and authority was delegated from the AHA level to individual hospital 
managers. In other words, a degree of decentralisation was introduced in order to 
enable the 1974 structure to function more effectively (see figures 1.1 and 1.2). 
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1.1.3 Managerial Reform 
Subsequent changes during the remainder of the 1980s were, however, markedly 
different. Whilst earlier reforms had addressed administrative systems, a change of 
ethos in favour of general management occurred in 1984 (Pettigrew, Ferlie, and 
McKee 1994) such that by the end of 1985, general managers began to appear in the 
hospitals, challenging former management systems controlled by health professionals. 
This policy change was not only to affect structural change "but more ambitiously it 
was to change roles, 'ways of doing things', create a new cadre of 'leaders' who could 
energise decision making and even produce 'a new culture'. " (ibid. pp3l-32). At the 
same time, a Government level Supervisory Board and Management Board (known as 
the National Health Service Management Executive (NHSME)) was installed to 
enhance the co-ordination and central leadership of the NHS. Between 198*5 and 
1989, the use of performance indicators and management budgets for clinicians were 
implemented, and the management mode moved from (clinical) consensus management 
to (managerial) hierarchical control. 
Despite the administrative reforms of the 1970s and the managerial reforms of the 
1980s, demands for increased NHS resources continued. By the mid 1980s, it was 
clear that the NHS was still proving to be 'excessively' resource intensive. 
1.2 Health Care Reform -The Politicians'Economic Dilemma 
The creation of a market for health care was a direct and explicit response to the 
government's continued need to limit the amount of government spending on health. 
The Government stated in its white paper for the market that: 
"Throughout the 1980s the Government has ... presided over a massive 
expansion of the NHS. It has ensured that the quality of care provided and the 
response to emergencies remain among the best in the world. But it has 
become increasingly clear that more needs to be done because of rising demand 
and an ever-widening range of treatments made possible by advances in medical 
technology. It has also increasingly been recognised that simply injecting more 
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and more money is not, by itself, the answer. " (Department of Health 1989b: 2 
para. 1.4) 
Although the reforms stemmed from an NHS review instigated in 1987 by the then 
Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher, this chapter discusses two initiatives to examine NHS 
structures which occurred in parallel and which formed the basis of "Workingfor 
Patients `9. One initiative was co-ordinated by the Office of Health Economics 
(OBE)'. who established a 'think tank' to begin developing ideas about NHS reforms. 
Around the same time, Professor Alain Enthoven an American Sociologist 2, was invited 
by Gordon McLachlan, Secretary of the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, to review 
the management and organisation of the NHS. 
1.21 The OHE 'Think Tank' 
Prior to Mrs Thatcher's review, the OHE had recognised the need for NHS reform and 
3 
so brought together representatives from the pharmaceutical industry, the Kings Fund , 
the Department of Social Security and a number of Universities, to discuss the 
economic problems facing the NHS and to consider possible solutions. Two 
particular meetings served as the forum for developing the market ideas. At the first 
meeting in 1984, the group took its direction and focus from Lord Vaizey (the 
Principal of St. Catherine's Foundation) who had said, 
"... it is not too soon to be looking at how Britain's National Health Service 
should be developed to cater for the situation which can be expected in the 
1990S 
... 
An NHS conceived to deal with the medical and social problems 
which existed in the 1930s and the 1940s cannot be expected to cater for the 
problems of the 1990s. " (quoted in (Teeling Smith 1984a: 3)). 
' An autonomous organisation set up in 1962. 
2 Enthoven is professor of public and private management at the Graduate School of Business, 
Stanford University. 
3 The King's Fund is an independent charity which undertakes health policy research and analysis 
and which promotes good practice in health and social care. It is based in, and focuses its work on, 
London. 
II 
The group, chaired by George Teeling Smith (Director of the OBE), identified seven 
crucial problems with the 1946 
NHS Act (see Box 1.1) which 
they felt they needed to address 
although they recognised their 
options were restricted. Private 
and insurance based systems of 
payment would undoubtedly be 
rejected so "... if neither private 
enterprise market-oriented 
health care nor insurance-based 
Box 1.1: Problems with the 1946 NHS Act 
" The NHS was planned to deal with acute disease 
like Tuberculosis and other infectious diseases 
which prevailed at the time. 
" The NHS was to be primarily hospital based. 
" It was a development of the earlier 'poor law' or 
'panel' health insurance schemes. 
" It was planned to be acceptable to a relatively non- 
affluent society. 
" It was assumed the NHS health care priorities 
would be self selecting. 
" It was based on relatively low technology medicine 
in the 1930s. 
It assumed professional dedication to the cause of 
caring for the sick. (Teeling Smith, 1984) 
pre-paid systems could solve the problems of the NHS, it is clearly time to examine 
other avenues. " (ibid. p. 5) 
Whilst acknowledging some need for additional NHS funding, the group sought to 
consider "new economic principles in relation to its organisation" and "to stimulate 
economic experiments within Britain to test some of the new approaches which 
economists and others have recently suggested to try and tackle the urgent problems of 
the National Health Service" (Teeling Smith 1986c: 3). Previous administrative 
reforms had, in Teeling Smith's view, failed to improve efficiency so three new 
approaches were proposed: - 
1. greater efficiency 
better allocation of resources 
3. possibility of attracting alternative sources of funds for health care 
To this end, group members brought various ideas to the meeting and in his account of 
the discussions, Teeling Smith drew attention to two in particular which the group had 
favoured. The first was that competition might be injected into the system: 
"Competition versus control 
A great deal of discussion centred on the role of competition in improving the 
quality and efficiency within the NHS. Although competitive sources of 
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funding (ie multiple insurance funds) were agreed to be irrelevant, this was by 
no means the case in respect of a multiplicity of providers ... If some form of 
effective competition could be introduced between different parts of the Health 
Service it could introduce the best features of a market system... " (p34) 
The second idea was that the role of general practitioners be augmented particularly by 
way of budget holding: 
"Developments in general practice 
The most important and interesting part of the discussion dealt with the future 
role of the General Practitioner ... For the future, it was predicted that General 
Practice would become even more important ... However, there will need to 
be 
changes if General Practitioners are to exploit to the full their potential role in 
improving the quality of care in Britain. First, it was emphasised that the 
General Practitioners' contract must be made more meaningful. At present it 
was largely a description of how they should be paid; it devoted too little 
attention to what their objectives should be. In connection with their contract, 
there was some suggestion that General Practitioners should in future be 
salaried employees of the NHS ... 
7he General Practitioner as a 'budget holder' 
Within the discussions on general practice another speculative and fascinating 
idea emerged. This was that the GP should in a very real sense become a 
'Budget Holder' for the whole of the health service. That is, funds for health 
care should be channelled through the General Practitioner instead of being 
distributed downwards from the DHSS, through Regional and District 
Authorities... " (Teeling Smith 1984b: 34-36) 
The importance of general practice was further reflected in the fact that the second of 
the OHE meetings (in October 1985) concentrated specifically on general practice. 
The groups' membership altered to suit the emphasis on general practice and included 
members of the Royal College of General Practitioners and the Department of Health 
and Social Security, practising GPs, university academics and journal editors. Their 
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discussions ranged from the role of primary health care teams, health promotion and 
GPs as rnicro-epidemiologists to the future of training in general practice and the 
nature of illness. Crucially though, it was at this meeting that Alan Maynard proposed 
the idea of budget holding GPs (Maynard 1986; Teeling Smith 1986a). 
Maynard suggested that general practitioners should become the 'budget holders' for 
the NHS on the basis that: 
CC .. when a general practitioner sent a patient to hospital, the practitioner would 
at the same time be allocating part of his budget to cover the cost of the 
hospital treatment ... the more efficient hospital departments would attract 
extra patients, and, at the same time, extra funds. Less efficient units would 
attract fewer patients and would decline and eventually be closed. There would 
still need to be some central overall control to ensure a fair geographical 
distribution of resources, but within a much looser central planning system 
market forces would again stimulate efficiency and improve the quality of care 
... 
" (Teeling Smith 1984a: 13-14) 
Maynard also proposed that GPs be encouraged to compete with one another and that 
additional income be used to "'buy-in' hospital and other services as needed. Such 
services could be bought in from the private or the public sector whichever is 
cheapest. " (Maynard 1986). Maynard also believed that there would be sufficient 
incentives to ensure that GPs would manage resources efficiently. For example, 
careless use of drugs, diagnostic tests or hospital care would impose direct opportunity 
costs on the GP by reducing the resources available for alternative uses. 
1.22 Alain Enthoven's Reflections on the NHS 
That some form of health care purchaser be created was also the conclusion reached by 
Alain Enthoven following his review of the NHS. Rather than GP budget holding, 
however, he recommended large district purchasers based on the American Health 
Maintenance Organisation (HMO) model (Enthoven 1985) . 
HMOs cater for a 
population of around 500,000 patients providing them with a comprehensive fist of 
medical services on a per capita basis. HMOs prosper by keeping their patients 
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healthy and satisfied and if any patients are dissatisfied, they can move to an alternative 
HMO (Newman 1995). Enthoven proposed that the DHAs operate in the same way as 
BMOs,, receiving a per capita allocation of resources. They would then be free to 
provide or to purchase the care for their population from other (public or private) 
organisations and more efficient districts could sell services to less efficient districts. 
He believed that the market would mean "... managers would be able to use resources 
more effectively; they could buy services from producers who offered good value and 
use the possibility of buying outside as bargaining leverage to get better performance 
from their own providers" (Hudson 1994). (Chapters 2 and 3 discuss fundholding 
and HA/UB purchasing in more detail. ) 
1.2.3 Improving NHS Efficiency - The Introduction of Market Forces 
Both the OBE and Enthoven's recommendations included the introduction of market 
forces in order to improve NHS efficiency and to do so, as Glennerster later pointed 
out, within a spending limit (Glennerster 1995), 
The UK health reforms were not concerned with halting the rise in health 
costs. Cost control had already been achieved. Rather, the reforms were 
aimed at coping with the consequences of imposing limits to the growth in 
health spending. " 
Teeling-Smith was all too aware of the social context of the NHS and the likely 
opposition to market forces. He considered that market solutions were unpopular 
because they were seen on the one hand as a challenge to the independence of the 
medical profession and on the other as a threat to the integrity of the National Health 
Service (Teeling Smith 1986b) As the following excerpt demonstrates, after 
discussion, a specific type of market was regarded as the optimal solution-- 
"It has often been pointed out that there are in principle only two ways of 
allocating resources. One is through the market, where people buy what they 
want provided they can afford it. The other is through a bureaucracy, in which 
resources are allocated centrally, usually in the belief that in that way they will 
be more equitably distributed. 
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Unfortunately, it seems to be inevitable that any large bureaucracy should 
contain pockets of inefficiency. Things are done according to the rule book 
rather than according to common sense: outdated practices continue because 
no one has the entrepreneurial initiative to challenge them: and without local 
ways of measuring efficiency and performance personnel may sometimes be 
poorly motivated to do what is best for the organisation as a whole. 
On the other hand, the market mechanism on its own is wholly inappropriate 
for the allocation of health care resources. Those most in need are usually 
those least able to pay for treatment or care. For this reason, almost all of the 
advanced countries in the world have comprehensive pre-payment schemes for 
the provision of health services. The British National Health Service is just one 
variant of the schemes which exist in other countries. 
It has recently been suggested that the conflict between the unfairness of a 
market system for purchasing health care and the inefficiency of a 
bureaucratic system of central allocation can be resolved. The proposed 
solution has been referred to as an internal market within the National Health 
Service. " (ibid. p12) 
LZ4 A Marketfor Health Care 
It was not long before the proposed internal market solution was adopted. In 1989, the 
government published its proposals for the internal market (Department of Health 
1989b) in which it created a purchaser-provider split, introduced purchasing agents 
and established independent hospital trusts. 
Key features of the market were: - 
9 NHS hospitals could volunteer to become independent of the Health 
Authority, and to adopt Trust Status. In so doing, Trusts became directly 
accountable to the NHSME. 
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DFLAs and HBs were to focus on purchasing, from the public or private 
sector, the services needed for their patient population and ceased to have 
responsibility for managing those NHS hospitals which became TruStS4. 
General Practitioners could volunteer to become budget-holders and 
purchase a limited range of secondary care services for their patients. 
The reforms introduced both types of purchasing agent proposed by the OHE and by 
Enthoven: GP budget holders and large district purchasers. The adoption of the 
former wasl however, something of a last minute decision since the fundholding model 
proposed by Maynard had been unpopular with the government (Glennerster et al. 
1994). 
Having created a split between providers and purchasers of health care, an annual 
contracting system was developed as the vehicle by which GP fundholders (GPFHs) 
and HAs would purchase care from NHS or private sector providers (see Figures 1.3 
and 1.4). The contracting mechanism is discussed fully in Chapters 2 and 3. 
I Figure 1.3 The NHS Market Structure in England., 
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The introduction of fundholding heralded the beginning of a purchasing role for GPs 
which was to serve as one of the most fundamental changes ever to the 'business' of 
4 Hospitals converted to Trust status over a period of time. In the meantime, non-Trust status 
providers were known as DMUs (Directly Managed Units). 
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general practice (Bevan and Marinker 1989; Duggan 1995; Meads 1996b). The 
scheme offered GPs the opportunity to have a greater say in the treatment of their 
patients and the costs and conditions of primary and secondary care services. 
Practices who could demonstrate to their HA MB that they were able to manage a 
budget and who had at least 11,000 patients5, were invited to apply for fundholding 
status-. The scheme offered practices decision making authority over a range of 
expenditures relating to staff costs, prescribing, investigative procedures, elective 
procedures and certain community services (see Box 1.2 for details). Having decided 
on their purchasing priorities, practices would then negotiate contracts with providers 
(see box 1.3 for contract types). 
Box 1.2: The Scope of the Fundholding Budget] [Box 1.3: Fundholding Contract Types 
" "all practice team staff costs and practice 
accommodation costs... 
" all expenses incurred during management 
of the fund and other costs associated with 
participation in the fundholding initiative 
" all drugs prescribed and dispensed 
" any diagnostic investigation of patients or 
specimens ordered or performed by the 
GP... 
" initial and continuing out-patient services 
delivered by hospital-based staff 
" costs relating to a defined group of surgical 
in-patient and day-case treatment - the list 
covers most elective procedures 
... Emergency admissions and medical 
admissions are excluded 
" costs relating to direct access services - 
physiotherapy, speech therapy and 
occupational therapy, dietetics and 
chiropody 
" health visiting and community nursing, 
elements of mental health and learning 
disabilities services. " 
(Pirie 1994) 
1. "Block contracts will cover the provision of a 
defined block of services in return for an 
annual fee 
2. Cost and volume contracts - providers will 
receive a defined sum for the provision of a 
baseline level of activity. Beyond that level, 
payment will be on a cost per case basis 
3. Limited volume contracts - payment for a 
defined volume of cases 
4. Cost per case contracts will be payments on 
the basis of a sum for each case treated. " 
(Pirie 1994) 
In financial terms, the average annual 
budget in 1994/95 (in England and Wales) 
was L1.7mil (or E160 per patient for around 
10,600 patients) (Audit Commission 1995). 
Hospital and community services accounted 
for approximately 55% (L940,000) of the 
5 The entry level was amended incrementally from the original minimum list size of 11,000 to 9,000 
(April 1992), then 7,000 (April 1993) to 4,000 (April 1995). 
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budget whilst the remaining 45% was split between prescribing (38%/L660,000) and 
practice staff (7%/f 115 000)6 . This equates to a sizeable amount of public finance. 
For example, in 1996 there were 2,221 fundholders in England and Wales wholl if the 
average of 11.7mil per practice is assumed, controlled in excess of 13775mil. 
GPs as Dtivers q Efficiency 
One important assumption underpinning the reforms was that GPs would respond to 
the opportunity to have some control over the costs of hospital treatment (Department 
of Health 1989b: 51) and would "negotiate the best deals they can" (Department of 
Health 1989b: 52). Mthough HAMB purchasing represents the majority 70%-75% of 
NHS purchases (Burnett 1994) GPs had a significant contribution to make to service 
improvements and efficiency gains: 
"[GPs] will move money to where the work is best done, and will make 
maximum waiting times an important feature of contracts and management 
budgets. [Fundholders] 
... will seek to buy where waiting times are shortest, 
and hospitals will have a stronger incentive to reduce their waiting times in 
order to attract funds. " (ibid. p37) 
By building in the flexibility for practices to make savings from their deals, there was 
an added incentive for GPs. Savings could be reinvested in the practice to improve 
existing services, introduce new services and improve practice premises thereby 
creating competitive advantage over neighbouring practices. Attracting new patients 
increases the GPs' per capita income and thus the GPs individual wealth as a partner in 
the business. 
The benefits from an increase in the range of activities within primary care does not 
only favour the practice. More minor surgery, and specialist clinics etc within the 
primary care setting should mean concomitantly fewer in the more expensive 
6 Hospital and community services can be further broken down as follows: mental health and learning 
disabilities - 6%; diagnostic tests - 6%; direct access - 3%; outpatients - 40%; inpatients and day cases 
- 29%; and community nursing - 16% (Audit Commission 1995). 
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secondary care setting because, the direct costs to the health service are lowered' and 
because secondly, if GPs do more within the practice they can reduce the value of their 
secondary care contracts (this represents a transfer of resources from secondary to 
primary care). 
In summary, GP fundholders were to make an important contribution to Teeling 
Smith's aims of stimulating improved efficiencies and ensuring better allocation of 
resources by; 
e selecting the cheapest source of supply and switching contracts where 
appropriate, and 
* instigating the transfer of financial and staffing resources from secondary 
care settings into the primary care setting by investing practice savings in 
new service developments. 
1.4 Developing GPs as Purchasers and Providers 
Although fundholding heralded the GP purchasing role, there have been a number of 
related policy instruments which have further contributed to the changing general 
practice environment (see Box 1.4). Two of the policies are of particular relevance to 
this study: the 1990 contract and the extension of the GP purchasing role in 1994 
(NHS Executive 1994). 
1.4.1 The 1990 GP Contract 
In 1990 the government introduced its new GP contract. At the OHE meetings, Alan 
Maynard argued that it was unclear what GPs' contractual obligations were and that 
GPs could too easily interpret their remit (within the constraints of their existing 
HB/FPC contract) according to their own interests and the influence of the payment 
system (Maynard 1986). Consequently, some practices would offer, for example, 
hypertension and diabetes clinics but others would not. However, because practices 
were not allowed to advertise their services, patients could not make informed choices 
7 The assumption is that primary care provision is less costly than secondary care provision but 
questions have been raised as to whether this assumption does actually hold. For example, Corney 
(1994) raises questions about the efficiency of outreach clinics. 
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about which GP practice to register with. Maynard also felt that there were 
insufficient pressures on GPs to contain their costs and that they were not sufficiently 
accountable to their employers, the FPCMB. 
I Box 1.4: Changes in Primary Care 
The 1990 contract contained five 
key measures aimed at increasing 
accountability and improving the 
quality and quantity of information 
flowing from the practice to the 
FPCAFIB and the patient: - 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4 
5 
Giving patients 
better choice 
through issuing 
practice information 
and thereby 
stimulating 
1988 Griffiths review of community care - formalised the responsibility of GPs to inform the 
social services authority (SSA) about patients' 
community care needs. In turn, the SSA must 
confirm receipt of the GP referral and inform the 
GP of proposed action. The GP needed, therefore, 
to ensure a systematic way of identifying expected 
community care needs and to use practice resources 
most effectively. 
"Working for Patients" - introduced the market and 
the fundholding/commissioning roles for GPs. 
"Caring for People" (Department of Health 1989a) - 
focused on community care provision and 
acknowledged the central role of GPs in identifying 
health (and social) care needs and working with 
health and social work colleagues to ensure quality 
services are provided. 
The 1990 contract for GPs - greater financial 
incentives for specific services (eg, clinics, 
immunisation). 
1990 establishment of FHSAs (in England) which 
developed and monitored primary care. 
competition between GPs. 
Making the terms of service more specific to raise standards and reduce 
variability of service. 
Amending the Statement of Fees and Allowances (SFA) (commonly 
known as the Red Book) so that remuneration is linked to performance, 
thereby rewarding quality service providers. 
Strengthening the contractual relationship between the FPC (Health 
Board in Scotland) and the GP. 
Ensuring greater value for money in general medical services. 
Given that the market reforms aimed to encourage inter-practice competition, promote 
consumer (patient) choice, improve the efficiency of service provision and reallocate 
scarce resources, the 1990 contract was an important means for supporting these 
goals. These measures mainly addressed the role of the GP as a provider rather than 
as a purchaser, but in 1994, the purchasing role was to receive further policy attention. 
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1.4.2 Fundholding & Commissioning 
In 1994 the MEL8 "Developing NHS Purchasing and GP Fundholding Towards a 
Primary Care-led NHS" was issued. It marked an important step in augmenting the 
purchasing role of both fundholders and non-fundholders as fundholding was extended 
and BBs/HAs were instructed to embrace non-fundholders more fully in their 
commissioning9 activities. 
The extension to fundholding was as follows: - 
Community jundholding (known in Scotland as Primary Care Purchasing 
(PCP)) was introduced as a fundholding option for practices with a 
minimum of 3,000 patients. The scheme included a budget for staff, drugs, 
diagnostic tests and community health services, but excluded all hospital 
treatments. It was also seen as a first step for those not ready to take on 
standard fundholding. 
e Standard Fundholding was expanded to include almost all elective surgery 
and outpatient services and specialist nursing services. The limit was also 
reduced from a minimum of 7,000 to a minimum of 5,000 patients. 
9 Total purchasing pilots were also introduced. These were open to GPs 
(normally within a consortium) to purchase all hospital and community 
health services for their patients including accident and emergency (A&E) 
services. By forming a consortium they could spread financial risks. 
The involvement of non-fundholders in purchasing was also addressed. HAs/BBs 
were instructed to "continue their leading role in the development and implementation 
of a local health strategy, working in collaboration with GPs, NHS trusts, local 
agencies and local people ...... on the 
basis that "In many parts of the country, health 
authorities and GPs - fundholding and non-fundholding - are already working closely 
8 MELs (Management Executive Letters) are a means of formal communication from central NHS 
executives to HAs/HBs and Trusts. They are used to issue instructions for policy developments, policy 
implementation and other such guidelines. 
' Commissioning is a 'broader', more long term process than purchasing denotes. For a discussion of 
these concepts, see Chapter 2. 
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to ensure they meet the needs both of individual patients and of the local community. 
(NHS Executive 1994). 
These moves were considered by the government to be "important steps in the 
evolution to a primary care-led NHS. " (ibid. pl, emphasis added). The aim was for 
decisions about purchasing and providing health care "to be taken as close to the 
patient as possible ... More decision making on patient care will be placed in the hands 
of GPs, both through the extension of fundholding and through a stronger partnership 
between all GPs and health authorities. " (ibid. p3) 
1.4.3 A Pýimary Care-Led NHS 
The 1994 MEL also made use of the term primary care-led, a fact which should not be 
over-looked, as it relates very much to the need for a good primary care foundation 
and it takes the role of the GP beyond that of simply a gatekeeper. As Peter 
Littlejohns (1996) noted, 
"Good quality primary care is being recognised throughout the world as the 
basis of a cost-effective health service. In the UK this approach has been 
adopted by the government with the emphasis on the National Health Service 
becoming a 'primary care-led service'. Rather than being considered merely a 
gatekeeper to expensive secondary care, the provision of health care by general 
practitioners, nurses and others is now recognised in its own right. 
Furthermore as general practitioners become more involved in the 
commissioning and purchasing of secondary care, the balance of management 
of the health service is shifting away from hospital based consultants and 
general managers to general practitioners. " (p 1) 
This vision of cost-effective care within a well supported primary care service fits with 
a broader World Health Organisation (WHO) declaration agreed by the UK 
government and all other WHO member countries at an International Conference of 
Primary Health Care in 1978. The declaration, known as the Alma-Ata declaration, 
states that primary care should be "universally available" and that it is the "first level of 
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contact of individuals, the family and community with the national health system. " 
(Faculty of Community Medicine 1986). 
The declaration includes an overall goal of 'Health for All by the Year 2000"0 and lists 
thirty-eight wide-ranging targets for its achievement". Three of these targets related 
specifically to primary care and endorsed the importance of primary care providers as 
co-6rdinators of services. 
In real terms, the notion of a primary care-led service implies a different locus for 
decision making, a locus where there is a convergence of clinical referral powers, 
financial controls and service planning (Littlejohns and Victor 1996) although not 
necessarily strategic planning (Meads 1996a). It also implies a close relationship with 
public health and other members of the HA with GPs as key decision makers (Meads 
1996b). 
However, although this notion is compatible with the Alma Ata declaration and with 
fundholding/commissioning policies, a primary care-led service could end up being the 
"sleeping beauty of health policy" (Bosanquet 1995). Bosanquet argued that advances 
in technology which offer the opportunity to reduce bureaucracy and provide more 
information and diagnosis close to the patient could change a primary care-led service 
from being a "weak aspiration" to being a "core concept". However, a long term 
strategy which addressed investment in technology, research and development, skills 
and team development in primary care was essential for this to occur. 
The language of a 'primary care-led' service did not remain in policy documentation for 
very long 12 but the general philosophy of the centrality of GPs as purchasers, priority 
setters, decision makers and a body of practitioners who ought to be involved in 
strategic decisions and service planning has been reflected to varying degrees in 
WHO Regional Office for Europe, 1985 Targetsfor Health for All 2000; Copenhagen. 
Targets addressed specific illnesses (such as poliomyelitis and cancer), mortality rates, policy, 
educational programmes and environmental hazards. 
12 In 1996 reference was made to a primary care-centred rather than primary care-led NHS (The 
Scottish Office 1996). This was symbolic of an emphasis on primary care as co-ordinators rather than 
as leaders and was partly a counter to interpretations of primary care-led meaning GP-led. 
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ongoing NHS policy developments (The Department of Health 1997; The Scottish 
Office Department of Health 1997). 
1.5 Post-Market Policy - From Competition to Collaboration 
As was stated in the introduction to this thesis, during this study, there was a change of 
government, one consequence of which was the disbanding of the NHS market. Under 
the new policy, GPs continue to play a role in shaping future NHS services and 
stimulating efficient, cost-effective, quality care. The mechanism for their doing so 
has, however, changed. Efforts were made during the fieldwork to gauge what 
implications there might be for the non-market role of GPs in light of their behaviour 
as purchasers. This section outlines the new role of GPs within the non-market 
structure in order to contextualise the research findings (Chapters 6-8), discu'ssions 
(Chapter 9) and conclusions (Chapter 10). 
1.5.1 "Designed to Care" 
In 1997, the Labour Government published its white papers (The Department of 
Health 1997; The Scottish Office Department of Health 1997) on the way forward for 
the NHS which included as a central tenet, the removal of the market and the creation 
of a "third way ... 
based on partnership and driven by performance. " (The Department 
of Health 1997: 10) Although policies for Scotland and England differ, the common 
principles are: 
* the separation of planning and hospital care provision 
e the retention of NHS trust status; 
* the abandonment of GP fundholding in favour of locality-based co-operative 
groups; 
new co-ordinated planning processes at Trust and HAMB levels; and 
national bodies to evaluate new technologies and measure performance 
Although the financial pressures facing the government of the late 1980s have not 
relented (both the Scottish and the English white papers stress the need for efficiency, 
performance measurement, cost-effectiveness and quality) the mechanism for achieving 
these ends has now changed. Rather than stimulating competition between providers 
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and between purchasers, the emphasis is on collaboration and partnerships at all levels 
of the system. Acute hospitals will not compete with one another, instead, GPs will 
refer patients on the basis of geographical locality. 
1.5.2 Pýimary Care Trusts & Local Health Care Co-operatives 
Of particular relevance to this study are the new arrangements for general practice, 
especially changes to their purchasing role. In Scotland a new type of NHS Trust has 
been established, the Primary Care Trust (PCT). PCTs are responsible for primary, 
community and mental health services within the geographical boundary of their 
individual Health Board. Within the PCT are primary care collectives known as Local 
Health Care Co-operatives (LHCCs). These groups are locality-based, and have 
responsibilities for service design and service commissioning: 
"The funding of primary care under PCTs reflects the move away from the 
individual practice model towards a collective arrangement managed through 
the Local Health Care Co-operatives. Co-operatives will have the fight to hold 
a budget for primary and community health services if they wish ... The 
fundholding management allowance will be re-directed to support the work of 
the new Co-operatives, which will require access to specialist expertise 
providing a range of skills and support across the practices. These 
arrangements are designed to empower all GPs, working collectively, to ensure 
that they have flexibility to invest in services which optimise the health gain to 
their local communities. " (The Scottish Office Department of Health 1997) 
GPS, who will become employed by the Trusts rather than having a contract with the 
HB, will have the option to hold a budget within their LHCC for primary and 
community services and prescribing (ie those services covered by the PCP scheme). 
(A summary of LHCC objectives is given in Box 1.5) This differs from the English 
model, however, where GP groups (known as Primary Care Groups) can have financial 
control over the full range of hospital services previously covered under the total 
fundholding scheme. There are a range of options available to PCGs. At a minimum 
they can act as advisors to the Health Authority when conu-nissioning care. 
Alternatively, they can take devolved responsibility for managing the budget for their 
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area,, can become free-standing, accountable bodies and conu-nission care, or 
ultimately, they can become free-standing bodies responsible for the provision of 
community health services and commissioning of care for their population (The 
Department of Health 1997). (See Figure 1.5 below for the new structure). 
Box 1.5: LHCC Objectives 
" provide services to their patients within an identified level of 
resources, including expenditure on prescribing; 
" work with the support of public health medicine to develop 
plans which reflect the clinical priorities for the area, whilst 
taking into account specific health needs of the registered 
patient population covered by the Co-operative; 
" support the development of population-wide approaches to 
health improvement and disease prevention which require 
lifestyle and behavioural. change; 
" improve the quality and standards of clinical care within 
practices and to support clinical and professional development 
through education, training, research and audit; and 
" support the development of extended primary care teams 
which are forined around the practice structure, and promote 
the development of clinical expertise and the emergence of 
specialisms within primary care. 
I Source: The Scottish office Department of Health 1997 
In many respects the 
policy fits well with the 
4vision' set out by 
Littlejohns and Victor 
(1996) and by Meads 
(1996b). There is 
provision for IT 
investment, locally based 
service design and some 
financial control. 
However7 there are 
substantial limits to this financial control in Scotland. 
1.5.3 The Pfimary-Secondary 
Interface 
Figure 1.5: The Collaborative Structure in Scotland] 
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Taking the HIP as a strategic framework, NHS Trusts then prepare Trust 
Implementation Plans (TIPs). TIPs must be consistent with the 1-Up and should set 
out the means by which services will be delivered to the local population. The primary 
vehicle for service design and development is the Joint Investment Fund (JIF). Each 
health board will have a JIF, the spend of which will be guided by the HIP, TIPs and 
collaborations between primary and secondary care with PCTs taking the lead in 
discussions. 
These changes represent a new set of relationships between general practices and 
between practices and trusts. The discussions in Chapters 9 and 10 reflect on the 
market and non-market structures in light of the data considered in Chapters 6-8. 
1.6 Summary 
This chapter has explained the progression of ideas underpinning the NHS market and 
has emphasised the importance of GP fundholding, and latterly GP involvement in 
commissioning, as mechanisms for stimulating efficiencies in the NHS. It is clear from 
the account of the theoretical development of the market that improving efficiency was 
a central tenet of the reforms and has been so throughout the history of the NHS. The 
1990 market reforms, the most radical to date, placed GPs in a position of considerable 
influence over large sums of NHS resource and expected them to negotiate low-price 
deals with providers, to move contracts in order to obtain these lower prices and 
thereby to stimulate competition in the marketplace. 
As Chapter 2 now goes on to discuss, the creation of a market within a nationaL social 
service has created many analytical and pragmatic challenges for academics and 
practitioners. Understanding the structures and behaviours within the market are 
important not only for the UK but for continuing market and non-market policy here 
and abroad where market-based solutions have also been adopted. Chapter 2 
discusses central structural and process issues relating to competition, and more 
specifically to the purchasing mechanism, which have arisen in the course of 
implementing the market during the 1990s. 
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unapter 2 
Purchasing Issues in the NHS Market 
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Introduction 
Establishing a market within the NHS led to a wide range of debates of concern to 
academics and health service practitioners. The relative merits of alternative 
purchasing models, the nature of, and scope for, competition and the relative abilities 
of GPs and HAs/HBs to become effective purchasers were key issues tackled within 
the disciplines of health services research, social policy, economics, management, 
finance and accounting. 
Chapter 2 discusses key issues of NHS market structure dealt with in the literature 
during the 1990s. It highlights the broader importance of these issues by reflecting on 
selected international market-based reforms and recognises the social context of the 
reforms by considering ethical concerns regarding the market system and the response 
to the market by the medical profession. The chapter also explains the nature and 
scope of purchasing and commissioning, clarifying distinctions between the two 
concepts. 
21 Implementing Reform 
Gaining an understanding of the market structure and inter-organisational relations 
offers challenges at a macro level whereas the detail of the impact of financial 
incentives on doctors, including the ethical dilemmas these may pose, has provided 
micro-level analytical challenges. These challenges are not unique, however, to the 
UK. Market-based health service reforms have been implemented on an international 
scale although as the following section discusses, systems vary in terms of financing 
and the degree of competition. 
21.1 International Health Service Reform 
It is worth noting similar patterns of health service organisation and finance that have 
occurred elsewhere and which can therefore benefit Ifrom 
the lessons learned in the 
UK. The differences between alternative systems can be considered in terms of the 
amount of supply-side and demand-side competition. Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, 
for example, have, like the UK, introduced an element of provider (supply-side) 
competition. County councils in Sweden and municipalities in Finland have become 
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the purchasers who buy from competing providers. Demand-side competition is 
lirnited, however, unlike in the US where HMOs compete for customers and then 
purchase health services (through insurance premiums). 
Donaldson and Mooney (1997) have positioned a number of countries in terms of the 
degree of competition between providers and competition between insurers (see Figure 
1.6-below). Some countries have injected an element of competition into the financing 
of health care. For example, New Zealand, who concentrated mainly on provider 
competition, also permitted people to opt out of regional health authority cover to a 
private sector Health Care plan. This is the main way in which the New Zealand 
reforms differ from those in the UK and puts it in quadrant 1. 
Figure 1.6. - Reforms in Financing and Provision 
Source: Donaldson andMoone 1997 Y 
FINANCE 
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The Netherlands have 
traditionally financed health 
care through private insurers 
but have recently proposed that 
purchasers seek out sources of 
supply in the public, private and 
voluntary sector on the basis of 
cost and quality. 
Provider competition is also 
characteristic of the Leningrad 
system in which hospital budgets were transferred to polyclinics (the main providers of 
primary care). Polyclinics also conduct some specialist out-patient investigations, 
treatment and rehabilitation. When polyclinics had a separate budget, there was an 
incentive for them to refer patients to hospital but the budgetary reforms removed that 
incentive. 
The UK reforms have, therefore, paralleled international health service reforms which 
can be characterised by the degree of supply-side and/or demand-side competition. 
The scale and pace of change, however, varies across these countries and Bevan and 
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Marinker (1989) have noted that, Cc even against this background, the scale and pace of 
change in the UK stands out ...... 
21.2 Health Service Reform in the UK 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that there are market issues on both the 
demand-side and the supply-side of the market, both of which may exhibit lessons for 
systems elsewhere. This chapter reviews the literature on key issues related to the 
demand-side of the market and is centred around the following: 
the purchasing function; 
flandholding leverage, purchasing information, skills and equity; 
the nature of competition; and 
the transactions costs of the market system. 
2.2 Competition and Contestability in the UK Market 
The UK market was never intended to be subject to free market competition in the 
sense that classical market models depict but, as the previous chapter explained, there 
was a belief that a measure of competition was needed in order to improve service 
efficiencies, responsiveness and quality (Teeling Smith 1986). The expectation was 
that purchasers would "act as the engine to drive the reforms and use their purchasing 
power to bring about improvements in both health and health services" (Ham and 
Maynard 1994), and that NHS trusts would compete for their custom. The challenge, 
however, was to allow a degree of competition through purchasing activities, but at 
the same time to safeguard the fundamental philosophy of free health care for all at the 
point of use'. Considerable emphasis had to be placed, therefore, on correctly 
managing the market and ministers needed to find a balance between intervening too 
much in the market (the risk of which would be to weaken the incentives for providers 
to cut costs and raise standards) and not intervening at all (which might mean the 
bankruptcy of some Trusts) (Ham 1994a; Ham and Maynard 1994). 
' This was one of the founding principles of the NHS which the 1980s Conservative government 
committed themselves to maintain. 
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Ham and Maynard have pointed out that "The purpose of the present NHS reforms is 
to introduce a managed market; developing some of the incentives for greater 
efficiency that are often found in markets while still being able to regulate proceedings 
to prevent market failures. " Elsewhere Ham (1994a) stated that the "underlying 
rationale for market management is that competition may run counter to the principles 
and values of a publicly funded healthcare system. Safeguards are therefore needed to 
protect the principles on which the NHS is based and to prevent behaviour which is 
an i-competitive. " In order to achieve this balance, Ham and Maynard proposed eight 
core elements for managing the market (see Box 2.1) 
That any market might be able to enjoy the 
benefits and not the disadvantages of 
competition was, however, regarded by 
Hunter (1995) as being unrealistic: 
"Managed competition's appeal lies in the 
promise it holds of perfect convergence 
between a managed system of healthcare 
on the one hand, but one that is not 
sheltered from the salutary discipline of 
competition on the other. This is known 
as having your cake and eating it. " 
Box 2.1: Core Elements for Management oj 
[ 
th e NHS Marke t 
" Openness of information 
" Control of labour and capital markets 
" Regulation of mergers and take-overs 
" Arbitrating in disputes 
" Protection of non-profit making functions 
" Overseeing provision of health services 
" Protection of basic principles of the NHS 
" Dealing with closures and redundancies 
Source: Ham and Maynard, 1994 
The need to carefully manage competition, and the difficulties envisaged in allowing 
competitive forces to prevail, led Chris Ham to question whether the exercise of 
competition was in fact important or whether "it is the psychology of competition that 
matters more". Ham advocated the notion of a contestable market2 where "it is the 
threat of contracts being moved that stimulates providers to respond to the demands of 
purchasers rather than the reality of moving contracts. " There are clear advantages to 
this philosophy. Firstly, it allows parties to work together over the longer term rather 
than working on a short-term/annual basis. This reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy 
' The notion of contestability was developed by Robert Willig and William Baumol (Baumol, Panzar, 
and Willig 1982). 
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for any one provider, a particularly important criteria given that in some rural areas 
there is only one hospital. This in turn avoids the high entry and exit costs associated 
with the health care market each of which are borne by the taxpayer. Secondly, the 
efficiency gains that result from competitive tendering may not outweigh the 
transactions costs involved in the process. Ham supported this view by drawing on 
experience elsewhere and proposed that "Evidence from several industries illustrates 
that- the most effective relationships are those where purchasers and providers work 
together in long-term, collaborative arrangements rather than relationships in which 
purchasers seek continual short-term gains by switching contracts between providers" 
(Ham 1994a). Contestability is based on purchasers and providers recognising areas 
where they have a shared interest and collaborating to pursue this interest (Ham 
1994a) and emphasises partnerships rather than costly monitoring systems associated 
with contracting relationships. 
Nevertheless, it is important that there are credible threats and perhaps occasional 
switching to alternative providers. There also needs to be a structure to facilitate this 
behaviour. In other words, there need to be alternative sources of supply and multiple 
purchasers. It also presupposes that GPs will respond to economic incentives. As 
Hunter observed, "managed competition forces providers into a way of behaving in 
which it is assumed that economic incentives dominate all others". This dominance of 
economic incentives, whilst disputed to a degree by Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) was 
quite clearly presented in Maynard's original design of the fundholding model (see 
Chapter 1). As Chapters 4 and 6 of this thesis discuss, these economic incentives 
prove to have been over-emphasised in relation to non-economic incentives. 
ZZI Supply Side Competition 
That there will be alternative sources of supply within the marketplace cannot be 
assumed because as Propper (1993) notes, in certain areas, there may be insufficient 
population to support more than one hospital, either because there are economies of 
scale in hospital production or because patients are unwilling to travel for treatment. " 
in Scotland, for example, there are areas such as the flighlands and Islands, which are 
served by only one major hospital. Accessing an alternative provider would involve 
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travelling considerable distances. In contrast, other areas (such as Glasgow) are in a 
position to choose from a number of public and private sector providers. 
ZZ2 Competition between Purchasers 
As well as supply side competition, there needs to be competition on the purchasing 
side. Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) point out that if the purchaser is large, whilst it 
may -be- able to exercise some power to offset the powers of large suppliers, the danger 
is that the authority will be too large to be sufficiently sensitive to health needs. 
Furthermore, if it has a monopoly position (monopsony) and exploits that position, 
patients may suffer because in the long run the provider may become demoralised, 
poorly motivated and ultimately go out of business (op cit. ). Another disadvantage of 
a single large purchaser and provider is that the relationship between the two may 
become "too intimate" (ibid. ) which would cause difficulties in the bargaining process. 
In effect, there would be decentralised budgets and a management contract between 
the two parties but no real competition on either side. 
As far as fundholding is concerned, the expectation was that practices would compete 
to improve patient service and would do so partly through the deals they made with 
providers (Department of Health 1989). There was an implicit assumption that 
fundholding would be taken up in sufficient numbers and that there would be multiple 
GP purchasers in any one HAMB area. As the Scottish statistics in Appendix I show, 
however, the uptake of fundholding differed across the country, 3 and two health 
boards had no fundholders at all. 
2.3 Fundholders - Purchasing Power, Information, Skills and Ethics 
It is not only important that purchasing organisations exist, but that they have, and are 
motivated to exercise, a sufficient degree of buyer power, that they possess adequate 
purchasing information and that they acquire the requisite purchasing skills. There was 
concern, however, that GPs were weak in terms of buyer power 
4 and lacked 
purchasing skills and information. 
This was also the case in England - See Appendix 1. 
See Chapter 3 for detailed discussion of buyer power. 
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23.1 Purchasing Power 
Glennerster (1994) suggested that GPFHs were more suitable purchasers than HAs. 
(His argument is discussed in detail in the next chapter so is only summarised here). 
Glennerster suggested that GPs have better information about the needs and 
preferences of their patients, and can form opinions about service quality because they 
see -patients after discharge from hospital. If care provided to patients is slow or 
inefficient, GPs suffer because visits to the GP wiH rise, draining resources, energy and 
time. There is,, therefore, an incentive for them to seek more efficient hospital 
services. They can take marginal decisions to buy or not to buy services which signal 
to the provider a dissatisfaction with quality and thus there are no inhibitions on 
exercising powers of exit. However, whilst the model is favourable in terms of 
information and incentives, it is weaker in terms of the overall contribution fundholders 
might make. Relative to HAs/HBs, GPFHs purchase only a small (25%-30%) 
proportion of overall health services so providers may see little reason to be sensitive 
to GPFHs compared with HAs/HBs. GPFHs may have very few (if any) alternative 
sources of provision and are therefore reliant on the provider. Limited information 
about prices and costs with which to bargain, and the limited ability of GPs to conduct 
secondary care activities themselves (ie vertical integration) further restrict their power 
as buyers rendering them rather weak. 
23.2 Purchasing Information 
The availability of information upon which to base purchasing decisions is central to 
the economic model and to the exercise of buyer power. Propper (1993) considers 
that GPFHs have more discretion about how and when their patients are treated than 
HAMB purchasers, that they have better access to patient and hospital service 
information' and that they will incur lower costs than HAsAFiBs when gathering this 
information. This renders them more efficient purchasers than HAs/BBs. Others, 
or to Glennerster (1994) notes that GPs see patients after discharge from hospital as well as pri 
hospital referral. This gives them access to information about patient needs and service quality which 
is not codified and made available to HAs/HBs. 
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however, raise more general questions about the availability and asymmetry of 
information. Deakin and Walsh (1996), for example, argue that "The purchaser is 
often dependent on the provider for knowledge of what has been done, or even what 
should be done. " Because of the importance of the availability of appropriate 
information, this issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
23.4 Purchasing Skills 
A third area of concern as regards the fundholding model was whether GPs had the 
requisite skills and information for purchasing relative to HAs/HBs (May and Robinson 
1995; Oakley and Greaves 1995b; Pollock and Majeed 1995; Exworthy 1996). 
Bowie and Harris (1994) for example, claimed that GPFHs have neither the skills nor 
the expertise to contract for services and claimed that it was the general managers, 
accountants and public health physicians based at the HVHB who possess the 
necessary skills. McKee and Clarke (1995), however, felt that clinicians (GPs) mystify 
business/contract managers and moreover, that HAs/HBs are unable to keep up to date 
"with the minutiae of change in clinical practice". Taking something of a middle 
ground, Alderslade and Hunter (1994) advocated that some combination of both sets 
of skills, rather than either one, was required and that GPs and HAs/HBs needed to 
work together. As this Chapter goes on to discuss, this approach is an important 
underlying principle ofjoint HA/HB and GP commissioning. 
23.5 Purchasing Ethics 
The size of fundholding practices was of particular concern because their relatively 
small budget would be financially vulnerable if patients were 'expensive'. Although 
the fundholding model does not stem directly from the FMO (see Chapter 1), 
Glennerster (1994) identifies an important, transferable principle: "American 
experience suggested that small HMOs were financially vulnerable. An unfortunately 
large number of expensive patients needing emergency treatment in any one year could 
bankrupt a small HMO. " (p22). As a result, Glennerster et al. argue that the risk pool 
needs to be larger than 50,000. This, however, is more than any one practice can 
achieve. In the UK only around 40% of practices had more than 7,000 patients at the 
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time fundholding was introduced'. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that it was 
only total fundholders whose budget covered the full range of services (including 
expensive accident and emergency services) that an HMO would cover 
One potential problem, caused by a small risk pool, is that of 'cream skimming' or 
biased selection (Bartlett et al. 1994). Bartlett and Le Grand (1994) and Glennerster 
(op cit. ) argued that because GPs had a fixed, per capita, income, there was an 
incentive for fundholders to avoid accepting patients with a huge risk of being 
expensive. Fears of a two-tier system also arose in relation to fundholding. Hospitals 
may offer preferential treatment to fundholders because of the opportunity to boost 
their incomes. This is particularly so if/when hospitals have a waiting list initiative 
(Audit Commission 1996). Enthoven contested this on the basis that in his view, the 
UK NHS already has a system with various tiers in terms of service quality although 
they are not measured and documented (Smith 1989) a conclusion to which Bartlett 
and Le Grand also came. 
24 Transactions Costs of the Market System 
The third market-related area of concern in terms of this study, was that of the 
transactions costs associated with the purchasing mechanism, a subject which is 
discussed in depth in the following chapter. When the market reforms were launched, 
many expressed concern about the transactions costs (see for example Ham 1994b; 
Benton 1995). However, transactions costs are not readily defined and calculated so 
little more was done than to discuss their potential scale. 
Transactions costs are the costs associated with market contracts such as setting up 
contracts, monitoring and ensuring compliance to them and renewing them. 
They 
arise under particular conditions 7 in which parties are engaged in 
formal contracts and 
6 Note that by 1994 the entry level for fundholding was 5,000 patients, and for community/PCP 
fundholding was only 3,000 patients. 
7 Transactions costs arise in circumstances of uncertainty and where there are small numbers of 
buyers and suppliers and where humans are boundedly rational and potentially opportunistic 
(Williamson 1975). These concepts are discussed in sec. 3.7-3.8. 
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where those contracts strictly specify products/services, payment systems are precisely 
defined with accurate orders, invoices and other records, and where some form of 
arbitration mechanism is required (Deakin and Walsh 1996). Ham signalled 
transactions costs as being of considerable importance to the NHS: 
"Perhaps the most important is the increase in management costs that has 
occurred. There is little doubt that a health service based on contracts between 
purchasers and providers is more expensive to administer than one in which 
health authorities manage hospitals directly. The increase in transaction costs is 
compounded by the fragmentation of purchasing ... Management in the NHS 
has come to resemble a paper chase as NHS trusts seek to secure their income 
by negotiating contracts with different purchasers and as all players in the 
market invest in information systems to monitor contract compliance. This has 
put at risk one of the greatest strengths of the NHS, its tradition of low 
administrative costs. " 
Ham believed that the market system was more expensive to administer than the pre- 
market model and that the transactions costs involved in the market were "likely to be 
considerable" (ibid) due, not least, to fundholding. Benton (1995) was equally 
concerned about the "exponential" rise in transactions costs due to fundholding, an 
increase which he said would result in "a large chunk of the healthcare pound being 
spent on the cost of developing, setting and monitoring contracts... ". McKee and 
Clarke (1995) took the situation further and suggested that as purchasing is likely to 
develop on the basis of clinical protocols and guidelines that "calculations of costs and 
benefits should include the cost of developing, implementing, and monitoring the 
guidelines". 
It is important to bear in mind that a further reason for the expected high level of 
transactions costs is due to the complexity of the product being exchanged (Petchey 
1993; Thomas 1995). Petchey argues that "When the product or service being 
exchanged is complex ... 
it is either impossible or extremely costly to specify in 
advance, in a written contract, every contingency that might affect the transaction. An 
elderly, unstable diabetic patient admitted for surgery, for instance, is obviously going 
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to require more hospital treatment than a young, fitter patient. Because it is difficult to 
incorporate contingencies of this kind contracts will inevitably be incomplete 
specifications of the rights and obligations of the contracting parties. Incompleteness 
creates scope for opportunism. " Writing more elaborate contracts or intensifying the 
monitoring process to cope with such complexities only adds to the transactions costs 
(op. cit. ). 
2.5 Market Reforms: The Views of the Medical Profession 
The concerns expressed so far in this chapter were echoed by the medical profession 
who exhibited considerable opposition to the reforms. Teeling Smith had anticipated 
that the OBE solution would be unpopular with the medical profession because it 
challenged their independence and because a market would be regarded as a threat to 
the integrity of the NHS (see Chapter 1). 
"Greater efficiency, a more rational allocation of resources, the introduction of 
alternative sources of finance and extra taxes all seem to be potential ways of 
helping to tackle the short fall of health care in Britain ... The problem 
is that 
each of these approaches has its potential opponents, both within the Health 
Service and outside it ... many 
doctors and other health professionals resent the 
suggestion that their pattern of behaviour should be modified in order to 
provide better value for money in the Health Service. The opposition in some 
quarters to any form of financial incentive for improved performance in general 
practice is an example of the resistance to change from amongst the professions 
... politicians 
face an unenviable dilemma. If they attempt to improve the quality 
of health care in Britain by other means in addition to better public funding they 
are likely to face problems. Governments have to work within the time-scale of 
a maximum of five years between elections. If they attempt to introduce 
politically unpopular moves within this time period, they may well lose office at 
the next election, and find that a politically more tin-ýd alternative government 
reverses their health care policies... " (Teeling Smith 1986: 18-19). 
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Teeling Smith's expectations were realised. The British Medical Association (BMA) 
regarded the document in which they stated their objections as being "... probably the 
most important document that the [British Medical] Council has issued in the last forty 
years. " (British Medical Association 1989). The Association did accept the general 
aims of Working for Patients, but disputed the measures for achieving them, 
considering that "many of the proposals would cause serious damage to NHS patient 
care; lead to a fragmented service and destroy the comprehensive nature of the existing 
service. " (ibid. ). Clearly, as it was important to the government that the medical 
profession perform according to the incentives designed into the system, this was a 
troubling response. As the analysis in Chapter 6 shows, professionalism is an 
important dynamic within the service and is strongly valued by GPs. 
2.6 From Purchasing to Commissioning 
As Chapter I discussed, purchasing policy developed in a way which extended the 
fundholding scheme and which also placed importance on the involvement of non- 
fundholding GPs in commissioning activities. This meant that the entire GP 
population of the UK was to have an opportunity to influence purchasing priorities and 
decisions about local hospital services. Commissioning, however, was not only an 
important development as far as embracing more GPs in the decision making process. 
The term commissioning evolved from being a somewhat "mysterious" (Opit 1990) 
and nebulous concept, one often used interchangeably with purchasing (Hunter 1997), 
to become understood to mean a higher level process than purchasing was considered 
to be. 
26.1 The Commissioning Concept 
Although purchasing was viewed as being the "engine for change" (Hunter 1997), 
there were criticisms that the role had been much underdeveloped (Prowle 1992). 
Furthermore, that "Workingfor Patients" made reference to HAMB commissioning 
but provided no explanation of the term and that subsequent working documents did 
not develop the concept either (Opit 1990) led to the emergence and use of the two 
equally undefined, ambiguous terms purchasing and conunissioning. 
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Subsequent attempts to clarify the nature of the purchasing role, however, identified 
both long and short term issues plus a range of purchasing activities (Prowle 1992). 
The long term issues were later understood as commissioning activities (Alderslade 
and Hunter 1994). Prowle specified three key purchasing roles: (1) identifying the 
health needs of the population; (2) purchasing selectively those health services likely to 
bring the greatest benefit for the resources available; and (3) promoting efficiency in 
service provision. He went on to define a number of short term and long term issues 
related to these roles (see Box 2.2) and in so doing, placed particular emphasis on the 
need for careful attention to what services are needed and from whom, otherwise 
purchasers would be "purchasing what providers wish to supply rather than what the 
population really needs. " (ibid. pplO). 
Box 2.2: Short and Long Term Issues in Purchasing 
Source: Prowle 1992 
Short/Medium Term Issues 
" "defining more precisely the current range of services; 
" introducing a greater degree of specification into contracts; 
" promoting further efficiency within provider units; 
* promoting alternative treatment patterns (eg in-patient to day patient surgery)' 
* looking for ways of reducing waiting lists. " 
Long Term Issues 
4P "what services should the DHA be purchasing (including what is the health care need and how do 
we weigh competing priorities, eg unmet demand or health gain)? 
o how and from whom should the DHA purchase those services? 
Prowle's distinctions were reflected in subsequent attempts to move towards a greater 
understanding of the purchasing and commissioning roles (Alderslade and Hunter 
1994; Ovretveit 1995; Hunter 1997). Hunter and Alderslade note the distinction as 
follows: 
"Commissioning is the process of gathering and analysing the wants and needs 
of the population, and identifying the services required to meet those needs. 
Purchasing is the interpretation of commissioning plans, and the construction 
and implementation of time-related purchasing plans. " 
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Elsewhere, Alderslade and Hunter (1994) refer to commissioning as a "strategic 
process by which health improvement is sought and a vision of the service market is 
created and implemented. Within that wider process, a series of 
purchasing/contracting decisions 
about specific service elements are 
taken by individual purchasers ... 51) 
(Alte - rnative distinctions are provided 
in Box 2.2). 
26.2 Commissioning 
Skills & Information 
Consideration of the longer-term, 
broader purchasing issues raises the 
importance of needs assessment, 
epidemiological analysis, priority 
setting and planning, disciplines in 
which public health clinicians receive 
training but GPs do not. 
Box 2.2: Definition of Commissioning / Purchasing 
Terms 
Public Health Commissioning: - 
"To maximise the health of the population and 
minimise illness, by purchasing health services and 
by influencing other organisations to create 
conditions which will enhance people's health. " 
Health Purchasing: - 
"... buying the best value for money services to 
achieve the maximum health gain for those most in 
need. " 
Health Contracting: - 
"involves selecting a provider and negotiating an 
agreement with them about the services they will 
provide in return for payment. It includes the 
activities of defining service specification for 
tendering, specifying a contract, monitoring the 
contract and reviewing contract performance. " 
Source: Ovretveit 1995: 18 
Commissioning has been viewed as being a means of combining the strengths of 
primary care with those of public health (Brown 1994). As Bowie and Harris (1994) 
explain, the skills of public health physicians are made available to all GPs "leaving the 
general practitioner free simply to make choices". Commissioning also brings 
together two sets of information. Shanks et al (1995) argue that there is a need for 
services to be commissioned following population wide needs analysis (the work of 
public health clinicians), rather than only practice-based decisions otherwise "General 
practitioners may ... 
find themselves limited to their unaided judgement of which 
services would most benefit the health of local people. " (ibid). On the other hand, 
practices know their patients and as Glennerster et al. (1994) pointed out, they see the 
patient prior to and following a hospital visit so are ideally placed to make judgements 
about service quality and patient needs. 
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2.6.3 Locality Perspective 
The importance of involving GPs in commissioning so as to ensure a local perspective 
can be further extended to involving the local population (consumers). "Health needs 
are not simple epidemiological variables" argue Alderslade and Hunter (op cit. ), they 
are "complex social constructs which must be analysed, interpreted and given meaning 
and priority in conversation with the population served ... 
II and HAsAFIBs have a 
responsibility to involve the local population directly in commissioning decisions (NHS 
Management Executive 1992). HAs/HBs must, therefore, rise to the challenge of 
'thinking globally but acting locally' and need to give careful consideration to the 
mechanisms for gaining consumer views. Various methods were suggested in "Local 
Voices" (NHS Management Executive 1992) (for example public meetings, focus 
groups, health forums, telephone hotlines and complaints procedures), many of which 
have been adopted by HAs/BBs. 
26.4 Commissioning Structures 
By 1994, when HAs/HBs were given a directive to involve non-fundholders in their 
activities, a number of DHAs had already merged with one another and formed much 
larger purchasing authorities (Exworthy 1993). They had simultaneously sought to 
ensure a local perspective in their purchasing in order to identify and reflect the 
potential diversity of health needs within their catchment area (Exworthy 1993)8. The 
various ways in which they established their purchasing structures so that they were 
locality sensitive are many and varied (see for example Carruthers et al. 1995; Balogh 
1996; Smith, Butler, and Powell 1996) and have depended in part upon local 
fundholding activities (Graffy and Williams 1994). The variability in approach is 
because "some health authorities have undertaken all the contracting and purchasing 
themselves while others ... 
have delegated substantial purchasing capacity and funding 
to GP practice groups. In between, various models and degrees of GP purchasing 
input, practice-sensitive and locality-based purchasing have emerged. " (Hunter 1997). 
8 The term locality can represent anything from a population of 13,000 (eg, in a GP practice), to 
35,000 (a neighbourhood patch or area) and to 100,000 throughout a sector within the 
health 
authority. When discussing particular models it is necessary to define the size of a 
locality but for the 
purposes of this discussion, the term locality is used generally to mean an area 
larger than that of an 
individual GP practice, but smaller than that of a health authority. 
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26.5 Integrated Activitiesfor Health Gain 
One of the criticisms of fundholding was that with practices developing their own 
strategies, the overall HAMB area strategy would become fragmented (Hegginbotham 
1994; Benton 1995) resulting in a "patchwork of services ... which is not responding to 
the needs of the wider community" (Oakley and Greaves 1995a). A commissioning 
process in which needs assessment precedes purchasing objectives is believed to 
overcome this fragmentation (Ovretveit 1995). This in turn is argued to facilitate the 
move towards concentrating on health gain rather than health services (especially acute 
services) (Hunter 1997). The YMO declaration discussed in Chapter I places great 
importance on health promotion and health gain but, according to Hunter (op cit. ) 
whilst purchasing was viewed as being the vehicle for achieving health again for local 
populations, "For many, purchasing has been about maintaining the status quo, 
resisting change and, at best, tinkering at the margins of current delivery systems and 
patterns of care ... " (ibid). 
26.7 Commissioning - No Panacea 
Whilst it is clearly in the mutual interests of GPs and HAsAF]Bs to find ways of 
working together to commission services (Graffy and Williams 1994), and although 
commissioning appears to counter many of the 'problems' with fundholding, it is no 
panacea for purchasing ills (Ham 1994b; Hudson 1995). Hudson identified various 
potential areas of difficulty relating to degrees of localisation and budgetary 
devolution, coterminosity of purchasing levels, maintaining diversity and 
comprehensiveness, compatibility of purchasing objectives and structures for 
managerial approaches to managing the commissioning process. If, for example, 
purchasing budgets are not devolved then the locality model is weakened and where 
budgets are devolved, decisions must be made about responsibility, accountability and 
the degree of flexibility any one locality has within the overall commissioning priorities 
and objectives for the area (see also Exworthy 1993). 
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26.8 Commissioning, Efficiencies, and Resource Allocation 
There are many models of locality commissioning (Carruthers et al. 1995) as well as a 
number of alternatives, for example that of community oriented primary care9 (Pollock 
and Majeed 1995). It is interesting to note, however, that discussions about 
commissioning generally address organisational structures and consultation processes 
but not mechanisms for stimulating efficiency and improved resource allocation. 
According to Donaldson and Mooney (1997), where HAs/HBs take account of 
collective consumer choice this may affect resource allocation but the impact is likely 
to be small'o. Whilst the mechanisms for stimulating efficiencies within the 
competitive environment through discretionary purchases by fundholders and HAMB 
purchasers have been more thoroughly explored, this is not the case with 
commissioning arrangements. 
2.7 Summary 
Chapter 2 has reviewed the key market issues concerning the demand-or purchasing- 
side of the NHS market. The literature covers a range of economic and social issues 
which are of importance not only to the UK, but to international governments who are 
in the throes of market reform, in particular countries like New Zealand which are 
experimenting with GP budget-holding. 
This chapter has illuminated a number of aspects which require further discussion. 
These concern the structures and mechanisms for stimulating efficiencies, transactions 
costs, the degree of purchasing power and information available to GPs and the extent 
to which purchasers may wish to collaborate with their providers. It is to these matters 
that Chapter 3 now turns. 
9 Community Oriented Primary Care originates from Israel and was proposed in the UK by the King's 
Fund. It is a method of teaching and applying public health skills in a primary care setting. It has 
several requirements: community-based primary care; identifiable population/community for which 
the practice assumes responsibility for improving health status, a planning, monitoring and evaluation 
process for identifying and resolving health problems; and liaison and collaboration with local 
community leaders. 
10 Donaldson and Mooney consider that the mechanisms for identifying consumer need and for 
differentiating between what is 'good' on the basis of individual patient choice and what is socially 
'good' are highly problematic and thus will limit the impact of consumer views on resource 
allocation. 
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Introduction 
Chapter I introduced the politician's problem - that of improving NHS efficiency - and 
the politician's choice - that of market versus hierarchy'. Having set out the 
underlying theory for the NHS market, key market-related issues arising from its 
implementation were discussed in Chapter 2. As Chapter 2 noted, certain of those key 
issues (structures and mechanisms for stimulating efficiencies, transactions costs, 
purchasing power and information and the extent of collaboration between parties) 
require further analysis in light of existing organisation theory. 
This chapter draws on and integrates economic and social theories concerning 
market structures, market costs and inter-organisational relationships. It places 
particular emphasis on transactions cost theory as a means of analysing the 
transactions and contracts between GPs and their providers and then introduces a 
network perspective on purchasing, to analyse the nature of the inter-organisational 
relationships that can arise between purchasers and providers. 
3.1 Organising Health Services: The Politician's Choice 
3.1.1 Allocating Resources 
The Government during the 1980s faced continual pressure to commit more public 
money to the NHS to meet the increasing demands placed on the NHS from the costs 
of new technology, the burden of a growing elderly population and the groundswell of 
consumerism in health care. Believing that comprehensive primary health care services 
were not only cheaper to provide but could prevent/reduce the likelihood of hospital 
admission or could serve as an alternative and more cost-effective venue for certain 
procedures, it became a policy goal to transfer financial and staffing resources from 
secondary to primary care health services (Department of Health 1989). This transfer 
or reallocation of resources between secondary and primary care is not easy to achieve. 
'Teeling-Smith talks about bureaucracy not hierarchy (Teeling Smith 1986). The terms bureaucracy 
and hierarchy are used by different disciplines. Sociologists refer to bureaucracy and address one set 
of issues. Economists refer to hierarchies and address a different set of issues. The differences will 
be 
discussed later. 
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An ideal situation would be to transfer resources in such a way that one set of patients 
gains but no other set loses out - this would be the condition economists refer to as 
Pareto-efficiency. ' This could mean, for example, transferring minor operative 
procedures and occupational therapy, from being delivered within a secondary care 
setting to delivery within primary care but doing so in such a way that resources are 
not taken from other areas of secondary care provision, for example intensive care or 
accident and emergency services. Alternatively, and perhaps more realistically, there 
may be trade-offs to consider when transferring resources. For example, it may be that 
resources can be channelled into the provision of inpatient rheumatology beds or into 
the upgrading and expansion of a community health centre or the provision of hydro- 
therapy'. 
3.1.2 Resource Utilisation: Reducing Waste and Improving Efficiency 
The second resource issue addressed within Working for Patients was that of resource 
usage. As Chapter I discussed, there was thought to be a considerable degree of 
waste in the NHS and that competitive forces would provide the incentives for 
hospitals to operate more efficiently and so reduce their costs. According to 
Leibenstein (1966,1987) this includes improving X-efficiency, ie, the motivation of 
management and staff to improve performance. As Chapter I also explained, the 
move towards a market represented a particular view that the competitive market is a 
more efficient way of allocating resources (ie ensuring that consumer tastes are met for 
a given level of resources and technology) than the inefficient hierarchical form of 
organisation that prevailed. 
2 Pareto-efficiency was named after the economist Vilfredo, Pareto whose Manuel DEconomie 
Politique was published in 1909. An allocation is said to be Pareto-efficient for a set of consumer 
tastes, resources and technology, "if it is impossible to move to another allocation which would make 
some people better off and nobody worse off' (Begg, Fischer, and Dornbusch 1987) (p3 14) 
This is an example from discussions at a civic forum in my own health board. 
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3.2 Resource Allocation and Utifisation in Hierarchies, Markets and 
Networks 
In any system, resources need to be allocated and activities co-ordinated. As Daems 
(1983) writes, "Co-ordination of activities, allocation of resources and monitoring of 
performance require communication of information about opportunities and actions. It 
is also necessary that compliance with contracts be enforceable to assure effective co- 
ordinat ion. 
The market "works through the price mechanism, to send appropriate signals to 
economic actors about what they should be doing" (Jarillo 1990) whilst in the firm 
(or hierarchy), "the organising principle is hierarchical: actors are simply told what to 
do, in order to deliver the final, complex product or service. " (Jarillo 1990). There is, 
however, a third alternative, the network. In the network "the mechanism is not quite 
complete integration into a single firm, but not quite exchange between two separate 
firms in markets either. Firms may form links or bonds of a long term, 'relational' 
nature, through which they become interdependent for business. " (Sako 1992: 23)' In 
reality, competitive and non-competitive environments display a range or "myriad" 
(Williamson 1985) of arrangements along the spectrum from market through network 
to hierarchy, so these distinct forms are rarely (if ever) found in their pure form. 
Nevertheless, their respective bearing on efficiency and resource allocation is important 
to the study of the NHS market. 
3.3 Hierarchies 
The hierarchy is the form in which a single administrative entity spans both sides of a 
transaction (Williamson 1975). Prior to 1990, health authorities decided on the 
allocation of resources within the health service, both in cash terms and in terms of 
which services were to be provided. Within this framework, resource allocation was 
governed by managerial authority which cascaded down through the tiers of NHS 
administration from the Department of Health to Regional/Area Health Authorities, 
4 There are two views of networks. One view is that networks are a form of organisation somewhere 
between market and hierarchy. The other view is that the network is a distinct forrn of organisation 
characterised by social ties and socio-economic motives. See later discussion on networks. 
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District Health Authorities, Family Health Services Authorities, Hospitals and General 
Practices and within hospitals, to areas, for example, of medical specialty, research) 
and pharmacy. 
The theoretical hierarchy model which is closely associated with Max Weber, has four 
key characteristics: hierarchy, continuity, expertise and impersonality (Beetham 1991). 
Decisions are made by supervisors who tell their staff what to do and tasks are divided 
up among employees who are accountable to their supervisor for the work that they 
do. The work is conducted according to prescribed rules and is done without 
arbitrariness or favouritism. Generally, there is the prospect of full time occupation 
with a clear career structure and regular advancement. Promotion within the 
hierarchy is based on merit and training for a particular functional expertise. 
Beetharn suggests that there are 3 classifications of staff within this model: chiefs, 
administrators and front-line workers. Chiefs are responsible for formulating policy, 
and administrators interpreting policy directives and translating them into action. 
Action (or service delivery) is the responsibility of the front-line workers. Max Weber' 
claimed that the more an organisation adhered to this model the more efficient it was 
likely to be. By efficient, he meant a complex of values which included performance 
(eg, speed, predictability), expansion of scope and cost effectiveness of operation. 
There are a number of advantages to hierarchy (Jaques 1991; McGuinness 1991). 
According to Beetham (1991), the central feature of bureaucracy is its systematic 
division of labour. Complex administrative problems are broken down into 
manageable and repetitive tasks which are co-ordinated by a command structure. This 
can allow enormous expansion of scope, a high degree of precision and cost 
effectiveness. 
' Max Weber offered his discussions of bureaucracy as an 'ideal' type of organisation. 
6Max Weber is most closely associated with discussions of bureaucracy as an ideal type of 
organisation. 
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Williamson (1975) claimed that organising transactions internally within a hierarchy 
has three particular advantages over the market. Firstly, it minimises the opportunity 
for sub-groups to pursue their own goals at the expense of the organisation (or system) 
as a whole. Although there may be divisions within an organisation which trade with 
one another, they do not have pre-emptive claims on their respective profits even 
although they may have a profit centre status. The prices which departments charge 
one another are likely to be constrained by organisational policy and rules so that no 
division can set monopolistic prices. Williamson also claims that within the hierarchy, 
managers within each trading division are more prone to co-operating with one another 
because "the aggressive pursuit of individual interests redounds to the disadvantage of 
the system and as present and prospective compensation (including promotions) can be 
easily varied by the general office to reflect non-co-operation, simple requests to adopt 
a co-operative mode are apt to be heeded. Altogether a more nearly joint profit 
maximising attitude and result is to be expected. " (Williamson 1975: 29) 
A second distinct advantage of the hierarchy is that it can be more effectively audited. 
Whereas an external auditor is constrained to review written records and documents 
and his/her investigation is restricted to pertinent matters, an internal auditor has 
greater freedom to explore less formal evidence and to pursue any byways which 
his/her investigation may discover. An internal auditor is not thought to be partisan 
but instrumental whereas an external auditor is perceived as being 'on the other side' 
and as such, potential informants are unlikely to volunteer information for fear of being 
branded as disloyal. 
The third advantage emphasised by Williamson is the fact that disputes are generally 
settled out of court thereby avoiding expensive legal costs. Resolution is achieved by 
exercising flat which is "an enormously efficient way to settle instrumental differences". 
(Williamson 1975: 30) 
Criticisms of bureaucracies, however, are well known and have been food for the 
proponents of market mechanisms. One principal criticism is that of excessive 
layering, ie too many rungs on the organisational ladder. Multiple layers mean that 
information and decisions need to pass through a great many people and levels which 
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can cause inefficient delays and distortion and loss of information. The rules which 
govern work can become burdensome and constrain initiative, innovation and render 
the organisation inflexible and unresponsive to changes in the internal and/or external 
environment. As Beetham states "Adherence to rules can become inflexibility and 'red 
tape'. Impersonality produces bureaucratic indifference and insensitivity. Hierarchy 
discourages individual responsibility and initiative. " (Beetham 1991: 133) That 
organisations are divided into functional areas with staff who are rewarded for 
functional expertise, can mean that functional departments pursue their own goals 
which are not consistent with overall organisational goals and which may be 
incompatible with sub-goals of other departments - ie, the problem of sub- 
optimisation. 
Beetham goes on to say that if one views an organisation as a social system of 
interpersonal relations then there are weaknesses in Weber's assumptions that the 
bureaucracy is efficient. "Weber's model of organisational efficiency assumes that all 
aspects of the individual personality which are not relevant to the strict performance of 
his or her duties will be cast off as the individual enters the organisation, or suppressed 
through effective socialisation. " (ibid. p133) In practice, people are individuals with 
personal needs and expectations for which they seek satisfaction and the way in which 
they interact socially can be crucial to the effectiveness of their performance. If social 
interaction is suppressed then it can lead to resistance. "People can be compelled to 
work upon command, but not to work efficiently or with commitment. That requires 
their active co-operation which is as much a matter of informal negotiation as of 
authoritative command. " (ibid. p 13 4) 
Beetharn's point illustrates one of the prime difficulties within the hierarchy, the 
problem of motivation and its relationship to incomplete labour contracts. As 
mentioned earlier, Leibenstein proposed the notion of X-efficiency (Leibenstein 1966, 
1987). Leibenstein acknowledged that specialisation gives rise to efficiencies because 
activities can be allocated to the person or equipment to which they are best suited. 
There are dexterity advantages to specialisation as well as improvements in the pace 
and quality of activity. There may also be training advantages because training can be 
shorter and more directed and effective. However, he identified what he termed 
53 
invisible elements in co-ordinating specialised activities because work which has been 
broken up must be recombined and here inefficiencies can be incurred. This he 
considers is the central internal efficiency question. Firms comprise many people and 
groups who have differing motivations, levels of trust, commitment to the firm and to 
one another and different levels of information on objectives which Leibenstein terms 
"natural attributes of the self-contained individual" (1986: 159). These need to be 
"fostered and created in a hierarchy" (ibid. pp159) such that they are in the best 
interests of the firm. As Sako (1992) explains though: - 
"There is no reason why the level of effort chosen by individuals in a firm 
should result in working practices most productive for the firm: hence the 
possibility of X-inefficiency. Moreover, increasing X-efficiency may not be 
easily achieved because of inertia to maintain the existing routine. Inertial 
behaviour has a basic psychological foundation in comfort felt due to familiarity 
of habit and to predictability of other people's behaviour. " 
It may be that poor motivation, conflicting goals, a lack of trust, suspicion of superior 
organisational levels in the hierarchy may result in inefficiencies (X-inefficiencies) in 
recombining specialised work. 
It is difficult to specify ex ante in the employment contract, all future contingencies 
which relate to future performance. As Williamson (1975) notes, even if they could be 
specified this would be a lengthy and complex process which would be of questionable 
value to both the employee and the employer. It is inevitable therefore, that all 
standards of performance cannot be specified within the contract. In a hierarchical 
form of organisation, therefore, although the owner or managers rely on some 
combination of authority and the forms of co-ordination identified by Mintzberg 
(1989), to ensure a desired level of worker effort, the quote above from Sako indicates 
that there are factors which prevent full worker compliance to the level desired by the 
organisation. 
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3.4 Markets 
In the 'ideal' market, resource allocation is co-ordinated through the price mechanism. 
Purchasers exercise choice between producers on the basis of price and other product 
and related information'. Due to the fact that there are a large number of buyers and 
suppliers, the price is regulated both by their relative bargaining powers and the fact 
that there are many alternative sources of supply (Begg, Fischer, and Dornbusch 1987; 
Douma and Schreuder 1991). 
The NHS market, however, operated within certain constraints in order to safeguard 
the social values of equity and access to NHS services. In other words, it was a 
managed or quasi market. Within the quasi-market framework, funding is not 
allocated solely through planning or formula funding but also through "competitive 
bidding, or an earmarked budget which can be given to users, or agents acting on their 
behalf, who can allocate the budget between competing providers. " (Ferlie 1992) This 
form of market altered the resource allocation among service providers' and the 
organisational form of the economic actors within the market. For example, GP 
practices went from non-budget holding to budget holding status whilst hospitals came 
under pressure "to adopt many of the characteristics of a 'quasi firm"' meaning that 
"they have to attract business in order to maximise revenue; they may need to market 
their services ... to reduce costs and raise quality ... they may also collude with other 
providers .. to 
find ways of reducing purchaser pressure on them. " (ibid) 
Nevertheless, although the NHS market differed from a fully competitive market, the 
competitive model underpinning it suggested that there would be "adversarial 
relationships between purchasers and providers, with individual providers competing 
with each other to attract purchasers, with individual purchasers competing with each 
other to obtain the lowers possible prices, and with purchasers and providers vying 
'Purchasers may draw on information about product quality and reputation, brand name, the 
availability of components required for repair, service guarantees, the availability of alternative or 
substitute products on the market and so forth. 
'Note here that GPs are also providers of services. 
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directly with each other to get the best possible deal". (Croxson 1997: 2) 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of some of the market-related issues which arose 
following the implementation of the NHS market. Particular issues reserved for more 
comprehensive discussion were those of GP purchasing leverage, the contracting 
process, the availability of purchasing information, and contestability. It is to these 
issues that the discussion now turns. 
3.5 Buyer and Supplier Power 
As the previous chapter identified, one of the key market assumptions was that buyers 
would be able to exercise purchasing leverage. Porter's (1980) treatment of the 
competitive conditions under which enterprises attempt to make strategic decisions, 
identifies buyer power as one of five competitive forces, the others being barriers to 
entry, supplier power, the threat of substitute products and the intensity of competitor 
rivalry. Of particular relevance to the healthcare market is the degree of buyer power 
which a GPFH or health authority might have relative to the NHS Trust with whom it 
is dealing. For GPFHs and HAs, the degree to which they can exercise buyer power 
within the market is a crucial aspect of their role. If they have little or no influence 
over suppliers, then they will be unable to influence what happens within secondary 
care and there will be no improvement in the efficiency of Trust hospitals' service 
provision. Porter argues that suppliers can exert bargaining power by raising prices or 
by reducing the quality of purchased goods and services. Customers on the other hand 
can drive down the prices, demand higher quality or more service and can play the 
competing suppliers off against each other (Porter 1980; Grant 1998). 
Buyer power is determined by the degree to which buyers are price sensitive and their 
relative bargaining power, in other words, via some combination of the factors listed 
below: - 
3.5.1 Buyers'Pýice Sensitivity 
The extent to which buyers are sensitive to the prices charged by the firms in an 
industry depends upon four major factors. 
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"The greater the importance of an item as a proportion of total cost) the 
more sensitive buyers will be about the price they pay ... 
The less differentiated the products of the supplying industry, the more 
willing the buyer is to switch suppliers on the basis of price ... 
The more intense the competition among buyers, the greater their eagerness 
for price reductions from their suppliers ... 
The greater the importance of the industry's product to the quality of the 
buyer's product or service, the less sensitive are buyers to the prices they 
are charged... " (Grant 1998) 
3.5.2 Relative Bargaining Power 
"Bargaining power rests, ultimately, on refusal to deal with the other party. The 
balance of power between the two parties to a transaction depends on the credibility 
and effectiveness with which each makes this threat. The key issue is the relative cost 
that each party sustains as a result of the transaction not being consummated. A 
second issue is each party's expertise in leveraging its position through gamesmanship. 
Several factors influence the bargaining power of buyers relative to that of sellers. 
Size and concentration of buyers relative to suppliers. The smaller the 
number of buyers and the bigger their purchases, the greater the cost of 
losing one 
Buyers' information. The better informed buyers are about suppliers 
and their prices and costs, the better they are able to bargain... 
Ability to integrate vertically. In refusing to deal with the other party, 
the alternative to finding another supplier or buyer is to do-it- 
yourself.. " (Grant 1998) 
Chapter 2 indicated that GPFHs were thought to have relatively little bargaining power 
and that this was problematic in the face of large, possibly monopolistic suppliers. In 
order to consider GPFH buyer power in some detail, the following analysis was 
conducted drawing on the literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 4, combined with 
some characteristics specific to the Scottish health service. The analysis confirms the 
fears expressed in Chapter 2, ie that GPFHs as buyers are indeed weak although they 
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can be considered to have a medium degree ofprice sensitivity. 
: Pýke Smsitivity - Medium 
........... Products as a Proportion of Buyers' Total Cost: Secondary -care services can Strong - represent a significant fraction (55%) of the GPFH's standard ftindholding budget. 
For total fundholders it is a greater percentage and for PCP ftindholders, it is lower. Medium 
On this criteria GPFHs are likely to be price sensitive. 
Product Differentiation: Hospitals have to offer certain core services, so in a sense Medium - products could be regarded as standard. This increases buyer sensitivity because they 
can, in theory, find an alternative source of provision. Technically, GPs are not 
Weak 
locked into particular providers due to, for example, complex, integrated production 
processes, so switching costs are in that respect low. 
However, health services are complex. They are largely intangible and heterogeneous, and they are difficult to define, cost, quantify and specify in contracts. 
Furthermore, service quality is known to differ between hospitals and hospital 
departments. Studies reviewed in the following chapter have identified difficulties in 
comparing procedures between providers. In reality, therefore, to suggest that all 
products are standard is inappropriate9. Accordingly such differentiation weakens 
_buyer power. Competition among Buyers: Fundholding designers intended that the incentives Weak 
within the scheme coupled with those in the 1990 contract would stimulate buyer 
competition. That being the case, GPFHs would have been highly price sensitive, 
eager to negotiate better deals for their patients in order to attract new patients. As 
research evidence has shown, however, the response has been somewhat different. 
Amid fears of creating preferential services for ftmdholding patients, practices have 
not competed in this way thus weakening their price sensitivity. 
Importance of Industry Service to Buyers' Service: Secondary care services form a Strong 
component of the primary care service in that primary and secondary care should be 
integrated and thus viewed by the patient as a single health service. It may be the 
case that if a patient receives poor hospital treatment that it reflects badly on the 
referrer (GP). Moreover, if the patient receives poor hospital services then it will 
increase his/her attendance in the GP practice and the patient may not be able to 
distinguish what components of the care they receive ought to be primary or ought to 
be secondary care. This increases price sensitivity. 
Buyer. Po Weak Wer 
Size & Concentration of Buyers & Suppliers: In the main cities there is generally a Strong - 
choice of provider. GPs therefore, have the option of sourcing services without Weak having to travel too great a distance. This gives buyers some power over providers. 
However, access (and therefore real choice) is a limiting factor to this power. In areas 
of poverty, high unemployment and/or deprivation, patients often do not have access 
to private cars and must rely on public transport to travel to hospital. For example, 
patients in Hamilton (Lanarkshire) may have difficulty in travelling into Glasgow 
even although there are only a few miles between the two locations. Patients are thus 
restricted to the 2 Lanarkshire acute providers. 
In rural and remote areas, GPs are often faced with more restricted choices. This may 
be because there are fewer providers compared with the large cities. It is also affected 
by access. Travelling from rural areas can be problematic because public transport is 
often inadequately provided. In remote areas, patients may have to travel considerable 
9 As Chapter 4 goes on to show, some services are more readily defined and specified (eg, laboratory 
services) but they are in the minority. Non comparability derives for difficulties in defining, costing 
and measuring the quality of the procedure. 
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distances by land, air or sea. Clearly these factors strengthen the position of the supplier. 
Technically, therefore, in the cities, GPs have greater buyer power than those in rural or remote areas. 
Buyer Information: One of the arguments in support of fundholding was that GPs had better access to information about hospital services. (See also Box 3.1 below). 
In theory, GPs could use this information, coupled with prices and league tables as their basis for provider choice. However, as this chapter discusses more fully later on, 
and as Chapters 4 and 8 discuss, GPs and HAs/HBs have had to make do with very little formal information and that which they do have is often ambiguous, incomplete, 
noncomparable and sometimes unreliable. This reduces their ability to bargain. 
Scope for Vertical Integration: There is limited scope for backward integration. 
Although GPs have to offer certain general medical services they can now offer minor 
operative procedures and other services previously offered within the hospital. There 
are limitations however. Only a small minority of secondary care services can be 
provided without specialist skills and equipment. GPs may lack sufficient funds to 
buy the required specialist equipment or may not have the capacity or demand to offer 
services on the scale necessary to achieve the necessary economies. The size of the 
practice premises is often a constraint. The range of areas in which GPs may 
experience vertical integration are, however, limited relative to the overall proportion 
of secondary services. 
Weak 
Medium - 
Weak 
Although GPFHs appear to have a medium degree of price sensitivity and are weak in 
terms of buyer power, it is important to bear in mind that they operate in an 
environment which is politically driven and highly politically sensitive. Given that 
there is an onus on Trusts to be responsive to purchasers there may be a degree to 
which buyer power is enhanced because of political power, an element not accounted 
for in Porter's framework. Moreover, relative to health authorities, GPs were thought 
to have a number of advantages as purchasers (see Maynard 1986; Glennerster et al. 
1994). These were discussed in Chapter 2 but are presented in Box 3.1 as a reminder. 
Box3.1 Advantages of the Fundholding Model 
" GPs have better information than Health Authorities about the needs and preferences of their 
patients. They can form opinions as to the level of service obtained from hospitals and 
consultants because they see patients before and after hospital attendance. 
" GPs suffer if the care given to their patients is slow or inefficient because the frequency of visits 
by the patient to the GP increases, taking time and resources and draining the GPs energy. 
There is, therefore, an incentive to seek more efficient hospital services. 
0 GPs could take marginal decisions to buy or not to buy services from a hospital or community 
trust, signalling a dissatisfaction with quality. There would be no inhibitions about using their 
power of exit compared with HA/HBs who because of the scale of impact, would find it 
politically difficult to remove contracts from local hospitals. 
Although it is limited, GPs do face some competition for patients from other GPs. 
By being responsible for drugs spending, there's an incentive to give thought to how money 
should be allocated. GPs can think holistically and economically about the uses for the money - 
eg, less drugs and more therapy. This argument also applies to the purchase of hospital care. 
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3.6 Governing Market Transactions 
Ao Chapters I and 2 have already discussed, the mechanism for expressing and 
realising purchasing intentions in the NFIS market is the contracting mechanism. It is 
important to now consider the characteristics of the contracting mechanisms and the 
GPFH transactions with their providers. 
There are three theoretical types of contract which can govern market exchanges: 
classical, neoclassical and relational (Ferlie 1992; Williamson 1996b)". As the 
following discussion will show, NFIS contracts" were expected to be neoclassical but 
were in fact relational. 
3.6.1 Classical Contracts 
Classical contracts are best suited to an environment where there are many buyers and 
suppliers and where good product information is available. Classical contracts suit the 
exchange of homogeneous products for which price is the basis for selecting the 
product, the market environment is relatively stable and the identity of the supplier is 
of no consequence to the exchange. The classical contract is seen as discrete and 
clear and the parties to the contract are irrelevant. It is also formal, carefully delimited, 
emphasises legal rules and formal documentation, and accounts for some anticipated 
future events. Since market alternatives are available, efforts to sustain any 
relationship between the parties are irrelevant and disputes are resolved in a court of 
law. 
loThese are not the only terms used. Sako (Sako 1992) for example distinguishes between Ann's 
length Contractual Relations (ACRs) which are similar to classical contracts, and Obligational 
Contractual Relations (OCRs) which are similar to relational contracts. Kay (1993) refers to 
perfunctory contracts (classical) and consummate (relational). 
11 Chapter I described four types of NHS contract: block, cost and volume, limited volume and cost- 
per-case. 
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3.6.2 Neoclassical Contracts 
When contracts are long-term, conditions uncertain, products complex and difficult to 
define or where there is a transaction-specific investment 12 , classical contracts are 
unsuitable. Under these conditions, it is either extremely costly or impossible to 
anticipate at the outset all future contingencies for which adaptations need to be 
stipulated. Consequently, an alternative form - the neoclassical contract - has evolved. 
Neoclassical contracts are long-term contracts, characterised by gaps in planning which 
allow parties to be more flexible in their agreements. Where there are gaps in the 
planning, parties expect to adapt to the circumstance prevailing at the time, a flexibility 
which creates pressure on parties to maintain a social relationship. In the event of 
any dispute, parties do not turn to a court of law for a resolution but to arbitration by a 
higher administrative tier. This type of contract dominates the building industry and 
was expected to dominate health services. 
3.6.3 Relational Contracts 
A third form - the relational contract - has evolved to cope with the increasing 
duration and complexity of contracts as well as the increasing degree to which 
transactions are asset-specific". Contracts are relational where "discreteness is fully 
displaced as the relation takes on properties of a minisociety with a vast array of norms 
beyond those centred on the exchange and its immediate processes. "" (Williamson 
1996b). Ferlie adds that, "the contract is increasingly embedded in a social relation 
with its own history and norms ... The reference point may not 
be the initial contract 
document, but rather the history of the relation as it has developed through time. " 
(Ferlie 1992). For relational contracts, sanctions are more informal than formal. 
It was expected that NHS contracts would be neoclassical and Workingfor Patients 
12 Transaction-specific investments are discussed below. 
13 See later discussion. 
14 R Macneil "Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Tenn Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical 
and Relational Contract Law" 72 Nw. U. L. Rev 854 (1978) quoted in Williamson 
(Williamson 
1996b) 
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proposed the set up of an internal (administrative) arbitration function to handle 
contract disputes. Given the complexity of health care services, however, neoclassical 
contracts have proved inappropriate. Flynn et al (1996) make this point very clearly 
following a longitudinal study of contracting in three health authorities in England -- 
"In order to create a contract, certain minimal conditions or prerequisites are 
necessary: the objective or service to be bought must be defined, the amount to 
be bought and sold must be agreed, the price for the exchange must be agreed, 
any conditions about the transaction and about quality must be set out, and 
terms agreed for the parties to cancel or withdraw from the contract. In the 
NHS quasi-market there are fundamental problems at each stage of this 
process, and this is compounded by the enormous complexity of, and variation 
between, specialties and procedures. We argue that, comparatively, acute 
medical and surgical specialties are relatively easier to define, codify and 
calculate for contracting purposes than those elements of health service which 
are more continuous and comprise 'care' rather than 'cure' ... However, even 
within the acute sector there are difficulties in agreeing standardised systems 
for coding: there are 13,000 different diseases and procedures. Consequently, 
'there is not, as yet, an accepted consistent way of grouping diagnoses for 
treatment into useful categories for contracting' (National Audit Office 1995: 
1 15 2) . In community 
health services, the range of different nursing and other 
para-professional staff involved, the variety of forms of treatment and settings, 
and the heterogeneity of clients and conditions all combine to exacerbate these 
inherent difficulties. Nevertheless, purchasers and providers are required to 
make contracts which agree activity (the volume of service), price and quality. " 
(pp 12-13) 
Flynn et al (1996) point out that information was poor and in their study, activity 
statistics (based on FCEs (Finished Consultant Episodes) in the acute sector and 
15 National Audit Office (1995) Contracting for Acute Health Care in England. Report 
by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General. London: EMSO 
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community contacts in the community sector) were frequently regarded as crude and 
unreliable. Contracts based on these quantifications of activity tended to 
underestimate workload. For example, a note through the door to a patient could not 
be differentiated from a 4-hour counselling session with a family experiencing terminal 
illness. Moreover, purchasers were continually needing to request more consistent 
and reliable cost information. Although policy required that "provider prices should 
be the same as actual costs, that costs should be full cost and that providers must not 
cross-subsidise different contracts, procedures or specialities. " (ibid. ppl4-15), Trusts 
found it very difficult to calculate and apportion costs associated with every 
component of health service diagnostic treatment and associated overhead costs. 
3.7 Transactions Costs 
As Chapter 2 pointed out, the introduction of the market system led to concerns about 
transactions costs, ie, costs associated with market contracts. These costs arise with 
all 3 contract types as Blois (1990) (quoting from Coase") explains: - 
It ... Coase's statements that'The most obvious cost of 
"organising" production 
through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are' 
and 'the costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each 
exchange transaction which takes place on a market must also be taken into 
account' indicate that these costs do arise from a variety of activities. " 
Williamson further developed the concept of transactions costs when trying to 
understand the conditions under which it was more efficient to internalise costs 
through vertical integration. He developed a framework to explain the circumstances 
within which markets fail (the 'organisational failures framework') and went on to 
identify the cost bearing and cost economising dimensions of transactions. Having 
done so, Williamson combined these frameworks into one overall framework to 
identify the most efficient forms of governance given certain market conditions and 
transaction characteristics. 
16 Coase, R. H. "The nature of the firm", Economica, 4,1937, pp. 386-405 
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3.8 The Organisational Failures Framework 
Williamson brought together the conditions in which transactions costs were thought 
to arise. The framework incorporates not only market/economic conditions but also 
human conditions (see Figure 3.1). Williamson argued that whilst branches of 
economics have tended to treat the theory of firms on the basis of the transaction, price 
and so forth, they have omitted "the elementary attributes of human decision makers - 
of which opportunism is one, and bounded rationality is another" (Williamson 
1975: 24). 
Figure 3.1: The Organisational Failures or Transactions Cost 
Framework 
Source: Douma and Schreuder 1991 
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In a perfect market, 
transactions are carried 
out without transactions 
costs. information is 
freely available, decision 
making is characterised as 
being rational, there are 
alternative buyers and 
suppliers "and there are 
no carry-over effects 
from one period to the 
other of a specific transaction between two parties in the market. " (Johanson and 
Mattsson 1991) When these conditions do not prevail, however, efforts are required 
to organise, carry out, control and enforce transactions. Faced with the risk of such 
costs, firms may decide to bypass the market and organise the transactions intemally 
(Williamson 1975). In other words, the market arrangement fails and transactions are 
intemalised. 
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3.8.1 Bounded Rationality & Opportunism 
The framework includes two aspects of human behaviour: bounded rationality and 
opportunism. Bounded rationality, first explained by Herbert Simon" proposes that 
"The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is said 
to be very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for 
objectively rational behaviour in the real world. " (Williamson 1975: 9) Human 
rationality is bounded by neurophysiological and language limits. The former refers to 
the ability to receive, store, retrieve, and process information without error. The latter 
refers to the inability of individuals to articulate their language and feelings in words, 
numbers or graphics in such a way that they are fully understood by others. In 
conditions of complexity and uncertainty then the limits on human rationality create a 
problem for buyers and suppliers because it is impossible to anticipate all possible 
contingencies for any one set of decisions. 
The second human condition Williamson allows for is opportunism. Williamson 
defines opportunism not as strategic self-interest but as "self-interest seeking with 
guile", which "has profound implications for choosing between alternative contractual 
relationships. " (Williamson 1975: 26). Opportunism involves making "false or empty, 
that is,, self-disbelieved, threats and promises" in order to realise some individual 
advantage (ibid. p26) and may be manifest in the manipulation of information or the 
misrepresentation of intentions (eg. making false promises regarding future conduct). 
Although Williamson acknowledges that one need not assume economic agents are 
opportunistic most of the time, he asserts that it is " important is to be alert to potential 
contractual hazards and, if and as these arise, to make provision for cost-effective 
safeguards. " (Williamson 1996a) However, it is impossible to distinguish ex ante 
(prior to the exchange) or ex post (after the exchange or contract has occurred) who is 
honest and who is dishonest (Douma and Schreuder 1991), so contract monitoring is 
required. 
17 Simon, Herbert A. 1957 Models ofMan. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
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3.8.2 Small Numbers & Information Impactedness 
In addition to the two human conditions, the organisational failures framework 
accounts for two market/economic conditions: small numbers and information 
impactedness. Where there are only a few sellers, the supplier may not have to worry 
about his/her reputation because the buyer has no alternative source of supply. Small 
numbers situations can arise ex ante, where there is, for example, only one buyer and 
one supplier (bilateral monopoly). Both parties will want to exchange a quantity of 
the good/service which is profit maxin-ýising but will need to expend considerable 
resources in negotiating over price. Small numbers may also arise expost at the stage 
of contract renewal: "Although a large-numbers exchange condition obtains at the 
outset, it is transformed during contract execution into a small-numbers exchange 
relation on account of (1) idiosyncratic experience associated with contract execution, 
and (2) failures in the human and nonhuman capital markets. " (Williamson 1975: 29). 
Information impactedness derives from the combined conditions of uncertainty and 
opportunism. It occurs when some circumstances relevant to the transaction are 
known to one or some of the parties, but cannot be made known to the other party or 
parties without costs being incurred. One party may, for example, have specific task 
or transaction experience which is not available to a competing firm and so can be used 
strategically to win the contract. Alternatively winners of initial contracts may gain 
advantages over future competitors because of the experience, information and know- 
how" acquired during the contract period. Consequently, ex ante multiple supplier 
conditions are altered and disparity arises. This may ultimately give way to firms 
integrating vertically. 
'8The distinction between know-how and information is made clearly by Kogut and Zander (Kogut 
and Zander 1997). Information here is taken to mean facts; axiomatic propositions and symbols, 
which do not lose their integrity when transmitted because the rules for deciphering it are 
known. 
Know-how implies knowing what something means and knowing how to do it. Quoting ftom Von 
Flippel's definition in The Sources ofInnovation (1998), the definition Kogut and Zander adopt is that 
"know-how is the accumulated practical skill or expertise that allows one to do something smoothly 
and efficiently" (312). 
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3.8.3 Atmosphere 
The final element of Williamson's framework is atmosphere, a condition which makes 
"allowance for attitudinal interactions and the systems consequences that are 
associated therewith. " (Williamson 1975: 37) He critiques standard economic models 
for ignoring attitudinal intentions and considering individuals as only neutral or 
instrumental whereas "it may be more accurate, and sometimes even essentiall to 
regard the exchange process itself as an object of value" (ibid. p38). Here Williamson 
introduces the exchange relation into the model and "... supplying a satisfying 
exchange relation is made part of the economic problem.. " Taking blood donation as 
an example, Williamson argues that there is intrinsic value in the act of donating blood 
which is altered or perhaps lost if the transaction is commercialised. "It seems 
reasonable to believe that voluntary donors derive satisfaction partly from their sense 
of indispensability. " (ibid. p38) If donation is commercialised, donors' sense of being 
essential may be impaired because they know the system can adjust to blood shortages 
by increasing the price of blood. 
3.9 Transaction Specificity 
WMst the organisational failures framework suggests conditions under which markets 
may fail, Williamson went on to identify specific characteristics of transactions which 
incur costs or yield economies. He proposed that there are 3 critical dimensions for 
characterising transactions: uncertainty, frequency of occurrence and the degree of 
transaction specific investment. Williamson maintained that "... the most critical 
dimension for describing transactions is the condition of asset specificity. " (Williamson 
1985: 30) because it can be a source of economic value: 
"Parties engaged in a trade that is supported by nontrivial investments in 
transaction-specific assets are effectively operating in a bilateral trading relation 
with one another. Harmonising the contractual interface that joins the parties, 
thereby to effect adaptability and promote continuity, becomes the source of 
real economic value. " (Williamson 1985: 30) 
Where products are unspecialised, there are few hazards and there are likely to be 
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several alternative sources of supply and custom. However, difficulties arise when the 
specific identity of one of the parties has important cost-bearing consequences. These 
transactions are termed idiosyncratic (Williamson 1996b). If, for example, a buyer 
induces a supplier to invest in specialised capital, specific to that transaction (eg highly 
specialised production equipment), then the supplier becomes 'locked into' that buyer 
to a significant degree. The buyer too may be locked in if alternative sources of 
supply are costly and/or use unspecialised capital. 
More commonly, however, the investment is not in specialised physical capital but 
human capital. Economies in production arise, for example, because of specialised 
training and learning-by-doing. These cannot often be transferred to alternative 
suppliers at a low cost and the benefits to the buyer and the supplier are only realised if 
their relationship is maintained. 
A further set of economies can also be transaction specific - communication 
economies: "specialised language develops as experience accumulates and nuances are 
signalled and received in a sensitive way. Both institutional and personal trust 
relations evolve. " (Williamson 1996b: 173) That these types of transactions evolve into 
relational contracts is influenced by the fact that: - 
"Although large-numbers competition is frequently feasible at the initial award 
stage for recurring contracts of all kinds, idiosyncratic transactions are ones for 
which the relationship between buyer and supplier is quickly thereafter 
transformed into one of bilateral monopoly - on account of the transaction- 
specific costs... " (Williamson 1996b: 174) 
3.10 Contracts Types and Fornis of Governance 
In 1985, Williamson developed his transactions cost approach to incorporate bounded 
rationality, small numbers etc, into 2 key dimensions which he proposed would 
determine the most efficient form of governance; these dimensions were the frequency 
of transactions and the degree to which they were asset specific 
(Williamson 1985). 
Figure 3.2 identifies the types of transactions and the most efficient governance with 
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which they are associated. Market governance was deemed by Williamson to be the 
most efficient for non-specific transactions which were either occasional or recurrent 
since "both parties need only consult their own experience in deciding to continue a 
trading relationship or, at little transitional expense, turn elsewhere. Being 
standardised, alternative purchase and supply arrangements are presumably easy to 
work out. " (ibid, p74) The relation between buyer and supplier is not valued and 
litigation is only a means of settling claims. 
Figure 3.2: Efficient Governance 
Source: Williamson 1985: 79 
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Where transactions involve mixed or highly transaction specific investments, 
Williamson believes that trilateral governance is required. Where these transactions 
are occasional though, it is difficult for parties to recover the costs incurred in setting 
up the governance structure so unified governance (a single firm) may prove more 
efficient. Bilateral governance is appropriate where transactions are mixed and 
recurrent. The parties to the exchange maintain their autonomy but engage in a 
relationship where the relation is of greater importance than the contract. Where 
transactions are idiosyncratic and recurrent, unified governance is appropriate and may 
be achieved through vertical integration of buyer and supplier. Williamson writes, 
"Highly idiosyncratic transactions are ones where the human and physical 
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assets required for production are extensively specialised, so there are no 
obvious econon-ýies to be realised through interfirm trading that the buyer (or 
seller) is unable to realise himself (through vertical integration). In the case, 
however, of mixed transactions, the degree of asset specialisation is less 
complete. Accordingly, outside procurement for those components may be 
favoured by scale economy considerations. As compared with vertical 
integration, outside procurement also maintains high-powered incentives and 
limits bureaucratic distortions. " (ibid, p76) 
As transactions become progressively more idiosyncratic, according to Williamson, the 
incentives for trading weaken. This is because assets (human and physical) become 
more specialised to the point of having a single use and are therefore less transferable 
to other uses. The key issue then becomes one of which mode of governance allows 
for adaptations. Williamson writes that "The advantage of vertical integration is that 
adaptations can be made in a sequential way without the need to consult, complete, or 
revise interfirm. agreements. " (ibid, p78) Williamson's argument is that "market 
contracting gives way to bilateral contracting, which in turn is supplanted by unified 
contracting (internal organisation) as asset specificity progressively deepens. " (ibid, 
p78) 
3.11 Transacdons Costs in the NHS 
The emphasis on efficiency within the government's 1990 policy makes the transactions 
costs perspective particularly appropriate to any discussion about the NHS market. 
Williamson states that the "criterion for organising commercial transactions is assumed 
to be the strictly instrumental one of cost economising. Essentially this takes two 
parts: economising on production expense and economising on transaction costs. To 
the degree that transaction costs are negligible ... [the market] ... will 
be the most cost- 
effective means of procurement" (Williamson 1996b: 177) 
Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that GP purchasing takes place within an 
environment characterised by bounded rationality, information impactedness and small 
numbers, conditions which, according to Williamson, when combined with 
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opportunism would give rise to transactions costs. In Chapter 2 it was shown that 
there is information asymmetry between purchasers and providers and there is little 
information upon which purchasers can base purchasing decisions. Because of poor 
provider information, it becomes difficult for GPFHs to switch provider on the basis 
that they cannot compare like with like, and have limited knowledge about the service 
quality. It is likely, therefore, that information impactedness will characterise the 
contracting environment and, as Williamson indicates, initial providers will learn from 
their experience and gain information and know-how giving them an advantage over 
other providers and further reducing the likelihood of provider switching. Products are 
complex and difficult to delineate within a contract and there is considerable 
uncertainty within the market environment. 
Two crucial dimensions though were presented in Figure 3.2 - frequency of occurrence 
and transaction specificity - as the dimensions which Williamson proposes would 
determine the most efficient form of governance for NHS transactions. The UK 
government originally envisaged a market in which GPFHs and Trusts would engage in 
annual contracts (short-term contracts), for defined services. In Williamsonian terms 
these would be recurrent contracts as opposed to occasional. The degree to which 
GPFH contracts are, or might be, asset specific is, however, difficult to ascertain. 
Studies show that GPFHs have been purchasing from local providers or hospitals 
where they know the consultant to whom they refer their patients. Local knowledge, 
experience with the hospital, and social contacts have been important determinants in 
placing contracts (see Chapter 4). GPFHs have, on occasion, removed their contracts 
and sought provision elsewhere. This has usually been when waiting times/lists have 
become intolerably long, or because practices have failed to negotiate an open/direct 
access service from their provider or where they can obtain more rapid 
diagnostic/investigative services. More infrequently, patients have travelled 
(sometimes considerable distances) for private sector treatment to alleviate pressure on 
waiting lists. 
This evidence would suggest that GPFH contracts are not 
highly asset specific. 
Indeed, there are certain factors which are likely to reduce the scope 
for asset- 
specificity. Human investments are likely to 
be constrained by the fact that clinical 
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staff receive nationally governed, standard training and experience to treat the general 
population whose health needs are likely to be relatively similar across the GP 
population. GPs are, therefore, unlikely to be in need of custon-ýised technical skills 
from hospital staff and hospital staff are, therefore, unlikely to develop skill s/expertise 
unique to any (set of) customers. Human asset specificity is also likely to be 
constrained by the fact that hospital doctors are a mobile cohort and often stay for very 
short periods of time in one Trust. 
A further constraint on asset specificity is the fact that Trusts are required to provide a 
set of core services. They are, therefore, likely to require standard, not customised, 
equipment. This reduces the likelihood of capital asset specificity. 
Despite these constraining factors, there may nevertheless be certain communication 
economies which are transaction specific. Williamson (1985) notes that parties can 
develop a specialised language as experience accumulates and evolves. It is possible, 
therefore, that because GPFHs and Trusts have had to learn to operate in a new 
market environment and have had to do so as partners in a contracting process, they 
may have developed a common language and a shared trust and understanding which 
represents a non-marketable investment. 
It would seem, therefore, that GPFH contracts are mixed, rather than non-specific or 
idiosyncratic. As they are also recurrent, according to Williamson's schema, they are 
most efficiently conducted under a bilateral form of governance through relational 
contracting. This form of governance does not require third party arbitration as 
neoclassical contracting does and so saves on the costs of setting up a governance 
body to monitor performance and resolve disputes. Bilateral governance also limits 
the bureaucratic distortions associated with the single firm (Williamson, 1985). 
However, Williamson suggests that "Problems with market procurement arise ... when 
adaptability and contractual expense are considered. Whereas internal adaptations can 
be effected by fiat, outside procurement involves effecting adaptations across a market 
interface. " (Ibid., p76) In other words, the buyer and supplier need to consult, 
complete or revise their agreements which restricts sequential adaptation 
to changing 
circumstances and incurs contract-related costs. 
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3.12 A Relational Perspective 
Williamson's TCE theory focuses on the transaction as the unit of analysis. Williamson 
proposes, however, that different contracts are suited to different forms of governance 
or inter-organisational relationship. This brings the discussion to a different level, the 
relati onal level. In relational contracting, the identity of the parties is significant and 
there is pressure for the relationship to continue over time. Such relationships go 
beyond simply the content of the material transaction: "... empirical observations ... 
demonstrate that the relationship interaction between suppliers and customers that are 
important to each other is not only - and in many cases not even primarily -a matter of 
buying and selling. " (Blankenburg Holm, Erriksson, and Johanson 1999). Their 
interaction can be described as a process of social exchange between the actors (op 
cit. ). Such relationships are socially embedded" (Ferlie 1994; Ferlie and Pettigrew 
1996) and each relationship "is at every point in time a result of its history. " 
(Blankenburg Holm, Erriksson, and Johanson 1999) " 
Not only should relational contracts be considered within a social and historical 
context, but as Blankenburg et al (1999) go on to suggest, although business 
relationships are distinctive entities that can be analysed (as WE theory treats them) 
they can be better understood if they are considered in the context of the transacting 
firms' co-operation in relationships with other parties. Thus, "... the dyadic relation 
should be considered within the context of the direct exchange network surrounding 
the dyad. " (ibid). (See also Harland 1996). 
3.13 Networks 
There has been a growing interest in the subject of networks during recent years. On 
one hand, it has been noted that relational contracts require an alternative form of 
governance somewhere between markets and hierarchies (Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 
1997). This form has frequently been described as a network (Barney and Hesterly 
" See later discussion on social embeddedness. 
20 Levinthal, Daniel A. & Mark Fichman. 1988. Dynamics of interorganisational attachments: 
Auditor-client relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly. 33: 345-69 
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1999) and is increasingly common in a range of industries (for example in the 
semiconductor,, bio-technology, film, music, financial services and fashion industries 
(Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997)). On the other hand, interest in networks has 
grown from the recognition that in business relationships "the pursuit of economic 
goals is normally accompanied by that of such non-economic ones as sociability, 
approval, status and power and economic action (like all action) is socially situated, 
and 'cannot be explained by individual motives alone; it is embedded in ongoing 
networks of personal relations rather than carried out by atomised actors 
(Granovetter 1992)2. 
Whilst there is general agreement on the characteristics of networks, the term lacks an 
agreed definition (Jarillo 1990). Jones et al (1997) identify a number of terms and 
definitions used under the umbrella of "interfirm co-ordination that is characterised by 
organic or informal social systems, in contrast to bureaucratic structures within firms 
and formal contractual relationships between them". For example, 'interorganisational 
networks' (Alter and Hage 1993); 'alliance capitalism' (Gerlach & Lincon, 1992 22). 
'business groups' (Granovetter, 1995 23 ) and 'network organisations' (Nfiles & Snow, 
1992 24) . From the definitions they 
identify, Jones et al developed an integrated 
definition and termed it 'network governance': 
4Ca select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous firms (as well as 
nonprofit agencies) engaged in creating products or services based on implicit 
2' Earlier in the chapter, reference was made to two opposing views of networks. On the one hand 
some regard the network as a hybrid form of organisation somewhere between market and hierarchy 
(see for example (Williamson 1985; Jarillo 1990; Miles and Snow 1996). On the other hand, some 
regard it as a distinct form of organisation (see for example (Ouchi 199 1; Powell 199 1)) which 
is 
C4 neither a market transaction nor a hierarchical governance structure, but a separate, different mode 
of exchange, one with its own logic" (Powell 1991) (p269). 
22 Gerlach, M. L. & Lincon, J. R. 1992. The organisation of business networks in the United States and 
Japan. In N. Nohria & R. G. Eccles (Eds. ) Networks and organisations: Structure, form, and action: 
491-520. Boston: Harvard Business School Press 
23 Granovetter, M. 1995. Coase revisited: Business groups in the modem economy. Industrial and 
Corporate Change. 1: 93: 130 
24 Miles, R. E., & Snow, C. C. 1992. Causes of failures in network organisations. California 
Management Review. 28(3): 62-73. 
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and open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to co- 
ordinate and safeguard exchanges. These contracts are socially - not legally - 
binding. " (ibid). 
3.14 Network Characteristics 
Although definitions of networks differ considerably, there is a greater consensus 
about network characteristics. Network characteristics include, for example, 
mutuality, complementarity, reciprocity, conflict and collaboration and these exist 
within the totality of connections between various actors (or nodes) (Knoke and 
Kuklinski 1991). These connections extend to include buyers, suppliers, suppliers' 
suppliers and the customers of buyers, competing companies and many others with 
whom the actors are connected directly and indirectly. There are potentially four 
levels of network analysis (Knoke and Kuklinski 1991): (1) egocentric - the simplest 
form which looks at an individual node, it's connections and the relations among them; 
(2) dyad -a relationship formed by a pair of nodes; (3) triad - formed by selecting each 
possible subset of three nodes and their linkages; (4) the complete network - all the 
possible connections between the nodes. The discussion which follows applies to each 
of these levels. 
3.14.1 Co-operation and Competition 
Firms within the network are considered to be interdependent relying on open-ended 
relational contracts (Powell 1991) and because market conditions continue to prevail, 
both competitive and co-operative forces are combined as Johanson and Mattsson 
describe (Johanson and Mattsson 1991): 
"We stress complementarity in the network. There are also, of course, 
important competitive relations. Other firms want to get access to specific 
exchange possibilities, either as sellers or buyers, and co-operating firms also 
have partly conflicting objectives. The relationships imply that there are 
specific interfirm dependence relations ... this model of 
industrial markets 
implies that a firm's activities in industrial markets are cumulative processes in 
the sense the relationships are constantly being established, maintained, 
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developed and broken ... through its activities in the network the firm develops 
the relationships that secure its access to important resources and the sale of its 
products and services. " (p257) 
"The exchange implies some kind of mutuality - that is, the involved actors give to and 
receive from one another ... " 
(Hakansson and Johanson 1993: 3 9) thereby making them 
interdependent. This interdependence extends not only to the network actors, but to 
the activities and resources; all three are interdependent. Hakansson and Johanson 
argue that "each actor controls certain activities and resources directly, but because the 
dependencies to some extent mean control, the actor has indirect control over the 
counterparts' activities and resources. " (p36). What is more, each activity is 
dependent to some extent on the performance of other activities and so the activities of 
the other actors are themselves interrelated in what Hakansson and Johanson term a 
chain of activities". The actors, activities and resources form a web of "relatively 
interdependent activities" in an industrial network. This web and the connections 
which form it will change continuously because actors will acquire new knowledge, 
may alter their intentions or may have different resources available to them over time. 
It is important to note before going further in the discussion that three assumptions can 
be made about network actors: - 
I. All actors control certain resources/activities. 
2. They are purposeful in their action and act in order to make economic gain in a 
general sense. 
3. They have bounded knowledge and they are well aware of this. Thus, much of 
their action and interaction aims at gaining knowledge. (Hakansson and 
Johanson 1993: 39) 
25 Hakansson and Johansson stress that they are not referring to generic value chains suggested by 
Porter (Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, New York: Free 
Press, 1985). Instead, they are referring to activities which are "enacted; they are emergent 
phenomena that are formed and modified through interaction among the actors. 
" 
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3.14.2 Co-ordination, Pýice & Reputation 
Co-ordination and mutual interest is achieved in part through "... a set of more or less 
implicit rules, which are related to the exchange in the same way as language is related 
to communication. The rules are formed, reinforced, and modified through exchange 
... They view one another as specific counterparts, they have some knowledge about 
one another; they have some trust in one another; and they are aware of and may even 
share one another's interests ... " (Hakansson and Johanson 1993: 39) Having 
recognised their common interests, the need for adjustments among the interdependent 
firms concerning quantity and quality of goods and services exchanged, and the timing 
of such exchange, call for more or less explicit co-ordination through joint planning, 
or through power exercised by one party over the other... " (ibid, p256, emphasis 
added). 
The role of price in the network differs from the market. Croxson (1997) points out 
that opportunities for short term gain are foregone in the interest of sustaining an 
integrated buyer-supplier relationship: "These opportunities appear if one part is 
offered a more favourable price by a third party, or if one party could extract economic 
rent from the other by acting opportunistically. Co-operative relationships will 
therefore be characterised by some degree of expected longevity ... and 
by the use of 
information other than prices to allocate resources. " 
Reputation plays an important part in network relationships. Granovetter (1985) 
argues that: 
"The widespread preference for transacting with individuals of known 
reputation implies that few are actually content to rely on either generalised 
morality or institutional arrangements to guard against trouble ... Better than 
the statement that someone is known to be reliable is information 
from a 
trusted informant that he has dealt with that individual and found him so. Even 
better is information from one's own past dealings with that person. This is 
better information for four reasons: (1) it is cheap; (2) one trusts one's own 
information best - it is richer, more detailed, and 
known to be accurate; (3) 
individuals with whom one has a continuing relation have an economic 
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motivation to be trustworthy, so as not to discourage future transactions; and 
(4) departing from pure economic motives, continuing economic relations often 
become overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of trust 
and abstention from opportunism. " 
3.14.3 Information 
Powell (1991) proposes that networks are particularly apt for circumstances in which 
there is a need for efficient, reliable information. "The most useful information is 
rarely that which flows down the formal chain of command in an organisation or that 
which can be inferred from shifting price signals. Rather, it is that which is obtained 
from someone whom you have dealt with in the past and found to be reliable. You 
trust best information that comes from someone you know well. " (p272) As a result, 
networks are especially useful where the value of commodities is not easily measured. 
Know-how, technological capability, production styles and innovative approaches to 
production are just some characteristics which are difficult to cost within a contractual 
relationship. Therefore, "the open-ended, relational features of networks, with their 
relative absence of explicit quid pro quo behaviour, greatly enhance the ability to 
transmit and learn new knowledge and skills. " (p272) 
3.14.4 Reciprocity & Trust 
Reciprocity is central to networks but is difficult to define because it may not be 
readily visible as equal value exchanges but may involve indebtedness and obligation 
over the long term (Powell 1991). Integral to long-term reciprocity is trust which, 
in 
Powell's words, is "a remarkably efficient lubricant to economic exchange ... 
Trust 
reduces complex realities far more quickly and economically than prediction, authority 
or bargaining. " (p273) For trust to be engendered, however, parties must 
have 
mutual interests and behave according to standards that neither can 
determine 
individually (op cit. ). 
Sako (1992) defines three types of inter-organisational trust: 
Contract Trust - charactenses all contracts, even arm s 
length (spot) 
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contracts where parties retain their independence. They still trust one 
another to behave in a mutually acceptable manner, ie, to uphold 
universalistic ethical standards of keeping promises - agreeing to produce 
and deliver goods on the basis of written orders, obeying the law, expecting 
payment within a given period of time after delivery etc. 
Competence Trust - concerns the expectation of a trading partner 
performing its role competently in terms of technical and managerial 
competence . ..... a buyer may either entrust a supplier to carry out a task 
which the buyer itself has the ability to carry out, or it may entrust a 
specialist to carry out tasks whose technicalities are outside of his 
capability. " (Sako 1992: 37-38) This may or may not involve inspection of 
quality on delivery (much of this having been mitigated by the increase in 
quality assurance by suppliers). 
Goodwill Trust - exists only within what Sako terms Obligational Relational 
Contracts (ORCs) which are akin to the relational contract. It refers to 
mutual expectations and open commitment between parties and "may be 
defined as the willingness to do more than is formally expected " (ibid. p38) 
There are no explicit promises to fulfil as with 'contractual trust', nor fixed 
professional standards to be reached, as with case of 'competence trust'. 
Someone worthy of'goodwill trust'is dependable, endowed with discretion, 
and can be trusted to take initiative without taking unfair advantage. 
Buyer and supplier reputation is important for the development of trust. At the outset 
when economic actors are perhaps unfamiliar with one another trust may be 'fragile' 
(Srnith Ring 1997). A good reputation may be sufficient to permit reliance on fragile 
trust until more 'resilient' trust can be developed. Network relationships will be 
important sources of information regarding each party's reputation (ibid. ). 
3.14.5 Knowledge Sharing, Research & Innovadon 
Relational interaction promotes the development of knowledge (Johanson and 
Mattsson 1991; Harland 1996; Stuart 1997) which means that the network is an 
important source of knowledge for individual firms. As Hakansson and Snehota 
79 
(1989) explain, "The interaction between the parties in a relationship entails more than 
just passive adaptation. While the two parties are interacting, their problems are 
confronted with solutions, their abilities with needs etc. Reciprocal knowledge and 
capabilities are revealed and developed jointly and in mutual dependence by the two 
parties ...... Alter and Hage (1993) suggest that ongoing development of inter- 
organisational networks is perpetuated because of "the growth in knowledge, 
produced by steadily increasing investments in research and the rapid technological 
changes that result. " (p20) Moreover, networks can "integrate diverse and disparate 
pieces of new knowledge ... 
[and] 
... allow the combination of different kinds of 
expertise. " (ibid. p28) 
Choi and Lee (1997) argue that networks may be more efficient than markets for 
knowledge integration and transfer. This in turn has a significant impact on the 
opportunities for investment, research and innovation. Whilst short-run price- 
competition improves efficiency by encouraging one-off cost reductions (Croxson 
1997), it may also impede investment in innovation which would yield sustained cost 
reductions. Croxson writes, "It is important to remember that the benefits of vying 
over prices are generated by a static model which does not recognise that, in a dynamic 
context, 'vying' over given resources may stifle growth-promoting innovation. " (ibid). 
Grabher (1993b) warns, however, that if relationships are over- or under-socialised, 
"Too little embeddedness may expose networks to an erosion of their supportive tissue 
of social practices ... Too much embeddedness, 
however, may promote a petrification 
of this supportive tissue and ... pervert networks 
into cohesive coalitions against more 
radical innovations. " (Grabher 1993 a) 
3.14.6 Learning & Adaptation 
Through inter-firm exchange, parties test how well they fit together in a process that is 
"not only a learning process but also an adaptation process. " (Johanson and Mattsson 
1991: 258) Adaptations may for example, be technical (eg, modifying products or 
production processes), logistical (eg, adjusting stock levels), administrative 
(eg, 
modifying planning or scheduling systems) or financial (eg, 
handling payments in 
special ways). 
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Attitudes and knowledge are also the subject of adaptations (eg, by working together 
in some technical development matter). This, Johanson and Mattsson suggest, results 
in a common language regarding technical matters, contracting rules and the 
standardisation of processes, products and routines. "A most important aspect of 
mutual orientation is mutual knowledge, knowledge which the parties assume each has 
about the other and upon which they draw in communicating with each other. This 
mutual knowledge may refer to resources, strategies, needs and capabilities of the 
parties and, in particular, to their relationships with other firms. It is a subtle 
knowledge based on personal experience, and takes time to develop. " (p259) 
As a consequence of adaptation, firms "utilise and strengthen the interdependencies of 
their activities. " (Hakansson and Johanson 1993: 40), and through learning, adapt their 
activities in a way which increases joint productivity and strengthens interdependence 
(op cit. ) 
3.14.7 Conflict, Power and Control 
Networks are co-operative but are not characterised solely by collaboration, harmony 
and concord (Granovetter 1985; Powell 1991; Hakansson and Johanson 1993) - "In 
every relation there are both common and conflicting interests between the actors. 
Thus, relations can be viewed as a co-operative mode of handling conflicts. " 
(Hakansson and Johanson 1993: 39-40) and each point of contact in the network is a 
potential source of conflict.. Each point of contact in q network is a potential source 
of conflict. 
Quoting Keohane 26 , Powell notes that reciprocity or co-operation 
in no way 
"insulate[s] practitioners from considerations of power. " (p273) Moreover, "Power 
is 
not only rooted in individuals ... It also stems 
from the interactions of individuals with 
and between firms, and from the control of information and resources 
in these 
interactions. " (Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley 1996: 711). Besanko et al identify four 
key sources from which power stems: "(1) the relative 
dependence of an actor on 
26 Keohane, R (1986) "Reciprocity in International Relations", International 
Organisation 40(l): 1-27 
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others in a set of interrelated jobs and tasks ... ; (2)the centrality of an actor within an 
organisation's communication network; (3) the degree to which the individual is 
substitutable within a relationship; and (4) the dependence of a firm, or a unit within a 
firm, on the ability of key individuals to cope with uncertainties that affect 
performance. " (p71 1) Clearly, these sources relate to the power of an individual 
within a firm but when one considers that firms within a network are mutually 
interdependent, this introduces further levels of power. 
Bates and Slack (1998) point out that much of the literature on integrated buyer- 
supplier (or supply-chain) relationships assumes that buyers have sufficient power to 
influence their suppliers. Bates and Slack, however, note that this is not necessarily the 
case. They support Thorelli's (1986)27 contention that power is never held unilaterally 
in such relationships neither is any participant powerless, and make the distinction 
between dependence and commitment in relationships. Dependence arises when the 
buyer needs the supplier whether they like it or not (perhaps due to limited supply 
options or a power imbalance). Commitment, however, "arises from mutual trust and 
an exhibited willingness by both parties to invest resources in the relationship, and to 
be tolerant in the face of problems. " (Bates and Slack 1998) 
Control is a further important structural dimension of networks (Hakansson and 
Johanson 1993). Actors have some, although incomplete, direct control over their 
own activities and have indirect control over other activities via their relations with 
other actors. "The overall indirect control over other actors' activities in the network 
is based on the position within the network, the strength of the relations, and the 
relative importance of the actors to one another. " (p42). It is not shared equally 
among the actors and as such its distribution shapes not only the direct consequences 
for actors, but the future shape of the network. 
27 Thorelli, H. B., 1986 Networks: between markets and hierarchies. Strategic Management Journal 7, 
37-51 
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3.14.8 Baniers to Entry 
Interfirm relationships which develop in a network can be difficult to intercept. To get 
established in a new market and enter any networks, a firm has to build relationships 
that are new to it and to its counterparts. Due to mutual adaptation, "'voice' is better 
as a conflict resolution mechanism than 'exit', since exit is not easy or attractive. " 
(Johanson and Mattsson 1991: 259) As Ferlie puts is "There is a tendency to 'keep 
things in the family' so that buyers - once locked into a set of relationships - may be 
relatively inert in seeking new sources of supply. " (Ferlie 1994) Penetrating these 
relationships becomes extremely difficult for a new firm to do. 
3.14.9 Pý-oduction Costs & Quality 
Firms may experience reduced production costs. If, or example, individual providers 
specialise but form co-operative relationships with providers of complementary 
services, then as a group they can offer a full range of services. Each firm can respond 
quickly to changes which affect only part of the overall production process but which 
benefit the group as a whole. Moreover, "within a cluster of specialised firms, each 
firm has access to a wider variety of 'capabilities' than if they each had to internalise all 
aspects of production. " (Croxson 1997) Firms may also make use of integrated buyer- 
supplier relations to improve product and process quality (Sako 1992; Dubois and 
Hakansson 1997) by streamlining production processes, jointly investing in equipment 
and by focusing on long term quality improvements. 
3.14.10 The Individual Organisational Unit 
Network effectiveness is not only dependent on the ability of firms to relate to one 
another, but also on individual firms' effectiveness, specifically that of its resource 
deployment capabilities (Hakansson and Snehota 1989). 
Within the supply chain, a firm's purchasing function becomes particularly important. 
Studies of supply-chain management (Cousins 1995; Harland 1996; Stuart 1997), 
emphasise the extent to which firms engaged in integrated buyer-supplier relationships 
have reorganised their individual internal activities so that combined inter-firm 
activities are effectively streaHined, adding value to the chain of their activities. 
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The deployment of knowledge resources is also important. Nonaka et al (1996) 
write: - 
"In recent years, the vital importance of knowledge to business has been 
highlighted. Quinn", for example, observed that a company's competitive 
advantage increasingly depends on such 'knowledge-based intangibles' as 
technological know-how and deep understandings of customers. Drucker" 
argued that knowledge is "the only meanineul resource" in business today. " 
(italics added) 
The capacity of firms to accrue and exploit new knowledge is particularly important. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggest that the scope for innovation and learning is not 
automatically accrued through collaborating, but is dependent upon an individual firm's 
absorptive capacity: "... the ability of a firm to recognise the value of new, external 
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends is critical to its innovative 
capabilities. We label this capability a firm's absorptive capacity ... " Whilst they do 
not constrain their discussion to knowledge within the firm, their attention to the ability 
of the firm to assimilate and use new knowledge is consistent with the views taken by 
proponents of the resource based view of the firm (see for example Wernerfelt 1984; 
Penrose 1997). Penrose (1997), for example suggests that the growth of the firm is 
constrained by internal resources, more particularly the productive services available to 
a firm from its own resources, and specifically its management resources". 
28QUin_n, J. B. (1992) Intelligent Enterprise: A Knowledge and Service Based Paradigm or Industry. 
New York: The Free Press 
29Drucker, P. (1993) Post-Capitalist Society. London: Butterworth Heinemann. 
30Penrose makes an important distinction between resources and the services rendered by resources - 
"Strictly speaking, it is never resources themselves that are the'inputs' in the production process, but 
only the services that the resource can render. The services yielded by resources are a function of the 
way in which they are used - exactly the same resource when used for different purposes or in 
different ways and in combination with different types or amounts of other resources provide a 
different service or set of services ... resources consist of a bundle of potential services and can, 
for the 
part be defined independently of their use, while services cannot be so defined. " (pp30) 
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3.14.11 Organisational Knowledge and Learning 
Cohen and Levinthal's (1990) attention to absorptive capacity proves particularly 
important in the context of the preceding discussion about networks. Networks are 
believed by many to offer particular advantages for knowledge sharing and innovation. 
However, papers cited in earlier discussions place little emphasis on limitations to 
innovation and knowledge sharing that may exist within individual firms. Absorptive 
capacity requires that prior, related knowledge exists within the organisation for new 
knowledge is to be assimilated and used (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). This knowledge 
may be technical, scientific or may include learning skills: "experience or performance 
on one learning task may influence and improve performance on some subsequent 
learning task". (ibid). 
That prior knowledge exists is extremely important: 
"... learning is cumulative, and learning performance is greatest when the object 
of learning is related to what is already known. As a result, learning is more 
difficult in novel domains, and, more generally, an individual's expertise - what 
he or she knows well - will change only incrementally. " (ibid) 
It is also important that prior knowledge is diverse: 
"In a setting in which there is uncertainty about the knowledge domains from 
which potentially useful information may emerge, a diverse background 
provides a more robust basis for learning because it increases the prospect that 
incoming information will relate to what is already known. In addition to 
strengthening assimilative powers, knowledge diversity also facilitates the 
innovative process by enabling the individual to make novel associations and 
linkages. " Obid) 
Nonaka et al (1996) stress that as well as transferring knowledge, organisations create 
knowledge by supporting creative individuals and providing contexts for them 
in which 
to create knowledge. (This is also said to be true for innovation, which also requires 
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the right organisational. environment in which to flourish (Henry and Walker 199 1; 
Nohria and Gulati 1996)) Indeed, Nonaka et al. argue that "Organisational knowledge 
creation ... should be understood as a process that 'organisationally' amplifies the 
knowledge created by individuals and crystallises it as a part of the knowledge system 
of the organisation. " Knowledge transfer and knowledge creation, they suggest, cross 
intra- and inter-organisational boundaries. 
Also important is the ability to exploit new knowledge, a process which "depends on 
transfers of knowledge" across sub-units within the organisation and across it's 
interface with the external environment (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). This relies on 
critical knowledge, ie, the "awareness of where useful complementary expertise resides 
within and outside the organisation. " (ibid) This may be knowledge of who knows 
what, who can help with what problem, or who can exploit new information. Critical 
knowledge therefore depends on both internal and external relationships. 
It is important to recognise that individuals within co-operating firms also have a role 
within the network. Sometimes mutual orientation among firms is principally a mutual 
adaptation among individual actors (Johanson and Mattsson 1991), for example, 
between individual salesmen and purchasers. Knoke and Kuklinski (1991) argue that 
"The organisation of social relations ... becomes a central concept 
in analysing the 
structural properties of the networks within which individual actors are embedded, and 
for detecting emergent social phenomena that have no existence at the level of the 
individual actor. " (ibid, p 173) Actors may also belong to a number of networks 
within the firm. For example, an advice giving network may differ from a formal 
authority network and that again from a fiiendship network. Also of significance are 
the networks to which individuals do not belong because "... the structure of relations 
among actors and the location of individual actors in the network have important 
behavioural, perceptual and attitudinal consequences both for individual units and 
for the system as a whole. " (Knoke and Kuklinski 199 1). 
In summary, therefore, 
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"To the extent that an organisation develops a broad and active network of 
internal and external relationships, individuals' awareness of others' capabilities 
and knowledge will be strengthened. As a result, individual absorptive 
capacities are leveraged all the more, and the organisation's absorptive capacity 
is strengthened. " (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) 
In summary, network theorists propose that the network form of organisation offers 
particular advantages over the hierarchy and market. It is more efficient due to the 
lowering of transactions costs, offers opportunities for jointly funded investments, 
learning, innovation and knowledge transfer, and achieves long-run efficiencies. Firms 
in the network adapt to one another on the basis of trust and pursue both economic 
and social goals. Networked firms engage in relationships which are reciprocal, 
collaborative (yet not devoid of conflict) and interdependent. It is, however, important 
to bear in mind that the extent to which networked firms can exploit the benefits 
associated with networks is dependent on individual firm capabilities. 
3.15 Networks and the NHS 
As this chapter noted earlier, research conducted in the years following the NHS 
reforms" (see for example Ferlie 1994; Bennett and Ferlie 1996; Deakin and Walsh 
1996; Ferlie and Pettigrew 1996) suggested that contracts between buyers and 
suppliers in the NHS were of a relational not neoclassical nature, and that the NHS 
should be regarded as a network of organisations engaged in socially embedded 
relationships. Purchasing is not influenced solely by price, as Ferlie points out, but by 
a number of factors of which one important one is reputation. "In professional services 
(e. g. medicine), information on reputation is transmitted through organisational and 
occupational networks and is critical in establishing market position. " (Ferlie 1994) 
Reputation plays a particularly important role in the NHS because of the dearth of 
information about health services and thus a high degree of information asymmetry 
between purchasers and providers (Mannion and Smith 1997). Mannion and Smith 
(1997) suggest why it is that reputation is particularly important in health care: - 
31 See Chapter 4 for review of the empirical evidence. 
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"The concept of reputation is ... closely associated with qualitative aspects of a 
product which cannot be incorporated into a formal contract. Purchasers can 
observe the past and current quality of a producer, and may form judgements 
about the future quality of its products on the basis of such historical 
observations ... In contrast to status, which tends to be thought of as a public 
attribute, reputation is often treated as a private judgement regarding future 
quality - that is, reputation judgements may vary from consumer to consumer. 
Reputation is likely to be important where (a) qualitative aspects of the product 
are important, (b) there is a difficulty in writing complete contracts, (c) 
contracts are long term, and (d) the quality of the product can only be judged 
after it has been used. " 
There are a number of important implications which follow from seeing markets in 
more relational terms-- 
"Unlike individual consumers, corporate buyers might often interact with 
sellers. The relationship between companies might display a complex history of 
adaptation, conunitment, trust and conflict. Buyer-seller relationships are but 
one example of sets of relations which may shape a market, as buyer-buyer and 
seller-seller relations may also be important. The interaction process is not 
solely revolving around product/service exchange, but also includes important 
processes of social exchange, undertaken so as to reduce uncertainty and to 
build trust. The result may be a common value system which emphasises 
source loyalty. There is a tendency to 'keep things in the family', so that buyers 
- once locked into a set of relationships - may be relatively inert in seeking new 
sources of supply. " (Ferlie 1994) 
What might also be expected when viewing the NHS as a network of relational 
contracts, is that there will be evidence of mutual adaptation, knowledge sharing and 
innovation unless the parties are unable to acquire, assimilate and exploit new 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). In terms of knowledge transfer and learning, 
because GPFHs and hospital trusts have prior knowledge of services and diversity in 
their knowledge (a combination of specialist secondary and specialist primary care 
88 
knowledge) there should be significant scope for innovation and learning. It can also 
be expected that there will be some degree of conflict and that some individuals may 
have more prominent network positions than others. 
As the network's effectiveness is dependent upon the organisational effectiveness of 
individual actors, at the end of the day, if a hospital is unable to organise itself 
internally and provide adequate services, good interorganisational relationships may be 
insufficient to sustain buyer-supplier relations. This is because the activities of, and 
service offered by, the GPFH are dependent to an extent on the activities of the 
hospital. Poorly performing hospital services may mean increased patient visits to the 
GP which ultimately drain GP resources. 
It is important to bear in mind that the network model whilst based on collaboration, 
also assumes a degree of contestability. If there are no alternative sources of supply 
available to the GPFH then there remains a question mark over the extent to which 
buyers can effect any changes in the hospital. Barriers to communication may prevail 
and high levels of inefficiency may occur if there are no incentives for the hospital to 
improve their performance because they enjoy a monopoly position in their local 
market. 
3.15.1 Networks: Resource Allocadon and Organisational Efficiency 
One of the crucial aspects of the network form of organisation in the NHS is whether it 
is an efficient mode of organising transactions; and whether it results in allocative and 
productive efficiency. This aspect is more problematic to consider because only Sako 
(1992)was found to deal with this aspect in any detail in the network context. Sako 
suggests that arms-length contractual relations (ACRs) (classical market contracts) and 
obligational contractual relations (OCR's) (socially embedded relational contracts) 
have different implications for the composition and level of costs". 
Resource Allocation 
32 Total costs include production costs and the transactions costs of negotiating, writing and 
monitoring contracts as well as building up trust etc. 
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Classical contract (ACR) trading has the advantage of flexibility in selecting trading 
partners and buyers can switch according to price whenever their contracts expire. 
Relational (or OCR) contracts, however, are more rigid due to moral obligations to 
sustain relationships. Sako suggests that "from this reasoning, allocative efficiency is 
more easily achievable under ACR then under OCR. " (Ibid, p224). However, this 
argument does not hold if there are suitable incentives under OCR which effectively 
mimic market pressures for continuous productivity-enhancing improvements. What 
is more, information asymmetry exists to a lesser degree between the buyer and 
supplier in OCR than in ACR. This, Sako argues, potentially leads to pricing which is 
more allocatively efficient because prices reflect costs more accurately. "Price 
negotiations in ACR take on an air of hard commercial bargaining with importance 
attached to tactics and strategy, while OCR negotiations tend to centre more around 
engineering effort to lower costs. The contrast in approach becomes starker when 
prices are reviewed and renegotiated. " (Ibid, p228) 
Resource Utilisation 
Relational contracts may reduce both production and transactions costs. Uncertainty is 
reduced through the development of trust and knowledge sharing (Johanson and 
Mattsson 1991) and parties may take a long term view of costs (Sako 1992). Sako, 
found that prices of materials and components were higher under OCRs but parties 
believed that long run benefits would be accrued from building trust with their 
suppliers which would outweigh the benefits of being able to switch trading partners as 
prices dictate. Consequently, 
11 ... there are grounds 
for believing that OCR may achieve a lower total 
production cost than ACR. This is likely to occur if normative values 
governing OCR elicit greater work effort, and hence higher X-efficiency, thus 
reducing labour costs (or increasing labour productivity). It 
is plausible that in 
times of crisis, a buyer's appeal to 'goodwill trust' ... may give greater 
incentives 
for suppliers to reduce costs than impersonal market 
forces. " (Sako 1992: 22) 
Transactions costs which arise from, for example, searching, negotiating and 
monitoring efforts are higher for ACR firms who 
deal with a greater number of trading 
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partners. Asset specificity (and thus the cost of non-marketability) is, according to 
Johanson and Mattsson (199 1), the rule rather than the exception. 
A further set of economies which may be achieved in the network are X-efficiency 
gains. Although the concept of X-efficiency is largely about what goes on inside the 
firm, Sako proposes that the concept can be extended to inter-firm relations. Inter- 
firm X-efficiency is about the efficiency of a pair of trading partners put together (Sako 
1992). "... Inter-firm X-efficiency may increase over time in a trade relationship as 
tacit understanding emerges over the product specification and quality requirements, in 
price negotiation and in planning future production. " 
Sako's research found no conclusive causal links between ACR-OCR patterns and 
organisational efficiency: "It could be argued that ACR traders achieve allocative 
efficiency by reserving the right to switch their partners as prices dictate, but there are 
no sufficient grounds for thinking that ACR-type relations lead to X-efficiency also. 
Similarly there is no theoretical basis for asserting that the existence of'goodwill trust' 
in OCR-type relations constitutes a sufficient condition for generating incentives to 
maintain efficient practices over time. It is quite possible that such trust, by 
diminishing the expectation of trading partners quitting, reduces the incentive to make 
an effort and hence coexists with X-inefficient practices. " (ibid, p221). The 
contribution of OCRs to the reduction of transactions costs is also uncertain - "... if 
we concentrate on the current component of transaction costs, ACR firms are willing 
to trade off an increase in transaction costs in order to obtain lower materials costs 
through bargaining, while OCR firms typically face low current transaction costs (due 
to past investment in trust) but temporarily high material and component costs. " (ibid, 
p22) 
3.15.2 Networks & Incentivesfor Efficiency 
Whilst there are uncertainties about the extent to which networks yield economies, 
there is some clarity about mechanisms or incentives for stimulating efficiencies. Sako 
identifies pricing and continuous improvement incentives which can be used to mimic 
market pressure and thereby improve efficiencies. 
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Price 
The determination of price is usually partly a matter of norms (industry- or country- 
specific) and partly a matter of relative bargaining power. Under ACRs, suppliers 
generally do not disclose details of cost calculations to their customers for fear of 
weakening their bargaining power". in OCR-relations, however, in the interests of 
openness and communication, greater levels of detail in costing/pricing can be 
disclosed. Because buyers exercise 'voice' rather than exit, parties can take a longer- 
term perspective on cost reduction. In Sako's study, firms had two mechanisms for 
such reductions: price-reduction targets or time path of price reduction targets and 
joint analysis of costs using value analysis and value engineering techniques. The 
benefits of this approach were mutual. Suppliers by rationalising their companies 
could save on material costs, increase capacity utilisation, cut internal costs and make 
quality and productivity improvements whereas buyers benefited from quality 
improvements and cost reduction over the longer term. 
Continuous Improvement 
A second mechanism/incentive is that of continuous improvement. In market 
relationships, the need to remain competitive serves as an incentive for product/process 
improvements. In network relationships, however, it is less clear what incentives exist 
to ensure concomitant levels of continuous improvement. Indeed, inefficiencies may 
be incurred where customers become locked-into particular suppliers (see earlier 
discussions). One incentive for ensuring continuous improvement is where suppliers 
are ranked according to (maintenance of) quality and delivery performance in published 
monthly lists. Suppliers who climb up the ladder are assured of increasing levels of 
desirable orders (Sako 1992). Sako argues that "Suppliers' incentives to make X- 
efficiency enhancing effort derive in part from inter-supplier rivalry but also from the 
customer company's reputation for integrity in keeping its promise to reward those 
suppliers making greater effort. " (ibid. p23 7) 
33 Disclosing profit margins or detailed cost levels might mean that their profit is negotiated away. 
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3.15.3 NHS Networks: Costs & Benefits 
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the comparative efficiency of markets and 
networks. The efficiency of individual activities is difficult to ascertain because 
individual firms' economies are dependent in part upon their ability to achieve 
economies of scale and to work efficiently with other network members (Dubois and 
Hakansson 1997). The efficiency of the network is a function of the ability of actors 
to combine and integrate different resource elements needed to perform the activities 
and to create value for customers (Dubois and Hakansson 1997). It is likely that 
network activities, resources and complementarities will differ over time and between 
network members, and may not always need to be combined. Not only is this 
complex to analyse but as Ebers and Grandori (1997) point out, conceptual 
frameworks have not yet been developed for analysing internal and external network 
costs. 
Nevertheless, from this discussion, it would seem that the NHS as a network 
organisation may benefit from the possible lowering of transactions costs and improved 
allocative and productive efficiency where it is able to create appropriate incentives. 
Innovations and learning ought to arise from the mutuality, reciprocity and creativity 
which characterises networks, although these benefits are limited by the degree to 
which NHS organisations can absorb and exploit new knowledge and asset specific 
investments may be non-marketable. NHS networks are also likely to be characterised 
by both conflict and collaboration, and should be seen from the point of view not only 
of buyer-supplier relations, but buyer-buyer and supplier-supplier relationships. 
3.16 Summary 
This chapter has integrated economic and social theories in order to analyse the likely 
impact of market and network forms of organisation upon allocative efficiency and 
resource utilisation within the NHS. It has discussed in detail the costs associated 
with market transactions and has considered the characteristics and dynamics of 
relational contracts. The chapter has concluded that NHS contracts are more akin to 
relational contracts and occur within a network of interconnected buyers and suppliers. 
it follows, therefore, that if the NHS is able to exploit individual firm capabilities, it 
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may benefit from knowledge transfer, organisational learning, joint investments and 
innovations. Parties may, however, become engaged in non-marketable investments 
thereby incurring losses if trading with those partners ceases. The thesis returns, in 
Chapters 9 and 10, to further reflect on to these issues in light of this study's findings. 
Having so far discussed the historical and theoretical contexts of the NHS market in 
Chapters I to 3, Chapter 4 now goes on to review the empirical literature dealing with 
the behavioural and attitudinal responses GPs have made to their purchasing role and 
to the fundholding scheme. It also identifies the research gaps to which this study 
contributes. 
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Review of Empirical Studies: 
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Introduction 
Chapters I to 3 have discussed the NHS market in terms of its historical context and 
theoretical basis. These chapters showed that purchasing relationships in the NHS are 
best understood from a relational contracting and network perspective which assumes 
that network actors are motivated by both economic and social factors. The empirical 
evidence reviewed in Chapter 4 supports this view. 
This chapter brings together published empirical evidence concerning GP purchasing 
behaviour and attitudes to the reforms. Two dimensions of purchasing are addressed, 
the purchasing role in the broad sense and the fundholding scheme in particular. 
Difficulties in interpreting research findings are highlighted before considering the 
published empirical material in detail after which the chapter concludes by 
highlighting the research gaps to which this study will contribute. 
4.1 Evaluating the Reforms -A Cautionary Word 
When the government launched the 1990 reforms, it resisted pressure and widespread 
criticism from practitioners and academics to scientifically evaluate pilot fundholding 
practices (Le Grand 1994; Robinson 1994; Coulter 1995b). The Secretary of State for 
Health, Kenneth Clarke, denied any requirement for formal monitoring and evaluation 
and said calling on the advice of academics was a "sign of weakness" (Robinson 1994) 
The lack of evaluation troubled even the pioneers of the NHS reforms (Smith 1989; 
Maynard 1994). Alain Enthoven called the decision "a mistake" (Smith 1989), 
suggesting that demonstration projects would have helped break down the resistance 
to change, and that much was at stake given the uncertainty of the policy 
innovations. 
Although the government's approach meant that there would be no pilot studies, some 
evaluations of the reforms have been conducted. The Kings Fund quickly 
decided to 
fund its own research programme inviting research proposals in 1989. 
Seven projects 
were awarded funding for the period 1990-1993 covering a range of 
issues: market 
structure and managed competition, performance of NHS 
Trusts, GP fundholding, 
views of GPs and patients concerning hospital referral, medical audit, services 
for older 
people and the changing role of the personnel 
function. Reports from each of the 
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studies were brought together in a comprehensive review of the reforms (Robinson and 
Le Grand 1994). The Audit Commission's (1996) study of GP fundholding in England 
and Wales was the largest evaluation to be conducted. 
In Scotland, the approach to evaluation was different. The BMA in Scotland 
persuaded the government to allow the proposals to be tested. They agreed to 
independently evaluate a shadow fundholding exercise to assess the effects on the care 
of patients and look at administrative structures, consulting patterns, and use of 
doctors'time. (Wisely 1993) Twelve practices (six in the north east of Scotland, five 
in Grampian and one in Tayside) were identified for a pilot study which was evaluated 
by Professor John Howie at the University of Edinburgh (Howie, Heaney, and 
Maxwell 1995). 
The lack of formal reviews is, however, not the only factor hindering evaluation. 
Simultaneous changes and subsequent injections of resources into the NHS cause 
further difficulties (Le Grand 1994). Firstly, Le Grand identifies a number of changes 
occurring in parallel with market development. The 1990 GP contract, the Patients' 
Charter, and 1990 community care legislation, for example, have all had an effect on 
the NHS' systemic behaviour. Consequently, it is impossible to isolate changes due to 
market factors from other influences. 
The second difficulty arises because of injections of resources into the NHS (see also 
Petchey 1993). Additional resources are likely to have enabled hospitals to reduce 
waiting lists and to improve the range of services they offer. Consequently, these 
changes cannot be considered as a direct or sole consequence of market measures. 
When considering empirical findings, it is also important to bear in mind that for the 
first few years of the reforms, there was pressure from the government to restrain the 
pace of change, to maintain a steady state (Ferlie 1994; Kirkup and Donaldson 1994). 
GPFHs and HAs were obliged to maintain referral patterns to a level consistent with 
the pre-market environment. Such artificial constraints are particularly significant 
when interpreting studies conducted during the early 1990s. 
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4.2 The Fundholding Scheme 
Despite the difficulties in evaluating the reforms, a number of empirical studies have 
been conducted. These studies have mainly concentrated on prescribing rates and 
hospital referral rates. Indeed, in a recent review of all the quantitative studies on UK 
fundholding, Gosden and Torgerson (1997) identified 17 published studies of which 
four were based on one original evaluation in Edinburgh and a further four were based 
on one original evaluation in Oxford. Although the studies reviewed by Gosden and 
Torgerson looked at the effect of fundholding on referral and prescribing costs aspects 
such as purchasing decision criteria and GP views of fundholding have also been 
addressed. The general conclusions from these studies can be summarised as follows: 
" fundholders have not responded to financial incentives as expected; 
" savings through changed prescribing practice have been only short term; 
" hospital referrals have increased; 
" formal sources of information have little influence on purchasing decisions 
when compared with the high value placed on local and personal knowledge 
and judgement; 
" GPs are keen to support local hospitals rather than to switch to alternative 
providers; and 
" buyer power was exercised only as a last resort. 
This chapter goes on now to review these empirical studies in detail beginning with a 
brief reminder of the original objectives of the fundholding scheme. 
4. ZI Objectives & Assumptions of Fundholding 
When considering the empirical evidence, it is important to bear in mind the original 
fundholding and purchasing objectives and assumptions. 
"[Fundholding] aims to make GPs aware of the financial consequences of their 
clinical decisions and, by giving them an incentive to make and spend audited 
savings, to encourage them to consider the costs of different courses of action. 
The expectation is that this will lead to more economic and efficient use of 
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hospital and community health services, and more rational prescribing. Giving 
GPs the power to contract with providers, and the freedom to choose between 
them, is intended to give providers - particularly hospitals and their consultants 
- an incentive to listen more carefully to what GPs have to say and to take steps 
to improve their quality of services. " (Audit Commission 1996: 6). 
"It is essential that practices are able to manage their total expenditure, without 
denying services to their patients. it is also important that they do so in a way 
which enables them to negotiate the best deals they can. ... GPs themselves will 
be responsible for deciding the best mix of budgeting and contractual 
arrangements for their practices... " (Department of Health 1989: 51-52). 
Clearly then, GPs had a dual responsibility to improve their own practice management 
and control their expenditure, and to negotiate improved services to patients, seek out 
the best deal thus stimulating improved efficiencies within secondary care. However, 
as Chapter 2 has already discussed, a number of concerns were raised about issues 
such as budget volatility, practice management skills, under-referral, 'cream skimming' 
and two-tier health services. The purchasing function was also called into question on 
the basis that GPs lacked purchasing skills and information (Pollock and Majeed 1995; 
Deakin and Walsh 1996), would not take a strategic perspective, but a'parochial' one 
causing fragmentation (Hegginbotham 1994) and that the transactions costs of the 
contracting system would be high, possibly outweighing any benefits to patients (Ham 
1994; Thomas 1995). 
These issues generated a broad research agenda, covered at two levels: (1) the 
fundholding scheme and (2) the purchasing role. The following sections go on to 
discuss the research findings as they relate to these themes. 
4.22 Prescyibing 
One of the most studied aspects of fundholding is prescribing. Early studies 
concluded that fundholders were more successful at reducing their prescribing costs 
than non-fundholders (Bradlow and Coulter 1993; Maxwell et al. 1993; Howie, 
Heaney, and Maxwell 1995). However, later evidence suggests that reductions are 
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only short term. The Audit Commission (1996) found that "In the early years of the 
scheme fundholders in general prescribed more rationally than GPs in non-fundholding 
practices. " (p3l) They made greater use of generic drugs, prescribed fewer drugs of 
limited clinical value and fewer antibiotics but "prescribed more drugs for preventing 
asthma attacks that, although expensive, reduce the need for hospital admissions and, 
hence, overall treatment costs. " (p3 1) The main efficiency gains were found to be in 
the first year of fundholding, a finding consistent with other studies (Stewart-Brown et 
al. 1995; Whynes, Baines, and Tolley 1995,1997; Whynes, Heron, and Avery 1997) 
indicating that in the early years of fundholding GPs are able to make initial savings 
through more efficient prescribing behaviour, but are unable to sustain this during later 
years when prescribing costs rise at the same rate as non-fundholders' (see also Gosden 
and Torgerson 1997). Whynes et al (1997) describe this as a "'sideways 
displacement' in the longer-term growth trend, by interpolating a year of 'less-than- 
normal' growth". 
Although GPs could benefit from inflating prescribing costs during their shadow 
fundholding year and thus make savings as fundholders, Whynes et al (1997) found no 
evidence of artificial inflation. It would seem, therefore, that incentives for reducing 
prescribing have not had the effect predicted in 1990, and have not been sufficient to 
influence clinical practice (Stewart-Brown et al. 1995; Whynes, Baines, and Tolley 
1997) although Stewart-Brown et al comment that ... maybe we are 
being premature 
in seeking to identify the effect of these incentives. The cultural change required of 
doctors to achieve any form of cost containment may take a long time to manifest 
itself "' 
4.23 Under-Referral 
Chapter 2 identified the potential danger of under-referral due to the incentive for GPs 
to make practice savings but studies of referral patterns have not found evidence of 
under-referral (Corney 1994; Surender et al. 1995; Audit Commission 1996; Ellwood 
1998). Surrender et al. (1995) conducted a study between June 1990 and January 
1994 and hypothesised that two courses of action could be taken by GPFHs to save 
money. Firstly, they could decrease outpatient referrals and secondly, they could 
encourage patients who have private health insurance to be referred to private clinics 
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so insurance companies subsequently meet the costs. They looked at 38,682 referrals 
from 16 practices (including non-fundholders) to II specialties and found that NHS 
referral rates from fundholding practices did not decrease over the four year period but 
instead showed a small, steady increase. Howie et al. (1995) noted a similar increase 
in referrals but found that there had been a change in the pattern of usage; with "a 
downward trend in most areas of activity .. matched by an upward trend in the use of 
direct Access services. "(ibid) 
The Audit Commission (1996) study showed that most GPFHs continued their pre- 
GPFH referral patterns. Where they did make changes, this was often temporary and 
in response to long waiting lists. They identified a gradual decrease in repeat out- 
patient attendances (some GPFHs set maximum levels in their contracts) but this trend 
began before fundholding so cannot be attributed entirely to its influence. 
Surender et al's study (1995) concluded that financial pressures had little effect on 
general practitioners' referral decisions after entering the scheme, but suggested that 
there was an incentive for GPs to increase referrals during the preparatory year 
because fundholding budgets are based on historical activity and costs. They found a 
"steeper increase in rates among three of the four practices who were in their 
preparatory year for fundholding. " (ibid) 
Gosden and Torgerson (1997) point out that interpreting referral patterns is "always 
going to be more difficult ... than prescribing 
behaviour.. ". This is because "if a 
fundholding practice succeeds in reducing its expenditure on drugs then it might quite 
reasonably spend some of the savings on increasing referrals thereby realising more 
health gain for its patients. Thus, the practice could be efficient in the sense that for no 
extra resources more patients are receiving effective procedures which improve health, 
but referrals actually increased. " 
4.24 Cream Skimming &A Two Tier System 
Fewer studies have considered the 'cream skimn-ting' and two-tier dimensions of 
fundholding. Although potential exists within the fundholding scheme for cream 
skinu-ning, there has been no published evidence so far that it has occurred. Llewellyn 
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and Grant's (1996) sample of fundholders (from Grampian, Lothian and Tayside) did 
not think cream skimming was a potential moral hazard of fundholding because there is 
an allowance provided for expensive patients (see also Bartlett and Le Grand 1994). In 
Llewellyn and Grant's study GPs also countered fears of two-tierism on the basis that 
"the Market is more muted in Scotland than in England. " 
Dowling (1997) conducted one of the few comprehensive studies on the impact of 
fundholding upon waiting times, in order to identify whether a two tier system was 
occurring. The study (covering 1992 - 1996) found that fundholding patients waiting 
for elective surgery had "significantly shorter waiting times" than patients of the non- 
fundholding practices. The Audit Commission (1996) though found similar waiting 
times for GPFHs and non-GPFHs. Dowling attributes the difference between these 
findings to the methodologies used, asserting that recalculation of the Audit 
Comn-ýission sample using Dowling's methodology identifies differential waiting times. 
4.25 Management Skills 
Fundholding received criticism because GPs did not have the managerial skills to 
engage in purchasing and would need to bring qualified managerial staff into the 
practice, but little has been written about this since the reforms were implemented. 
Most first and second wave practices appointed a dedicated fund manager in addition 
to their existing practice management staff. The smaller third and fourth wave 
practices though tended to appoint a combined practice and fund manager or to recruit 
a part-time fund manager who would work in one or two other practices as well 
(Laing et al. 1996). Laing et al. found, however, that of practice managers, only 37% 
had previously been employed outwith the NHS. Of the remaining 63%, most (46%) 
were from previous posts in general practice administration. Similarly, of the fund 
managers, 42% had held previous practice administration posts whilst 38% were 
drawn from outside the NHS. Consequently, only a minority of fund/practice 
managers with financial/managerial skills were recruited. 
Some fundholding practices combined into multifunds both to pool their managerial 
resources and skills (Locock 1995) and to increase their buyer power (D'Souza 1995; 
Audit Commission 1996; Laing and Cotton 1997a). Multifunds are large groups of up 
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to 50 fundholders who collaborate voluntarily but maintain their separate identity. 
They have a decision making body of GPs who act on behalf of their colleagues and 
oversee central office staff. Around half have an executive group (including GPs) 
who take responsibility for particular areas of finance. Although this maximises their 
managerial resources, there are difficulties in organising multifunds. D'Souza (1995) 
notes that pooling management allowances "has always generated heated public 
debate. It remains to be seen how well they can agree on the expenditure of pooled 
public money for patient care. " Not all GPs share the same philosophy - "Most doctors 
see themselves simply as professionals delivering ethical care, some feel they are 
entrepreneurial managers whose chief concern is to maxin-fise their incomes, and a 
relative few are interested in doing clinical science. In the past, each of these types of 
doctor have practised in separate environments. " (ibid) 
Laing and Cotton (1997a, b) witnessed similar organisational difficulties within GPFH 
consortia'. There were power struggles (based on length of time as a fundholder and 
individual knowledge bases), problems with communication, disagreements as to who 
ought to be on the executive committee of the consortia, dominant individuals, sub- 
groups and divisions. Experience of consortia in Grampian though suggests that GPs 
are better able to influence quality, waiting times and communications and GPs 
responded enthusiastically to dialogue with, and changes within, secondary care 
(Wisely 1993). 
None of the papers cited offered evidence as to whether multifunds were any better at 
purchasing than individual practices although they suggest that multifunds save on 
direct management costs. 
4.26 Perceptions of the Fundholding Scheme 
The fundholding scheme has proved "deeply divisive among GPs" (Petchey 1995) and 
response to the scheme has been mixed across the UK (Lapsley, Llewellyn, and 
Grant 
1997). Fundholding was viewed by some GPs as an opportunity to be innovative. To 
others, it was an ugly, incongruent blot on the primary care 
landscape. There were 
'Laing and Cotton do not use the term multifund but rather consortia to mean the same thing. 
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deep divisions between GPs when the scheme was introduced and practitioner journals 
have been the forum for heated debate about its costs and benefits (Eve and Hodgkin 
1991; Bowie and Harris 1994; Iliffe and Freudenstein 1994). However, despite public 
debates, little research has been conducted concerning GPs' views of fundholding 
(Leese and Bosanquet 1996). In the two studies presented below, researchers found 
that there was minority support for fundholding, even when fundholders were 
surveyed. Despite opposition to fundholding, a sizeable minority of fundholders 
thought that service quality had improved and contract switching had either occurred 
or was expected to occur in 53% of practices. 
In 1993, Bunce (1993) published the biggest survey of GP opinion on fundholding 
which covered more than one third of GPFHs and included non-fundholders. Only 
two thirds of existing fundholders supported the fundholding scheme and there was a 
44 significant difference in the level of support from lead fundholders and from their 
partners". Less than 50% of non-lead fundholders say they are in favour of the 
scheme, compared with 22% of lead fundholders and 66% said they were forced to 
join despite having reservations. Interestingly, 9% had switched community provider, 
18% planned to do so the following year and 26% planned to move parts of their 
contracts to other providers, a factor attributed to GPs' frustration with providers who 
refused to negotiate. Community budget holding though was not highly valued: 22% 
said it helped improve patient care, 54% said it was introduced too quickly, 30% said 
it was too much work for too little gain, and 28% said that it was a welcome addition 
to the fund. Most GPs felt that practice savings were a short term phenomenon and 
that the capacity to save would diminish in future fundholding years. 
Leese and Bosanquet's (1996) study in 1993 of GPs' views of the 1990 contract and 
fundholding found that more than half of their respondents were opposed or strongly 
opposed to both the 1990 contract and to fundholding. They write, however, that 
"despite this opposition, a sizeable minority of group practice practitioners (38%) 
agreed that the quality of services provided had improved or considerably 
improved 
since the 1990 contract" (ibid). (Views of the scheme are summarised 
in Figure 4.1). 
Of the group practices, 8% were strongly in favour of fundholding and 16% 
in favour, 
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a stark contrast to the single-handed practices of which none were strongly in favour 
of fundholding and 17% were in favour. 
Figure 4.1: Views on the Fundholding Scheme 
Source: Leese & Rosannuet 1993 
Strongly in In Favour Opposed Strongly 
Favour Opposed 
GRP* SH** GRP SH 
' 
GRP SH GRP SH 
Fundholding Scheme 8% 0% 26% 17% 1 32% 1 2 1% 28% 
-tj" = group practice FF ýiH = single lianded practice 
Fifteen percent of group and single-handed practices had no strong view and 2% did 
not know what they thought of the scheme. Less than half of the fundholders (45%) 
demonstrated support for the scheme and 22% voiced opposition. Nevertheless, "67% 
[of fundholders] reported that the quality of service provision had improved or 
considerably improved as a result of the practice controlling its own budget: there was 
almost unanimous agreement that the administrative workload of the practice had 
increased or considerably increased as a result of fundholding. " They found that 69% 
of the fundholders in their study felt that to a large extent, or to some extent, 
fundholding had led to shorter waiting times for hospital outpatient appointments and 
hospital inpatient appointments (59%). Sixty-nine per cent felt that there had been an 
improvement in patient services. 
Bunce (1993) and Leese and Bosanquet (1996) show the support for fundholding to be 
rather low among fundholders and non-fundholders, yet Tod (1995) asserted that "At a 
time when morale in the NHS is said to be low, the one area where it is seen to be high 
is in fundholding practices, where innovation is the name of the game, efficiency is the 
password and savings are being seen to benefit patients through more on-site services, 
modem equipment and improved services. " Tod admits, however, that "translating the 
benefits of fundholding into health gain for patients will prove more difficult because it 
is the appropriate use of clinical skills which produces health gain, rather than new 
administrative systems involving purchasing. " (ibid. ) The challenge to which 
he 
believes general practice is beginning to rise, is to evaluate activity at the 
primary/secondary care interface and to think about the benefit of medical care. 
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These two studies show that support for the scheme is low yet only 3 published studies 
were found reporting data on why GPs decided to become flandholders in the first 
place (Bartlett and Le Grand 1994; Lapsley, Llewellyn, and Grant 1997; Ennew et al. 
1998). Ennew et al. (1998) found that there were positive and negative reasons for 
becoming a fundholder. The most frequently cited positive motive was to improve 
patient choice and the quality of services and patient care. Others included reducing 
waiting lists, facilitating access to secondary care consultation and admissions, 
maintaining the good quality of services already being received and gaining control 
over their practice. The negative motives included not disadvantaging patients where 
neighbouring practices were fundholders, avoiding threats of restricted freedom for 
referral, pressure from the FHSA, and gaining additional funding for computers. 
Lapsley et al (1997) found that the primary reason for GPs becoming fundholders was 
to gain more control over their activities and to do so in a way which improved 
services to patients. The authors, however, offer only a limited comment on 
motivation for fundholding so their findings cannot be compared fully with Ennew et 
al. Bartlett and Le Grand found that GPs became flandholders in order to gain 
freedom over referrals and their budget, to improve service quality and to develop 
services, to benefit from additional financial and computing resources, and for some, it 
was partly to respond to the challenge. 
4.3 The Purchasing Role 
GPs have not, it would seem, responded to incentives at a practice level in the way 
they were expected to and GPs seem dissatisfied with the fundholding scheme. 
However, the studies which looked at GPs' perceptions suggest that fundholders 
had 
stimulated improvements in service quality. This chapter now goes on to review 
how 
GPs have behaved as purchasers, the extent to which they have fulfilled their 
anticipated purchasing role and how they have 
influenced resource utilisation/hospital 
efficiency and resource allocation. 
4.3.1 Resource Utilisation /Hospital Efficiency 
The anticipated changes in referrals were based on an assumption 
that GPs would 
actively choose between providers, would respond to price signals 
and would have the 
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information upon which to make decisions. Under the rules governing fundholding, 
GPFHs could buy a select list of outpatient, inpatient and day case procedures each 
defined by an OPCS4 (Office of Population Censuses and Surveys) code (Miller 1997). 
Every hospital procedure has a price tag per episode which must reflect the full cost of 
the referral. Low prices therefore reflect low hospital costs so by switching provider 
according to the lowest price, GPFHs reward the more efficient providers. 
Two questions are important: 
firstly, 'to what extent are prices comparable and thus good signals of 
efficiency? ', 
0 secondly, 'to what extent are GPs sensitive to pricesT. 
4.3.2 PHce as a Signal 
Ellwood conducted a longitudinal study in the West Midlands which examined NUS 
prices (Ellwood 1995,1996b, 1998). Her exploration of costing methods for 1991/92 
contracts found imprecise definitions of services, non-consideration of variations in 
case-mix, and where procedure prices were compiled they were often based on 
inadequate data and cost methods therefore prices "were not a reliable indicator of 
resources consumed" (ibid). The study also showed that there were considerable 
variations between prices (based on consultant episodes) across one region. In 
obstetrics, for example, prices ranged from f350 to L1,353 for the same procedure and 
in dermatology from 1469 to 0,417 There are a number of reasons for these 
differentials: 
"The choice of clinical specialty as the cost product is bound to give rise to 
distortions due to differences in specialty case-mix or complexity between 
hospitals. (Specialty case-mix refers to the frequency of patients falling into 
types according to some predetermined characteristic, for example diagnosis. 
Different hospitals may have different mixes of diagnosis within the clinical 
specialty and even if a similar mix of cases exists, the individual characteristic, 
for example diagnosis, may relate to more complex forms. )" (Ellwood 1995). 
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In 1993 the TqHSNI[E2 set minimum costing standards (as guidelines) which were to be 
applied in calculating 1994/95 contracts. They established a minimum cost level by 
type (direct, indirect and overhead), and endorsed a more standardised approach to 
methods of apportionment for indirect costs and overheads. However, Ellwood found 
that despite the guidelines, 1994/95 prices still varied significantly (Ellwood 1996b). 
For a total colectomy, prices ranged from 1558 to 13,616 and for a day case skin 
biopsy, from L69 to L224 (Ellwood 1998). Providers had attempted to apply the 
NHSME guidelines, but differed in their costing methods and procedure classifications. 
Despite moves towards bottom-up costing there is "still a dearth of departmental cost 
and activity systems" (ibid). 
In a similar study, NEller (1997) analysed 1994-95 tariffs for all the NHS providers of 
five former NHS regions (Northern, South East Thames, Wessex, West Midlands and 
Yorkshire). He found significant price variations for the same procedure. "A two, 
three or four-fold difference in price for a procedure was common. Absolute 
differences in price are also large -a 15,500 difference, for example, in the published 
price of an inpatient lobectomy among the seven providers in the former Yorkshire 
region. " Price variance identified by the Audit Commission (1996) was 2-fold. 
Price Sensitivity 
Given the non-comparability of prices and procedures, using price as a market signal is 
clearly problematic. Nevertheless, assuming that the accuracy of costing methods can 
improve, it remains important to establish whether GPs are price sensitive because 
stimulating provider efficiency through competition will "hinge on the role of price 
within the purchaser-provider relationship and, crucially, on how purchasers respond 
to price. " (Miller 1997) . 
Miller developed a model to calculate potential' savings from 
shopping around which proposed that the maximum possible savings 
for fundholders, 
aggregated to district level, ranged from 1700,000 
in Wakefield to E7.2m in North 
Yorkshire. "If all fundholders within Yorkshire region purchased 
in accordance with 
2MSNI[E (1993), EL(93)26,6 April, Costingfor Contracting. This subsequently formed the 
basis of 
a manual on costing, NHSMEE (1993) FDL(93)59, Costingfor 
Contracting - The 1994195 Contracting 
Round. 
The model ignored feasibility and capacity. 
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their district 'price optimal' pattern, the maximum possible saving could be about 
L24.5m. " Ellwood's (1996a) conclusion was that between L100,000 and 1300,000 
could be saved per practice for fundholders in the West Midlands had they purchased 
from the providers with the lowest prices. 
Whilst potential savings are considerable, they are unlikely to be realised because 
studies show that the influence of price on GP decision making is relatively low. 
Figure 4.2 summarises the findings of 3 studies in which GPs were asked to rank their 
criteria for referral. The studies differed in research methodology, geographical 
location and samples (Ghiacy's study included the views of practice managers, Miller's 
study was aimed at fundholders and Mahon et all covered fundholders and non- 
fundholders), however, the results indicate similar relative rankings of factors in GP 
decision making. 
Figure 4.2: Factors Which Influence GP Referrals 
NEller 1997 Ghiacy 1995 Mahon et al 1993 
Waiting time 
Reputation 
Distance to travel 
Price 
Other 
Waiting time 
Quality 
Attitude of clinician 
Communication 
Courtesy to patient 
Cost 
Distance 
Attitude of hospital 
Representative 
Environmental 
Wait in hospital 
Existing referral position 
Marketing 
Good clinical care 
Local and convenient 
Waiting time for appointment 
Known consultant 
Patient's preference 
Waiting time for surgery 
Good overall service 
Patient's clinical needs 
Only hospital available 
Consultant's manner towards patients 
Good communication at hospital 
Patient's previous attendance 
Patient's personality 
Sub-specialty available 
Although price does not appear in Mahon et al's list of 14 criteria, elsewhere the full 
list of 17 criteria used in their study is provided (Mahon, Wilkin, and Whitehouse 
1994). In each of the specialties studied during 1992 (general surgery, ophthalmology 
and orthopaedics), low costs as a decision criterion was ranked 
17th. Ellwood 
(1996a) found that of 21 GPs studied, 12 ranked price as least important compared 
with location, waiting time and service quality. Of the remainder, 
8 ranked price third 
most important and I ranked it second. In NEller's study, price entered 
the purchasing 
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process for less than half of those surveyed and none stated it as the most important 
factor. 
Laing and Cotton (1996) found similar results among their sample of Grampian 
GPFHs. Waiting lists, followed by previous experience, reputation, patient interest, 
service range and loyalty were ranked as the most frequently mentioned decision 
criteria. Financial considerations and administration were the least frequently 
mentioned'. Price, as a decision criterion has thus been identified as being of low 
influence. This consistent rating of criteria is also supported by results from a pre- 
fundholding study in Northern Ireland (Kennedy and McConnell 1993) where GPs 
rated waiting times and knowledge of the consultants' expertise as being the most 
important referral criteria although costs and prices, did not come into this latter study 
because it predated the fundholding scheme. 
Nfiller (1997) found, however, that GPs were willing to "shop around". Their 
purchasing is "not entirely restrained by geography" (ibid) but shopping was not based 
on price. In their choices, GPs most frequently cited the consultant's reputation as 
being the most important factor (38% of respondents). Although Nfiller's study 
showed a greater propensity for GPs shopping around than other studies have shown, 
their lack of sensitivity to price is a common factor. 
Nevertheless, price is not entirely irrelevant. Ennew et al. (1998) found that although 
GPs emphasised quality and accessibility, there was often an "implicit or explicit use of 
a 'value for money concept"'. However, the role of price within purchasing is sensitive 
as according to Ennew et al., there was "considerable resistance to the idea of price as 
a bargaining tool". 
4.3.3 Switching Provider 
There has been very little evidence of fundholders switching provider to any great 
extent (Audit Commission 1996; Bennett and Ferlie 1996; Ellwood 1998; Ennew et al. 
4 Laing and Cotton differentiate between decisions by a GP consortia and individual fundholding 
practices. The difference in terms of results though was that for the consortia sample, service range 
was ranked as the second most frequently mentioned criteria after waiting lists. 
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1998)). Where GPFHs have switched provider, it is only when local provision is 
unsatisfactory and efforts to change local provision have failed (Ellwood 1998; 
Fischbacher and Francis 1998). Fundholders have found though that the threat of 
switching is a useful mechanism for negotiating the type of service they want (Ennew 
et al. 1998). 
Strong and Hanmer Lloyd (1997) sought to identify factors which influenced GP 
practices to switch contracts and identified waiting times, followed by price, as being 
the most important reasons. Distance was the "final push" in deciding to switch. 
However, their sample, whilst it included GPs, focused mainly on practice managers 
who are administrators not clinicians so one cannot assume their priorities are the 
same as GPs'priorities. 
Ennew et al (1998) proposed that an "improved price-quality configuration" led to 
switching. This is consistent with Ellwood's study in which "prices have rarely caused 
shifts in services, but if waiting times or service quality is unsatisfactory then price is 
considered when evaluating alternatives ... 
" (Ellwood 1998). In summary, therefore, 
although there is little evidence of contract shifting, where it does occur, it is likely to 
be due to some combination of long waiting lists, poor service quality and better 
altemative prices. 
4.3.4 Non-Price Cyiteria in Purchasing Decisions 
It is clear from the evidence presented so far that price has been of relatively low 
influence in both purchasing and switching. Instead, a number of other criteria have 
emerged as having a major influence: quality, location and waiting lists being the main 
ones. 
Service QualitY 
Quality is a consistently highly ranked decision criterion. The term, 
however, has been 
used to cover a range of service attributes. Ellwood's 
(1998) definition included 
previous experience of outcomes, reputation of consultant, communication 
between 
consultant and GP, courtesy of consultant to patients, attitude of consultant 
to GP, 
communications between hospital and GP, 
hospital reputation, physical environment 
III 
and attitude of hospital management, each of which was ranked individually. Mahon et 
al (1993) did not use the term quality at all, but asked GPs to rank categories which 
were similar to Ellwood's, for example, good clinical care, good overall service, 
patient's previous attendance) consultant's manner towards patients and good 
communication at hospital so were clearly addressing quality issues. Miller (1997), 
however, rates reputation individually and has no general term for quality. This makes 
study comparisons difficult. Nevertheless,, Figure 4.2 showed earlier that good clinical 
care, reputation and quality appear at, or near the top of the list. 
Laing and Cotton (1996) helpfully differentiate two dimensions of quality; technical 
quality (what is delivered) and functional quality (how it is delivered)'. Recent 
published accounts ( Laing and Cotton 1996; Llewellyn and Grant 1996; Lapsley, 
Llewellyn, and Grant 1997; Fischbacher and Francis 1998) have identified GPs as 
having influenced functional quality (care management) more than technical quality 
(clinical care). (Examples of functional quality include the quality of discharge letters, 
the speed with which laboratory and other test results are received, waiting times for 
outpatient appointments and the setting up of one-stop-shops'. ) 
Location 
The relative priority of location (distance to travel) differs in the studies cited in Figure 
4.2. In Mahon et al's study (1993), when asked which factors commonly influenced 
GP decisions, 'local and convenient' received the highest score but was ranked as the 
second most important factor in decision making. In Ellwood's study (1998), location 
was not ranked as first by the majority of GPs, but previous experience of the 
consultant was considered an aspect of quality not location whereas in Mahon's study, 
previous experience of the consultant would possibly be considered within reputation 
although this is not stated. Thus, the two measures of location cannot readily be 
compared. In Ellwood's study, the pattern of referrals to traditional, local providers 
differed between areas covered in the study. Overall though, distance travelled 
5 Classifications originally made by Gronroos, C. (1984) "A Service Quality Model and its Marketing 
Implications" European Journal ofMarketing 18. (4) pp315-334 
Waiting times are considered here as a measure of quality not efficiency. 
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remained fairly static with minor increases after the first year of fundholding for 
particular procedures such as cataracts and endoscopies. 
The importance of location may also be influenced by a non-market factor. Where 
rationalisation of acute services is imminent, GPFHs' loyalty to their traditional, local 
providers may be higher (Ellwood 1996a). Switching provider for one type of service 
might conceivably jeopardise the future of the entire hospital, so GPs have been 
reluctant to move contracts "because one of their prime concerns was to keep a 
particular provider in business because it was geographically convenient. " (Ennew et 
al. 1998). There is some evidence to suggest that where closure threats are not 
imminent, loyalty may not be consistent across services but was greater for services 
like diagnostic radiology where there is a higher degree of ongoing patient-provider 
interaction, than for laboratory services (Laing and Cotton 1996). 
Waiting Lists & Waiting Times 
Waiting times appeared to be the most or one of the most important referral criteria 
(see Figure 4.2) However, there are again difficulties in definition. Miller and Ghiacy 
(op cit) use the term waiting whereas Mahon et al (op cit) differentiate between 
waiting time for appointment and waiting list for surgery. 
Waiting lists were considered important purchasing criteria but according to Mahon et 
al (1993) were "less influential than good clinical care and the proximity and 
convenience of the hospital". Ennew et al (1998) suggested that it was the more 
entrepreneurial GPs who used waiting times as the basis for their negotiations with 
providers whereas the less innovative GPs focused on keeping their main provider in 
business. The interpretation of waiting lists has been discussed as an issue not only in 
purchasing, but as a means of comparing hospital quality more broadly within National 
league tables. There are considerable difficulties interpreting waiting lists and, as the 
next section discusses, problems in acquiring waiting list information. 
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4.4 Service Contracting 
It is clear from the studies reviewed so far that GPs have proven to be non-price 
sensitive and reluctant to change provider. This would suggest that there is little 
pressure on hospitals to reduce their costs albeit there may be pressure for them to 
improve their quality. One cannot assume, however, that concern for quality 
automatically translates into quality improvements. The contracting process is the 
opportunity for GPs to stipulate specific quality improvements and to enforce penalties 
where standards are not met. 
Contracting is the vehicle for negotiating prices and agreeing performance standards. 
Establishing, monitoring and reviewing contracts gives purchasers an opportunity to 
influence provider performance. For example, standards can be set and, where 
providers fail to meet those standards, penalties enforced. This is important in terms 
of improving resource utilisation and X-efficiency. Research findings about the quality 
and types of contracts used however, is mixed. 
Allen (1995) reviewed 12 GPFH contracts for 1993/94 and found that they bore little 
resemblance to well drafted commercial contracts, yet it is fundamental that parties 
clarify what services are to be provided in terms of tasks and standards of 
performance. They ought to specify inputs (staff, buildings etc), outputs (the service 
provided, eg, finished consultant episodes) , throughputs (eg number of patients to 
be 
seen, operations to be performed) and outcomes (the impact of services upon the 
recipient (eg health gain)) (Allen 1995). GPFH contracts contained some attempts to 
specify throughputs but "it is particularly difficult to specify ... services ... 
[like]... 
continuing care ... as opposed to 
discrete episodes of treatment. " Specifications of 
levels of outputs and throughputs are incomplete as performance specifications but 
setting standards and measuring performance is complex, (See Chapters 2 and 3 for 
further discussion). 
Allen's findings though have been contradicted by other studies. Locock (1995), found 
GPFHs favoured cost-per-case contracts because they were more effective when trying 
to sort out administrative problems, they invited hospital staff to visit the practice and 
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discuss information issues with practice staff. A similar preference was identified by 
Llewellyn and Grant (1996) and by the Audit Commission (1996) who found that most 
GPs used cost-per-case contracts (44% of sample), only 16% block contracts and 3 1% 
cost and volume contracts with their main provider. The remaining 10% used a 
combination of these types. 
Again, in contrast to Allen's findings, Locock's sample imposed fines on providers if 
efficiency index targets were not met, set monitoring requirements and supplemented 
their monitoring by regularly issuing questionnaires to their patients. Whereas, Ennew 
et al (1998) identified GPFHs (albeit a minority) who were prepared to charge an 
invoice fee or withhold payment when invoices were issued late. 
The Audit Commission (1996) 
reported that "Most fundholder 
Box 4.1: Standards detailed in GPFH contracts 
Source: The Audit Commission 1996 
contracts met at least half of the 
principles of good contract drafting. ") 
GPFHs were found to have included 
quality targets (see Box 4.1) based 
on the Patient's Charter standards 
although very few had included any 
outcome measurements. Three 
quarters of GPFHs surveyed set 
specific waiting list targets in their 
" Patient's Charter standard for non-urgent 
inpatient waiting times - >90% 
" Patient's Charter standard for waiting times in 
outpatient clinics to see the doctor - >90% 
" Clauses covering withholding payment - >75% 
" Standards for the speed and content of discharge 
letters - >75% 
" Agreement that the GPFH would inspect quality - 
>40% 
" Outcome measures (eg: re-admission rates, 
infection rates) - <20% 
Incentive bonus - <20% 
Penalty clauses if provider fails to meet contract 
requirements - =- 10% 
contracts. On a smaller scale, Oxley and Buchan (1997) discovered a total fundholding 
practice in Attleborough who employed a part-time nurse to monitor care given to 
patients and to ensure compliance with contracts and the multifund in Kingston-Upon- 
Thames has appointed members of its executive to monitor quality standards and 
health outcomes (D'Souza 1995). 
Whilst some progress in monitoring quality is clearly being made, it remains that the 
simple 'classical' model of contracting is only applicable in practice under special 
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circumstances' (Bennett and Ferlie 1996) and neo-classical contracts are also 
inappropriate (see Chapters 2 and 3). The majority of contracts are much more 
complex and "the picture ... confusing" 
(Bennett and Ferlie 1996). 
4.4.1 X-efficiency 
The extent to which fundholders are able to improve X-efficiency "depends on how 
contract provisions translate into actual behaviour. " (Ennew et al. 1998). Allen's 
(1995) findings that contracts were virtually devoid of detailed specifications about 
performance standards, performance monitoring and methods of pricing, have been 
shown to have been contested to an extent (Audit Commission 1996), but it remains 
the case that outcome measures and quality are ill defined in the NHS setting. Where 
peer review was occasionally mentioned, there was no mechanism by which it could 
stimulate better performance. Only three of the twelve contracts contained any 
financial methods to enforce performance and Ennew's study showed GPs' were 
reluctant to implement these kinds of measures. 
Ennew et al. found though, that some practices had specified the number of outpatient 
attendances and who should see the patient, and practice managers had complained 
directly to hospitals where standards had not been met. The authors point out that, 
"While this places increased pressure on providers to deliver what they are supposed to 
deliver in an efficient way, the absence of formal mechanisms for enforcing the 
provision of the contracts raises questions about the extent to which organisational 
slack is reduced. Indeed, a closer examination of invoicing and payment arrangements 
highlights considerable inefficiencies and delays which, according to the contracts, 
should not occur. " 
Flynn et al (1996) found that GPs had not intended to use the contracting process as a 
means to 'drive' changes. "Contracting had enabled them to obtain improvements 
in 
information and to increase or modify particular services, but was not seen as a device 
to abandon current suppliers or even to coerce providers into changes. 
While there 
7 For example, spot purchases of a discrete package of care from a private agency where 
there is no 
obligation to maintain a social relationship. 
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were some examples of 'adversarial' attitudes among some of the GP fundholders, they 
avoided bureaucratic or punitive styles of contracting in favour of much looser and 
more informal approaches. " 
Another way in which GPFHs can influence X-efficiency is through measures to 
reduce waiting lists. The Audit Commission (1996) found examples of a number of 
measures such as checking waiting lists carefully to ensure those waiting longest get 
called in before others with equal or fewer needs, and setting tight waiting time targets 
in contracts and switching provider if targets are not agreed/met. Implementing these 
measures would force the hospital to reduce the waiting list by changing the case mix, 
reorganising consultants' lists and checking the appropriateness of outpatient follow- 
ups. However, "Most fundholders do not apply [these] measures ... 
because they lack 
the relevant information about average waiting times or the number of patients waiting 
in particular specialties. " (p2l) 
4.4.2 Resource Utilisadon 
That GPs appear to be non-price sensitive has "significant implications for efficiency 
and cost containment in the NHS ... 
Gains from the market system ... crucially 
depend 
on the price mechanism and on cost-effective purchasing ... purchasers must reward 
efficient provider units by strategic contracting and by responding to price signals. " 
(Miller 1997) 
Although GPs are non-price sensitive, Sbderlund et al (1997) found that productivity 
improvements had been made in hospitals (ie, the cost per inpatient episode had 
reduced). They attributed this improvement to a change from DMU to Trust status 
although the exact forces for change were less clear. The authors suggest the 
possibility that hospitals were intentionally unproductive before becoming trusts so 
they could make gains when changing status. However, they write that "Analyses of 
the effect of trust status by trust wave sheds more light on the timing of productivity 
changes. For second and third wave trusts the largest gain in productivity was in the 
year of gaining trust status ... suggesting that whatever changes occurred, 
they were 
relatively immediate ... 
There is ... some evidence that 
hospitals who already had 
effective cost control mechanisms in place might have been more likely to 
become 
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trusts, so some of the trust productivity gains may well have happened anyway. " The 
authors concluded that competition between hospitals had no significant effect on 
productivity most probably because hospitals were not competing on the basis of price 
but quality since GPFHs did not make price a priority. The implications of quality- 
based competition may actually be that prices increase as they have in the US (Ellwood 
1996b; Soderlund et al. 1997) 
4.4.3 Resource Transferfrom Secondary to PHmary Care 
As well as stimulating efficiency improvements, GPs were also expected to encourage 
the transfer of resources from secondary to primary care, doing more within the 
primary care setting. The evidence suggests, however, that in this respect, the 1990 
vision has not been realised. Surender et al (1995) write, "It may be disappointing, 
however, to those who hoped that the fundholders' scope for reinvesting savings in 
new practice based facilities would encourage a shift away from dependence on 
specialist hospital services. Our results show no such shift, at least in terms of initial 
outpatient referrals. " (ibid). Fundholders did offer community health services from the 
practice (eg physiotherapy, dietetics, chiropody, psychology and acupuncture) (Audit 
Commission 1996). For example, in excess of 50% of GPFHs provide physiotherapy 
at the practice whereas for non-GPFHs the figure is less than 25% (of larger practices). 
Although the Audit Commission report noted that such practice-based provision often 
pre-dated the practice's entry into fundholding, Corney (1994) found that there had 
been a general increase in facilities for investigations and treatment within practices. 
Eleven of the fifteen practices she studied had set up extra surgery facilities including 
facilities and equipment for, among others, audiology, sigmoidoscopy, cholesterol level 
investigations and pregnancy tests. Evans' (1996) study showed that GPs believed 
their workload had increased significantly, for example, they had greater demands for 
post-operative follow-up, although Trusts maintained that the workload increase in 
primary care was concomitant with the increase in GP referrals. GPs admitted that it 
was difficult to differentiate workload increases due to shifts from other factors like 
increased patient expectations. 
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One area where there has been some shift in the locus of activity is consultant 
outreach. Nine of the 15 GPFHs studied by Comey (1994) during 1992, had 
developed outreach consultant clinics directly as a result of fundholding. Others had 
set up physiotherapy clinics or audiology clinics and more clinics were being planned. 
Nineteen per cent of the practices in Leese and Bosanquet's (1996) study held outreach 
clinics although 46% of them were fundholders (23 practices). Outreach clinics were 
most common for psychiatry followed by dermatology. Clinics were advantageous 
because patients were seen in familiar surroundings, spent less time and money 
travelling and waiting times were reduced. Furthermore, fewer patients failed to keep 
their appointments and they saw a consultant. GPs were able to talk to the consultants 
about specific cases which resulted in more appropriate referrals and fewer follow ups. 
They also had more control over reviews and follow-up appointments. However, 
clinic initiatives were hampered by antagonism from providers, who felt practices 
lacked appropriate accommodation and facilities, and, in order to offer consultant 
clinics, providers required additional staff to make appointments, organise clinics etc. 
Moreover, consultants have at times been reluctant to participate because of the loss of 
econornies of scale and the threat to centres of excellence (Corney 1994; Evans 1996). 
Leese and Bosanquet's (1996) study showed, though, that of the 42% of fundholders 
who had a budget surplus (27 practices), most of them expected to improve their 
practice premises (15) or to buy new equipment (14), compared with only 4 who 
wanted to introduce services for cataracts, physiotherapy (3) or chiropody (2) services 
in the practice. Bunce (1993) also found that the majority of fundholding savings 
were intended for equipment (>70%) and/or practice premises (>60%). 
It would seem that although a shift in the locus of service provision is occurring, it may 
not be a priority to GPs who are already complaining of workload pressures (Petchey 
1994; Leese and Bosanquet 1996). More broadly, the lack of resource transfer (eg. in 
terms of financial resources) may be because implementing a shift requires the 
strengthening and development of the primary care infrastructure. If more patients are 
to be treated (or to manage their own conditions) within primary care clinics or in the 
home, then community support needs to be strengthened (Lewis and de Bene 1994). 
Primary care centres need to develop (perhaps by increasing practice-based consultant 
sessions, by undertaking more minor surgery or diagnostic tests etc). 
This requires 
119 
financial and human resource investments and "clearly specified condition-based 
pathways of care, agreed between secondary and primary care providers. In 
particular, the respective roles and profiles of both primary and secondary care must be 
explicit and protocols must define thresholds for entry to and exit from secondary 
care. " (Lewis and de Bene 1994) Importantly, problems of low morale in general 
practice and more evidence about appropriate and effective shifts need to be addressed 
(Corney 1994; Evans 1996)). 
4.4.4 Information 
GPs must continually make decisions about purchasing and health care provision, but 
as discussions have indicated they have little information to underpin their decisions. 
Activity transfers from secondary to primary care need clinical guidelines, protocols 
and pathways and defined thresholds for entry to and exit from secondary care (Lewis 
and de Bene 1994). Some sources of published information are available to GPs on a 
local and national scale and efforts have increasingly been made to produce objective 
measures of clinical effectiveness (eg, SIGN guidelines (Scottish Inter-collegiate 
Guidelines Network )) and organisations like SHPIC (the Scottish Health Purchasing 
Information Centre) were set up with the primary aim of providing information on 
effective health care. 
Although considerable progress is needed regarding cost effectiveness more is known 
about the role and adequacy of purchasing information. Waiting lists have become 
more readily available and National league tables are now published. NHS Trusts also 
publish their price lists. As Ellwood found, there were a number of factors impeding 
the influence of published prices: - 
"the need to look at the total package of care including out-patient 
prices; 
the late publication of prices; 
the lack of need to be receptive to price ... 
the effect of cost and volume contracts where marginal prices are paid 
for activity above target; 
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destabifising effect on local providers; 
additional administrative work. " (Ellwood 1996a) 
"Most GPFHs were extremely dubious of the value of any league-table approach for 
assessing service quality. Many GPFHs said that if they were considering referring to a 
consultant for the first time they would ring another GP who had experience of the 
consultant. " (Ellwood 1996a) Mahon et al (1993) though, found that waiting times 
did influence their referral decisions and that potential referrals outwith the district 
were hampered by the lack of information about comparative waiting times. Of the 
254 GPs in their study, 95.8% received information about waiting times for outpatient 
appointments and 81.4% received information about waiting lists for surgery but this 
was only for hospitals in their district. For hospitals outwith the district the 
percentages were 53.4 and 40.5 respectively. 
Another study explored the extent to which GPs used research evidence to support 
their purchasing activities (Farmer and Williams 1997; Farmer and Chesson 1998). 
GPs were given a list of 15 different personal, local and national information sources 
and asked to identify their degree of influence (see box 4.2 below). 
Knowledge about local providers 
and the GPs' own professional 
experience were considered as 
having the greatest influence on 
purchasing decisions. The doctor's 
own intuition/hunch was identified 
by 3 9.4% of the 71 GPs who 
participated, whereas only 4.2% 
indicated that NHSME/Scottish 
Office priorities were of high 
influence. "Cost of treatments 
Box 4.2: Sources ofInformation in GP Decision 
Making Listed in Order of Degree ofInfluence 
Source: Farmer and Chesson 1998 
Knowledge about local providers 
Own professional experiences 
Own intuition/hunch 
Local priorities 
Opinion of clinicians 
Information about costs of treatment 
Information about treatment of outcomes 
Statistical information 
Consumer opinion 
Health economics 
Evidence from the literature 
Opinion of public health doctors 
NHSME/Scottish Office Priorities 
Opinion of local advisory bodies 
National/local politics 
were highly rated by approximately a quarter of practices, but nearly two thirds saw 
them as having some influence. " (Farmer and Chesson 1998). The most frequently 
stated source of information used was files kept within the practice. "Such files, 
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however, are likely to be idiosyncratic and may be particularly prone to personal 
bias... " (ibid). Local guidelines (eg, Effective Health Care Bulletins) were of little 
influence. Overall, the picture was one of "low and ad hoc use of nationally published 
information" (ibid) and a high reliance on personal intuition and hunch as the main 
sources of information (see also Shanks, Kheraj, and Fish 1995). 
In another paper based on the same study, Farmer and Williams (1997) combine the 
influences on sources of information upon GP purchasing with the importance of these 
same sources upon Health Board purchasing. Sources used by the Health Board are in 
stark contrast to those used by GPs. The priority runs almost in reverse to the 
sequence in Figure 4.3. 
When asked whether they thought that quality of information was poor, adequate or 
high quality, responses were 37%, 60% and 3% respectively. Most felt they needed 
improved health outcome measures and effectiveness information upon which to base 
decisions. More accurate waiting times were also thought desirable. 
In Laing and Cotton's (1996) study of the main sources of information "The most 
striking feature of GP fundholder purchasing behaviour is the overwhelming reliance 
placed by GP fundholders on what may be described as informal or non-controllable 
sources of information. " GPs were found to place "particular importance ... 
[on] 
direct personal knowledge 
or experience of the key 
professionals responsible 
for service delivery, rather 
than 'second hand' 
knowledge or experience. " 
Like Farmer and Chesson 
(1998), Laing and Cotton 
found that fundholders 
Figure 4.3: Relative importance ofsource of information in 
GP decision making. 
Source: Laing and Cotton 1996 
Clinical outcome Of Previous referrals to consultant 
2 Personal knowledge of consultant 
3 "Word of Mouth" - patients 
4 "Word of Mouth" information - other GPs 
5 "Word of Mouth" - other health professionals 
6 Professional publications 
7= Health board literature 
7= Promotional / contractual materials from providers 
9 Seminars / presentations from providers 
placed "little or no weight on the more formal, largely 
impersonal sources of 
information. " (See Figure 4.3) 
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Farmer and Williams (1997), Ellwood (1996) and Laing and Cotton (1996) all note 
the influence of other GPs upon purchasing decisions. That GPs rely on their own 
views and the views of other GPs when referring patients is perhaps symptomatic not 
only of the lack of information but the nature of services. Laing and Cotton (1996) 
contend that, 
"Health care services are highly intangible, both physically and mentally; they 
are heterogeneous over time as well as per customer, ... and production and 
consumption are inseparable with customers taking an active part in the 
delivery process ... professional services consist primarily of experience and 
credence qualities. Such a characterisation of professional services is crucial, 
in that evaluation and judgement of such services are based on experience 
and perception. " (emphasis added) 
Hunter (1997) concurs with this view and suggests that even with the developments in 
knowledge bases, medicine remains an art/craft so clinicians will continue to rely on 
expert judgement. 
4.5 What Kind of Market? 
This chapter has presented a range of evidence about the NHS market which suggests 
that GPs are non-price sensitive and not seeking to drive efficiencies but that they are 
concerned with quality and local access and also the very nature of services is such that 
purchasers rely heavily upon experience and judgement in their decisions and less so 
upon formal or published information (Laing and Cotton 1996; Mannion and Smith 
1997). Nevertheless, a number of studies have identified the primary/secondary 
interface as being where GPs can and have exercised considerable leverage (Wisely 
1993; Glennerster et al. 1994a; Lapsley, Llewellyn, and Grant 1997). GPs do not 
need to make major contract switches, but need only move those contracts which are 
at the hospitals' margins for break even to generate a response. Furthermore, 
Glennerster et al (1994b) noted that where over half the practices in an area became 
fundholders, the impact on providers was considerable and conversely where numbers 
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are small, buyer power is weaker. This presence negated the need for contract 
switching. 
Despite the lack of provider switching and contract penalties, negotiations between 
purchasing GPs and providers have yielded results. GPs have focused mainly on care 
management but have demonstrated a growing desire to influence clinical care 
(Llewellyn and Grant 1996). In the main they have stimulated direct/open/rapid access 
services and improved purchaser provider communications: - 
e Direct access services in audiology, endoscopy, radiology and cardiac 
investigations have been a key area of progress (Corney 1994; Howie, Heaney, 
and Maxwell 1995; Evans 1996). They allow GPs to make more rapid assessments 
and provide more appropriate treatment. 
Communications with the provider have been identified as a main area of 
improvement since fundholding (Glennerster et al. 1994b; Audit Conunission 1996; 
Evans 1996; Llewellyn and Grant 1996). In Evans' study, GPs reported a marked 
difference in the attitudes of trust managers and consultants "who now listened and 
took account of GP views". This was attributed to the consultant's awareness of 
the increased power of GPFHs within the market although Evans comments that 
"this perception of increased GP power was stronger in the trusts and the 
commission than among GPs themselves. One trust respondent commented that 
GPs had greater potential power, but had not yet worked out how to use it 
effectively. " GPs though tended to be very aware of the limitations of their 
power. 
Flynn et al (1996) proposed that the balance of power has swung in favour of the GPs 
and they were becotning involved in the design and specification of services, 
particularly service quality: 
44 ... contracts 
did not appear to be valued because they stimulated supplier 
competition or large-scale shifts in services per se. Rather, they were seen 
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(and used) as vehicles through which the fundholder could articulate a demand 
for information and influence quality in a way they were unable to do before 
holding their own budget, but which had been a long-held aim. " (ibid). 
4.5.1 Social Embeddedness 
Buyers are enacting their role, exerting their influence, within a socially embedded 
market context. They are collaborating with providers (Bennett and Ferlie 1996) in a 
setting which is underpinned by close professional relationships which exist between 
clinicians across different sectors of the health service (Laing and Cotton 1996) . GPs 
and hospital clinicians share much of their educational and training experience and 
their relationships continue to exist across organisational boundaries within the 
healthcare market (Laing and Cotton 1996) or rather, "the market mechanism within 
the health service was effectively super-imposed on such existing relationships, and the 
resultant market relationships are viewed by many clinicians as secondary to these 
professional relationships. "' (ibid) 
Laing and Cotton contend that "It is almost inevitable within the context of services 
such as medical care, that the existence of these relationships will be relied on even by 
professional intermediaries, as the key source of information underpinning purchasing 
decisions. " Interestingly, Laing and Cotton found that where there were no such 
relationships, the relative ranking of decision criteria changed. Priorities for 
purchasing laboratory services altered to: service range (most important), financial 
considerations,, administration, loyalty, previous experience, reputation and least of all 
patient interest9. There are not the same strong, shared relationships between GPs and 
laboratory service providers because many of the latter come from a scientific rather 
than medical background" so loyalty became less important. Loyalty was a feature in 
'Laing and Cotton make reference at this point to Harrison S (1995) "Clinical Autonomy and 
Planned Markets: The British Case" in Saltman R and Von Otter C (Eds) Implementing Planned 
Markets in Health Care, Open University Press, Buckingham. 
9Figure 4.4 shows the results for referrals to general surgery, orthopedic surgery and gynaecology. 
"Another factor is that laboratory services are more 'tangible' than other services and can more easily 
be standardised. Because of this, there is likely to be little variation between providers 
in terms of the 
actual service delivered. Past experience and reputation 
become less important decision criteria for 
GPs and thus heightens their willingness to switch provider. 
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the study by Flynn et al (1996) who found that "The possible threat of replacement by 
competitors from outside the locality was not seen as feasible or reasonable by most 
GPs and GP fundholders; instead, they appeared to endorse a network approach in 
which loyalty to colleagues ... was essential. " (p136) 
Despite their shared medical training and education, there are accounts of the deep 
division which has historically existed between these generalists and specialists 
(Honigsbaum 1979,1993; Glennerster et al. 1994b). In a recent study Marshall (1998) 
acknowledged this history and expected to find it's legacy today but discovered instead 
that although "there might still be problems with mutual understanding and 
communication ... " that there is also a "high level of mutual respect and co-operation 
between the two branches .. and a strong desire to build a personal relationship over a 
long period of time. " Marshall found that mutual support was more prevalent than 
conflict and that there were perceived benefits for patients where clinician relationships 
were based on trust and mutual respect. GP-consultant relationships are not devoid of 
conflict or tension, but the potential for continued good working relationships was 
found to be considerable. 
Flynn et al (1996), found that inter-organisational trust was based on a perception that 
professionals delivering community services delivered high quality work and had 
knowledge of the locality. GPs were therefore willing to place a great deal of trust in 
providers "in a whole range of circumstances" (p136). That social relationships 
influence the maintenance of quality is particularly important given the deficiency of 
NHS contracts in specifying quality standards (Allen 1995). 
4.5.2 Scotland and England - Two of a Kind? 
Before concluding this chapter and clarifying the research gaps to which this thesis 
contributes, one last distinction must be made concerning fundholding and purchasing. 
As this chapter noted earlier, the enthusiasm with which fundholding was embraced 
differed between Scotland and England. It also differed across geographical regions 
within these two countries. In England, for example, on the I s'Apfil 1995 there were 
93 funds in Essex and 87 funds in Kent but only 3 in Sunderland and I in Camden and 
Islington (Audit Commission 1995). 
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Similar differences occurred in Scotland (see Appendix 1) where the uptake in 
Grampian, Lothian and Tayside has been more rapid than elsewhere. In 199611, 
Grampian Health Board, followed by Borders Health Board had the highest number, 
and the greatest percentage, of the population covered by fundholders in Scotland. In 
both Boards more than 50% of the population were served by fundholding GPs. 
Greater Glasgow Health Board (GGBB), the location for this study, ranked 9 th out of 
the 15 health boards in terms of both the number of fundholders and the percentage of 
the population covered by fundholding GPs. In GGHB there were 61 fundholders 
(compared with 163 non-fundholders) who between them covered 30.9% of the 
GGBB population. 
Of particular significance to this research is the fact that by 1996, only 3 published 
studies had looked specifically at the Scottish market (Howie, Heaney, and Maxwel, 
1995; Laing and Cotton 1996; Lapsley, Llewellyn, and Grant 1997) and of them only 
two (Laing and Cotton 1996; Lapsley, Llewellyn, and Grant 1997) concentrated on 
purchasing. Llewellyn and Grant's study focused on Grampian, Lothian and Tayside 
and included non-fundholders, whereas Laing and Cotton covered the whole of 
Scotland but sampled only fundholders". Of further interest is the fact that Lapsley et 
al's (1997) study suggested that there are "distinctively Scottish aspects to GP 
fundholding" (p47) in terms of the motivation of GPs seeking to join the scheme; the 
degree to which GPs identified with the overall aims of the Scottish health service; and 
particularly as regards their desire to work with providers: 
4' ,... predominantly, these fundholders have worked in close liaison, have sought 
to target specific issues, whether of care management or clinical practice, in 
their negotiations with hospital trusts and have sought to ensure such gains are 
available to patients of both fundholding and non fundholding GPs" (p48). 
11 The fieldwork for this thesis began in 1996. 
12 The publication cited previously by Llewellyn and Grant (Llewellyn and Grant 1996) was 
from the 
same study as Lapsley et al (1997). 
13 Although Laing and Cotton's (1996) study was Scotland-wide, three of the health boards at that 
time had no fundholders and so were not included so the ftindholding population but not the 
geographic patient population was covered. 
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As the following section goes on to conclude, whilst evidence concerning the reforms 
is limited,, Scotland as a whole, and the west of Scotland in particular, are particularly 
under-researched. 
4.6 Conclusions: What Does the Evidence Say & What are the 
Research Gaps? 
A number of authors have reviewed the empirical studies of fundholding and 
purchasing and have agreed that the evidence is mixed, limited and ambiguous not to 
mention riddled with methodological difficulties (see for example Appleby 1994; 
Maynard 1994; Coulter 1995a). These and other authors (see for example Coulter 
1995a, b; Petchey 1995; Baggott 1997; Gosden, Torgerson, and Maynard 1997; Smith 
and Wilton 1998) all warn of the difficulties in drawing firm conclusions too early, so 
offer cautious conclusions. With their warnings in mind, some general conclusions 
from this chapter are stated below. 
4.6.1 Economic Incentives in Fundholding: 
Evidence: 
Studies have shown that GPs have not responded to financial incentives in the 
way they were expected to. More efficient prescribing did occur, but 
fundholders were unable to sustain the momentum over the long term 
whereupon costs increase at the same rate as fundholders. Referral patterns 
overall have not changed. Practices continue to refer according to traditional 
patterns although there has been some change in the type of referral - GPs are 
making greater use of direct access services for example although they have not 
achieved the anticipated targets for day surgery both of which would be 
cheaper services to purchase. 
Research Gans: 
(1) Studies do not comment fully on why referral patterns have not changed. 
There are suggestions that it may be to do with loyalty to a provider, or an 
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unwillingness to make their patients travel, but more research is needed to 
identify the rationale behind GP behaviour. 
4.6.2. Efficiency and Quality: 
Evidence: 
GPs have not been primarily engaged in stimulating improved efficiencies as 
was anticipated. Price is of less importance to them than service quality and 
access, and practices are reluctant to switch provider. This means that they 
are not putting pressure on hospitals to reduce costs although they are calling 
for improvements in functional quality (care management) and technical quality 
(clinical care). They have, improved x-efficiency (although this concept of 
efficiency has not been explored in empirical studies) although it is unclear 
how, as their emphasis on quality has not been translated into contracts with 
sanctions for non-compliance. 
Resea 
(2) It is not clear whether the lack of attention to efficiency is because GPs 
think hospital services are efficient, or whether there are other issues which are 
of greater importance; for example, there may be some social process (eg 
loyalty to hospital doctors) which causes GPs to avoid bringing pressures to 
bear on hospital costs. 
(3) If GPs are claiming improved quality of hospital services but they do not set 
targets and standards or impose fines within contracts, how are they stimulating 
quality improvements? What are the factors which put sufficient pressure on 
Trusts to improve practice? 
(4) To what extent are GPs actually seeking to improve x-efficiency or is it a 
by-product of other negotiations? 
4.6.3 Resource A Ilocadon: 
Evidence: 
Fundholding studies have identified a number of areas in which practices have 
developed primary care services (eg, outreach clinics, practice-based 
audiology) which suggests that there is a shift in the locus of service provision. 
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There are, however, limitations to transferring activity, for example, the cost 
effectiveness of consultant outreach clinics is not yet known and the primary 
care infrastructure may not be developed enough to support new services. 
Developments which have occurred have not been widespread and have not 
been unique to fundholders. Furthermore, it is not clear whether resources are 
being released from secondary care to fund new primary care services. 
Research Gaps: 
(5) The evidence does not show whether GPs trying to release hospital funds to 
develop primary care services, is a specific priority. 
(6) Studies do not identify whether transferring financial resources from the 
secondary to the primary sector is possible and is occurring. 
4.6.4 The Purchasing Function: 
Evidence: 
Chapter 2 proposed that GPs as individual purchasers have linýted buyer 
power. The evidence presented here has shown that consortia/multifund 
purchasing is believed to have increased buyer power. Collaboration has also 
helped to pool resources (financial and human). 
Studies have shown that purchasing decisions are based to a large extent on 
personal judgement and less so on formal information sources. GPs are 
operating within a socially embedded market where they value open dialogue 
with clinicians and seek partnerships. They do not develop sophisticated 
contracts for renewal the following year, but intend to continue with their 
traditional providers over the long term. 
The market has been criticised for bearing heavy transactions costs. 
Costs 
may be negated to a degree by the move towards relational contracts 
but 
because the transactions costs framework is a comparative one and no 
fundholding pilots were conducted, research is unable to identify the real scale 
of these costs. 
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Resea 
(7) Studies have not compared the relative strengths of individual versus 
consortia purchasers. It is not clear who has the greater influence over 
hospitals. 
(8) The relationship between purchasers and providers has been described in 
terms of referral patterns, and has been characterised as based on trust, 
personal relationships and so forth. However, little is known about the detailed 
content of the relationships or the interaction process. For example: what do 
clinicians discuss which they did not previously talk about?; how do they 
communicate?; is the relationship characterised by conflict or harmony; how 
are quality issues tackled? 
(9) Transactions costs have been of concern to management researchers and 
economists (see Chapter 2). It is not known, however, whether GPs and trusts 
are concerned about transactions costs or are actively seeking to reduce them. 
4.6.5 The Scottish Health Service: 
Evidence: 
The uptake of fundholding was greater in England than in Scotland. 
Furthermore, in Lothian, Tayside and Grampian, the fundholding scheme was 
adopted with much greater enthusiasm than elsewhere in the country. 
Research Gaps: 
(10) Glasgow, although one of the largest health boards, is one about which 
little is known in terms of fundholding and purchasing. As an area 
characterised by a more reluctant uptake of fundholding, what are the attitudes 
of GPs in the area and do they differ from elsewhere in Scotland and Engand? 
Of the research gaps identified above, all but number 2 are addressed in this thesis. 
This is because this study concentrates on the purchasing dimension of general practice 
rather than aspects of primary care provision. 
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4.7 Summary 
The NHS reforms stimulated a broad research agenda, the pursuit of which has been 
hindered by the lack of formal review studies and has been made more complicated due 
to the influence of ongoing policy developments. Nevertheless, there is a growing 
body of evidence concerning GP fundholding and purchasing from which general 
conclusions can be drawn. It can be said that GPs have been motivated by social 
goals; have been largely insensitive to prices; have been preoccupied with issues 
concerning service quality; and have been reluctant to shift contracts, preferring instead 
to work collaboratively with (predominantly) local providers. They have also placed 
greater reliance on personal or local knowledge and judgement than formal information 
when making purchasing decisions. 
There remain, however, a number of gaps in the research concerning GP purchasing. 
This chapter has identified 10 such gaps which are addressed in this study. They 
concern the extent to, and means by which GPs actively seek to improve hospital 
efficiency and service quality; the nature of the purchaser provider relationship (social 
and economic characteristics); and initiatives to stimulate resource transfer. Particular 
emphasis was also given to the need for more research in Scotland. 
Having now reviewed the purpose and development of the reforms and identified the 
research gaps (Chapters 1-4), Chapter 5 proceeds with a discussion of the research 
aims for this study and the methodology that was adopted. 
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Introducidon 
Chapters 1-4 have provided detailed discussions about the historical context of the 
reforms; the theoretical arguments underpinning the market arrangements; the differing 
characteristics of market and network forms of organisation and their likely impact on 
the NHS; and the empirical evidence concerning GP purchasing behaviour. Having 
identified a number of research gaps in the preceding chapter, this chapter goes on to 
discuss the qualitative methodology that was adopted. Interview and observation 
techniques were employed in order to view the purchasing role and relationship from 
the perspective of the GPs. The mode of enquiry was therefore flexible, allowing 
emerging themes and dynamic processes to be accommodated. 
Chapter 5 restates the aims and objectives of this study and justifies the research 
methodology adopted. It then goes on to discuss the interview and observation 
processes and sample characteristics. Care is taken to clarify the geographical 
context of the research and the links between subjects who were interviewed and 
observed. The chapter also discusses the methods of analysis and concept derivation. 
Reflections on the role of the researcher are made and the limitations of the research 
are also discussed. The chapter concludes by setting out the structure for the empirical 
chapters which follow. 
5.1 Research Aim & Objectives 
The subject of this thesis was very much driven by the issues stimulated after the 
introduction of the NHS internal market. As Chapters 1-4 have discussed at length, 
GPs were expected to be drivers of change and efficiency through their purchasing and 
conunissioning activities yet, whilst some conclusions can be drawn about the extent to 
which these expectations were met, there is much that is still uncertain. Ten research 
gaps to which this study contributes were identified in the previous chapter. 
In order 
to contribute to these gaps, the following research aim was developed: 
to explore the role GPs are performing as purchasers and to identify which 
of the purchasing-Imarket-related issues are ofparticular concern to 
them. 
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More specifically, the objectives were as follows: 
to consider whether GPs are seeking to stimulate efficiency in secondary 
care; 
to find out whether GPs are seeking to initiate the transfer of resources from 
secondary to primary care; 
* to understand the relationship between GPs (as purchasers) and hospital 
Trusts (as providers); and 
e to identify implications for policy makers and managers within the NHS 
5.2 Research Methodology -A Qualitative Approach 
When selecting a research methodology, it is important to suit the mode of enquiry to 
the research aim (Adams and Schvaneveldt 1985). Cassell and Symon (1994) offer a 
number of reasons why, when doing exploratory research in changing organisational 
environments, a qualitative method of enquiry is particularly suitable (see also Shaffir 
and Stebbins 199 1). Firstly, it is less likely to impose restrictive a priori classifications 
on the collection of data, therefore "research is less driven by very specific hypotheses 
and categorical frameworks and more concerned with emergent themes and 
idiographic descriptions" (Cassell and Symon 1994: 4). Qualitative methods also allow 
flexibility in the research process and thus the opportunity to pursue emerging insights. 
This flexibility extends to the methods employed such that the researcher can "change 
the nature of his or her intervention as the research develops in response to the 
changing nature of the context. " (ibid. p4). This is particularly important because as 
Cassell and Symon note, "the fact that we are working in complex situations means we 
cannot define exactly what we are interested in or how to explore the issue at the 
outset", (ibid. p4) and "only qualitative methods are sensitive enough to allow the 
detailed analysis of change" (ibid. p5), which is crucial when organisational dynamics 
are of interest. Moreover, and importantly, qualitative methods are "concerned with 
understanding human behaviour from the actor's own frame of reference (Bogdan 
and Taylor 1975) here, from the perspective of the GPs. 
Figure 5.1 below shows the relationship between qualitative and quantitative methods 
as determined by the degree to which the phenomena are known. 
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Figure 5.1: The Relationship of Qualitative and Quantitative Methods 
Source: Shaffir and Stebbins 1991 
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Prediction - 
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It indicates that both quantitative and qualitative data may be gathered during 
exploratory studies but that, "most exploratory studies ... are predominantly 
qualitative, possibly augmented in a minor quantitative way by such descriptive 
statistics as indexes, percentages, and ennumerations. " (ibid, p6). The better-known 
the phenomena, the more research tends to rely on prediction. This study lies to the 
left of the diagram as a little or partially-known phenomena. 
Notwithstanding the importance of suiting the aim and mode of enquiry, there were a 
number of additional contextual and empirical factors which confirmed that a 
qualitative approach would be most suitable as they underpinned the need for face to 
face discussion or observation as a means of understanding purchaser-provider 
interaction. 
5.21 General Practice Climate 
Certain characteristics of the primary care environment at the time also suggested that 
a qualitative approach would be required. In particular, the policy environment was 
changing continually. The stipulated patient list size for fundholders was reduced 
giving greater scope for eligibility' and the scheme was expanded 
in two directions to 
1 The proposed criteria was 11,000 patients but when enacted 
in 1990 was reduced to 9,000. In 1993 
the limit was reduced to 6,000 patients, and to 4,000 in 1995. 
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increase the range of services included (via total fundholding) and to reduce the scope 
of the budget (via PCP/ Community Fundholding). In addition, non-GPFHs were 
embraced within the purchasing framework via health board purchasing. At the same 
time, alternative purchasing and commissioning frameworks (from total purchasing 
pilots to consortia, locality purchasing, practice sensitive purchasing and health 
authority commissioning) were emerging across the UK in a mosaic of arrangements. 
The environment was, therefore, not only fluid but complex making the research a 
more difficult process (Robinson 1996). Cassell and Symon suggest that in an 
environment which is changing, only qualitative methods are "sensitive enough to 
allow the detailed analysis of change ... with quantitative methods we may be able to 
assess that a change has occurred over time but we cannot say how (what processes 
were involved) or why (in terms of circumstances and stakeholders). " (Cassell and 
Symon 1994: 5) Although this is not a study of change per se, the characteristics of 
general practice are such that studies need to take account of and be sensitive to the 
changes which are occurring in primary care. 
With such a diverse range of structures and a general ambiguity about definitions of 
and differences between purchasing and commissioning (see chapter 2 for discussion), 
the language and practice of purchasing/conunissioning was complicated and it was 
clear that the language one might use within a questionnaire or interview about 
purchasing was also potentially complex. Theoretical concepts had been used within 
the medical literature but were often not explained. It was not clear therefore, to what 
extent they were acc I urately understood by medical practitioners. The term 
transactions costs, for example, was used but little explained and could easily have 
been taken to mean the administrative costs of the contract and invoicing system rather 
than the more comprehensive notion which includes search costs for information 
arising from uncertainty, switching costs incurred due to asset specificity etc. Where 
concepts such as 'fundholding' were well-defined it was not ambiguity which was a 
problem so much as the fact that the terms were emotive. For example, the word 
fundholding could provoke reactions ranging from apathy and indifference to 
enthusiasm or opposition. 
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Some final concerns which influenced the choice of methodological approach were that 
the agenda had moved on in primary care. In June 1996, the Scottish Office hosted a 
one-day conference in Dundee entitled "Primary Care, the Way Ahead". The meeting 
was attended by a range of people from the Scottish Office, HBs, social work, general 
practice, nursing and community services. The issues in which they were interested 
included service quality, involving and informing carers, integrating health and social 
care, working in primary care teams, strengthening primary care co-ordination,, 
matching primary care resources to changes in patient demand, all dimensions of 
managing primary health and social care rather than purchasing or improving 
secondary care services or debating alternative models of fundholding. Indeed, the 
subject of fundholding was rarely raised during the discussions. 
That the agenda was shifting to these issues raised concerns that the apparent 
irrelevance (particularly to non-fundholders) of a questionnaire about flandholding and 
purchasing might contribute to a low response rate. This concern was compounded 
by a general awareness that GPs felt they had too much administration, and by 
question marks over the future viability of the fundholding scheme. I decided to seek 
advice from primary care researchers at Aberdeen University. Their recommendation 
was that unless I had a prior relationship with practices in Glasgow, I ought to adopt 
an interview-based approach because their experience suggested that questionnaire 
return rates would be low. 
It is clear from the literature review in Chapters 2-4 that there was a range of 
purchasing-related issues which could potentially have been of concern to GPs. Trying 
to identify those peculiar to any one GP and to explore them via some form of 
questionnaire was likely to prove problematic when coupled with the need to provide 
definitions of otherwise ambiguous terms and concepts in order that responses could 
be compared as like with like. Coupled with concerns about poor response rates, the 
arguments in favour of a qualitative approach were compelling. 
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5.3 Fieldwork 
In line with the arguments presented above, a qualitative approach was adopted. The 
choice then became one of selecting a suitable method such as participant observation, 
interviewing or focus groups in order to yield data from the subjects' point of view 
(Bogdan and Taylor 1975: 2). The choice of method was not only theoretical but also 
pragmatic. To undertake participant or non-participant observation, I needed access 
to inter-practice meetings or purchaser-provider meetings but I had not established the 
right contacts within general practice to begin with this strategy. Focus groups were 
also an unlikely option because of the need to bring a group of GPs together when they 
were already complaining about being over-worked and were seeking to reduce their 
commitments by, for example, working co-operatively in out-of hours services. On the 
advice of medical and academic colleagueS2, I decided to undertake a series of * 
interviews with GPs and fund/practice managers gaining initial access through personal 
health service contacts (see below). 
5.3.1 Interviews 
Before detailing the nature of the interviews and observations, it is important to clarify 
some particular characteristics of Glasgow which are relevant to the sample choice. Of 
the health boards with fewer fundholders, Glasgow is a particularly interesting area to 
study because it accommodates 5 acute hospitals whose relative proximity means that 
patients can easily access alternative providers. As two of the hospitals are located on 
the south side of the city and the other three on the north, practices located in the city 
centre, west or east end are well placed to benefit from a number of alternative 
providers. There are also a number of private sector providers, so the potential for 
competition/contestability is high. 
As Chapter 4 noted, GGHB is a Board which, in terms of fundholding uptake, ranked 
9 th out of the 15 Boards. The statistics in Appendix I show that in GGHB there were 
2 Medical colleagues were public health clinicians and a GP with whom I 
had worked in previous 
years. Academic colleagues were Loma McKee, Angus 
Laing and Gordon Marnoch from Aberdeen 
University. 
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53 live fundholding practices in 1996 3 and a further 8 shadow practices. By 1997 
therefore, there were 61 live fundholding practices. These 61 practices represented 
27.2% of all GGHB, GPs and between them covered 30.9% of the population. 
Although at that time GGHB had a relatively low flandholding rate, it had the highest 
level of practices in the preparatory phase and the interest in PCP fiandholding during 
1996 was such that by 1997, more than 50% of practices were PCP budget holderS4. 
Like other BBs and HAs, GGHB has created a locality framework for commissioning. 
The HB divided Glasgow into 3 sectors: south, north east and west. Each sector was 
then further divided into localities of which there were 19 and within which there are a 
number of LPAs to represent the GPs in their locality. The LPAs' views were then 
given to the sector's Purchasing Facilitators who acted as the conduit between the HB 
and the locality on commissioning/purchasing issues. In 1998 an additional role of 
clinical commissioner was developed whereby one GP worked on a sessional basis as 
an advisor to the health board. GGHB's commissioning arrangements embraced both 
fundholders and non-fundholders although fundholders purchased certain services via 
their own direct provider negotiations. 
5.3.2 Interview Sampling 
A purposive interview sample was selected (Churchill 1991; Cassell and Symon 1994) 
to include each type of fundholder, (including practices who had been purchasing for 
some time and who had, therefore, had ample opportunity to build a relationship with 
their provider(s)) as well as non-fundholders. Some interviewees were selected 
specifically because they could "shed light on a particular aspect of the behaviour 
under investigation" (Cassell and Symon 1994) - this is sometimes known as the expert 
judgement technique (Churchill 1991; Cassell and Symon 1994). The LPAs, for 
example, were chosen because they could comment on their purchasing role within the 
3 The data for this thesis were collected in the GGHB area between the end of 1996 and the middle of 
1998. 
4By 1998 the figures had increased quite significantly to 78 PCP practices (including 
6 in the shadow 
year); 38 standard fundholders (including the total purchasers) and 
101 non-fundholders. 
5 This fi-arnework has changed under the new PCT and LHCC structure. 
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GGHB conunissioning framework and could comment on how GPs in their locality 
behave as purchasers. Others were selected using the snowballing technique, (ie, the 
initial set of respondents were used as informants to identify others with the desired 
characteristics). The figure below identifies which of the interviewees were 
recommended (snowballing)', which were personal contacts and those who were 'cold' 
contacts (expert judgement). It is also clear from the diagram that interviewees HB I 
and GP(2) were important gateways to subsequent interviews. 
Figure 5.2: Sample Selection - Snowballing and Expert 
Judgement 
(G-P(8)) 
HB I' 
........................ 17) 
HB2 rSO GP(6) 
so (b 
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............. ............. 
--- ----------- 
,, 'GýP 
'(13) 13 
FPM = Fund/Practice Manager 
SO = Scottish Office 
HB = Health Board 
practitioner 
reconunendation 
researcher's 
personal contact 
'cold' call 
0 
non-GPFH 
. PCP fundholder 
(0 
standard GPFH 
. total GPFH 
Eighteen practices contributed to this study via interviews and multiple observations 
and a further 13 were observed but not interviewed. Of those interviewed, 13 were 
fundholders, II of them from GGHB (17% of the fundholding population in Glasgow 
at the time)'. It is worth noting that this is the first published study in Scotland to 
have included PCP fundholders in its sample. In order to obtain a general picture of 
' It was sometimes through a combination of snowballing and expert judgement 
by which 
inteniewees were selected. GP9, for example, was contacted through snowballing but 
had also been 
identified (expert judgement) as someone important to speak to because he was involved in the 
GPFHA, was a total fimdholder and regularly spoke to the media. 
This includes PCP and shadow ftmdholders. 
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purchasing behaviour within Glasgow and across Scotland, interviewees included 
health board commissioners and members of the primary care division at the Scottish 
Office. Two Trust contract managers were also interviewed in order to gain an 
understanding of their view of GP purchasing behaviour. Two health board interviews 
(Forth Valley and Borders) were not used directly in this study but were used as 
background material. 
Twenty six interviews' were conducted, all held at the employees' place of work and 
lasting between 45 minutes and 2 hours. Each interviewee was contacted by letter and 
a follow-up telephone call. Included with the letter was a one page summary of the 
research purpose and sample interview questions'. If the GP/Fund Manager had been 
recommended, the letter began by stating who had recommended them. Twenty 
practices were contacted of whom one declined to participate (the GP said he never 
takes part in academic studies) and one other said they were too busy at the time but 
would help out if I was having difficulties gaining access. Each practice was offered 
feedback from the study. Interviews were transcribed verbatim usually within one 
week of the interview taking place I Box 5.1: Data Source Coding 
and field notes from observations 
were written up by the following 
day. Each interview and 
observation was labelled for ease of 
reporting and to maintain anonymity. 
The source coding is explained in 
Box 5.1. 
The breakdown of GP/Fund/Practice 
S= Standard Fundholder 
PCP = PCP Fundholder 
I Interiview T 
Total Fundholder 
0 Observation 
N Non-Fundholder 
Page Numbers 
GP 14 PC (5 -6y-'-7 
from 
i 
which 
- quote is taken. I \< 
Practice / Trust 
GP = General Practitioner Health Board 
FPM = Fund/Practice Manager Identifier 
T= Hospital Trust Interviewee 
BB Health Board Interviewee 
SO Scottish Office Interviewee 
' The two Scottish Office interviewees were jointly interviewed. 
9 Colleagues at Aberdeen University had stressed the value of providing practices with a 
(nicely 
produced) sunu-nary sheet. The GPs they had worked with responded more positively when 
they could 
see that the researcher(s) had made an effort to clarify the purpose of 
the interview. 
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Manager interviewees can be seen in Table 5.1 which also identifies their length of time 
as fundholders and their roles (where applicable) within GGHB's commissioning 
structure. 
Table 5.1: General Practice Interviewees, Their Purchasing Status and Locality Role 
GP 
Identifier 
Y"dbolding.. 
Status 
Fundholding 
Date 
Location 
NE/W/S 
Wider Purchasing Role 
GP6 Non-GPFH - W&NE 
GP8 Non-GPFH - NE LPA and speaks publicly (eg, to the 
media) giving a non-fundholder 
perspective 
GPIO Non-GPFH - W LPA 
GP13 Non-GPFH - S 
GP17 Non-GPFH - W 
GP3 PCP 1995 Forth Valley 
HB 
Medical Director of a Community Trust 
GP2 Prep. PCP 1996 W 
FPM5 PCP 1995 NE 
GPII PCP 1995 S Purchasing Facilitator, now Clinical 
Conu-nissioner 
GP14 PCP 1994 S LPA 
GP16 PCP 1998 S Purchasing Facilitator 
GP18 PCP 1996 NE 
FPM4 
GP4 
Standard 1993 W GP is former Chairman of the GPF14A 
and is very involved at health board and 
local medical committee level. 
GPI Standard 1991 Lanarkshire 
BB 
Also University Lecturer 
FPM7 
GP7 
Standard 1991 S 
GP12 PCP 
Standard 
1995 
1997 
NE 
GP15 Standard 1992 NE 
FPM9/ 
GP9 
Standard 
Total 
1992 
1994 
NE Chairman of the GPFHA. Very 
outspoken supporter of ftindholding. 
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In summary, there were 5 non-fundholders, 7 PCP fundholders, 5 standard fundholders 
and I total fundholder. With the exception of the total fundholder, each geographical 
sectors was represented in each category. An LPA for each sector was also included 
in the sample plus two purchasing facilitators for the south sector of whom one is now 
a clinical commissioner. In addition, the sample includes Glasgow's first fundholding 
practice, a total fundholder (of which there were only 3 in Scotland at the time), two 
very outspoken fundholding enthusiasts and an outspoken non-fundholder. Four of the 
fundholders had been involved in the scheme for more than 5 years and two of them 
had been fundholders since the scheme began in Scotland. Although the sample is not 
numerically representative, it represents the types of fundholding and non-fundholding 
purchasers and includes GPs at all levels of the health board's cominissioning/ 
purchasing structure. It also represents the views of some of the most experienced 
fundholders in Glasgow who are particularly well placed to comment on the 
fundholding and purchasing scene. 
5.3.3 Interview Design 
The research design was neither highly inductive (loose) nor highly deductive (tight) 
but combined elements of both approaches as described by Nfiles and Huberman 
(1994): "Much qualitative research lies between the two extremes. Something is 
known conceptually about the phenomenon, but not enough to house a theory. The 
researcher has an idea of the parts of the phenomenon that are not well understood and 
knows where to look for these things - in which settings, among which actors. " (p. 17) 
This meant that there were aspects of both approaches within this study as described 
again by Wes and Huberman who write, "... we should not forget why we are out in 
the field in the first place: to describe and analyse a pattern of relationships. That task 
requires a set of analytic categories. Starting with them (deductively) or getting 
gradually to them (inductively) are both possible. In the life of a conceptualisation, we 
need both approaches ... to pull a mass of 
facts and findings into a wide-ranging, 
coherent set of generalisations. " (p 17) 
Following the literature review, a number of market-related themes were identified and 
incorporated into an interview schedule (see Appendix 11) to provide an interpretative 
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framework (Bogdan and Taylor 1975) for deductive analysis. The schedule included 
questions covering the following areas: 
9 efficiency of resource utilisation 
e resource allocation / transfer 
e transactions costs 
buyer power 
primary care-led decision making 
the necessity of the purchaser provider split 
The interview schedule was designed to elicit data on these themes but within that) to 
allow related issues which were of significance, to be raised by interviewees and allow 
for inductive analysis and theory generation. 
Although the first interview was guided in a semi-structured fashion based on the 
schedule, it became apparent that both the language used and the range of topics 
covered were not as suitable as intended. The data gathered were appropriate to the 
research purpose, but the interview was more restrictive than anticipated. Both the 
interviewer and interviewee felt constrained during discussions by the need to complete 
all the scheduled questions and there was, therefore, too little scope for new themes to 
emerge and be pursued. During reflections following the interview, it was thought that 
greater opportunity should be provided for GPs to raise issues they thought important 
and for the interviewee to guide the discussion more gently. In other words, the 
interviews became more thematic, "focused on particular themes ... neither strictly 
structured with standardised questions, nor entirely 'non-directive'. " (Kvale 1983: 3 1) 
This more flexible approach meant that the schedule was reconstituted into a thematic 
guide of the territory through which the interviewee and interviewer travelled with 
greater freedom (see Appendix III). This accords with the position adopted by the 
researcher as what Kvale describes as a traveller. Kvale (1983) suggests that the 
researcher's approach to new knowledge will depend on whether s/he adopts the role 
of miner or traveller. The miner considers knowledge as a "given" which needs to be 
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sought by the miner as s/he digs deeper and deeper for the nuggets of treasure 
(knowledge) which are there to be found. The traveller, on the other hand, considers 
himself/herself as being on a journey which leads to a tale to be told when returning 
home. The traveller wanders through the landscape and enters into conversation with 
those s/he encounters. The traveller explores domains, roams freely around the 
territory talking to natives in order to learn about their world. S/he then interprets and 
re-telts these stories. 
The change in approach did mean more pre-interview preparation because 
methodological choices had to be made during the interview (eg. when to close one 
topic and move onto the next, how to pursue a theme without loosing direction and 
when to pursue a new emerging issues). Each choice demanded a decision about the 
relative importance of that particular topic and the overall direction of the interview. 
Such choices are recognised characteristics of thematic/focused interviews (Kvale 
1983). Kvale writes "The aim is to make decisions about method on a reflective level, 
based on knowledge of the topic of the study and of the methodological options 
available, and their likely consequences for the interview project as a whole". The 
very openness and flexibility of the interview, with its many on-the-spot decisions - for 
example, whether to follow up new leads in an interview situation or to stick to the 
interview guide - put strong demands on advance preparation and interviewer 
competence. The absence of prescribed sets of rules creates an open-ended field of 
opportunity for the interviewer's skills, knowledge, and intuition. Interviewing is a 
craft that is closer to art than to standardised social science methods. " (p84). 
Adopting a more flexible approach transformed the interview encounter and suited the 
purpose of the research. By allowing interviewees freedom to raise their concerns at 
the outset, I could then explore in greater depth the nature of their concerns and could 
return later to raise issues from the thematic guide which had not already been tackled. 
10 Methodological choices include decisions about how many interviews are needed, whether 
interviews should be taped, whether they should be transcribed, how interviews should be analysed 
and whether transcripts should be given to the interviewee or not. 
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5.3.4 Non-payWcipant Observadon 
As a method of enquiry, participant observation is "exceptional" for studying 
processes, relationships among people and events, and the organisation of people and 
events (Jorgensen 1989). Jorgensen suggests that observation is particularly 
appropriate when there is little known about the phenomenon, when there are 
important differences between the views of insiders and outsiders and when the 
phenomenon is obscured from the view of outsiders. The method is one in which the 
researcher "depicts what goes on in [the subjects'] lives and what life is like for them, 
in such a way that one's audience is at least partially able to project themselves into the 
point of view of the people depicted. " (Lofland 1971: 4). As Bogdewic (1992) 
explains, one of the principal advantages of this methodology is its ability to identify 
the "sequence and connectedness of events that contribute to the meaning of a 
phenomenon" and that "Rather than attempting to piece an understanding together 
from various clues or repeated interviews, the context can be observed as it unfolds in 
everyday life. " 
Methodologists draw attention to the difficulties of access for the purposes of 
observation (Lofland 1971; Strauss 1987; Jorgensen 1989) and the need to develop a 
rapport with a gatekeeper. Earlier it was noted that observation as an initial method of 
enquiry was problematic because of these difficulties of access. The interview phase, 
however, presented an opportunity to develop the necessary rapport with interviewees 
to facilitate greater research access. Four of the interviewees (2 GPs and 2 Trust 
Contract Managers) functioned as gatekeepers to the observation episodes". 
Ten observations were conducted. Nine of them took place between January 1997 
and October 1997 whilst the tenth was almost one year later in August 1998. The 
meetings differed in kind. Seven of the meetings involved direct encounters between 
GPs and Trusts: five could be described as clinical or purchasing meetings and the 
other two contracting. Two meetings were FIB commissioning meetings at which GPs 
were represented but Trusts were not. The first meeting was a half-day away day at 
11 Whereas the two contract managers invited me to attend meetings which they were having with 
purchasers, I asked the GPs directly for permission to accompany them to meetings. 
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which the purchasing intentions of 10 practices were being discussed and co-ordinated. 
Meetings varied in length, the first meeting (01) was the longest, lasting 4 hours, 
whereas 09 lasted just less than I hour. Standard fundholders were represented most 
frequently at the meetings, followed by PCP fundholders. (Table 5.2 below identifies 
the schedule of meetings observed (numbered 01 -0 10). ) 
Table 5.2: Meetings Observed 
Parties Date Setting & Purpose Attendants 
(Total in brackets) 
Code 
Collaborating 14th Jan. 1997 Half day'away in a nearby hotel 6 ftmdholding GPs, 6 ftmd managers and 
GP fundholders for a group of GP practices who an administrator from the fundholding 
collaborate in their purchasing association. (13) 
decisions. Ol/ ... /(.. ) 
Acute Trust A 14th Feb. 1997 One of a series of bi-monthly Trust members: Dir. Business Planning & 
and local GPs clinical meetings held at the Contracts, Medical Director, Clinical 
Trust with GPFHs and the LPA Director, Ophthalmologist, Financial 
manager, secretary 
Primary care: 4 GPs (incl. I non-GPFH 
LPA), 2 Fund managers (12) 
02/ ... 
/(.. ) 
Acute Trust B 18th Feb. 1997 One of the quarterly meetings Trust members: Financial director, 
and ftmdholders between GPFHs and the trust. nursing manager, administrator, 6 
consultants (incl. 4 clinical directors), 
Primary care: 7 GPs and 3 fund/practice 
managers. (19) 
ON ... /(. -) 
Community 17th Mar. 1997 Pre-contract meeting at a health Trust members: Locality manager, director 
Trust and centre with PCP fundholders. of contracts, management trainee. 
ftmdholders Primary Care: 2 PCP fundholders, I 
practice manager, representative from the 
GP purchasing agency. (7) 
04/ ... 
/(.. ) 
Acute Trust A 14th Mar. 1997 One of a series of bi-monthly Trust members: Director of Contracts, 
and local GPs clinical meetings held at the administrator. 
Trust with GPFHs and the LPA Primary care: 2 GPFHs, I practice 
manager. (5) 
05/... 
community 23rd Apr. 1997 Pre-contract meeting at the trust Trust members: Director of Contracts, 
Trust and I I with a group 
of collaboratmg management trainee, 3 locality managers, 
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ftindholders GPFHs deputy director of finance, finance officer. 
Primary care: Administrator from 
fundholding association, 4 ftmd/practice 
managers, 2 GPs (14) 
06/... 
Acute Trust A II th Jul. 1997 One of a series of bi-monthly Trust members: Director of Contracts, 
and local GPs clinical meetings held at the Medical Director, Consultant, Business 
Trust with GPFHs and the LPA Manager, Administrator 
Primary Care: 3 ftind/practice managers, 4 
GPs (incl. I non-GPFH LPA) (13) 
07/ ... /(.. ) 
Health Board 14th Oct. 1997 One of a series of fortnightly Health Board members: Dep. Dir. Sector 
commissioning (now monthly) meetings about Commissioning, finance officer, contracts 
meeting services in two sectors of the officer, public health clinician, senior 
city. health promotion officer, primary Pare 
development officer and information 
officer. 
Primary Care: Clinical commissioner 
(PCP fundholder) (7) 
08/ ... /(. -) 
Acute Trust C 21st Oct. 1997 Meeting requested by the Trust Trust members: 2 consultants 
and Clinical to find out GP views on its Primary care: 2 clinical commissioners 
Commissioners services. (PCP ftindholders) (4) 
09LA.. ) 
Health Board 25th Aug. 1998 One of a series of monthly Health Board members: Dep. Dir. Sector 
commissioning meetings about services in two commissionimg, finance officer, contracts 
meeting sectors of the city. officer, senior health promotion officer, 
primary care development officer, 
secretary 
Primary Care: Clinical Commissioner 
(PCP ftindholder) (7) 
010LA.. ) 
Figure 5.3 below summarises these observations indicating which of the interviewees 
were observed and illustrating that there were 4 clusters of practices meeting with 
providers one of which also met with the HB at commissioning meetings. 
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I Figure 5.3: Observation Episodes 
GP Cluster I 
........... ........... ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ........... ..... ............. 03 Trust B 
............ ............. ........... 
Trust A 
........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ .......... .................. ............ 
(To 
-------------------- 015 ........ GP Cluster 3 
(I U) 06 Trust C 04 I 
(T2) GP Cluste 2 
It was important to decide 
what to observe during the 
meetings. Jorgensen (1989) 
suggests that the 
possibilities include how 
people are arranged and the 
discernible relationships 
among them as well as the 
feelings that the observer 
gets during the meeting. 
Lofland's suggestions 
include acts,, activities, and meanings (Lofland 197 1). Although as a complete 
observer (rather than participant observer), note taking was easier because I took no 
part in discussions, it remained impossible to record all the acts, meanings, 
relationships and feelings. Field notes therefore, represented the subject matter for 
discussion, the main points made and by whom, the tone of the exchange and a small 
number of illustrative quotes. I was aware, however, that the content of the 
discussions was sometimes sensitive and I did not want to be seen to note down every 
significant comment immediately it was made lest the participants became guarded in 
their expression. I chose, therefore, to hesitate on occasion before writing down a 
particular exchange and to keep the quote in mind whilst watching the behaviours and 
interactions which followed. Sometimes I chose to note not what was said but the 
non-verbal communication. For example, during 02, one GP suggested a course of 
action to which the consultant made no verbal response but looked directly at the 
Trust's business manager, clearly angered by what was being said. His response to the 
GP was made without direct eye contact. The consultant offered a controlled, 
measured (and defensive) response whilst maintaining deliberate, angered eye contact 
with the manager 12 . On this occasion 
it was important that I could observe the 
encounter rather than take my eyes off the setting to write direct quotes. This type of 
12 His focus on the contracts manager was indicative of the consultant's reliance on the manager to 
perform the role of broker in the discussion. 
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choice was made regularly during the observation meetings. I did not keep a log of 
who entered the meeting, who left, the points at which any one individual spoke to 
his/her colleague, what papers were issued or referred to at any point during the 
meeting and so forth. 
My status as observer did not permit me to interrupt and clarify the nature of what 
participants were meaning, neither did it enable me to develop a rapport with the 
participants (other than the gatekeepers). In this respect, my role as observer was 
limited when compared with the more prolonged, involved ethnographic participant- 
observer roles which can sometimes be conducted. Participant observer 
methodologists place considerable importance on immersing ones-self in the subject's 
world, understanding meanings and symbols, and developing an ongoing rapport with 
the subjects. However, the subjects in this case are clinicians who were discussing 
topics about which I had limited knowledge and experience and so whilst I could seek 
to understand the process, I was unable to contribute to the content. Furthermore, 
because I had to attend meetings which suited my timetable, I was unable to attend 
meetings continually with the same clusters to develop a longer-term rapport. That 
said, one member of clusters I and 2 on arriving at 06, said "ah, the ubiquitous 
researcher". laughed and asked how my research was going. Feeling a little guilty" I 
apologised for the intrusion but was reassured when the practice manager (supported 
by nods from 3 others) said that no such apology was required and that they did not 
mind my being there. I felt, therefore that I had been accepted and was unintrusive - 
an important dynamic of participant observation. 
5.4 Data Gathering and Analysis: An Iterative and Interactive 
Process 
One of the key characteristics of qualitative research is that data gathering and analysis 
should be concurrent activities (Coffey and Atkinson 1996) (See Figure 
5.4 below. 
13 my guilt stemmed from the fact that I had attended 4 previous purchaser-provider 
meetings at 
which this particular practice manager was present 
but had done so at the invitation of the Trust not 
of the GPs. 
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Figure 5.4: The Research Process 
Designing 
Interviewing 
Thematizing 
on-Linear 
Reporting Proces 
Transcribing 
............... ............. ................ .......... 
Verifying 
Analysing 
(Adapted from Kvale 1996) 
Following accepted practice, 
analysis began after the first 
interview. " Initial analysis 
indicated that starting with a 
direct question about hospital 
efficiency (as was the case in the 
first couple of interviews) was 
problematic because it was too 
specific and not necessarily of interest to the GP. Consequently, a more general 
question was introduced at the start of the interview to set the scene and engage the 
GP's interest. Interviewees were asked "Why did you decide (or decide not) to 
become a fundholder? ". If their response was along the lines that they were 
dissatisfied with hospital services then subsequent questions would pursue the line of 
hospital efficiency and service quality. If, however, the response was that they wanted 
a bit more influence in what happened to their patients, then questions followed the 
line of how they exercised that power, whether they were prepared to or had moved 
contracts and so forth. This allowed a more natural progression through the issues 
than the interview schedule had originally permitted, meant that both the interviewee 
and I were more relaxed and ensured that, in accordance with the research aim, the 
discussion was tailored to the issues of importance to the interviewee. 
The iterative nature of the research process (as illustrated in Figure 5.4) is particularly 
well illustrated by the way in which inter-practice collaboration was explored. In the 
initial interview schedule, the question addressing inter-practice relationships was "do 
GPs compete with one another? ". This was asked of a number of the interviewees. 
As 
the interviews progressed, various views about competition emerged and preliminary 
analysis showed that competition, whilst it was an element of inter-practice 
relationships, was less important an issue to practices than that of collaboration. 
Collaboration wasl therefore, discussed in subsequent interviews. This same theme 
14 It is important to note that this resulted in the change towards a more flexible, thematic 
interview 
schedule and process. 
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became increasingly important when in December 1997, the Government published its 
policy on Local Health Care Co-operatives. This is reflected in the interviews (GP15- 
GP 18) which took place in late December 1997 and early in 1998. 
The interaction between data collection and analysis was the same for the observation 
sessions. The initial step was to record the data as described above, noting the 
content of the discussions and the nature of the purchaser-provider interaction. When 
reviewing and analysing the first 7 observation episodes, for example, it became clear 
that the interaction being observed was characterised not only by a purchasing process, 
but by mutual learning, partnering and service design processes. These elements of 
what I later term a multiplex relationship (see Chapter 7), were verified during 
subsequent observations and reflections on interview transcripts. Ongoing analysis 
during the fieldwork phase thus supported analysis, interpretation and thematic 
development during subsequent interviews and observations. 
5.5 Data Analysis 
Data analysis began early in the data collection phase. It began with coding the 
transcripts and moved on into interpretation of the data. The analysis (described 
below) followed the 3 levels recommended by Coffey and Atkinson (Coffey and 
Atkinson 1996): (1) coded data are retrieved, recontexualised, parts are extracted and 
placed with other data to explore coded sets; (2) codes are explored and used as 
pathways through the data whilst looking for patterns, themes, contrasts etc; (3) coded 
data is then transformed into meaningful data. The last phase is done by 
recontextualising data or, as Dey (1993) (cited in Coffey and Atkinson) terms 
it 
'connecting' data within a thorough description of context and social action. 
Each interview was manually coded in terms of the interview themes. Maps were then 
drawn for each code and indicated interviewee responses (see Appendix 
W)". These 
maps provided an overall picture of the responses to any one 
issue and included cross- 
references to page numbers in transcripts. Maps were constructed 
for the following 
" Maps were not conceptual/cognitive of the type written about 
by Miles and Hubberman 1994 
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themes: competition/collaboration, commissioning, information, fundholding rationale, 
buyer power and contract switching, miscellaneous purchasing issuesl hospital 
efficiency, equity, transactions costs, the necessity of the purchaser provider split, 
primary care-led and service quality. From the maps, it was possible to identify some 
patterns of response - the first level of analysis identified by CaMey16 (in Miles and 
Hubberman 1994) (see Figure 5.5 below). 
Figure 5.5: The Ladder ofAnalytical Abstraction Carney, 1990 
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The second analytical approach was to read through the transcripts without looking for 
anything in particular but taking note of any surprising terms, looking at what was not 
said as well as what was said, noting commonalties and differences between 
respondents (level 2 in the above diagram). One of the most important findings (see 
Chapter 6) was discovered in this way. When reading through the interviews I noted 
the non-use by GPs of the term power. This was unexpected because there 
had been 
16 Carney, T. F. (1990) Collaborative inquiry methodology; Windsor, Ontario, Canada: University of 
Windsor, Division for Instructional Development. Source: Nfiles and Huberman 1994. 
154 
much in the literature about GPs holding the purse strings, exercising power over 
providers and so forth. What interviewees did talk about, however, was control. 
Although my initial view was that perhaps it meant the same thing, (control over the 
provider), it became clear on further analysis that control meant something very 
different - professional autonomy. Furthermore, professional autonomy was 
ameliorated in a number of ways through the fundholding scheme (eg, control over 
staff appointments, control over service developments and prescribing, control over 
what happens to patients in hospital), none of which were synonymous with the 
original concept of power. 
The third approach was what Kvale (1983) terms an ad hoc approach, one of a number 
of techniques he identifies (see Figure 5.6 for an illustration). 
Figure 5.6. - Kvale's Approaches to A nalysing Qualitative Interviews 
Approaches to Interview Outcome of 
Analysis of Meaning Text Analysis 
------------- Condensation 
--------------------- 
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------------- start goal 
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enen-jes >hero < he4)eM 
Interpretation 
--------- 
---------- 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
Ad hoc ----------- 
EJ - El 
The 'ad hoc' approach combines techniques of condensation, categorisation and 
narrative. It was a particularly creative part of the analysis during which I took 
themes and 'played around' with what they may have meant, what they linked to, 
whether they could be categorised or whether they were sub-categories of other 
themes and their relationships with other data. It was during this process that the 
main concepts presented in chapters 7 and 8 were developed. For example, thinking 
about the observations, I sought to describe the interaction process in various ways 
until the multiplex relationship was conceptualised. By trying to describe what was 
going on during the observations in a non-content way (ie, without 
describing the 
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subject matter of the conversation(s)), it became apparent that learning, service design, 
partnering and purchasing processes were occurring. Similarly, as I tried to 
understand and describe the inter-practice interaction, another learning process was 
identified. Both discoveries lead to a renewed analysis of the interview transcripts to 
find out whether there were data to support these observations. Maps were 
subsequently drawn (as in stage one of the analysis) to capture the themes of service 
design, learning and partnership. 
A similar 'ad hoc' approach drawing heavily on attempts to categorise data was used 
to handle the data about information. The matrix presented in Chapter 8, was derived 
after a number of attempts to capture the form of the information and the way in which 
it was communicated. 
Part way through the fieldwork, preliminary analysis was reported at a conference 
(Fischbacher and Francis 1997) and the paper was sent to half a dozen of the 
interviewees for feedback. Two GPs responded with comments which confirmed that, 
as they understood it, the analysis and discussion did indeed represent the purchaser- 
provider relationships with which they were themselves familiar. One HB and one 
Trust interviewee also responded to that effect. Later in the fieldwork phase and when 
further analysis had been undertaken, a second opportunity arose (this time a health 
care conference) to present and verify the findings. This paper was also found to 
concur with research elsewhere and a GP in the audience commented in depth on the 
findings after the session. The conference presentations were important opportunities 
to develop yet further my understanding of the market and to verify the findings in a 
wider research context. They contributed to the verifying and reporting processes 
identified in Figure 5.4. (The papers have since been published (Fischbacher and 
Francis 1998,1999)). 
Level 3 of the analysis process identified by Carney, involved taking the themes and 
concepts generated during levels I and 2 and interpreting them in light of the 
theoretical ffameworks discussed in chapter 4. Chapters 9 and 10 represent the 
synthesis between the theoretical framework and the data analysis. 
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5.5.1 Data Gatheying - When to Stop? 
The difficulty with gathering qualitative data where there is no pre-determined sample 
size or number of observations, is that of deciding when to stop gathering data. There 
were several indicators though about when this should be. 
As identified earlier, the interview sample included GPs who were involved not only in 
practice-budget holding but in health board commissioning activities, fundholding 
association and/or broader medico-political activities. During some of the interviews, 
two particular GPs were named as particularly active, experienced purchasers, those 
who had most frequently negotiated over prices. Their practices were both included 
in this study during interviews and observations. Two of the interviewees were often 
quoted in the National newspapers, one offering a fundholding view, the other a non- 
GPFH view. Because the sample included the more radical and the non-radical, 
enthusiasts and experienced purchasers, when it became clear that the interviews and 
observations were not yielding any new data, the decision to stop gathering data was 
taken. 
The distinction between content and process was of particular relevance to this 
decision because whilst the topics being discussed would continue to develop in an 
interesting way (in terms of the range of issues tackled), the purchaser-provider 
purchasing process was not exhibiting any new characteristics or yielding new data. 
Similarly, interviewees towards the latter half of the fieldwork were raising similar 
issues to those previously interviewed. Furthermore, the same stories were raised 
during multiple interviews (eg, the issue of the endoscopy service at Trust A (I/FPM4 
and I/T 1) and the movement of an ophthalmology contract from the public to the 
private sector (I/FPM9, I/GP8,01 and 03)). The repetition of the stories was in one 
sense a validation of their occurrence, but was in another sense indicative that these 
were probably the exemplars (perhaps the more extreme cases) which various 
purchasers and providers used to illustrate their points and that there were not many 
significantly different examples around. Furthermore, that they were the main 
examples used to demonstrate that contract switching did occur, one can infer that it 
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would be unlikely to find many other examples around the city because the most 
radical of Glasgow practices were included. 
Before finally deciding to do no further data collection, I reviewed the empirical 
evidence which had emerged during the fieldwork phase. Studies such as Ellwood 
1998, Lapsley et al 1997 and others (see for example, Farmer and Williams 1997; 
Whynes, Baines, and Tolley 1997; Whynes, Heron, and Avery 1997; Ennew et al. 
1998; Farmer and Chesson 1998; Smith and Wilton 1998) were identifying similar 
behaviours (eg, non-price sensitive purchasing, reliance on informal information 
sources, little contract switching, loyalty to local providers, etc) which indicated that 
there were no obvious omissions from this study and that the sample was not 
uncharacteristic. 
It was also the case that the purchasing issues had moved on. The launch in December 
1998 of the Government's plans for locality based co-operatives meant that GPs would 
no longer be working independently but that fundholders and non-fundholders would 
come together, fundholding as such would be abolished, and new co-operative ways of 
working would be put in place". 
Taken together, these factors lead to the decision to complete the fieldwork around 
Easter time during 1998. The meeting in August (010) was attended some months 
after this though because it had been rescheduled from an earlier date in March. 
5.6 The Researcher and the Researched 
Before concluding this chapter by considering the limitations of the research and 
setting out the structure of the remainder of this thesis, some reflection on the role of 
the researcher is called for. One of the key characteristics of qualitative research 
is the 
interaction between the researcher and the subjects of the research (Kvale 1983; 
Adams and Schvaneveldt 1985; Cassell and Symon 1994). Adams and Schvaneveldt 
write that the "interview setting, skill, and training of the interviewer, openness and 
17 The arrangements in Scotland differ from those in England where the locality Purchasing 
is based 
on the total fundholding model. See chapter I for discussion. 
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frame of mind of the respondent, the subject under study, and a host of other mood- 
situational factors enter into the process of collecting data via the interview. " (p213) 
These fieldwork dynamics must not only be recognised by the researcher but need, as 
much as possible to be managed and taken into account during analysis. 
Given the broad range of theoretical issues and content questions included in the 
interview schedule and the measure of skill required in the craft of interviewing, it was 
no wonder that initial interviews seemed rather unsettling and intimidating. I can 
endorse Shaffir and Stebbin's (1991) comment that "For most researchers, the day-to- 
day demands of fieldwork are fraught regularly with feelings of uncertainty and 
anxiety. " (p 1-2) However, I sought to adopt an interview style which not only put 
interviewees at ease but during which I considered them as experts who had something 
interesting and important to say. By inviting them to identify the important issues, it 
secured their interest in the interview and allowed them their role as expert. 
With participant observation, the interaction between the researcher and the subjects is 
of particular importance (Lofland 1971; Strauss 1987; Jorgensen 1989). Being 
accepted by subjects as a member of their group and participating in a way which 
allows both empathy and objectivity, immersion in the subject and withdrawal from the 
field can be difficult tensions to manage. As a complete observer, however, once I had 
secured a gatekeeper, I was not faced with many of the dilemmas observation can 
often present. However, as an observer and not a participant, there is an extent to 
which my understanding of the subjects, their language, culture, symbols and world 
view may be limited: "An accurate picture of daily life requires that the presence of an 
outsider-researcher be routinised. Time generally is an ally. The longer (or more 
frequently) you are in the setting, the more people are likely to come to perceive you 
as nonthreatening and otherwise take your existence for granted. Casual interactions 
when not forced also tend to put insiders more at ease, especially if you are able to 
engage them in casual conversation and provide routine assurances that you pose no 
threat to them. " (Jorgensen 1989: 58). 1 did not get to know many of the subjects 
individually, and most knew me only as a student from the University. My status 
appeared to pose no obvious threat to them and they did not appear inhibited in their 
behaviour in fact, as Bogdan and Taylor (1975) suggest, they may even have had some 
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sympathy with me as a student trying to complete her research. Nevertheless, it is the 
case that my immersion into the process which I observed and my rapport with the 
group members was restricted and thus my interpretations may be less complete than 
would ideally be the case. 
My role as a 'traveller' became increasingly important during the observation episodes 
where I heard, recorded and interpreted stories and encounters between the 'natives' 
of the NHS world. These encounters proved fundamental in shaping my understanding 
of the purchasing process and the interpretations which are made in Chapters 6-8. 
Kvale comments that "the journey may not only lead to new knowledge; the traveller 
might change as well. " (p4). This was certainly the case during the fieldwork and 
writing phase. On a personal level these changes occurred at an intellectual level) an 
interpersonal level and in terms of my view of the social world. Intellectually, ie in 
terms of my grasp of the theory, the fieldwork illuminated aspects of the theoretical 
framework and vice versa. This growth was further stimulated by the experiences of 
conference presentation and publication both of which encouraged increased rigour in 
analysis, writing and reporting the research. On an interpersonal level, interviews, 
observations, research seminars and conference presentations served as opportunities 
to become more articulate in clarifying my ideas, interpretations and findings to two 
types of audience: academic and practitioner. Finally, the fieldwork phase changed my 
view of the ways in which social interaction shapes decision making and learning and 
how organisational structures and the formal decision processes not only exist 
alongside but can be superseded by social processes. This change in outlook in turn 
informed my interpretation of the theory as I reflected on the research findings. 
5.7 Research Limitations, Generalisability, Validity and Reliability 
It cannot be assumed that the research findings from this study will necessarily be to be 
exhibited elsewhere in Scotland or further afield. This is because the purpose of 
qualitative research is to understand and give meaning to the phenomena under study 
not to ascertain the frequency with which it is occurring: "The label qualitative 
methods has no precise meaning in any of the social sciences. It is at best an umbrella 
term covering an array of interpretative techniques which seek to describe, 
decode, 
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translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not frequency, of certain 
more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world. " (Van Maanen 1979). 
Consequently, no attempt has been made to suggest that the findings are representative 
of the whole of Scotland. However, supporting evidence from other studies does 
allow for some findings to be considered indicative of the likely behaviour elsewhere in 
the country. 
"The problem of validity in field research concerns the difficulty of gaining an accurate 
or true impression of the phenomenon under study. " (Shaffir and Stebbins 1991: 12) 
whereas the problem of reliability concerns the replicability of observations : "It rests 
on the question of whether another researcher with similar methodological training, 
understanding of the field setting, and rapport with the subjects can make similar 
observations". (Shaffir and Stebbins 1991: 12) Hammersley, 1992.67" defines 
reliability as "refer[ing] to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned 
to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different 
occasions". 
The concerns about validity and reliability centre around the effect of the 
observer/interviewer on those being observed/interviewed, the distorting effects of 
selective perception and interpretation by the observer and the limitations on the 
observer's ability to witness all relevant aspects of the phenomena in question. 
Jorgensen (1989), however, suggests that participant observation actually enhances the 
validity of the concepts used within the research because of the preoccupation with 
defining concepts in terms of the subjects' view point. Jorgensen's perspective is 
particularly important in this study where the potential incongruence between 
interpretations/meanings of terms such as purchasing/conunissioning, transactions 
costs and efficiency (for example). Jorgensen goes on to suggest that participant 
observation is particularly concerned with the dependability and trustworthiness of 
findings which are dimensions of validity and which can be checked in a number of 
ways. That a participant observer does not rely on a single form of evidence, means 
" Hammersley, M What's wrong with Ethnography: Methodological Explorations Roudedge: London 
cited in Silverman (Silverman 1993) 
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greater triangulation and access to otherwise 'unobservable' settings increases the 
validity of concepts, as their use in daily life can be tested. 
It is important to bear in mind though, that "the character of field relations heavily 
influences the researcher's ability to collect accurate, truthful information .. " Jorgensen 
1989: 21. In this study, the role adopted was very much that of observer (not 
participant) and as noted earlier, prolonged exposure to the same cluster of GPs was 
not obtained. That I was not an active member of the group and did not have the 
opportunity to develop a rapport with members other than the gatekeepers, does 
suggest that interpretations could lack a degree of understanding of the NHS culture, 
language, symbols etc being observed. Shaffir and Stebbins (op cit. ) however, suggest 
that one of the principal ways of countering these problems is "to play back one's 
observations to one's subjects ... by casting them in roles of local experts and 
helpful 
participants in the research project ... " (p. 16). 
As earlier discussion has illustrated (and as chapters 6-8 show), there was a 
considerable degree of consistency with which the processes of learning, designing 
services, purchasing and partnering were observed during this research and with which 
the importance of professional autonomy, the desire for collaboration and a loyalty to 
providers was exhibited. Observations and interview material were mutually 
reinforcing" and were supported by feedback from academics and practitioners during 
and after the fieldwork period. Public presentation and refereed criticism of the data 
provided an opportunity for the data to be subject to debate and testing from external 
experts and practitioners and thus increased the validity of the data. 
5.8 Presentation and Interpretation of the EmpiriCal Findings 
The data are presented in 3 chapters. Chapter 6 looks at what kind of actors 
GPs have 
become in the market place. GPs' views about why they became fundholders, their 
perceptions of bargaining power and the necessity of the purchaser provider split are 
19 This form of reliability is termed 'synchronic reliability' by Kirk and Nfiller 
(1986) who are quoted 
in Silverman 1993. Kirk and Nfiller define synchronic reliability as "the similarity of observations 
within the same time-period". A standard way in which this 
form of reliability is assessed is through 
triangulation of methods such as the use of interviews as well as observation. 
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among the aspects discussed in the chapter. Chapter 7 moves on to discuss the 
relationship between purchasers and providers. The relationship explored was 
identified primarily during the observations and the chapter draws heavily on 
encounters between GPs and hospital clinicians. The third data chapter, Chapter 8, 
looks at inter-practice relationships and develops a typology of information used in 
purchasing decisions. The quotations used in each of the chapters are anonymised 
using the source coding explained earlier in this chapter. 
5.9 Summary 
In order to tailor the research methodology to the research aim, which was exploratory 
in nature, a qualitative approach was adopted. This approach utilised interview and 
observation techniques in order to understand the purchasing roles and relationships 
from the point of view of the subjects. The methodology was flexible, allowing 
emerging themes to be pursued and organisational complexities and changes to be 
accommodated. The analysis was both inductive and deductive drawing on an 
interpretative framework and also allowing themes to be generated from the empirical 
data. 
The following chapters (6-8) go on to discuss the findings, conceptualising the data 
according to the research framework and emerging themes. Chapter 6 discusses GP 
perceptions of the fundholding scheme and of their purchasing role. Chapter 7 goes on 
to discuss the purchaser provider relationship in terms of its content and process, 
drawing heavily on the observation data. Chapter 8 then discusses the inter-practice 
relationships which support the purchasing process. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 6 is the first of three empirical chapters in which the study's findings are 
presented. The chapter discusses the fundholding scheme and purchasing role from 
the perspective of the GPs who were interviewed. It then goes on to present their 
views on resource utilisation/hospital efficiency, resource allocation and the market 
mechanism. Having done so, it turns to consider the extent to which these GP 
perceptions were mirrored by providers, HBs and the Scottish Office. 
The data show that the most compelling reason for becoming a fundholder was that it 
offered GPs enhanced professional autonomy. This strong social motive was 
accompanied by subsidiary economic motives such as the opportunity to gain 
additional financial resources for the practice. GP purchasing behaviour was 
characterised by a reluctance to switch contracts, a general insensitivity to price, a 
desire to focus on service quality and waiting lists, and an express intention to 
collaborate with local providers. GPs were united in believing that they had a 
legitimate role in influencing secondary care in their capacity as agents for their 
practice population and most believed that the purchaser provider split had served as 
a catalyst for making providers more responsive. 
6.1 Fundholding -Incentives and Disincentives 
GPs offered various reasons for becoming fundholders. The main reasons were: to 
develop services to patients (or more generally to develop the practice); to gain control 
over staff, to make savings; and to benefit from upgraded computers and a 
management allowance. Less frequently mentioned were the ability to change referral 
patterns and to compete with other GPs. Only two interviewees said that a main 
reason was to stimulate better service from the provider. Following the analysis, these 
reasons have been categorised according to two types of reward: professional rewards 
andfinancial rewards (see Figure 6.1). 
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6.1.1 Professional Rewards 
Professional rewards derived from two 
domains of general practice activity: 
(1) practice organisation and (2) 
making hospital referrals and 
influencing secondary care services. 
The two aspects are demonstrated in 
the following quote from one GPFH: - 
Figure 6.1: Motivational Factors in Fundholding 
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... 4 or 5 years ago, we used to wait 50 weeks for a psychology appointment and 20 weeks for 
a physiotherapy appointment ... we weren't getting clinical services that we wanted and we 
thought 'well if we had the budget that perhaps we might be able to influence it'... also ... 
GPs wanted to develop a better building for their practice and wanted to be able to make 
some savings which they could put into a better building and better facility ... and put some 
money into extra staff for some of the things we were doing in primary care ... We wanted to 
be able to have ownership over the services patients were getting and there's nothing worse 
than having an anxiety patient and knowing it's a year before you could get an appointment 
with a psychologist. It wasn't very satisfying for the GP... I/GP9/T(l) 
This interviewee, however, was one of only two who addressed the matter of 
improving secondary care performance. Only one interviewee (a fund manager) said 
that they had hoped to make ... umovative referrals ... I/FPM4/S(l) and to perhaps move their 
contracts. In the main, interviewees wanted to improve the way in which their 
practice was organised and in particular, to be more in control of co-ordinating and 
recruiting staff. 
just to have a little bit more control over how the practice was running and what we 
coudd do for our patients. That kind of sums it up ... 
I/GP12/PCP(l) 
GP7/S(l) 
... 
From a professional point of view it's being in control of your own wo ng 
environment. It's just more stressfid for everybody when they're working, not 
being in 
control and that was the case where I was. GPs now feel that they are more 
in control if 
they have an input into decision making... I/GPI/S(4) 
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... I think one of the significant things perhaps is a bit more control over your staff, your 
attached staff. I think the difference between staff you employ and staff you don't employ is 
gargantuan ... With attached staff you don't have the same 'control' ... [M addition] ... I knew 
there was incentives, there are financial incentives as well, computers, locurn expenses. Also, 
having a little more control over your practice budget from a drug point of view. I've found it 
very stimulating. I've had the Medical Prescribing Advisor out and the pharmacist who 
worked with him. I found it quite challenging to get the drug bill down ... I/GP 16/PCP(I -2) 
The last quote is interesting because the ability to reduce prescribing costs yielded a 
financial reward in the form of savings, and presented a professional challenge. Rising 
to the challenge lead to a change in professional practice - At has asked many 
pharmacological questions whereas before you would just prescribe something. There's an overall look at it 
to say 'why are you prescribing that instead of thatT... I/GP 16/PCP(2). 
Fundholding also represented freedom from 'control' by the Health Board. Some 
practices were frustrated because if they lost a practice nurse, securing a replacement 
took a great deal of time if processed through the health board. Holding the budget 
enabled them to recruit more quickly and also enabled greater GP influence over 
nursing workloads and priorities. 
... We went 
into fundholding 4 years ago because we felt that was a way to improve 
services for patients plus to be quite frank we were sick fed up with the Health Board 
being so interfering in everything we did ... other major reasons were all the standard 
ones - gaining a little bit more control ... LfFPM4/S(l) 
PCP fundholders were influenced by additional factors. Three PCP practices felt they 
had been heavily influenced by the Health Board who "sold" the scheme as a means of 
making savings and gaining control over staff. Four chose PCP fundholding after 
rejecting standard fundholding on ethical grounds, and another because they were 
neither adequately organised managerially nor inclined to engage in standard 
fundholding. PCP fundholding offered the opportunity to manage a prescribing 
budget, make some savings, and have 'control' over practice staff, without becoming 
embroiled in purchasing acute services. 
Although only a ýninority spoke about influence over secondary care being a specific 
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reward from fundholding, it became clear later in the interviews that most of the 
practices had sought to reduce waiting times and some (see Chapter 7), sought to 
increase their control over what happened to their patients in the hospital setting by, 
for example, developing protocols to increase patient management in primary care. 
Interestingly, the fuller picture of how control was exercised with respect to hospital 
referrals and patient management, only really emerged clearly during the observation 
sessions (see Chapters 7 and 8). It was not something about which GPs and 
fund/practice managers were very specific during interviews. 
6.1.2 Financial Rewards 
Financial rewards came in the form of upgraded computers, practice savings and the 
management allowance. Many interviewees were open about the importance of 
additional funding. One PCP fundholder felt ... it was an offer too good to refuse ... a win win 
situation... I/GP3/PCP(l) He could benefit from a management allowance and savings but 
if no savings were made, he was no worse off. 
Another said, 
I suppose to be truthful, monetary. You can make savings on various aspects of it, you 
obviously get the management allowance to use to improve the practice to get things that 
you maybe wouldn't otherwise have had the funds to have... I/FPM5/PCP(l) 
Six of the interviewees said that financial incentives were a main decision criteria. 
Two (one non-GPFH and one standard GPFH) were particularly clear about the 
importance of increased funding-- 
we're struggling financially to manage the system the way it is, ... 
In fact taMng to people in 
other practices that have gone fundholding, they say the reason they went fundholding was 
because they felt forced into it because of the money ... the attraction of PCP, one is that we'll 
get updated computers and the management allowance which would probably allow us to 
function. So that's one of the big attractions, putting aside the fact that it would be quite nice 
to have a bit more control over your district nurses... I/GP I O/N(6) I 
'This practice was considering becoming a PCP fundholding practice but at the time of the interview 
was non-fundholding. 
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... We went into ftindholding because there was this promise of extra money for running the 
practice, that's the major thing. Ehm, we knew that we would be able to buy new computer 
systems with any potential savings that we made ... I mean, we're businessmen, we saw it as a 
way of getting more income into the practice and just took it that way... I/GP I 5/S(l) 
In one respect, taking control of the drug budget was an expression of the sense of 
proflýssionalism incurred by improving primary care practice. On the other hand it 
was a concrete means of bringing in additional income to the practice. None of the 
interviewees said that making savings was the primary reason for becoming a 
fundholder, where savings from prescribing were mentioned, it was generally 2nd, 3rd 
or 4th in the list of reasons provided'. However, it was clear in recent years money 
had become a dominant topic of conversation in general practice. 
I think there's a greater awareness ... doctors never talked about money. Now they talk 
about money all the time. Money's number one. 'Till 5 years ago we never discussed money 
I/GP16/PCP(3) 
... in one week I had two meetings. One was with the LPA people where we sat down and got 
really into detail about something clinical and I thought it was a really good meeting, we'd 
achieved a lot and we'd moved forward. About 2 clays later I had a meeting with a group of 
GP fundholders and we spent probably 1.5 hours of a2 hour meeting having a huge discussion 
about fmance and how we put our prices together ... the difference was incredible ... there will 
always be a discussion about money at a GP ftindholding meeting... I/T 1 (3 -4)... 
6.1.3 Non-Fundholders: Immune to Rewards? 
None of the non-fundholders gave any indication that they were unattracted to 
fundholding rewards. What had prevented them from becoming fundholders was 
mainly the efficiency or equity of the scheme. The disadvantages of the scheme were 
perceived to outweigh the benefits of professional and financial rewards'. 
A think that the input and the voice but no actual financial management is the way I 
2jt is important to bear in mind that GPs were not asked to rank the ftindholding rewards but the 
sequence in which they recounted the decision factors may be indicative of priorities. 
This also applied to PCP fundholders who chose not to opt for standard fundholding. 
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would like to see things develop ... there's also the skills and I think financial 
management is a skill that few GPs have and although I think that it's good that we are 
cost conscious, to devolve decision making too far down just increases bureaucracy... 
I/GP13/N(I-2) 
... not 
just the 00,000 management allowance but ... the amount of personnel the Trusts 
have to employ to deal with all the GPs and different contracts, we felt if it was logically 
going to be that every practice was going to be a fundholder .. the amount of money that 
was being spent on administration was going to be too great... I/GPII/PCP(l) 
... if I want to be totally selfish, it would make life easier for me because I could buy in all the 
services and make it happen. I would get money thrown at me, the grants just now are 
extremely generous. But how efficient is that really?... Budget holding is superficially 
attractive because you see an immediate effect, but that's only because this is a new concept 
and there's a small number involved. I think there's an element of short-termism. There will 
not be more money at the end of the day ... we need to take a long term view. 
If you do that, 
budget holding is not the true answer ... I/GP6/N(3-4) 
Far from being untouched by issues economic, non-fundholders took a philosophical 
stance against fundholding often on economic grounds based on concerns about two- 
tier services their unwillingness to need to take financial criteria into account when 
deciding on patient care. 
6.1.4 A Two Tier Service? 
Views on a two-tier service were mixed. Some interviewees felt that the system was 
unethical and proliferated a two-tier service. One fundholder had deliberately avoided 
negotiating shorter waiting lists because he did not want to incite two-tier treatment. 
Others though felt that it was not as black and white as that, and that there already was 
a two- or even multi-tier service. 
... 
We already have a multi-tier service. It depends on where you live, who your 
GP is, 
which consultant you see. That's reality. Single tier is, I'm afraid, 
just political talk... 
I/FPM4/S(IO) 
actually get quite irritated with the 2-tier label that's attached ... 
There are 
inequalities which do come from fundholding ... 
but in the main the 2-tier thing as it is 
flagged up is totally inappropriate. There's always been a multi-tier service. 
For 
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instance, we employed a dietician, prior to: ftmdholding. We coUld get a patient seen by 
a dietician within 2 weeks. The practice next door had to refer them down to the 
hospital which at that point had a 31 week waiting list. That's a 2-tier system and 
nothing whatsoever to do with fundholding... I/GP7/S(6-7) 
Most fundholders had sought to reduce waiting times, and they generally felt that 
waiting time reduction had benefited their patients and patients of non-fundholding 
practices too. 
6.2 GPs as Leaders in the NHS 
There was a general consensus that GPs ought to have a direct influence upon 
decisions about secondary care provision because they are gatekeepers to secondary 
care and agents for their patients. Most interviewees felt that if a primary care-led 
service was to become reality then they needed to be able to influence hospital 
services. The degree of influence was a point over which GPs differed. Some felt that 
GPs should have direct decision making power whereas others simply wanted a voice, 
some representation at the decision making table. 
... I would like it to be more direct decision making power. I don't think it should be 
exclusively the province of GPs, but there's an inevitable swing too far towards GPs 
because for too long the hospitals abused the power that they had, to provide the services 
that they wanted to provide rather than what was needed and it may take some time to 
get the balance of what is more appropriate... I/GPI/S(IO) 
I suppose primary care led means you're looking to primary care to give a lead and be 
the innovators and to even lead the decision making process... I/GP6/N(l) 
... I think 
GPs as a group are much closer to their patients as a whole and have a much 
better idea of what patient needs are and I think people who work inside hospital all the 
time get a totally distorted view of what the health service should be doing. But up until 
now it's just that the power has been within the hospital sector. I think that radically 
needs to shift around but it needs to shift around in partnership ... 
hospital consultants 
are starting to do an interesting type of meeting where they get local GPs along and 
discuss the services they re offering and they discuss the latest research and how that 
relates to what they should be offering ... 
That's the way Id like to see things moving... 
I/GP12/PCP(9) 
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Not surprisingly some were more keen than others to be personally involved in 
decision making meetings but they were all of the view that as advocates for their 
patients they had a valuable input to make. 
6.3 Resource Utilisalion / Organisational Efficiency 
Previous chapters have continually stressed that one of the main intentions of 
fundholding was that GPS would stimulate provider efficiency. Policy makers 
assumed that GPFHs would be concerned about hospital efficiency and would seek to 
improve waiting times and service quality by moving their contracts and that they 
would respond to price signals. 
6.3.1 Hospital Efficiency 
When asked about hospital efficiency, there was a general agreement that inefficient 
practice was a problem: 
I think there are concerns and that's come from [some local] practices. They held a 
meeting last week and they're having a follow-up meeting this week because there are 
concerns generally over the service the Acute Trust is giving... LIFPM7/S(3) 
I think it's always a problem. I think that they're grossly inefficiently ... there are a lot of 
things they could be doing to make the show a lot better, a lot easier but they're not interested 
in that. They want to keep their own empires... I/GP I 5/S(l) 
... Yeh, certainly there are now 
delays in getting people seen at the ENT clinics, dermatology 
clinics, orthopaedic clinics where waiting times seem to be rising. Anything that's introduced 
like the endoscopy, open access endoscopy, the waiting list for that is now rising - it used to be 
2-3 weeks, now it's up to 10 weeks... I/GP I 8/N(l) 
Some who acknowledged the problems were more hesitant though about 'accusing' 
providers of being inefficient. They were sympathetic to the financial pressures on 
Trusts and accepted waiting lists were a means of controlling demand. 
... 
I think ' Hospital X has probably been a bit inefficient because it has been cash 
starved and you do get into that situation. I think a little bit of extra resource would 
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probably bring a lot of savings .. [it] got into a situation of fighting fires all the time 
rather than fire prevention ... it is a more inefficient provider but that's due to cost and 
being addressed to an extent. I'm a great believer in systems... Inefficient systems 
create inefficient bureaucracy and a lot could be improved there ... I/GPII/PCP(15) 
... Of course ... [efficiency] ... concerns me because the system is structured to provide 
built in long waiting lists as a cost control measure. It's as straight forward as that ... 
You re going to need some control system cause there isn't enough money to provide 
everything for everybody, but that's the way it's been structured as being the choke point 
and to drive people to look for alternative means to channel or to organise secondary 
care ... I/GP6/N(3) 
Interviewees dealt between them with 6 Glasgow Trusts plus others outside the health 
board area, so it is likely that their perceptions of efficiency differed because of 
differing experiences of hospital services. Two PCP fundholders, for example, said 
categorically that hospital efficiency ... was not an issue at all ... I/GP2/PCP(2) and 
had no 
desire to give any examples of what they might consider to be inefficient or wasteful 
practice. They remained entirely happy with service provision. It is interesting though, 
that even the fundholders who spoke most strongly against provider efficiency had 
only moved perhaps one or two smaller contracts. The strength of their feeling had 
not translated into direct economic action. 
Another possibility for the differing views is that there may have been some confusion 
over what was meant by efficiency. In one interview, for example, a fundholder said 
he was not concerned about the efficiency of his main provider but later in the 
interview explained that they had ... moved slightly away from Hospital X and a bit more to 
Hospitals Y and Z,... I/GP7/S(2) because of lengthy waiting lists and quality issues. It seems 
he considered waiting lists and service quality to be clear cut quality issues and not 
matters of organisational efficiency. 
6.3.2 Price 
The role of price did not come up in conversation at all except if mentioned specifically 
as an interview question. GPs spoke of having rather less waiting time 
information or 
clinical guidelines than they would like (see Chapter 8) but they 
did not complain about 
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a lack of price/cost information. Prices did not seem to be high on the agenda, (a 
point confirmed by Trust representatives) but to suggest that GPs were indifferent to 
prices would, however, be misleading. 
Their contracts are first and foremost about volume of activity, numbers of patients treated. 
Price, they're very concerned about price and very concerned about quality issues. To be fair 
to them I think that they are more concerned about quality than they are about price. In terms 
of quality it's usually access to services, so short waiting times, good clinical communications 
ITF1(1) 
Earlier quotes suggested that financial considerations have become increasingly 
important to practices. This concern translated into efforts to reduce the cost of 
services and to re-engineer services more effectively (see Chapter 7) but price was not 
a dominant factor in selecting the provider. 
functional quality (care management). 
6.3.3 Service Quality 
GPs' were more concerned about 
Almost all the interviewees had tried to influence service quality and found their 
discussions with hospital clinicians particularly fruitful in this regard (see Chapter 7). 
The main quality issues were the speed and quality of discharge letters and the 
timeliness of death notifications. Waiting lists were also mentioned but to a lesser 
degree. 
Most practices had benefited from improved communications particularly in terms of 
the timeliness and quality of discharge letters. Letters had previously contained very 
little information and more often than not, had arrived late. 
... 
In one week, we had 28 people coming ... 
looking for results that weren't in. Seventeen of 
those were in one surgery. That's nearly one whole surgery wasted in this practice by people 
coming for a letter that the hospital said would be back and wasn't ... 1//GP7/S(I 
1-12) 
... we 
have seen, across Glasgow, hospitals communicating better, actually telling us on 
occasion that our patients have died in hospital which is quite a useful thing to 
know. I'm 
being ... sarcastic ... 
but that was the type of thing that we didn't get told in the past. 
Communication was sometimes bad - you could wait a couple of months on occasion to 
be told 
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that your patient had been taken into hospital for an operation and of course there are all sorts 
of ramifications for the GP if they don't have that information. So we feel that's all improving 
and that ftindholding and what we've done in it has given it all a nudge in the right direction 
... I/FPM4/(10) 
Improvements to waiting times were unclear. One practice was convinced that it had 
negoti ated improved waiting times, but others offered no such definite assertions. 
Interviewees spoke vaguely about things changing and improving but even in the 
observation sessions, waiting times were not major topics of discussion. They were 
mentioned, but almost as if simply to remind the provider that GPs were waiting. GPs 
did not appeared to be having any direct impact on waiting times as one non-GPFH 
confirmed, 
... With the number of procedures now being done in general practice in terms of minor surgery 
and so forth, where are all these surgeons not doing things because it's all being done in 
primary care? There's still the same number or more, doing the same a-lings, apparently still as 
busy, with just as long waiting lists. But that should have changed and it hasn't happened... 
I/GP6/N(I 3) 
At the time this fieldwork was conducted, the GPFH Association was co-ordinating 
efforts to improve quality. The Association had agreed quality standards for inclusion 
in fundholder contracts (most of which were block contracts) so that practices across 
an area would be able to set and benefit from similar quality standards. Coupled with 
this was a move by fundholders to include penalty clauses in their contracts although as 
Chapter 7 shows, they were reluctant to impose penalties and tried hard to get Trusts 
to invoice them on time, thereby avoiding penalties. Chapter 7 goes on to provide 
more detailed discussion about the range of quality issues tackled by GPs. 
6.3.4 X-efficiency 
As well as tackling service quality, there was some evidence that purchasing and 
commissioning activities had improved hospital X-efficiency. For example, one LPA 
said that through their negotiations they had managed to change the way in which new 
patients were allocated to a hospital consultant. The former arrangement had been 
that all patient referrals were allocated sequentially to consultants 1-8 irrespective of 
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the length of individual lists. For example, one urgent referral might be made and 
allocated to consultant number I whose waiting list was only two weeks. The next 
urgent referral would then be allocated to consultant number 2 despite his/her list 
beinglO weeks. GPs highlighted the matter and the Trust ... looked into it and discovered 
that's what was happening and they've now equalised the waiting times so that if someone's got a 
shorter waiting time they get all the urgent ones 'till they're up to the same waiting times as the others 
... I/GP8N(3) 
Elsewhere, practices had negotiated improved nursing management at the community 
trust: 
... 
We've managed, not through PCP, but through my role at the health board along with 
others, to have the mental health trust delayer its management structure and allow GPs to have 
much more influence over what the nurses are doing ... I/GP II /PCP(7) 
The scale of such x-efficiency improvements was not ascertainable from this study, but 
the Trust interviewees indicated that they had, on a few occasions, had to reorganise 
service management. 
64 Switching Provider 
Most standard fundholding practices had moved contracts but only one or two per 
practice. Moves included switches to the private sector for ophthalmology and 
investigative procedures (eg endoscopy, CT scans) plus switches to other NHS 
providers for urology, dermatology, chiropody and physiotherapy. On each occasion, 
contracts switches were considered temporary and used merely to alter the status quo. 
Those who had moved (or threatened to move) contracts found that providers were 
responsive. 
In our own case it was urology services that were absolutely abysmal so we were having to 
refer patients to Stirling to put pressure on local hospitals. That has resulted in another 
urologist being appointed... I/GP I /S(2) 
Responses were not always swift though and were sometimes unsatisfactory. One 
fund manager provided a lengthy explanation as to how, and why, his practice had 
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moved its contract for upper gastro-intestinal endoscopy and the response this had 
elicited from the provider. The practice had become increasingly frustrated with the 
fact that patients with a possible ulcer, for example, had to wait 3 months for an 
outpatient appointment. Then, when the consultant recommended an upper GI 
endoscopy, the patient needed to wait a further 3 months before the procedure could 
be undertaken. The practice became fed up with what they said was ... a decade, making 
suggestions to the Health Board and to hospitals which they said they couldn't take up... I/PFM4/S(2). 
A . 
0. 
-Uter becoming fundholders, the practice put forward another proposal for direct 
access endoscopy but the provider again refused. The practice threatened to remove 
the contract which, including in-patient and out-patient attendances, would cost the 
provider 150,000. As there was still no response, the practice ... very reluctantly... took 
their business to a nearby private provider in a move which saved 05,000. The 
following year they returned to re-negotiate with the NHS provider. The Trust said 
that it lacked sufficient resources so the practice invested 123,000 in an endoscope 
which consultants requested for the direct access service. Despite pledges from the 
provider, the GP practice (whose contract remained with the private sector provider in 
the interim) heard nothing for 8 months after which they contacted one of the business 
managers, warning that they would never again agree to contribute their money to a 
hospital service. The following day one of the hospital consultants visited the 
practice. The direct access service was subsequently set up but, it took a further 14 
months and GPs had no input into the design. As a result, access was ... much, much more 
restricted .. than we had anticipated ... so the practice's contract remained with the private 
sector provider. 
What was interesting about this particular case was that the interviewee went on to say 
that they remain unhappy with the direct access service and were still reluctantly 
dealing with the private sector, but they were ... willing, if the NFIS can match a private 
hospital 
in speed and money, every single time we'll go to the NHS. Our ethos is stick with tile NHS, support the 
local hospital, but if we think they're being unreasonable look elsewhere and use that as a stick to beat the 
local hospital to try and change their attitude... i/Fpm4/s(4) The practice were continuing to meet 
regularly with the hospital's managerial and clinical staff hoping to work 
in partnership 
despite the frustrations. 
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A similar earnestness to work with the provider existed even where communications 
had broken down entirely. Another practice experienced difficulties .. getting past the 
management... We can't get them to talk to us. They won't come to meetings, they won't give us any data. 
They elucidate tons of problems but they won't share with us what the problems are. They say they're terribly 
underfunded. Give us the evidence and we'll fight your case, they never give us any evidence ... 
I/GP7/ý(4,2-3) Later in the interview he went on to say ... I would like to be listened to by the 
consultants and I would like to have a much closer relationship with the consultants. Consultants know sod 
all about general practice, and I know I know sod all about their work. I need their knowledge and they need 
our knowledge and at the moment the hospital structures have kept us apart ... we're being kept apart by the 
management ... I/GP7/S(14) 
Practices generally exhibited considerable loyalty to their local provider and. a few 
stated this loyalty quite clearly: - 
Interviewer: Do you see yourself as having a role in supporting [hospital x] because it is your 
local provider? 
GP: Of course, yes. Absolutely... I/GP I 5/S(5) 
hospital X has been a local provider for a long time ... in fact one practice came into 
fundholding because they wanted to help hospital X, we didn't want it to go down the tubes or 
anydiing like that... I/FPM9/T(5-6) 
It was not always clear though whether they felt some traditional loyalty to that 
particular provider and the staff working within it, or Whether it was local provision 
which they valued regardless of the provider's identity. 
. 
Ve're all reluctant [to move a contract] because if you remove a dermatology servIce, you're 
reducing the service locally for your patients, so things have to be pretty bad before you'd go to 
those lengths with it... I/GP I /S(3) 
Interviewer: Do you see it as Unportant to support your local provider because of issues over 
access? 
GP: If you can. But it's not essential. The cataract operations .. our patients would 
travel 30 
rmles if they knew they were going to get it, and they 
do 
... they go 
by taxi and are very happy 
to do so ... I/GP9/T( 
10) 
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Although the above quote indicates that patients were willing to travel, the contract for 
cataracts was the only one this practice had switched to the private sector. They had 
invested considerable energies in stimulating changes in ophthalmology for some time 
before moving the contract and as Chapter 7 will show, were continuing to do so with 
a view to switching back. 
6.4.1 Buyer Power 
Although there was only a small amount of contract switching, interviewees were 
asked whether they thought fundholders had sufficient buyer power to influence the 
activities of their providers. In the main interviewees felt they had some influence but 
that it was limited. 
... I have had hospital finance people turn around and say to us 'your f 100,000 that you're 
saying you're going to take away from us ... we get around f 160 Mill, you're in the margins you 
don't really matter'... I/FPM4/S(I 5) 
... I diink they probably felt we're too small. That's the impression we get from any meetings 
we've been to ... 
I get the impression that we're just small fish really... I/PFM5/PCP(6) 
Nevertheless, there was only one interviewee who had encountered an entirely 
intransigent provider. 
... they were quite enthusiastic and quite positive until we started to try and change anything 
and then they were extremely negative and obstructive. Trying to get to the clinicians has 
proved very difficult. I think [they] see us as irrelevant annoyances that can be ignored and so 
far we certainly can be ignored... I/GP7/S(2) 
When GPs collaborated with one another (through fundholding or commissioning) 
their perceptions changed. LPAs felt that although they had been ... tinkering around the 
edges... I/GP8/N(2) trusts had been fairly responsive. Fundholders thought their influence 
increased substantially through group efforts and they were also able to avoid 
fragmenting services across the locality. 
... Banding together will give us more power. 
It will also force individual practices to take a 
more strategic overview, a more long term overview whereas new fundholders tend to 
be very 
focused on themselves... I/FPM4/S(I 5) 
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... we meet probably once a month with the 
local Trust. I think that's probably more useful 
because they're keen to hear firom GPs, what their concerns are, what problems they're having 
and we've managed to change one or two things about the way they do things in the local Trust 
... of course we're talking to the managers, not to the clinicians... I/GP8/N(2) 
6.4.2 Pressuresfor Change 
It was generally accepted, even by those who had less positive purchasing experiences, 
that 'things' were changing. The attitudes of clinicians were ameliorating towards GPs, 
services were improving and communications were better than before. The degree 
though to which GP buyer power alone was sufficient to stimulate providers was 
unclear. There was a belief among interviewees that no amount of pressure from 
purchasing or conunissioning GPs could singularly make any difference. They thought 
that it was the combined influence of purchasing, commissioning and extra-market 
pressures (eg a cash crisis, Scottish Office or Health Board pressure) which stimulated 
hospitals to be responsive. 
---I think you're 
finding a big change particularly in Glasgow medicine, particularly because of 
all these pressures which have come ... The trusts are now saying 
'we can't go on with this'. I 
think it's a combination of pressures, all these things coming together: commissioning, 
ftindholding, attitude of the health board, financial pressures, all these things, realisation of the 
consultants that they can't go on this way, the ostrich mentality ... I/GP16/PCP(6) 
In the urology case cited earlier, the problem was particularly widespread. The 
fundholders placed pressure on the Trust to improve urology services, but recognised 
that the specialty was experiencing difficulties on a national scale and that it was not 
fundholding alone which could bring about the solution. 
urology's too boring a specialty that they can't get young doctors to 
do it. Presumably they 
have taken steps to improve the pay and conditions ... to the extent that surgeons and 
trainees 
now consider it to be a reasonable option. After about 5 years of constant pressure 
it's resulted 
in somebody to do it... I/GPI/S(2) 
In addition to national and local pressures it was suggested that uncertainty 
about 
future service configurations was also a pressure for change: - 
180 
... there have been improvements ... obviously hospitals are competing to provide a service, it's 
obviously going to improve the situation but I think now it's not so much that, it's competing to 
survive and I get the impression that because of the changes that are taking place, the hospitals 
are not going to be closed because of ftmdholding, they're going to be closed because services 
are going to be concentrated in certain areas ... I/GP I 7/N(2) 
Uncertainty is likely to have played a particularly strong role in this study because the 
Scottish Office Acute Services Review (reported in June (? ) 1998) was underway 
during the data gathering phase of this research and there was speculation about which 
Trusts would survive. One more consistent influence for change was, as in the past, 
the interests of particular clinicians which determined the degree of responsiveness. 
... 
There's a few initiatives that have come up, a few waiting list initiatives that have been either 
suggested by ourselves [LPAs] .. or 
have been supported when the hospital suggested them ... 
There's new services coming on line all the time ... 
but I wouldn't like to claim credit for them. 
The Trust sees a business opportunity and decides to develop it ... 
Probably there will be an 
interested clinician, it's still happening that there'll be somebody In the hospital who has an 
interest in a particular specialty and puts forward a case and manages to get ftmdMg from 
somewhere, whether it's a drug company or the Scottish Office ... and goes ahead and 
develops an excellent service... I/GP8/N(4) 
the management structure and the consultants working in the units ... 
I/GP14/PCP(3) 
Clearly there have been changes and efficiencies occurring within secondary care 
provision. On the basis of this evidence and the studies reviewed in Chapter 4, 
however, it remains unclear just how much of a catalyst fundholding has really been 
(see Chapter 7 for further discussion). 
6.5 Resource Allocadon 
Previous chapters have stressed the importance of transferring resources into primary 
care. GPs can influence resource transfer in two ways. Firstly, they can do more 
in 
primary care and therefore reduce the volume and value of secondary care contracts. 
Secondly, they can make savings through prescribing which free up resources to 
develop primary care services. Ultimately, however, the substantial transfers of 
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resources can only come from the closure of hospital wards. 
6.5.1 Redistributing Existing Resources 
Most GPs in this study had made savings through more efficient prescribing but only 
one spoke about making savings from changing their provider or from increasing 
primary care activity and thus reducing the value of secondary care contracts. Where 
prescribing savings were reinvested in primary care developments, this was mainly to 
supplement rather than substitute hospital services and represented a redistribution of 
existing primary care resources. 
Savings were used in various ways in particular to increase nursing provision, 
examples of which are shown below: - 
Practice-Based Nursing Services 
Breast feeding facilitator 
Increased district nursing 
0 CPN sessions 
0 Health visitor and district nurse clinics (eg: diabetes and asthma 
clinics, in-house mental health programme) 
Other Practice-Based Services included: 
Psychology sessions 
Nfinor Surgery 
Chiropractice 
These new services,, however, were not easy to develop. Two GPFHs explained the 
difficulty of getting health board approval for service developments. 
... 
it's enormously complex and difficult to get anything out of savings. It has to be approved 
by the Health Board and the mechanisms for getting it approved are Byzantine .. 
if people get 
approval then they can often make quite imaginative use of it... I/GP I /S(4) 
At's very difficult in Glasgow to actually improve the services to your patients. 
Spend 
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it on some capital project, on something which is nice and safe and that the accountants 
can look at and say fine, that's easy. Spend it on something that's slightly risk taking, 
developing a new service which is actually patient centred is actually bloody difficult in 
Glasgow. We could spend it much more easily on repainting this health centre than we 
could on employing an acupuncturist. We have to jump through hoops as soon as you 
have a new innovative idea. If it's something safe you can get a quote on, three quotes 
to compare, no bother! ... I/GP7/S(5-6) 
To suggest that savings were used only in practice refurbishments or developing 
primary care services is only part of the picture. In fact some savings were used 
specifically to boost secondary care service provision such as the endoscopy example. 
The same practice put a further f5,000 towards kick starting a laboratory specimen 
pick up service which doubled the number of collections. Now the provider dollects 
specimens from practices (or a central pharmacy) and delivers practice mail twice daily 
to all practices in the area. Another practice had contributed to a CT scanner. 
6.5.2 Changing the Location ofActivity 
Little mention was made of consultant outreach clinics. One fund manager said ... We 
have not brought in consultants fi7orn outside ... the hospitals were very, very resistant to it, very resistant 
indeed. I can understand it because it means taking away a consultant fi7orn a clinic that would be based 
there ... we also felt a lot of our out-patient clinics would require specialist equipment which we wouldn't 
have on the premises ... I/FPM4/S(8) 
Some outreach clinics had, however, been set up. A paediatric consultant had been 
invited to provide health centre-based clinics in one sector of the city because parents 
had been opting not to take their children to the hospital, and fundholders hoped that 
an outreach clinic would reduce non-attendances. Elsewhere in the city, one provider 
offered to provide paramedic outreach clinics where there was sufficient demand. In 
another location practices had combined to purchase additional psychology sessions. 
On the whole though there was not much evidence of GPs actively seeking to increase 
the numberof outreach clinics. 
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6.5.3 Shifting Resourcesfrom Secondary to PHinary Care 
Two fiandholders commented that they had initially focused on changing hospital 
services but after 4 or 5 years were thinking more about developing primary care 
services and transferring resources into primary care. 
... I don't think there's an awful lot more services that we want out of acute providers. I think 
this is much more about developing primary care and therefore what we're not looking to do is 
to spend much more money on the provider, we're looking to actually spend less so that we can 
develop primary care and the services that we provide here. I think the provider and ourselves 
have accepted that and therefore our negotiation with them is very much aimed at trying to 
release some resource that can come into primary care rather than us giving them extra 
finance for services they've already got... I/GP9/T(2) (emphasis added) 
Transferring real sums of money from hospital to community provision is, however, a 
complex task. GPs were aware that for resources to be released, wards needed to 
close and trust services rationalised. 
.. because of fmancial pressure on us all we're going to 
be able to look at is how we could 
maybe do it much cheaper than a hospital could ... 
it will mean an actual transfer of services 
into primary care with a view to reducing the cost and therefore achieving efficiency and 
developing the services ... 
but I do think the hospitals will need to merge in some way so that 
the reduction in cost will produce more services out M the community ... I/GP9/T(2-3) 
One group of collaborating practices had, however, found a way of releasing some 
resources even where wards were not being closed. They had agreed a form of 
discount with the Trust where 4% of the value of their contracts would be released 
into primary care: 
... We contract with a 
block contract with a discount of 4% and the Trust and ourselves agree 
that that's for primary care development and that allows the GPs to provide more follow-up of 
patients, more diabetic services, psychology and other things. So we ring 
fenced the amount 
we spend with our local provider ... 
I/GP9/T(3) 
There were also indications that some practices were attempting prophylactically 
to 
reduce hospital admissions. The total fundholding practice 
had employed nurses with 
specialist skills in asthma, cardiology and respiratory nursing so that they could provide 
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more intensive care to their patients and prevent emergency admissions. 
practice was hoping to reduce adrnissions for the elderly. 
Another 
... "If you save L5,000 - f. 10,000 on your drug bill you can spend it in other ways. I'dliketoget 
a physiotherapist here and maybe a chiropodist ... The other fl-iing is there's a lot of old people 
in this area - 25% of my practice are over 65 ... One of the main reasons they go into hospital is 
'cause they fall and can't get up but I'm sure you can prevent that with health Visitors gomig in 
prophylactically, physiotherapists going in to build up their leg muscles, get them aware of the 
carpets and things. Basically their leg muscles aren't strong enough. I felt that if we did a 
project like that it would prevent hospital admissions... I//GP16/PCP(2) (emphasis added) 
These findings suggest that shifts of resources and activity from secondary care to 
primary care have been occurring, but not on a large scale. Practices have developed 
primary care services largely through their prescribing savings and only minimally 
through savings on contracts. Reinvesting practice savings, however, only 
redistributes existing primary care resources and does not release secondary care 
resources. However, given the difficulties inherent in closing wards, it may be that 
practices can only gradually build up their primary care services in order to reduce the 
need for hospital referral. Given that they have only their prescribing savings with 
which to do this, and given that the potential for long term prescribing savings is 
limited (see Chapter 4), this could be a slow process with limited long term scope. 
66 The Market Mechanism 
Although the focus of this thesis is on GPs' purchasing role, particularly (although not 
exclusively) through fundholding, interviewees were invited to think beyond their 
immediate purchasing/commissioning experiences and to consider whether the 
purchaser provider split had been necessary and/or beneficial and to comment on the 
transactions costs of the system. 
6.6.1 The Purchaser Provider Split -A Necessary Divide? 
Of those asked about the necessity of the purchaser provider split, around half felt that 
it had been necessary. The other half were uncertain and only one interviewee said 
that it ought never to have been necessary and could have been prevented had there 
been open lines of communication with hospital clinicians. Separating the purchasing 
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and providing functions was supported largely because of the improved 
communications which had occurred as a consequence. Most interviewees thought 
that the attitudes of managers and clinicians had improved and that hospital resources 
were being managed more appropriately. 
... I can see a 
lot of good things have come out of the purchaser provider split. The 
management in Hospital X is much more in touch with what's going on than it was before, as 
far as I can tell .. say you come to me and you've got some medical problem and I want an 
urgent appointment for you, I can get on the phone just now, phone up the hospital, and they 
have a computerised system and if they have a cancellation for this afternoon, you can get that 
appointment. That never happened before, that used to be the sort of service we'd get from 
'Private Hospital' and I have managed to get patients seen on the same day several times .. just 
because they are now managing their resources much better. So I think there's been some 
improvements in that respect. I think it was crazy to have some wee guy sitting in Bath Street 
running 6 hospitals in Glasgow... I/GP8/N(3-4) 
Those who were uncertain about the split, were primarily concerned with the costs 
which it had generated. 
... I don't know! I 
haven't seen enough other different models to suggest what might 
work better. The main thing I don't like about it is the bureaucracy it's created. I see 
that continuing to be a problem whether we have fundholding as it's presently 
constituted or whether we move on to other types of purchasing. There still may be a lot 
of clerical work involved, chasing patients and deciding who's paying for what 
procedure... I/GP12/PCP(6) 
... I 
don't know if you can answer that quite honestly. I think lt did produce benefits. I think 
there were very substantial administrative costs all the way up, not just at practice level ... 
I/GP17/N(4) 
Only one interviewee, a fundholder, offered the view that really the market philosophy 
was incompatible with health care and so it was impossible to conclude whether the 
split had been necessary or not. 
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6.6.2 Transactions Costs 
Most interviewees accepted the transactions costs (either resignedly or after some 
justification) or were indifferent about the matter. Two primary care interviewees and 
the two Trust interviewees, however, thought them unjustifiable 4. The basis for 
accepting transactions costs seemed to be because the NHS system was thought hugely 
costly anyway and transactions costs were only one element of a costly service. Other 
justifications were that the costs were at least being monitored, might be lower than 
under alternative structures and were coming from a source which did not impinge on 
clinical resources. 
... There's costs in everything and it's good that they're being monitored. Aside from 
contracting there are substantial costs that people forget about. For example .. the cost of 
discussing the case between a GP and practice nurse, the cost of looking out the records 
... I/GP3/PCP(3) 
... I think the amount of money we waste on the transactions costs, it would be more than 
wasted on the unfocused activity if there wasn't fundholding. Both is a waste... 
IGP7/S(4,8) 
Opposition to transactions costs was identified earlier as being the reason why two of 
the PCP practices had decided not to become standard fundholders. It was the trusts, 
however, who were most strongly opposed to the need for contracting, invoicing and 
monitoring. They bore the brunt of the cumulative effect of many fundholding 
contracts. Furthermore, Trusts frequently wrote the GP contracts; practices just 
checked and signed them. 
67 GPs as Purchasers, the Overall Picture 
The main emphasis in this chapter has been on the views which GPs held of the 
purchasing scheme and of their purchasing role. The findings are developed in the 
following chapter where data from the obse rvation sessions is presented. 
Nevertheless, some initial comments can be made on what has been presented so far. 
'It was noted earlier in the chapter that these two PCP practices chose not to opt 
for standard 
fundholding because of the transactions costs element. 
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This section looks at the picture which has emerged in Chapter 6, and goes on to 
consider the extent to which the findings were supported during interviews with trust, 
health board and Scottish Office representatives. 
6.8 The Viewfrom General Practice 
On some issues GPs presented a relatively consensual view (eg, motives for 
fundholding) whereas on others they offered a range of opinions (eg, transactions costs 
and buyer power). However, a general picture has emerged. GPs did respond to the 
financial rewards offered by the fundholding scheme but they did not then behave in 
response to incentives to lower cost through their purchasing activities. Some savings 
were made when contracts were moved, but the driver to move the contract was not 
financial so savings were fringe benefits. GPs were concerned about quality although 
the improvements and changes were sometimes intangible, pertaining to changed 
attitudes. Fundholding and non-fundholding GPs were, however, quite clear about the 
legitimacy of their role in influencing secondary care provision and felt entitled to 
contribute to the shape of services in their capacity as agents for their patients. 
69 The View of General Praclice 
In order to validate these findings, the following section presents views obtained from 
interviews with representatives from two trusts (one acute and one community), the 
health board, and the Scottish Office Primary Care Directorate. Each interviewee was 
asked to talk about how they considered GPs had responded to the market and had 
been behaving as purchasers. 
6.9.1 Hospital Efficiency 
There was no doubt that the trust interviewees felt under pressure from GPFHs and 
commissioning GPs. The acute trust, for example, had been pressed by GPs to 
improve access to services and this had resulted in more direct/open/rapid access 
services. 
... [practice x] ... the year 
before they bought us some new endoscopy equipment out of their 
savings. This current year they've ftinded part of a transport service to collect specimens firom 
their practices, to deliver all their letters from the Trust so rather than posting them they go on 
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this van twice a day ... they invested [savings] specifically so they could get better access to 
that service ... 
I/T 1/(8) 
This would suggest that there have been improved efficiencies if one regards waiting 
times as a measure of efficiency rather than quality. Neither of the trust interviewees, 
however, offered examples of any other ways in which efficiency had been stimulated. 
One health board interviewee thought that health boards were stimulating efficiency 
but practices were stimulating effectiveness. 
... the Board ... has been the main driver of efficiency into the system ... and fimdholders have 
been the main influencers of effectiveness... Probably ... 'cause they're at the sharper edge of 
improved effectiveness ... I think that the contracting at the moment that we do as a Board is a 
pretty big blunt tool. It's about getting money back into the system as efficiently as possible. I 
think with ftindholding it's about getting it back as effectively as possible in terms of the fi7ont 
end quality of the service that you get. I think on both counts as a Board and as Fundholders, 
there will be a move in the next 5 or 10 years to improve the effectiveness clinically of the 
services that we provide ... IAVMla(5,15-16) 
By effectiveness, the interviewee meant both clinical effectiveness and the effectiveness 
of the service. GPs have been more preoccupied with the effectiveness of the care 
process which includes how the patient was treated on arriving at hospital, whether 
staff were courteous etc; in other words, the care management process (functional 
quality). Once again though the delineation between efficiency and quality is blurred. 
Interviewees perhaps see efficiency as an aspect of quality. 
6.9.2 Quality 
GPs, concerned initially with care management, were moving on to address clinical 
care. This was thought to be for two main reasons: firstly, GPs are fairly operationally 
oriented and want control over what happens to their patients; secondly, as they 
become more involved in discussions with providers, it is natural that discussions 
develop to include clinical aspects. 
The community trust were particularly aware of the GPs' focus on operational aspects. 
The interviewee explained that discussions with GPs occurred at three levels: 
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... there's probably ... 3 levels of issues. First of all you'll get issues which are around what I 
would cafl day to day routine kind of issues where they bring up things like poor 
communications ... It's more about the process ... The second level would be .. some specifics 
about things they want to buy ... it's a question of then trying to match what it is they want to 
buy with what it is that we can provide. Now some of them, and that ... brings us then to the 
third level ... want to buy and want to change ... I can see here's a GP who's thinking quite 
strategically, who's sitting and saying 'I'm not happy about my nursing mix' for example ... but 
they'll also bring up other types of issues which you say to yourself 'why are they bringing 
those upT, more kind of operational things ... nursing tends to dominate ... they could see that 
nursing was something that they wanted more direct control over ... of the 59 practices that we 
have agreements with just now, I would say .. there's only about 19 of them (that leaves a 
balance of 40) who genuinely want to sit down and talk strategically with you... 11172(l) 
First and foremost, GPs want control over what is provided in the community by the 
nursing staff employed by the Trust and secondly, they are interested in clinical issues 
like skills mix. This may, however, be because there are two agendas: the short-term 
care management agenda and the longer-term clinical care agenda and only now are 
GPs moving to the latter. 
many of them [GPs] wanted to move on from what the early days of fimdholding were about 
which was the process of it, and they wanted to move on to the more clinical concept of it 
I/SOa/(7) 
6.9.3 X-efficiency 
The emphasis on nursing management at the community trust resulted in x-efficiency 
gains. GPs were unhappy with the management of their attached staff (district and 
health visiting) but, through the purchasing facilitators and fundholders, they 
instigated the restructuring of nursing management within the community trust. 
... We met with a very 
influential group of GPs, these are the opinion makers ... who are 
actually paid by the Board to be advisers, they're called purchasing facilitators and there's 5 of 
them ... [they felt the way] that community nursing 
is managed and organised leaves a lot to be 
desired. They accused us of things like introducing tiers of management which weren't 
required, introducing bureaucracy that wasn't required etc. So we've now made a fairly 
fundamental shift and we've reduced some of the bureaucracy ... We've stripped out 
levels of 
management and as of the Ist April there'll be no nurse managers left in Greater Glasgow. 
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We took the whole lot out... I/T2(4) 
The acute trust indicated that there had been improvements to services (see Chapter 
7), but did not give any examples of managerial changes of the nature described above. 
6.9.4 Switching Provider 
Trusts and the health board were aware that GPs were reluctant to move their 
contracts and were very loyal to staff delivering services. 
... They're very supportive and very loyal ... I think the greatest loyalty is to the staff actually, 
the staff in the fi7ont line. It's not a loyalty to [manager] or to the Chief Executive ... 
Vr2(9) 
there is a great deal of loyalty between a GP and their Trust. So if they can get that 
relationship better by holding the purse strings and getting the leverage to get better 
effectiveness of the quality of the service then that's what they've been doing ... IAýffl I a(4) 
They also concurred that when contracts had been moved it was not because of price 
but because of quality and waiting times. 
they tell me, and I've no evidence really that it's not true, that [switching] it's on the basis of 
quality. I don't think they shift their patients around the city looking for the cheapest price. I 
honestly don't think they do that. ... I/T 1 (4) 
It was also thought GPs didn't switch contracts because they appreciated that by 
offering accident and emergency and intensive care, NHS trusts necessarily incur 
higher overheads (and therefore higher prices) than the private sector. GPs 
understood that if they removed their contracts, they might jeopardise the livelihood of 
the provider. 
they get all their other stuff here and they know that if we go to the wall over certain services, 
if they took their elective work somewhere else then clearly we couldn't offer the rest of the 
services that they need and then we're stuck. I think .. they understand some of the economics 
of it.. I/T 1 (6) 
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6.9.5 Buyer Power 
Although GPs questioned the degree of power they had, the perception at the other 
side of the negotiating table was that GPs were rather more influential than they 
realised. This was not simply because of the money they might remove, but because 
of their influence on the Health Board: 
... say that it costs E140mil to run this Trust every year ... ftindholders represent probably D 
mill of that. So, it isn't huge amounts, but ... GPs will then influence health boards and they 
could influence health boards to stop purchasing with you if they're not happy. Now, we've 
had an incidence of this... I/T 1 (5) 
The incidence to which the interviewee referred was one where the health board 
removed its contract because of complaints from fundholders and an entire service was 
lost to the Trust. It had been offering an outreach clinic in a hospital some miles away. 
The clinic was run by two older consultants who were nearing retirement and who 
were reluctant to travel the distance so often arrived 'out of sorts'. There were 
complaints from the patients and because of mishandling' by the trust, the contract was 
removed by the fundholders and by the health board to whom the fundholders 
complained. It cost the Trust 17m in total. Although this is not an example of direct 
buyer power, this scenario indicates just how much influence GPs can actually have. 
Trusts felt that commissioning GPs had an influential voice too, despite the fact that 
they have no direct contractual control. 
... [LPAs] 
have a big influence ... If we say 'oh we'd 
love to do this for you but we can't because 
we haven't got ftinding for such and such a development', they have a voice on the health board 
which says 'we think this is really important, we back the Trust getting that development', so 
they're hopefully on our side, sometimes... I/T 1 (3) 
The trusts were ... obviously 
keen to make sure they don't have a hole in their fmances so they will 
improve m the way they deal with people ... I/1-M Ia (4). 
Although they recognised GPs were 
loyal, they claimed not to see the potential threat of removing contracts as an empty 
5 The interviewee explained that the Trust ought to have dealt ... much more vigorously 
with the 
consultants ... but thaVs not 
been traditionally the way that the health service has worked although it is changing ... 
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one. 
We've got quite a big practice ... they only want to guarantee sornefl-ýing like 50% of the'r 
work here. Now they nearly always put the rest here anyway but it's just to give them the 
flexibility 
... but it just makes us that little bit more at risk because you can only guarantee 50% 
of that income coming in and the rest might or might not ... I/T 1 (6-7) 
... they can sit down and say 'we've got this money, if we don't give the money to you we can 
give it to somebody else. Until they actually do it, ... unless they've actually genuinely got a 
viable alternative to us, we could consider it to be an empty threat. Now we would consider it 
to be an empty threat at our peril. I've always argued ... it's not an empty threat, It'll only 
be a 
matter of time before someone else decides to set up. In Glasgow for instance, you could say 
what's to stop the other acute trusts in Glasgow from saying 'wait a minute, if you've met 
[south side GPI he'll have told you about some of the discussions they've had in the South with 
the [provider] ... they went to the 
[provider] and said 'instead of us getting our community 
nursing service from the community trust, could you supply iff. They said 'yeh, no problem ... 
, 
... 
At the end of the day they decided that we were still the better bet but .. there's nothing to 
stop that from happening... 1/72(7-8) 
The recent popularity of PCP fundholding contributed to even greater pressure on the 
community trust because from Ist April 1998, fundholders represented around L12mil 
of the trust's income. A few years before there were only a handful of fundholders 
who were ... small beer ... 
but the increase means that ... the small beer now is starting to rise and 
rise and rise ... I/T2(6). 
6.9.6 Pressuresfor Change 
Trusts were clearly aware of direct pressure from fundholders, the fundholders' 
influence on health board purchasing and the LPAs and purchasing facilitators. There 
was also a further dynamic involved. Trusts were keen to keep GP business because 
there was a feeling that the money given to GPs was really the trusts' in the first place 
and they cannot afford to lose it. 
... In truth, that money's come 
fi7om us in the first place anyway because traditionally they got 
their activity here before they went ftmdholdmg. When they go fundholdmig the health 
board 
looks at all the services they bought here, takes that money away fi7om us and gives 
it to them. 
So, we actually can loose out doubly really so we have a great deal of pressure on us to make 
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sure that they do continue to buy from us ... I/T 1 (4) 
6.9.7 Resource Allocation: Money and Activity 
It would seem that the main emphasis of activity has been on making better use of 
existing resources. For example, one trust trained GPs to do joint and soft tissue 
injections in the practice (see Chapter 7) thereby avoiding an outpatient referral. 
Direct access services offered a more efficient means of delivering services using 
existing resources some of which also required one-off injections of funding up-front. 
Increasing activity within primary care was evidenced by both fundholders and non- 
flandholders. 
There has been rather less focus on leveraging more substantive reallocations of money 
and activity from secondary to primary care. One interviewee suggested that this was 
in part because GPs had more immediate concerns, but that it was also because a 
service like the NHS takes a long time to change and shifting resources on a large scale 
means shutting down hospital wards to release the money. One only need read the 
newspapers to know how quickly local and national opposition to hospital closures can 
arise. 
... I think most of them 
have been concerned in the short term with improving upon the quality 
of the service in terms of access, in terms of availability of the services ... 
I don't think that 
many of them have been concerned about getting the best deal value-for-money-wise 
necessarily ... 
It's only now 5 years since the reforms came in and yet people are expecting 
there to be massive, massive changes ... time goes quickly and changing 
the health service ... 
moves slowly. One of the great difficulties is that historically money has 
been locked into 
acute. To get that money out, you don't by saying I'm not going to refer 
Moira anymore for her 
chronic knee problem, I'm going to treat her in the practice. You don't get the 
Trust freeing up 
the cost that you are going to incur - the bit of consultant time, the 
bit of nurse time, the bit of 
in-patient or day case time ... 
You actually need to close up wards, hospitals to free up money 
and bring it back into primary care ... 
I/BHla(2,14) 
The resource allocation issue is further complicated by the fact that 
doing more in 
primary care may not be less expensive, 
that kind of [resource allocation] decis, on sa local declsion between the practces and 
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increasingly the local health board saying 'where is the trade-off between having a locally 
accessible service and a centralised service which may be more efficient in pure cash terms, 
but in terms of accessibility and in social terms It might be worth paying the extra. But if it's 
worth paying the extra, it's the opportunity cost question, what are we giving up in order to do 
that? But that is I guess what local decision making is all about, it's about the trade-offs. I 
think one of the things we don't know very much about in the NHS, and we ought to know 
more about, is something about these trade-offs in different services. Where does the balance 
lie? I don't think there's one answer 'cause that might depend where you are mi Scotland 
I/SOa(l 3) 
6.9.8 Market Mechanism 
Health board, Scottish Office and Trust interviewees were positive about the division 
between purchasing and providing services but less happy with the administration and 
contractual aspects of the market. A Scottish Office interviewee felt that the market 
model was not really appropriate to health care: 
I think in fact you could argue that you can't have a real market (a) Ma public service (I 
think you could argue that), but (b) In a public service which ftiridamentally has a cash limit. 
There seems to be some contradiction around markets and cash limits. We have some kind of 
... quasi market arrangement ... However, within some parts of Scotland, the reality is that 
there is ... not very much competition ... people had to find different ways of dealing with that 
issue, so you get into things like contestability rather than just straight competition, and using 
comparators to say 'the performance in that hospital, which is very similar to your own, looks 
like this, and yours looks like that, why? '.. So it's not competing one with another. It's using a 
benchmarking process... I/SOa(7) 
The trusts seemed to feel they were subject to competitive pressure so might disagree 
in part with the views presented above. They were particularly aware of the 
administrative burden and the transactions costs which the market incurs. Invoices 
needed to be issued in three schedules (in-patient, day case and out-patient) each 
listing the patients from the practice, dates of admission, discharge and the nature of 
the procedure. A separate schedule was then issued listing the costs. (Trusts are not 
allowed to list finance and patient related data together). Assimilating the patient 
information required for invoicing procedures and processing invoices is a very time 
consuming exercise which, in one trust, involves 2 full time staff. Nevertheless, Trusts 
felt that the purchaser provider split had been beneficial and that they were better able 
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to concentrate on provision. 
... My own view 
is that the whole thing has been helpful in the extreme. Not the money side of 
it - certainly with GP fundholding, that whole cycle of invoices and all the rest of it is such a 
waste of time but, yes I think they should feel that they've got control over spending and 
commissioning and what gets done 'cause if they're not close to the public and the patients' 
needs then nobody is, and they have to be given their place ... IT I /(10) 
... 
Well, I think it's helped to focus on what's important there's no doubt about it. What 
it does is that once someone tells you you are a provider of services then you focus on 
that ... but having said that, whether we needed all this bureaucracy that goes with it I'm 
not at all sure ... I think the important difference has been about those who comn-tission 
services and those who deliver services... I/T2/(18) 
The Scottish Office interviewees agreed that the split was something which ought not 
to be changed. 
I think there's still a concern from a number of people at the use of the terminology of 
markets if anything. I think if you get beyond the terminology and talk to people about a 
different set of relationships where you do have people who are concerned with corninissioning 
or purchasing on behalf of a local population to meet those local needs and you can work In 
partnership with other people to supply those needs, I think if you phrase it that way, and look 
at it that way, then I think there'd be a lot more people saying that actually makes a lot of 
sense, and indeed there seems to be no particular desire to change that fundamental 
relationship... I/SOa(l 5) 
6.10 Discussion & Conclusion 
The results presented in this chapter are generally consistent with the behaviours and 
perspectives discussed in Chapter 4. In this study, however, one particularly powerful 
motive for becoming a fundholder stood out above all others, that of enhancing 
professional autonomy. CaInan and Williams (1995) and Lapsley et al 
(1997) 
identified control as being important to GPs, but did not convey it as being as 
significant as it was found to be here. As other studies have reported 
(see for example 
Lapsley, Llewellyn, and Grant 1997; Ennew et al. 1998) this social goal was 
accompanied by the pursuit of economic goals ones such as the ability to make savings. 
This is consistent with the theory proposed by Granovetter (1985) 
(see Chapter 3) that 
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actors pursue social goals such as status in addition to economic ones. 
That GPs were more concerned with the quality of the service in terms of accessibility, 
care management and clinical care than with efficiency was also similar to other studies 
(see for example Mahon, Wilkin, and Whitehouse 1994; Laing and Cotton 1996). As 
far as reallocating resources is concerned, progress has been made in redistributing 
existing resources and shifting some activity from secondary to primary care. Some 
outreach clinics had been set up and practices were providing an increased range of 
services as Corney (1994) also found. However, releasing major amounts of money 
previously locked into acute services has proved more problematic and long-term and 
it is unclear how cost-effective some services are when provided in the community. 
Switching from one provider to another rarely occurred. Where it did occur, 
switching was because of quality and accessibility not increased costs, a factor which 
was also noted in the studies reviewed in Chapter 4 (see for example Ellwood 1998; 
Ennew et al. 1998). GPs proved to be loyal to their providers seeking an ongoing 
partnership even when GPs had found the provider unresponsive. Evidence 
concerning the importance of financial criteria within GP decision making though does 
appear slightly contradictory. Clearly the management allowance and the ability to 
make savings were valued and both GPs and trusts acknowledged that discussions 
often revolved around finance, yet GPs appear unresponsive to price signals. This 
ambiguity continues to an extent throughout the next two chapters although greater 
insight is gained into where and when the subject of money is raised. 
In this study, fundholders thought they had very little buyer power as individuals and 
that it was greatly enhanced when they collaborated. However, the trusts seemed to 
think that fundholding and non-fundholding practices could not be ignored, however 
empty their threats of switching might seem. It is probable though that Trusts' 
responsiveness was the result of additional pressures from the Scottish Office and 
health boards to improve performance, meet targets etc. (These non-market influences 
were found to complicate interpretations of findings in other studies (Petchey 1993; Le 
Grand 1994). ) 
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It emerged very clearly that GPs do want a direct influence over secondary care 
services. Almost all of the interviewees were confident that the purchaser provider 
split had been beneficial although much of its accompanying administration had been 
difficult and costly to handle. GPs generally believed that they had a legitimate role in, 
and valuable contribution to make towards, influencing secondary care services 
although they differed in the extent to which they wished to become directly involved. 
The purchaser provider split, whilst not universally favoured, was recognised to have 
been a catalyst which has made providers more responsive and which has opened up 
opportunities for GPs to influence hospital services. 
6.11 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the views of fundholding and purchasing held by GPs. 
They were found to have been strongly motivated by the opportunity to enhance their 
professional autonomy (a social motive) but were also responsive to economic 
incentives. Their purchasing behaviour was characterised by a reluctance to switch 
provider or bargain over price. Rather, they focused on working collaboratively with 
providers in order to influence service quality and to transfer some resources from 
secondary to primary care. The purchaser provider split was considered beneficial as 
a catalyst for making hospital services more responsive but GPs believed that 
additional pressures from the HB and Scottish Office had contributed to this 
responsiveness. 
Chapter 7 continues to discuss these themes in the context of the purchasing 
relationship. It discusses the relationship in terms of the content of purchasing 
discussions and conceptualises the relationship process in which GPs and Trusts are 
engaged. 
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Chapter 7 
The Purchaser Provider Relationship 
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Introduction 
Building on the GP perspective of the purchasing process, Chapter 7 considers the 
nature of the purchasing relationships in which GPs and Trusts in Glasgow were 
engaged. Earlier chapters have described the purchasing relationship as being 
relational but none have studied its content in detail. Chapter 7 discusses both the 
relationship content and process, and considers its impact upon service efficiency, 
resource allocation and service quality. 
Drawing extensively on the observation data, the chapter conceptualises the 
purchaser provider relationship as being multiplex and socially embedded. GPs and 
Trusts are engaged in 4 key processes: learning, partnering, purchasing and service 
design. Direct discussions between primary and secondary care clinicians have 
resulted in a number of innovations, and efficiency improvements, and have provided 
opportunities for GPs to enhance their professional autonomy through directly 
influencing the treatment of their patients in the secondary care setting. 
1 Purchaser Provider Interactions 
Previous chapters have characterised purchaser provider relationships as being socially 
embedded within a relational contracting framework. Studies reviewed in Chapters 2 
and 4 have described patterns of GP activities and explained purchaser provider 
interactions from either studying contracts or interviewing transacting parties but have 
not provided detail on the content of the relationship. This chapter examines data 
obtained from non-participant observation of meetings between mainly fundholders 
and Trusts (supplemented by interview material) in order to provide a greater 
understanding of the relationship process and content. 
Z2 A Multiplex Purchasing Relationship 
Five of the meetings observed were entitled clinical meetings. They were not 
concerned with contracting but with broader purchasing issues such as shaping 
services, expressing purchasing interest and intent. Contracting meetings 
04 and 06 
dealt specifically with the details of the contract, clarifying prices and so on. 
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Discussions between the practices and the trusts indicated that a multiplex function 
was being performed. The purchaser provider relationship was a co-operative one 
comprising four elements: learning, designing services, partnerships and purchasing 
(see Figure 7.1) 
Learning 
Partnerships 
Purchasing 
Designing Services 
It was virtually impossible to isolate purchasing from activities of service design, 
learning and partnership processes as they were occurring simultaneously. The 
relationship was dynamic, influenced continually by a number of underlying tensions 
some of which were specific to a particular Trust or GP, some of which were peculiar 
to the UB and thus contextual to the purchaser provider interaction being observed. 
Accounts from two of the meetings (02 and 03 presented below) demonstrate the 
nature of the multiplex relationship. They are presented as two separate cases and 
occurred in two acute Trusts within the city. Both meetings were attended by 
management/ contracting staff, senior clinicians and a group of GPs who were 
purchasing services collaboratively. In case 2, a non-fundholding LPA was also 
present. 
721 Case 1: Acute Trust A and Local Fundholders (02) 
Every 6 weeks or so this group of practices met with the contracts manager, medical 
director and other invited members' of the Trust (see Table 5.2 for attendants). The 
main focus of discussion during the meeting was on an initiative proposed by one of 
the fundholders to alter patient referral letters. He had proposed that a pro-forma 
letter be used in which there were two options for the GP to tick. The first would 
indicate that the GP wished the consultant to see the patient only once and to inform 
'Particular clinical directors, consultants, members of the finance department etc, are invited to 
meetings where an item relates specifically to their area. 
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Figure 7.1: Multiplex Purchasing Relationship 
the GP of his/her recommendations concerning future outpatient appointments/ 
treatment. This would allow the GP to decide whether or not to proceed with the 
consultant's recommended course of action. The second box indicated that the GP 
was happy for the consultant to proceed directly with any necessary treatment and 
follow-up. The letter had been circulated to the clinical directors in the hospital by the 
Professor of General Medicine (PGM) who reported that there was a degree of 
opposition to the proposal. 
The PGM and Medical Director (MD) presented the grounds for objection: 
e consultants no longer keep patients longer than necessary for ego reasons as may 
have been the case in previous years. 
assessments might be made, opinions given and then the patient sent elsewhýre 
(somewhere cheaper) for the treatment. 
consultants felt that they wouldn't be able to do an urgent procedure if the GP had 
ticked the 'single appointment and return' category. This presented risks to the 
patient. 
the PGM was in favour in some cases of a 'one stop shop' approach. He was not 
willing to concede that it was desirable in every circumstance or specialty. 
the MD indicated his concern that there were legal and ethical issues associated 
with all of this. Consultants might feel that they no longer had the freedom to treat 
patients according to their knowledge and expertise. This is something they need 
time to consider. 
op the MD also said that consultants are already under a lot of pressure to reduce 
repeat referrals, to meet waiting time targets (ie to eliminate attendances which 
don't add value). 
e attention was drawn by the PGM to the resource implications. Where there are 
similar types of service changes in the hospital they are being done with extra 
funding (from the health board, the Chief Scientist Office or Management Executive 
etc). Where would money come from for this type of reconfiguration - albeit that it 
may only require extra clerical time? 
The clinicians' dislike of the proposal was clear. They resented the implications that 
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unnecessary out-patient sessions were being recommended and were resistant to any 
infiingement of their clinical autonomy. Whilst they remained calm, the atmosphere 
was tense and they appeared rather annoyed. 
To counter what he clearly viewed as a miscomprehension of his intentions in 
suggesting the letter, the GP was quick to point out that the letter had certainly not 
been designed to enable GPs to obtain a professional opinion and then refer elsewhere. 
He stressed that it was designed to inform the consultant about the GP's preference 
because some GPs want to ... regain control ... 02/GP/(2) of their patient and deal with the 
condition within the practice if possible. He considered that rather than increasing the 
demand on Trust resources it should actually relieve some pressure. 
The GPs and hospital consultants both repeated their respective positions each time 
seeking to clarify their motives. The discussion which ensued, whilst tense, was 
neither acrimonious nor aggressive. The PGM however, was obviously frustrated. 
He often shook his head as the GP spoke, screwed up his eyes and sighed appearing 
tired of yet more paper work. The GP seemed taken aback by this response and by 
the fact that his intentions could be interpreted as opportunistic. 
During the discussion, a fund manager quipped ... it's a lot cheaper at the [private 
hospital] ... 02/FPW(3). 
This comment provoked a more angered response from the PGM 
who began to clarify that the private sector did not incur the level of overhead that 
NHS hospitals did because private hospitals do not provide intensive care facilities. 
Should they require intensive care, patients are sent to an NHS Trust so in effect the 
NHS was subsidising the private sector. 
As a compromise, the GPs requested a short pilot of the letter, but were cautioned 
by 
the Director of Business Planning that savings might not be as significant as the 
practices anticipated. The Trust conceded that the PGM would 
discuss with the lead 
consultant in gastroenterology, some way of improving services. 
Practices in turn 
agreed to select 2 or 3 examples of 'unnecessary' outpatient sessions so 
the Trust 
agreed to respond to any perceived problems. The matter of categorisation 
though 
remained unresolved so the hospital consultants agreed to give 
it further thought. 
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722 Case 2: Acute Trust B and Local Fundholders (03) 
The setting was similar to Case 1. The fundholders were attending the hospital to 
discuss clinical matters which had a bearing on their purchasing intentions. Six 
consultants from different directorates had been invited to talk with the GPs about the 
changes in their area of work and the services they provided. (See Table 5.2 for 
attendants). 
0 Ear, Nose and Throat (ENT) Services: 
The consultant asked why so few children were referred to this service. GPs 
explained there was a common assumption that they should refer to Yorkhill 
Hospital for Sick Children. Furthermore, GPs were concerned that referrals 
to Trust B would then be referred on further to Yorkhill so they would incur 
additional costs. Other concerns though related to the patient experience - 
eg, the non-availability of mother and baby facilities for parents at Trust B and 
the longer waiting times. 
During the discussion it became clear that the GPs were willing to refer to 
Trust B (their local provider) but that they also wanted more control over the 
referral process. GPs identified 3 phases in dealing with a patient who had 
ENT problems: - (a) an initial visit to the GP (or assessment by a health 
visitor/speech therapist from Yorkhill at the health centre/practice); (b) an 
outpatient appointment for further investigation; (c) surgical procedure if 
necessary. GPs were interested whether a protocol could be established so 
that they could undertake stages (a) and (b), referring only those who needed 
surgery to the hospital. 
The response by the consultant to this suggestion was one of scepticism and a 
remark implying good luck to you. He clearly thought the 
GPs were 
underestimating what was involved but the GPs were persistent and after some 
discussion the consultant agreed to send them the criteria which he would use 
to determine whether or not a patient needed surgery. 
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0 Radiology: 
The issue here was of direct access to the CT scanner. The consultant agreed 
in principal to providing the service but needed to approach his colleagues 
about it. The GPs indicated that although their contract was with another 
provider, they would be prepared to move but needed to know what the price 
would be. The Trust, however, wanted to know the expected volume of 
activity before they could calculate costs. There was considerable debate on 
this point. The GPs wanted a rough figure but the Trust were disclosing 
nothing and continually restated their difficulty in costing the service: there 
were issues about entry levels (the lowest volume to ensure a cost-effective 
service), recruitment (they couldn't recruit someone until they were sure there 
would be enough work. Ultimately, to break the deadlock, one GP said ... if I 
sent you I per week could you quote me? ... 03/GP/(6) At this, the Trust agreed to 
calculate the figures. 
0 Ophthalmology: 
This service had been under discussion during a number of previous meetings 
and for quite some time. This was evidenced by the fact that the clinical 
director began by saying how relieved he was to see that finally ophthalmology 
was no longer a major issue and he listed the many changes and improvements 
that had been introduced into the service. However his tone then altered. His 
frustration with the requests being made of his department became apparent. 
He stated categorically that under no circumstances would he work within 
standards set by non-ophthalmologists. He was particularly opposed to 
agreeing with timescales imposed by GPs about when a second cataract could 
be operated on. Only recommendations from the College and his own clinical 
judgement would determine the stage at which a patient was to be operated on, 
and not something written into a GP contract. Furthermore he pointed out that 
a bilateral contract was not the same as two unilateral cataracts for the price of 
one, or of one-and-a-half 
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7.3 The Learning Function 
The learning aspect of the relationship involved knowledge sharing and mutual 
education. In Case I. two conflicting perspectives came together - the view of the GP 
and of the hospital consultant. They each sought to explain their position and the way 
in which they hoped to operate. The referral letter allowed GPs to express their 
preference about patient management. It also reflected their desire to manage more of 
the patient's care, to ... regain control ... 02/GP/(2) after the outpatient appointment. 
Furthermore there was a resource implication - fewer outpatient visits meant less 
expensive treatment. 
To the hospital consultant, however, it represented the entrance of the GP into the 
hospital medicine domain and the erosion of their professional autonomy. It also 
restricted their ability to exercise professional judgement about how many visits 
patients should make and how they should be treated. They did acknowledge though 
that historically much has been done in the name of medicine which is really the 
furtherance of consultants' research interests or careers. Their second point revealed 
their mistrust of the nature of fundholders who they regarded as financially driven 
opportunists who were there to cherry pick and to exploit the system for their own 
ends. Whilst this may seem an extreme view, the PGM towards the end of the 
meeting, in an outburst of frustration, said that he was fed up of the ... cherry picking... 
0/2/Cons/(8) which was going on where GPs were taking ... all the good or easy bits and leaving 
the hospitals with the rubbish or expensive bits ... 0/2/Cons/(8) This was not taken up 
by anyone 
present at the meeting, but this brief declaration revealed a deep-seated resentment of 
what he believed to be behind the changes proposed by his primary care colleagues. 
As the two parties spoke about their respective worlds of health care GPs explained 
their primary care-based philosophy, their processes, preferred management style, and 
implicitly what they felt they had the knowledge and skills to do themselves. The 
consultants meantime presented their philosophy, the ethical implications of the 
letter, 
their knowledge base and the extent to which they wished to retain control over their 
own working practices. 
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The discussion was free-flowing and engaging for both parties, but the underlying 
tension became apparent when one of the fund managers made an off-the-cuff remark 
au about prices being lower from the private sector provider. This sparked a much 
broader discussion where the MD unequivocally defended the Trust's position. In his 
view prices were higher because in fact they are subsidising the private sector. Private 
sector hospitals use accident and emergency facilities provided by NHS hospitals 
which allows them to reduce their costs. It was simply a fact of life that if the GPs 
wanted accident and emergency and intensive care services then prices would be 
higher. 
Ongoing discussions about the GP referral letter illustrated further opportunities for 
learning. The topic was raised again during two subsequent meetings (05 (14/03/97) 
and 07 (11/07/97)). Although during the first discussion (02) all parties had agreed 
to conduct a preliminary review of cases, the promised action by the PGM had not 
ensued. In March, a fund manager proposed an alternative solution but this too made 
little progress. The subject arose again in July with a consultant rheumatologist (CR) 
who had been brought in to speak about this matter. The CR conceded that within 
rheurnatology there were return appointments for new patients which might be 
construed as unnecessary, however, there were sound reasons for this and so once 
again in presenting his reasons, there was an opportunity for learning. The CR 
explained that: 
9 he had a policy of always seeing a new patient himself Patients are sometimes 
seen by a senior house officer (SHO) on the first visit, so the CR requests a return 
visit so he can make his own assessment. Changing this policy would be 
detrimental to hospital training. 
* there is sufficient motivation to discharge patients because of the constant flow of 
new patients who can be better served if the doctors' time is not preoccupied with 
unnecessary repeat visits. 
e it is unclear how GPs would assess whether a consultant's reconimendation 
for 
returning a patient 6 months later for review was a good decision or not? 
As far as 
routine follow-up is concerned, the issue of specialist review versus 
GP review 
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often comes down to GP preference and there is little comparative research to 
indicate which is more clinically effective. 
9 repeat attendance is sometimes due to clinical trials. It is important to be able to do 
research on patients undergoing standard medication and therapy to advance 
knowledge about accepted practice and drug usage. 
His final remark immediately prompted a response from one GP who questioned who 
would be paying for these repeat attendances - it seemed fundholders were indirectly 
contributing to the research grants by having to pay for hospital attendances. The 
Trust personnel reacted with unanimous incredulity and exasperation which was 
further fuelled by the GPs insistence that returns for research purposes could ... all too 
easily become a habit... 07/GP/(2). 
Another clear example of mutual education and knowledge transfer occurred during a 
meeting between Acute Trust C and two clinical commissioners. The Trust had called 
the meeting because they wanted to know the GPs' views about the future direction for 
services. The GPs welcomed the invitation to comment on services but stressed that 
what they really needed was evidence of real change. GPs (especially LPAs) were 
becoming increasingly ... dejected ... 09/GP/(2) 
because they were putting in lots of work 
but the hospital seemed ... intransigent... 09/GP/(2). 
They discussed how services could be 
better organised to suit the needs of general practitioners, for example, they could have 
more problem oriented clinics (eg, chest pain clinics) and GPs explained why this 
would be appropriate 2 They also explained that follow-up letters often do not arrive 
at the practice either on time or at all. Patients make an appointment with the GP but 
it is wasted because the hospital letter is late in arriving and so the GP does not know 
what the consultant has recommended. 
As they discussed new clinics, revised processes etc, one of the GPs said ... a lot of it is 
education ... 09/GP/(4). 
He felt that the hospital had a role to educate GPs because 
techniques and medical knowledge are changing all the time and GPs need to 
be 
continually updated. One of the consultants took this 
further, acknowledging that 
See later quote under innovations in clinical care. 
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there are also changes in primary care to which some hospital clinicians are oblivious - 
... there is a shift out there that people in here don't understand ... 09/Cons/(4). At the end of the 
meeting the GPs asked whether the meeting had been useful to which the consultant 
replied, ... Oh yes. It's a new way of looking at things, breaking down the barriers between primary and 
secondary care. ... 09/Cons/(5). 
A X1 
Auer the meeting I commented to the consultant on the apparent importance of mutual 
education/learning. She agreed, commenting that whilst GPs had of course worked in 
hospitals, hospital clinicians had never worked in general practice and had no idea 
about what was involved. This was further confirmed during an interview with a PCP 
flandholder who pointed out that in primary care, medical practice and the doctor 
patient interaction is very different. It is something to which hospital consultants 
should be exposed: 
... I think all doctors should spend a year, at least maybe six months, as a GP because it's one of the 
hardest Jobs of all ... you're dealing with everything ... every patient's demand. I am a property 
consultant, I'm an employer and I've got a partner. Consultants don't have any and they don't have 
the constant demand of patients ... One of the chaps in my year, he's a vascular surgeon, vascular 
surgery is one of the most dramatic things in medicine - traumatic. He's had the hairiest moments 
of his life when he did locums in general practice. ... What do I do here with this screaming wain? 
Does it have meningitis? Huge responsibility ... I/GP16/PCP(4-5) 
74 Designing Services 
From the interviews and observed meetings it emerged that a number of existing 
services had been redesigned and others newly designed as the purchasers and 
providers engaged in clinical discussions ie, where GPs and hospital clinicians were in 
direct communication. Design was generally stimulated from discussions about 
service quality, both the care management process (functional quality) and clinical care 
(technical quality). Sometimes ideas were stimulated by GPs, other times by the 
Trusts. 
... 
Sometimes the GPs come along with bright ideas and say can we do this or not? our 
guys will say no way, you can't do that . But very often good 
ideas come out of these joint 
meetings that we have ... 
What tends to happen is that the GPs pick a subject. I then make 
209 
sure that we get the clinical specialists from the hospital involved in the meetings and we sit 
around, they put their point of view and we discuss how we can best provide that service for 
them. There are lots of examples of good practice that have come out of these meetings ... 
I/Tl/(2-3) 
7.4.1 Innovations in Care Management 
During the meetings between trusts and GPs. a number of innovations in care 
management were stimulated. For example, during the meeting with Acute Trust C 
(09), the GPs tackled the usual subject of discharge letters' and then went on to 
discuss the discharge process and follow-up appointments. They complained that 
letters often do not appear at the practice. Patients wait for an appointment date but 
nothing arrives so practice staff need to phone and ... badger the consultants' secretaries ... 
o9/GP/2. One GP suggested that an appointment date be arranged at the time of 
discharge rather than a separate process having to kick in later. One of the 
consultants explained that in fact 4 forms are completed for discharge and retained in 
the hospital. She assured the GPs that a committee was looking at the discharge 
process and its associated paperwork with a view to creating a template for a single 
discharge form. The form would be longer than any of its previous incarnations, but 
would have headings which would stimulate junior doctors to think through and write 
about the relevant issues. The form would ultimately contain much more qualitative 
information and would be copied to the GP. Enthusiastically one of the GPs 
suggested that ... re-engineering is the key... 09/GP/(2). 
The consultant heartily concurred that 
.. 
if the system works well it will nm efficiently ... 09/Cons/(2). 
Other innovations were witnessed at Trust C and in other settings. At Acute Trust C 
(09) GPs also questioned how referrals were prioritised, suggesting that too often all 
referrals were being treated as routine and not being stratified. A system alteration 
was again proposed (by the GPs); different types of referral letters for different clinics 
could be set up. For example, GPs could state on the letter the types of tests they had 
carried out. Clinicians at the hospital would then have a better idea of how to 
prioritise the case. Asthma services were being streamlined at Acute Trust B (03). 
3 This issue was raised at most of the meetings because letters were said to be late and often of poor 
quality. 
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The Trust had written a protocol on the casualty card which would be followed on 
adn-ýssion- The card would later be sent to the GP so that they would be fully 
informed of the patient's condition and the treatment provided. 
Concern for, and influence over, the design of processes extended to the redesign of 
organisation structures within the Trust. In one case, pressure from GPs meant that 
supervisory and management structures had to be altered. Chapter 6 showed how 
purchasing facilitators had complained about the management of community nurses. 
Their influence was such that the Trust fundamentally restructured its nursing 
management for the whole city. 
Not all the changes were so radical. Sometimes all that was required was a more 
incremental enhancement of care management. For example at Trust A (02), the 
consultant ophthalmologist pointed out that whilst GPs were complaining about the 
discharge letters and seeking more control over referral letters, they were neglecting 
to provide patient information on referral. She had taken a small sample of referrals 
from a3 week period and noted that 60%' had contained no information at all about 
patient medication and general medical health. All that was required was for the 
medical director to write to GPs reminding them of the need to provide comprehensive 
patient information on referral. 
74.2 Innovations in Clinical Care 
As well as modifying the care process, clinicians also worked on designs which 
combined more efficient processes with changes in clinical practice. For example, at 
Acute Trust B (03) a new approach to ultrasound was proposed by one of the 
hospital consultants. The clinical director for radiology issued copies of a short 
publication describing a recent study which suggested that it was efficient to provide 
open access ultrasound to GPs. Moreover, open access enabled GPs to manage 
patients within the primary care setting (ie, they need not relinquish control). The 
publication read as follows: 
Forty percent of the 60% were from fundholders. 
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Increasing demands on diagnostic ultrasound make it important to ensure the most efricient use of 
services. Recently, [Acute Trust BI allowed direct referral for pelvic ultrasound to some of the 
local GP practices and this retrospective study aimed to determine the potential of this facility to 
improve patient management, and which individuals were most likely to benefit. Patients referred 
de novo by GP for pelvic ultrasound scan over a 24 month period were studied ... Of the 104 cases 
studied, 32 (3 1 O/o) of the scans were positive, matching published figures for referral for general 
ultrasound from hospital outpatient departments. Of the patients with negative scans, 47 (65%) 
were managed in the community, and 25 (35%) were referred to hospital outpatient clinic. Of those 
with an abnormal scan, only 8 (25%) were managed in the community and 22 (68.75%) were 
referred to clinic. 
The highest proportion of positive scans (645) came from the group presenting with a palpable 
mass, but, as the majority of such patients will require ftirther investigation, the value of an 
ultrasound scan prior to referral is not clear. ... We demonstrated that In all other categories, 
if the 
ultrasound scan result was negative, most cases required no further *input from hospital services, 
and that provision of this service can reliably help GPs to decide on the future management of 
such patients. (Reid, S. R; F. M. Bryden and 1. A. MacLeod. Department of Radiology. Source 
unknown)(emphasis added) 
On hearing this account, GPs were interested in whether radiologists could do the 
diagnosis. This would avoid any need for a consultant appointment and would further 
reduce the cost of the service. The consultant confirmed that this was the case. 
However, GPs then asked ... how can we have confidence in the diagnosis? ... 03/GP/(5). 
Although 
they were assured that radiology training was intensive and that service quality could 
be guaranteed, they had to decide whether they wanted a consultant opinion. This 
rnitigated against the GPs' initial enthusiasm and they decided that they needed time to 
think about the relative risk of perhaps receiving a mis-diagnosis. 
The development of ENT protocols (Case 2) also addressed clinical care. Their 
proposals entailed the removal from secondary care of some routine testing and 
diagnosis which meant an increased clinical role for GPs in dealing with ENT cases and 
a reduced need for patients to attend hospital. Trust A (02) had launched an 
initiative 
where hospital consultants were training GPs to do joint and soft tissue injections 
in 
the practice. They had successfully piloted the project and were planning to provide 
further GP training elsewhere in the city. There were suggestions that this might be 
extended to include training in the management of acute knee conditions and 
chronic back pain. The same Trust had also launched a new chiamydia screening 
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service. This service differed from most in that it was available on request. GPs had 
voiced concern about the possibility of women contracting chlamydia but the medical 
director and the infectious diseases consultant thought that because it is only women 
with multiple partners who were at risk, there was no need for large-scale, routine 
screening. Instead, they offered that GPs could send a urine sample and request 
screening when required. Direct access for minor operative procedures had also 
been set up so practices who do not have their own facilities for minor day case 
operations (eg, removal of ganglions etc) can refer their patients directly to a day case 
operating list bypassing all out patients and other procedures. 
It is clear that fundholders and non-fundholding LPAs were directly involved in service 
design by virtue of ongoing clinical discussions with the Trust. It was also said to be 
the case though that similar discussions took place through the commissioning process 
between trusts and LPAs. I did not observe any such meetings at the Trust, but 
during a Health Board conunissioning meeting (07), the clinical commissioner' 
indicated that he had been involved in a number of service design matters: prioritising 
gastroenterology patients at an acute trust and improving the efficiency of the care 
process; exploring the scope for community radiology; and issuing guidelines to GPs 
about how best to use the pain clinic. Because of increases in laboratory spending, 
GPs were drawing up guidelines and revising the lab handbook so as to educate GPs 
about the availability and appropriateness of various tests in the hope that services will 
be used more efficiently and effectively. Prior to the meeting I had interviewed this 
clinical commissioner and asked about whether he thought he was involved firstly 
when as an LPA then latterly as a clinical commissioner in designing services. His 
response was definite and demonstrated that he was concerned with both design and 
resource utilisation. 
... Interviewer: Given your commissioning role, 
do you see yourself as designing services? 
GP: Oh yes. We are looking at templates for the haematology service. 
Interviewer: Like flow charts of what will happen? 
GP: Yes, and the kind of service specification for what we'd expect to happen. We're working with 
5CIinical commissioners are GPs who attend the health boards as representatives for the LPAs (see 
Chapter 5). 
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the consultants to do that. 
Interviewer: The technical function of the service or the niceties of how you treat the patient etc? 
GP: Not a lot of that (niceties! ). Here's an example ... The Trusts give us their wish list every year 
and indicated f 16 mill of wish lists this January ... Now the Health Board doesn't actually have any 
money to give away at all, but some of the services they were asking for, they'd put in say E50,000. 
Rapid access chest pain clinic, we were given a budget and asked by a Trust for L50,000 to fund 
this 6. Now I look at it this way. Someone comes here with chest pain, how are they dealt with at 
the moment? Well it depends, if they're an emergency they end up in coronary care, if you think it's 
angina you treat them, maybe refer them to a cardiologist, or if they're a halfway house they maybe 
end up being sent up to casualty to be seen by the receiving physician who decides whether it's 
cardiac or oesophageal and they get discharged. If you run a chest-pain clinic once per week for 
more urgent types of chest pain you then have a set up where they go and see a consultant 
cardiologist and they get all the investigations done and are reassured or admitted or whatever. 
Now, the benefit to the patient is that they're seeing a cardiologist, not an A&E officer or junior 
hospital doctor. So what do you need? To employ more consultant cardiologists? Well perhaps 
that's why you need more money, but if you're employing more consultant cardiologists you need 
less junior staff. There aren't enough patients. It's being dealt with in a different way so why do you 
need f 50,000. The immediate knee-jerk response for the Trust is 'oh well we'll just keep 
everything we've got already but add in a few new ECG machines, we'll produce a new department, 
a department of chest-pain, or something. They need to get out of this and give a proper costing. If 
you're going to employ an extra cardiologist and loose half a junior member of staff then OK, I'll 
buy it for f. 25k if that's what it is, but you're seeing the same patients with the same conditions In 
the same hospitals, so you need zilch unless you can prove to me otherwise. They're always 
wanting more money for reconfigurations of services and I certainly wouldn't give them it... 
I/GP II /PCP(17-18) 
Not all of the new services had arisen directly from discussions with GPs. 
There were cases where the Trusts had recognised a need to improve a service 
or had recruited a new consultant who was keen to launch a new service. Trust 
A had launched a chest pain clinic because ... a new consultant came who'd done the 
same thing m Edinburgh when he worked there and wanted to do it here and we were able to set it 
up and offered it. They [GPs] all think it's wonderful and want more different things ... I/T I /(11). 
The same trust had also launched a new urology service, again because of 
consultant interest: ... that was because one of the consultants realised 
that there were a lot of 
nurse practitioners down in England ... he went off to a conference and 
he came back saying 'they're 
using ... nurse practitioners ... 
So he thought this would be really good and we happened to get an 
6He is speaking as a clinical conumssioner so 'we' refers to his role at the health 
board. 
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excellent appointee into the job who's really done a lot of work ... It was really from him seeing the 
light and then us saying to the GPs that 'this is a better way of doing things, what do you think? 
I/T I /(11). 
74.3 Baniers to Innovation 
Whilst designs could be stimulated by consultant interest, they could also be prevented 
by a lack of consultant interest. At Acute Trust B (03), GPs wanted to develop 
neurology services. Neurology complaints are generally dealt with in a hospital well 
known for its neurological services, but it is not so readily accessible for patients living 
in the area around Trust B. However, the consultant physician explained that nobody 
was interested in neurology. The only scope was for patients to attend general 
medicine clinics where ... they do a lot of 'soft neurology'... 03/Cons/(3). The alternative was to 
set up direct access to CT scanners, an option which the GPs eagerly pursued. Trust 
A had attempted to set up an open access endoscopy service but, ... One of our consultants is 
not convinced that this is the right way to go, so he really has not blocked it but he's not been very helpful 
and every tirne you try to do something he says 'oh, we don't have the nurse' or 'oh, I'll have to change the 
doctors hours', so it took months to get that going ... He thought it would open the floodgates, that suddenly 
all these patients would creep out of the woodwork and need diis service ... I'm clear that it won't. It's the 
same group of patients, it's just that they come directly rather than via an outpatient clinic I/TI/(l 2). 
It is clear that purchaser/provider discussions stimulated a number of innovations. 
Those noted above were only examples of what was said to be a number of 
innovations. 
... there's lots of innovative things like that but the whole emphasis is to keep patients as far as 
possible with the practice... then, of course we get into the more hi-tech stuff that clearly only we 
can do and it's more then about outcomes of care and to some extent shared care. There's lots of 
discussion around at the moment about how cancer services should be managed at the moment ... 
I/T 1 (2) 
7.5 The Partnership Process 
Forming a partnership was important for service design. It was also valued as a goal in 
itself as was clear from the findings presented in Chapter 6. Practices actively sought a 
partnership with their providers so that services could be integrated, patients could 
have access to local facilities and so primary care clinicians could benefit from dialogue 
with specialists and visa versa. 
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It was clear that not only did purchasers make demands of the providers, but providers 
made demands upon GPs. The very presence of the consultant ophthalmologist at one 
meeting had been because, as she put it ... I flew off the handle at my business manager one 
day ... 02/Cons/(4). This was because she had been receiving patient referral letters with 
little or no medical information. She said she resented that when hospitals fail to 
provide information they are not paid, but when GPs don't provide information 
hospitals need to just accept the status quo. The consultant went on to point out in a 
slightly jocular fashion that she had observed in the proposed pro-forma letter (see 
Case I earlier) that there was little space for patient information. In response, both a 
GP and a fund manager suggested that GPFHs should be penalised for providing 
insufficient information and that this should be formalised in their contracts. 
At Trust B (02) a similar situation occurred concerning death notifications. For more 
than a year the GPs had been registering their dissatisfaction with the delay in death 
notifications. At times they would not know for weeks that a patient had died in 
hospital and this led to unpleasant repercussions. One GP, for example, was not 
notified that one of his patients had died in hospital. Consequently when the GP later 
met one of the patient's relatives he made no comment on their unfortunate 
circumstances. This was clearly damaging to the doctor patient relationship and ought 
never to have occurred. The problem it seemed lay with the Trust. Protocols had 
been set in place to govern death notifications but they were not always followed. 
However, what was also raised was that when patients die in the community, GPs 
often fail to inform the Trust. This was, therefore, an area where information flow 
was undoubtedly a shared responsibility. The two parties undertook to improve their 
efforts in notifying one another respectively. 
Another aspect of the partnership was the recognition that GPs were rightfully 
becoming involved in hospital services. At Trust B, the Consultant in Respiratory 
Medicine said that he was ... acutely aware of the need for interaction with 
GPs ... 03/Con/(3) and 
that he wanted to be sure their services were flexible, community based and ... sensitive to 
GPs... 03/Con/(3). He invited GPs to 'phone if they wanted to discuss the service. 
At 
Trust C (09), consultants stressed their view that GPs needed to be brought in on 
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discussions about the future of hospital services. In response one GP said ... it isn't about 
sides, we're all in the one boat ... 09/GP/(4). 
He said that there should be more joint meetings 
between hospital doctors and GPs where they could state their respective agendas and 
then work towards a shared agenda so there could be a continuum of care. At this 
same meeting, it was noted that waiting lists for the pain clinic had increased. 
Interestingly to alleviate the problem one of the GPs (a clinical conunissioner) wrote to 
GPs suggesting they took on more responsibility for pain management so that the 
burden on the hospital might be reduced He did so knowing such a move would 
increase the burden on primary care. 
There was also a sense that when working in partnership, practices and trusts could 
take a much broader, locality-wide focus. During a meeting at Trust A (05), GPs 
enquired whether the Trust had seen an increase in the number of referrals to open 
access endoscopy and respectively, a decrease in referrals coming through out- 
patients. This proved not to be the case although there had not been a large increase in 
open access referrals. As they explored the difficulties in collecting the right activity 
data, the discussion snowballed. GPs were interested in data about referral levels and 
activity levels for the current and previous years. This interest extended to comparing 
referral rates across specialties, including emergency referrals, and then grew into a 
discussion about cross-boundary referrals and whether referral patterns were changing 
across specialties and sub- specialties. The enquiry was partly to ascertain whether the 
GEMS' service had stemmed the number of casualty admissions. It was not entirely 
clear during the discussion what the direct benefit would be from working out these 
figures (they were not easily available), however, one benefit emerged later when the 
subject of prices was raised. At Trust C, GPs also expressed concerns about the 
impact of activities on a locality or sector wide basis. They too were discussing 
referral patterns and the need for co-ordinated action between GPs. They couldn't just 
decide to do anti-coagulation in one practice and not on a sector-wide basis - ... GPs can't 
cherry pick, and they have to do it in the whole sector for it to be cost effective ... 09/GP/(4). 
In other 
words, they were seeking to avoid fragmenting services across primary care and across 
'Glasgow Emergency Medical Service: ie, the overnight emergency general practice service which is 
co-ordinated city-wide. 
217 
the primary/secondary interface. 
The partnership aspect also enabled practices and trusts to extend their work beyond 
clinical services. At Trust B (03), GPs became involved in a complex discussion 
about shifting care for the elderly from hospital to the community. The clinical 
director for medicine for the elderly explained that GPFHs would need to put their 
savings'-into the hospital in order to reshape services because the Trust did not have 
sufficient financial resources. GPs explained that they were already investing money 
by increasing prescriptions for Aspirin and other medication so their drug bills had 
already increased. The clinical director, however, said there had been an increase in 
emergency admissions and that the hospital could not cope, far less reduce hospital 
services, unless GPs stopped the referrals. The trust gave fuller explanations about 
the need for bridging finance and pressures for wage increases but it was obvious that 
neither party had sufficient funds at the time to invest in medicine for the elderly. 
Although in some respects they reached an impasse, neither party questioned the fact 
that they had a shared responsibility to make the shift from hospital to community 
actually happen. 
Financial pressures proved to be unifying forces. Two city-wide pressures had been 
brought to bear at the time this research was conducted: reduced funding for Glasgow 
as a whole and the redistribution of community nursing resources. GGUB had 
received a significantly reduced budget allocation for the year 1997/98. This meant 
that Trusts and GPFHs would receive smaller budgets. At the same time, however, 
prices had increased. At Trust A, one GP expressed his concerns about funding for 
GPFHs and for the Trust. He considered that Glasgow as a whole had been badly 
served by the SHARE formula because it made inadequate allowances for deprivation. 
He said ... I want to see GPFHs equitably treated 
but not overly so ... 05/GP/(6). 
When the contracts 
manager for the trust spoke of the difficulties the trust was experiencing because of 
their funding the GP was quick to say ... exactly, that is why we need to work together to make 
savings by, for example, reducIng the level of outpatient referrals ... 05/GP/(4). 
One cannot know 
from this statement what all of the motives might be. Clearly there was an opportunity 
for the GP to further justify his intentions behind the revamped referral letter, there 
would undoubtedly be a financial or economising motive too, but nevertheless, there 
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was an identification that the two parties had to work together in partnership to make 
the best of an uncomfortable and worrying situation. At two meetings (04 and 05) 
fundholders reminded the Trusts that invoices were arriving late, GPFHs didn't want to 
apply penalty clauses but the later the invoices arrived, the more difficult it was to pay 
the trust in time. During the meeting with the community trust (04) a representative 
from the fundholding association persisted in his attempts to convince the trust to issue 
invoices on time because they did not want the Trust to lose out. 
7.6 Purchasing Services 
The very fact that GPs needed to agree a contract, means that purchasing is one 
element of the purchaser provider relationship. Even where purchasing was not 
explicitly discussed (eg. provider 'A' did not offer service X to purchaser 'B' for 
price 'P'), there was an underlying assumption that if service developments progressed 
agreeably, it would be unlikely that contracts would be removed. Incidences of 
purchasing were less clear in the clinical meeting, than the functions of learning, 
designing services and partnering to which most of the time was devoted except during 
two of the meetings (04 and 06) which were contract meetings, where more 
attention was given to pricing structures and volumes of activity. 
There were times when negotiation and bargaining not to mention some strategic 
manoeuvring were quite overt. The most overt solicitation of GP business occurred at 
Trust B where the Clinical Director of ENT services openly asked why it was that GPs 
did not refer children for surgery (03). This lead to a discussion about the availability 
of comparable family facilities and comparative waiting times all with a view to 
encouraging GPs to change their referral patterns. 
During this same meeting parties were discussing setting up direct access for CT scans 
(03). The GPs indicated that if this service were available they would move their 
contract from another acute trust to Trust B. Not wishing to commit themselves to an 
under-priced service however, the Trust asked what volume of activity the GPs would 
provide; finance could not be calculated nor could they contemplate appointing staff 
when there was no conunitment in terms of volume of referrals from the 
GPs. The 
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GPs did not want to quote figures so asked for a rough cost-per-case. Again the 
Trust refused. The point of increment, they said, was critical to their calculations and 
they couldn't suggest a price. Again the GPs returned,, what would the entry level be? 
How many referrals before they could begin to think of setting up direct access? The 
Trust were unable to answer that without some financial assessment. The GPs 
persisted in a quest for ball park figures. The Trust reiterated that there were marginal 
costs and'they needed to know that there would be enough activity. They reached 
stalemate until one GP said ... if I sent you I per week could you quote me? ... 03/GP/(3). The 
Trust conceded and agreed to produce the figures. 
This example was the clearest and most obvious bargaining situation observed. Both 
parties were frustrated by the dialogue although the GP who lead the negotiations 
seemed to be enjoying his role. It was unclear whether the Trust's agreement to cost 
one case per week was out of exasperation or whether this was a workable volume of 
activity. 
The contracting meetings served as the forum for discussing prices (04 and 06). The 
subject of the two contracting meetings was community care services, not acute 
services. Practices met with the provider, Trust C, to finalise prices and volumes of 
activity. However, three factors made this a difficult task to accomplish. Firstly, the 
trust was not able to confirm its prices. Contracts run from I st April to 31 st March, 
yet by the middle of March (04) prices were not available. (This was also the case at 
Acute Trust A. ) By 23rd April (06) when prices had been issued there was a 
considerable difference between old prices based on historical activity and the new 
prices based upon the same activity levels. Part of the difference was due to a 
confusion between GGHB and the Trust. GGHB had requested pricing information 
from the Trust in a specific format (costs split between core and non-core). However, 
the Trust alleged that when interpreting those costs and allocating practice funds, an 
anomaly had occurred. One fund manager explained that she had been unable to 
reconcile the prices for 1996/97 with those for 1997/98 for her practice and could 
make little sense of the figures. 
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The second difficulty facing the purchasers was that they had not received 
confirmation from the health board of their fundholding budget. They were aware that 
funding was restricted and prices had increased but they had no final figures. This 
produced a remarkable situation whereby purchasers were discussing 'in principal' 
decisions because, until they knew the correct prices, they could not guarantee to 
purchase the same levels of activity they had previously bought. The Trust, therefore, 
was continuing to provide services without any guarantee that they would be 
purchased in full. 
The third complication was that the Trust had just introduced an equity model to 
reallocate existing community nursing (district and health visitors) throughout the city. 
The practices represented at 06 were net losers whilst those at 04 were net gainers. 
The reallocation was to be phased over a 3-year period during which time the Trust 
were proposing that practices be billed on the basis of pre-equity service, then after 
they had decided what to do with their shortfall or increase, they would receive a 
credit note or additional invoice for the balance. ' 
Most of the discussion revolved around the costing principles rather than specifics 
(probably because information was unclear and prices and funds were unconfirmed). 
However, a situation arose in which some ffiction was apparent between a fund 
manager and GP (not of the same practice). This illustrated the need for GP input 
into contracting. The FPM expressed an ob ection to paying management costs for 2 
sessions out of every 10 psychology sessions. Unknown to the FPM, the costs were 
clinical management costs not administrative management costs, ie, for every 10 
sessions, a psychologist needs 2 for supervision. The FPM disputed the need for these 
costs during a debate with the Trust's Director of Contracts. He explained that if the 
practice refused to pay these costs then they would need to purchase the services of a 
more highly qualified psychologist who required less supervision time and that would 
ultimately cost more. The FPM was reluctant to accept this explanation until a GP 
'The issue is conflated because practices may decide to pay extra and keep existing staff rather than 
lose out. This has a knock on effect on the reallocation of those resources. Gainers, however, may 
decide that whilst they stand to gain in district nursing, they would like to use the resources to pay 
instead for additional health visiting. This makes managing the reallocation of nursing staff very 
complex. 
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quite forcefully said that was just the way it worked and they would need to accept it. 
Another clash between financial detail and clinical procedure arose later in 06. 
Practices questioned how they might accurately calculate costs for referral to mental 
health centres (MHCs) which house multidisciplinary teams. Although a GP may refer 
his/her patient to a psychiatrist, the MHC team may reallocate the patient to a 
community psychiatric nurse. There was no way that fundholders could tell ftom their 
monitoring statement which MHC member carried out the activity. This had direct 
cost implications for practices because nursing staff are cheaper than psychiatrists. 
The Trust undertook to try and produce more sensitive information. 
7.6.1 Marketing 
In Chapter 6 Trusts were identified as being keen to secure future contracts with their 
customers. Even although switching rarely occurs, it would be unreasonable to 
assume that Trusts did not view encounters with fundholding practices as an 
opportunity to market their services. It was clear from the interview material 
presented that GPFHs could influence health board purchasing if they were dissatisfied 
with a service. 
A number of incidences occurred when Trusts took the opportunity to market their 
services. They did so subtly and often it was the clinicians who 'told the good news'. 
At Trust B. for example, the Clinical Director for ophthalmology talked about how his 
directorate had responded to pressure from the GPFHs and had set up a new 
ophthalmology suite. A physician explained that there had been a number of changes 
in the general medicine wards (eg, more cubicles and fewer mixed wards) and outlined 
the potential benefits of the changes. Clinicians also explained the improved asthma 
services and possible new radiology services. 
During the course of 02, the endoscopy service came up for discussion. One of the 
GPs present had previously removed his endoscopy contract. The Trust took the 
opporturuty to report the satisfaction ratings from GPs since the service had been 
improved. They cited figures on waiting times and affirmed the importance of this 
particular service development to the Trust. The contracts manager commented to 
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the GP concerned that although he no longer purchased this service there had been 
good reports. 
This form of marketing was not met with disinterest. At 02 GPs enquired about the 
referral rates, referrals to related investigative procedures and so on. Whilst neither 
party engaged in a discussion about the pricing of the service or the quality of delivery 
as such, the Trust was aware of the GP's reluctance to remove the contract and that he 
would be keen, in principle, to return his business to the NHS. 
7.7 Learning, Partnerships, Designing Services and Purchasing: 
Integrated Activities 
The four elements of the GP-provider relationship are not mutually exclusive. For 
example, resolving contract issues at the community trust very clearly demonstrated 
the integration of purchasing, partnerships and learning. The Trust looked to the 
GPFHs to lobby the GPFH Association for support in the proposed billing system. 
They knew that to make the reallocation work, they needed to work with the practices. 
The practices present agreed to explain the situation to members of the association in 
an attempt to ... defuse ... 06/FPM/(3) the 
difficulties. The Trust pledged to ... go along with the 
association if there's unanimity, whichever way you want to go... 06/1\4gt/(4). The amount of 
discussion about how the equity model would be applied, plus the discussions over 
pricing and activity levels illustrated the learning process as each party sought to clarify 
their situation and the difficulties they faced. 
The potential purchase of ENT services from Trust B developed into a matter of 
redesigning services. Service redesign and purchasing were also central to discussions 
about direct access CT scanning, radiology and endoscopy services. Almost every 
discussion involved clarification by both parties as to how service redesign would 
impact on their practices, so learning was integral to redesign. Furthermore, redesign 
clearly depended upon a partnership between general practice and secondary care to 
ensure that processes suited both parties. 
The cases cited show a direct link between learning and the design of services. 
As 
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clinicians talked together they identified ways in which secondary care processes could 
be modified to better suit GPs and patients. As was clear in the earlier examples, 
discussions were sometimes frustrating, sometimes enlightening and sometimes 
crossed clinical boundaries. The opportunity though to actually discuss services was 
valued by the GPs and the trusts as was shown in the previous chapter. Open lines of 
communication between clinicians were thought to have been one of the most 
significant benefits of the purchaser provider split. 
Service design was also based upon a partnership between primary and secondary care 
in which GPs often agreed to fund elements of the new service as described below. 
... traditionally we've only really talked to health boards about all our service developments 
for the coming year. What I'm going to do shortly is to circulate a list to all the GPs of what 
we've been looking for in terms of service developments. If they re not aware of them they 
can't support them. For example, for fairly small sums of money they've sometimes got 
enough savings in their practice for the previous year to be able to fund that for you and they 
will do that. Like Dr X's practice, .. the year before they bought us some new endoscopy 
equipment out of their savings. This current year they've funded part of a transport service 
to collect specimens from their practices, to deliver all their letters from the Trust so rather 
than posting them they go on this van twice a day. I think there are better understandings 
and if they don't know what we need, or if there is a really good idea about service 
developments but the board can't fund them they might want to... I/TI(7-8) 
7.8 Discussion 
78.1 Hospital Efficiency I Resource Ulifisation 
The interview data in Chapter 6 did not provide a clear picture of the importance to 
GPs of reducing costs and improving efficiency. The data examined in Chapter 7, 
however, show that econon-ýising was central to the process of service redesign. Case 
I outlined the proposed referral letter which would increase GP control over their 
patient. However, were the proposal to be accepted, there would be an impact on 
hospital resource utilisation. Wasteful or unnecessary referrals (if they exist) could be 
reduced. This would reduce the flow of money from the practice to the hospital and 
thus release resources into primary care'. The possibility of direct access radiology 
9The Director of Contracts suggested, however, that the savings potential was limited. 
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had similar implications. By making direct referrals, GPs avoid out-patient 
appointments and thus can reduce the cost of their contract. Furthermore, if it proved 
feasible for a radiologist to offer the diagnosis, this would avoid all consultant contact 
reducing the total cost of the contract even further. Direct access for minor operative 
procedures offers similar economic benefits to GPFHs. 
It was not just the standard fundholders who were keen to reduce costs. The two PCP 
fundholders in 09 were also keen to reduce waste. They were aware that the 
practices were wasting appointment time because patients were appearing to discuss 
discharge letters which had not yet arrived and were thus using up appointment times 
unnecessarily. Their enthusiasm for problem oriented clinics also had an 
efficiency/cost implication. A GP quoted earlier explained that sometimes GPs do not 
know which consultant to refer to when a patient presents with chest pain (it could be 
angina, heart failure etc). By referring to a problem-oriented clinic they guarantee that 
the patient will be seen by a consultant who can address all types of chest pain. This 
therefore reduces the number of unnecessary referrals and ensures that more can be 
done on one single hospital visit which reduces administrative costs. At one 
commissioning meeting (08), a PCP fundholder said that he wanted to ensure that 
gastroenterology cases were stratified so that the process could be ... as efficient as possible 
... 08/GP/(4). 
Interestingly, as far as radiology services at Trust B were concerned (03), it was the 
consultant who identified direct access as being efficient, and he had clearly done 
previous research to verify its efficiency. 
The role of price became more apparent in this chapter. There was some indication 
that GPs had tried to negotiate deals over ophthalmology procedures (a bilateral 
cataract being two unilateral cataracts for the price of one, or one and a half). One 
practice had also sought to reduce the management costs associated with community 
psychology services. Fundholders were perceived by some consultants as being 
overly-concerned with finance but whilst discussions about service costs did occur, 
they remain a relatively small part of the overall dialogue. 
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7A2 X-efficiency 
The findings illustrate an important aspect of stimulating efficiency. To the GPs, 
identified in Case 1. repeat out-patient attendances seemed inefficient and costly. 
However, there were a number of reasons why this apparent inefficiency was 
occurring, none of which were directly due to a waste of resources. Furthermore, it 
would seem from the response made by the consultant rheumatologist that the problem 
was not one of x-inefficiency either. This would imply that when purchasers are 
making assessments about efficiency, ignorance of some of the underlying factors 
would lead to an entirely wrong conclusion and perhaps the detrimental removal of a 
contract. Contract removal in this case could have jeopardised the viability of clinical 
trials and medical training. 
The findings presented in this chapter did not yield any greater insight, nor did they 
identify any further incidences of improved x-efficiency than have already been 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
78.3 Quality 
GPs' concern for quality is clear from the findings. For example, their reluctance to 
refer children to Acute Trust B was because they doubted the quality of the patient 
experience. It is interesting to note how discussion about quality resulted in 
suggestions for improving efficiency at a process level. At Trust C (09), when GPs 
and consultants began by talking about the quality of discharge letters and the 
discharge process, their suggestions for re-engineering the process enabled them to 
improve both the quality and efficiency of discharge. Similarly, at Trust A (02) one 
could imagine that improving the quality of information in referral letters would 
improve the efficiency with which diagnosis could be made and appropriate treatment 
offered. It is not possible to tell from these data whether proposed quality 
improvements would be costly to implement or not, but it could be suggested they will 
mean less time is wasted trying to work out diagnosis etc and thus overall costs are 
reduced in the longer-term. 
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The relative importance of quality and financial gain were illuminated in this study. 
GPs were regarded by some as being cherry pickers who were preoccupied with 
money. Casual remarks like ... it's a lot cheaper at the [private provider] ... 02/FPW(3) reinforced 
any stereotypes. One senior consultant commented at the end of a meeting that 
meetings with fundholders were worse than meetings with the health board or Scottish 
Office. They were purely ... accountancy driven... (07/Cons/(5) and for that reason, most 
unpleasant. However, at trust B (03), concerns about the quality of an ultrasound 
diagnosis given by a radiologist constrained any pursuit of financial gain from a lower 
cost service. This suggests that GPFHs are eager to encourage innovations which 
result in lower costs, but maintaining quality has a higher priority. 
78.4 Resource Allocation 
The observations provided evidence of moves which would result in a transfer of 
resources from secondary to primary care. Efforts to implement ENT (03) protocols, 
for example, showed a desire for such a transfer. GPs could reduce the value of their 
contracts because they were doing more in primary care and thus retain some of the 
original contract funding within the practice. If protocols were implemented city-wide 
then there would be a marginal release of resources into primary care. Direct access 
radiology (Trust B (03)) would also release some resource into primary care because 
patients need not attend (costly) outpatient clinics. 
There was evidence of another, albeit marginal, shift in activity at Trust A (02) in the 
form of joint and soft tissue injections being conducted within primary care. That 
there is scope for this to develop to the management of acute knee and chronic back 
pain conditions, common complaints) indicates the potential for release of further 
funds. 
Outreach clinics met with a mixed response. At Trust A, there are oncology outreach 
clinics. Consultants travel considerable distances to provide this service which the 
Trust does feel is valuable, but not all outreach is viewed in this way. For example, a 
large health centre requested outreach orthopaedic clinics but the consultants said that 
they did not have the time to attend and that they were limited in what they could 
do 
because health centres did not have adequate facilities. Other outreach services 
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though, (eg paramedic clinics (02) and community radiology (08)) were under 
discussion and had not yet been ruled out. As was made clear in Chapter 4, thejury is 
still out' on the cost-effectiveness and appropriateness of outreach clinics 
The clearest debate about major resource transfer occurred at Trust B (03) and related 
to care of the elderly. The difficulties in releasing large amounts of resource from 
hospital wards became clear. GPs felt that they were doing all they could by increasing 
prescriptions of aspirin (a direct cost to their fund), but hospitals also needed practices 
to reduce emergency admissions as well as contribute money up front if wards were to 
close and money to be transferred to the community. There was no question as to the 
appropriateness of community-based provision, but the means for releasing the 
necessary funds proved highly problematic. 
The evidence suggests that some resource transfer is occurring but that it is on a 
relatively small scale. Mobilising the transfer of larger amounts of secondary care 
money which is locked in acute beds, is a much more difficult nettle to grasp and 
requires substantial initial investments which practices are unable to support. It is, 
however, on the GPs' agenda. 
7.9 Conclusion 
Consistent with the literature reviewed in Chapters 2-4, market relationships between 
purchasers and providers were found to be socially embedded within a relational 
market (Bennett and Ferlie 1996; Laing and Cotton 1996). Studying the content of the 
relationship has indicated that GPs and their providers are actively engaged in 
discussions about service characteristics, quality and developments. These activities 
are embedded within a relationship which comprises the 4 key processes of learning, 
service design, partnering and purchasing. Importantly, service efficiency and 
resource transfer are being addressed within the relationship process and are 
done so 
not through competition and cost cutting, but through collaboration, partnering and an 
emphasis on quality. 
It may be that the desire for ongoing collaboration 
is in part because the boundaries 
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between primary and secondary care are in some respects blurred. From the point of 
view of the GP, what is the primary care service? Is it simply to consult with the 
patient and to instigate a referral? Or, it is to instigate a referral and bring it to a 
satisfactory conclusion? If one takes the view that it is the latter, then primary and 
secondary care services from the GP's point of view were seen as a whole, or 
integrated package. It is then difficult to differentiate who is responsible for what as 
was pointed out by one interviewee: 
... 
I think because GPs, many of them wanted to move on from what the early days of ftindholding 
were around, which was more about the process of it, and they wanted to move on to the more 
clinical content of it. As soon as you do that you form a different relationship because it's not just 
then about competition, it's actually about saying 'we have a common problem to tackle here', 
maybe a particular service, 'how do we get the orthopaedic service working more effectively 
between primary and secondary care?... I/SO/(7) 
This would explain why GPs were so keen to work closely with providers and to do so 
even where they had experienced difficulties and intransigence in the past. 
The findings indicate that the role of finance is rather more important than was 
suggested in chapters 4 and 6. Economising was central to discussions about service 
redesign. GPs were clearly seeking to reduce wasteful activities and this went hand in 
hand with increasing their control over their patients. Chapters 4 and 6 indicated that 
financial issues were constrained by a desire for quality and this was confirmed in this 
chapter. Quality remains a superordinate criterion but it is important to note that 
discussions which initially tackled quality often resulted in improved efficiencies. This 
may suggest that concerns about price inflation conveyed in chapter 4 (see for example 
Ellwood (1995,1996)) may not necessarily be a direct consequence of an emphasis on 
quality, particularly as there would appear to be no consistent meaning to the terms 
quality and efficiency (see chapters 4 and 6). 
It was also clear that in order to provide a seamless transition from primary to 
secondary and then back to primary care, GPs and trusts needed to spend time 
clarifying their priorities, explaining their motives, and updating one another on their 
respective communities of practice. Current government policy and medical opinion 
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support the endorsement of integrated or seamless care and these findings demonstrate 
that integrating two different worlds requires a considerable investment in 
organisational. and individual learning. However, resource transfer remains 
troublesome because of a lack of cost-effectiveness information,, the difficulty of 
releasing money from wards and restricted GP facilities for outreach clinics. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that there is a desire on the part of the GPs to ensure that 
resources are released and there is no evidence of their efforts being deliberately 
opposed by hospital clinicians. 
The design of new services and the stimulation of innovations relies on a partnership 
and learning. Both the Trusts and the GPs were responsible for stimulating 
innovations. This would appear to have been a symbiotic process in which the input of 
both parties was required in order to provide an integrated solution to the problems 
they faced. However, although designs were stimulated by purchaser / provider 
meetings they were not solely driven by them. The historical picture of an interested 
clinician still continues. Furthermore, trusts were in discussion with health boards and 
LPAs who were simultaneously putting pressure on providers to introduce changes. 
7.10 Summary 
Analysis of the observation data has lead this study to conceptualise the GP-Trust 
purchasing relationship as being socially embedded and multiplex in nature. The four 
key processes of learning, service design, partnering and purchasing have contributed 
to the further enhancement of GPs' professional autonomy, to service innovations, 
efficiency improvements and to resource transfer. It is important to note that 
improved efficiencies and resource transfer were realised by way of service design 
activities rather than being pursued as stated objectives. 
From this chapter it is evident that GPs have been working together when meeting 
with service providers. Not only has this given them enhanced buyer power (see 
Chapter 6) but it has also enabled them to share information and to secure locality- 
wide service developments. The following chapter turns now to examine the inter- 
practice dimension of the purchasing network, indicating the contribution that primary 
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care networks make to efficiency improvements and resource allocation as well as to 
service design and purchasing. 
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Introduction 
This chapter discusses the inter-practice dimension of the purchasing network. It 
examines the ways in which GPs were found to collaborate with, and compete against, 
one another and discusses the types of information used in their purchasing decisions. 
The chapter draws attention to the constraints upon, and outcomes of, the 
collaborative process and discusses characteristics of the group context. 
The chapter shows that fundholding did not necessarily encourage practices to 
compete for patients. Instead, practices may have been stimulated to communicate 
and co-operate with other practices and to identify common interests more so than in 
the past. Much more important to practices than competition, was collaboration. 
The meetings where practices collaborated seemed to offer the type of mutual, micro- 
level support that might be likened to some form of Purchasing Development 
Network. Practices were engaging in collaborations which facilitated information 
exchange, learning and nurturing. The chapter also offers a typology of formal and 
informal information indicating the most appropriated modes for information 
exchange. 
The discussion proceeds in two sections. The first section looks at inter-practice 
competition and collaboration and the second turns to discuss the nature of formal and 
informal purchasing information exchange. 
8.1 Competition 
In "Working for Patients" the Government spelled out as a key principle that 
fundholding was to encourage competition between GPs: 
"... to help the family doctor improve his service to patients, large GP practices 
will be able to apply for their own budgets to obtain a defined range of services 
direct from hospitals. Again in the interests of a better service to the patient, 
GPs will be encouraged to compete for patients by offering better services. 
And it will be easier for patients to choose (and change) their own GP as they 
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wish. " (Department of Health, 1989: 5) (Emphasis added. ) 
The data in this study suggest that the relationship between practices is complex, 
neither entirely collaborative nor entirely competitive. Views about the extent to 
which competition existed between practices varied across the spectrum from the 
perception that there is no competition at all, to one that believes there is relatively 
intense competition. The three interviewees who said they felt that practices did 
compete, offered explanations as to how competition was manifested and the basis on 
which it existed: 
... 
Yes, but it's difficult to know exactly how it's operating. I think it's there under the surface 
and I think it has to be happening in Glasgow because patient numbers are dropping in 
Glasgow. If you look at inner city Glasgow patient numbers are dropping rapidly and GP 
numbers are staying relatively constant so I think there's underlying fears there and anxieties 
there. In other areas, perhaps in the outer areas of the Health Board area where population 
numbers are actually rising due to new housing and so on, then I think there's competition 
there 'cause as new patients come along they don't know where to go. I don't think it's really 
overt competition... I/GP12/PCP(II) 
... Interviewer: 
Do you seek to differentiate yourself from other GPs? Is there competition 
amongst practices? 
GP: Very locally yes. The competition is not for patients, it's for the value added stuff, drug 
trials, research, health visitors, district nurses, but I have very good relationships with the 
other local practices ... Patients are extremely 
loyal, they don't move. There's a GP who's 
been struck off here, he's still practising and patients still go along, they're very loyal... 
I/GP7/S(12) 
Only one of them felt that practices competed intensely for patients: 
[competition] ... Oh yes. 
Quite intensely. 
Interviewer: For patients? I didn't think that patients changed their GP all that often. 
GP: They didn't use to but it is increasing with the general move to consumerism, patient 
empowerment, citizens' charters and everything. Again in some areas 
it will be more so than 
others .. 
There was a practice in Lanarkshire where there was a health centre and the two 
practices split .. and the competition 
lead to one changing their hours - it was a commuter 
area so they started opening at 8.30am so the other practice started opening at 
8am and the 
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other one went to 7.30am. Then one practice started getting the whole place decorated, so 
the other one started putting fruit bowls out. Then the next practice started putting out daily 
newspapers... I/GPI/S(12) 
Other interviewees were less certain, suggesting that there was no competition at all. 
One interviewee even said that they would be reluctant to accept patients from another 
practice unless there was a very good reason for the patient to leave. 
... 
We certainly don't have a big flow of patients from practices. Patients are fairly loyal, 
they tend to join a practice and if they're happy with it they stick to the practice. I think it's 
to do with the personalities of the GPs rather than services that they get. ... I think also most 
GPs have a great deal of integrity. If patients come and ask to join our list and they're at a 
local practice we try and strongly discourage that 'cause we don't like the idea of patients 
leaving a local practice unless there's a major problem with their relationships with their own 
doctor. We tend to say that unless they've moved into the area we're not terribly happy with 
them joining. I should think fundholders would be very much the same... I/GPIO/N(8) 
Indeed, this practice had a particularly close, non-competitive, working relationship 
with another practice with whom it shared its practice premises: 
... Interviewer: 
There's two practices here, is the other practice thinking about PCPI too? 
GP: Well, we do work together as much as we possibly can so it would be, yes, between the 
two practices. We'd be joining together. We have the equivalent of 2 full timers, I full time 
and 2 part time ... 
The other practice has 3 full timers. So it's the equivalent, I suppose, of a 
5 doctor practice and we jointly share the staffing costs and the running costs... I/GP I OIN(I 3) 
it is not possible to come to a conclusion from these data about the degree to which 
practices compete, although the views offered indicate that there is some form of 
underlying competitive tension at play: 
... 
Interviewer: You do seem though to be keen to work together despite this competition? 
GP: It's an interesting area 'cause we do realise this when we go and sit down with people 
and talk about service delivery and then at the end of the day we realise that 
if Dr Smith next 
door gets all the new patients then our practice will either not survive or will 
have to change 
its character... I/GP12/PCP(II) 
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The lack of evidence about the degree and nature of competition in general practice 
both generally (see chapter 4) and specifically from this research would suggest that 
the political objective to increase competition between practices has not had a 
significant impact. What is evident however, both from the evidence reviewed in 
Chapter 4 and the data presented here, is that regardless of the degree of competition, 
practices are collaborating in a particular way which enhances their role as purchasers 
and enables them to develop skills and acquire knowledge pertinent to their purchasing 
role. 
8.2 Collaboration 
This research provided an opportunity to observe an afternoon of inter-practice 
collaboration during a practice away day for practices in one part of Glasgow who 
collaborate quite closely on an ongoing basis (01). The group of 10 practices meet 
voluntarily on a quarterly basis to discuss purchasing issues. The particular meeting 
observed in January 1997, was held 2 months before the annual NHS contracting 
period and was the one at which the practices discussed their purchasing intentions. 
8.21 Group Organisation 
The group is led by one particularly zealous fundholding GP whose leadership role 
extends beyond his chairmanship of the group to that of educator. Most of the 
members purchase the majority of their services from one particular provider, Acute 
Trust B. However, three or four of the practices experience either a 50%/50% split 
between acute trusts B and A or a preponderance towards the latter. 
AW of the practices involved were standard fundholders although the length of their 
experience as budget holders varied. The group's leader was one of the first in 
Glasgow to participate in the fundholding scheme whereas others had been fundholders 
for only a year or two. Three of the practices in the group had a particularly close 
relationship for two reasons. Firstly they are located very close to one another within 
the same suburb of Glasgow - two of them are situated virtually opposite one another - 
and secondly, the three are involved in a total purchasing pilot scheme and so have 
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developed a more fundamental, formal link than the others in the group have. As total 
flandholding covers a greater range of services than the standard flandholding scheme, it 
was agreed by the group that only standard fundholding issues would be discussed in 
this large-group setting with total fundholding matters being settled by the three 
practices in an alternative meeting. 
Participants were not interviewed about the consortium' structure and organisation, so 
comments as to the range of organisational issues they have dealt with as a group 
cannot be made. However, two organisational aspects which arose during the meeting 
indicate something of the group's structure and the types of issue likely to arise in a 
group setting: 
* At the time (January 1997), the group received a 4% discount from Trust B, which 
was shared between the practices'. The discounts were calculated as shown in Box 
8.1. 
The Trust, however, had 
indicated that because some of 
the practices purchased from it 
less than 50% of their services, 
it was reluctant to award them 
a discount. It was considering 
including in the discount 
scheme only those practices 
whose purchases with the 
Box 8.1: Discount Calculation for Group Purchasing 
Discount Value: 
4% on the total contract value* 
Practice Calculation on Sliding Scale: 
where a practice's contract represents 22% of the total 
contract value, they receive 22% of the 4% discount. 
3% of services purchased --+ 3% of the 4% 
* ie. The value of the combined contract when adding 
together the 10 individual components. There is no 
upper or lower limit to contract value. 
Trust exceeded 60% of the practice's total purchases. Furthermore, the Trust was 
proposing that the discount be applied to a limited value contract. The Trust's 
stance was explained to the group by the chair who indicated that under the new 
discount conditions, if the group admits any new members then current members 
1 Very often the group re-invest the discount in the Trust in order to support the development of a new 
service or the purchase of new equipment. 
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would have to accept a reduction of the fixed discount rate'. 
At the end of the meeting, the group were invited to consider the possibility of 
setting up a total purchasing locality in which all GPs (including those non- 
flandholders in the area) could become involved. This illustrated some further 
structural issues such as the optimal group size for collaboration and the possibility 
Of some practices not carrying their own weight within the group but piggy-backing 
on others. 
8.22 Group Context 
This particular meeting (01) was attended by 6 fundholding GPs, 6 fund managers and 
an administrator from the GPFHA. It began informally with a buffet lunch during 
which conversations varied from discussions about funds and general practice to 
friendly chats. After half an hour the meeting began with a review of the minutes from 
the previous meeting in October 1996. Particular items from the minutes were 
updated and short discussions ensued. The group then moved on to what was the 
main focus of their afternoon, their purchasing intentions for 1997/98. 
The Chairman made the fullest contribution throughout the day. GPs from the other 
two practices in the total fundholding group also made a contribution but most of the 
other GPs were relatively quiet throughout. The fund manager from the Chairman's 
practice was the most vocal of the fiandholding support staff. The 'dominance 13 of this 
particular practice was a reflection of their length of experience as fundholders, their 
roles within and knowledge of the GP Fundholding Association, and their knowledge 
of Trust B. However, as one view expressed informally during a coffee break 
illustrated, such 'dominance' led to a concerted emphasis on one particular provider 
(Trust B) which some members felt excluded them from certain discussions. Practices 
purchasing 50% or less from Trust B said informally that they did not feel they could 
contribute fully to the discussions and thought it would be better in the future for them 
to split from the group and either form another group or join with a more appropriate 
2 For example, by admitting one new group member, II practices would need to share the fixed 
discount which would reduce the portion for existing group members. 
3 This term is not meant in the pejorative sense. 
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group. 
8.3 The Collaborative Process: A Purchasing Development Network 
Analysis of the interviews and observations indicates that practices are forming 
networks which function as Purchasing Development Networks. Practices were 
meeting together informally and voluntarily to share information and to nurture their 
own business in a relationship comprising 3 main elements: information exchange, 
learning and practice nurturing/growth (See Figure 8.1 below). 
Figure 8.1: General Practice Purchasing Development 
Network 
level; and 
8.3.1 Information 
Exchange 
The main process observed was 
that of information exchange. 
Four main types of information 
were identified from the data as 
being shared by practices: 
* service developments at a 
practice level; 
9 practice experience; 
9 developments at a locality 
e developments within secondary care services (eg, quality, service range and future 
developments). 
The information exchanged was both formal and informal in nature and came from 
various sources which are discussed more fully later in this chapter. The nature of the 
information exchanged during the practice away day is presented below. 
e Practice-Based Service Developments 
One practice intimated their intention to offer chiropody sessions from the 
practice and that they were arranging this with the Community Trust. GPs 
from other practices nodded in approval and interest, indicating that they too 
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were considering offering this service. Although they did not discuss the 
matter in any depth, that they communicated their intentions was significant 
because were they to be thinking of using the service as a source of competitive 
advantage then they would probably have withheld information. 
9 Practice Experience 
There was one particular issue about which practices were keen to share their 
experience - repeat hip operations. Practices reported experiencing 
considerable variability in the time patients experience between an initial hip 
replacement and a subsequent re-do. There were no statistics available (at least 
none that the practices were aware of) which could shed any light on their 
uncertainty about the expected time span between the two operations and as 
practices told of their own experiences, it emerged that time spans ranged from 
between 4 and12 years. The practices had little formal and objective 
information to aid their debate so suggested the possibility of inviting and 
funding a consultant to come to the hospital and do some work on the likely 
expectancy of hip re-do time scales. 
e Locality-Based Developments 
Only one locality-based development was discussed at this meeting. One of the 
GPs mentioned that the Scottish Office were interested in piloting total 
purchasing locality fundholding and he expressed his personal interest in the 
proposal plus his hope that local practices would consider being a pilot site. 
The practices were cautiously interested and speculated about whether current 
non-fundholders in the area could be persuaded to join the scheme and stressed 
that there would need to be a great deal of thought behind any such proposal. 
During a relatively brief discussion, they headlined key issues such as the nature 
of proportional representation within a locality scheme, the optimum size of a 
locality fundholding scheme, the transferability of lessons from smaller-scale 
fundholding and the potential time commitment. These were flagged as being 
fundamental to any future collaboration of this type and were noted for future 
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discussion'. 
e Secondaty Care Services 
Meeting together gave GPs an opportunity to voice informal information which 
would otherwise be unlikely to circulate (eg, via email, memo or formal 
Fundholding Association, hospital or health board newsletter). On three 
occasions such information served as the basis for discussion. The first related 
to the availability, at the local provider, of certain types of surgery, the second 
two related to service quality. 
Local Service Availabili1y: When reviewing minutes of the previous 
meeting, one GP commented at the item on hand surgery, that he 
had 'bumped into' a consultant from Trust B (the local trust) in a 
local DIY store. The consultant had commented that he would like 
to do more hand surgery but received an insufficient number of 
referrals to build up the service. The mention of this encounter lead 
to discussion about the reputation of surgeons elsewhere. GPs 
quickly indicated an interest in referring to the local trust but had 
neither enough information about what quality they could expect 
from the consultant nor any benchmarks against which to measure 
such information were it to become available. In the absence of 
formal data, GPs shared the little informal information they had 
about named consultants practising in the area. Their discussion 
centred around consultant reputations and did not broaden out to 
cover providers' overall reputation and service quality or 
comparative prices. 
Functional Service qualit was a key issue discussed by the group. 
Practices were concerned (despite previous negotiations with the 
4 Although only one locality-based development was discussed, it was clear from Chapter 7 that a 
number have been instigated (eg specimen delivery). 
241 
Trust) about the time still taken to receive death notifications'. One 
of the GPs commented that he sat on a panel at the local hospital and 
was therefore acquainted with the hospital's standing procedures on 
death notification. He affirmed that there was no obvious reason 
why procedures could not be implemented, so the issue was noted 
for further discussion with the Trust at the next contract meeting. 
+ Technical service guLli1y was also raised when a question mark was 
placed over the quality of particular procedures at a private hospital. 
Again, lacking any formal information about quality, practices turned 
to more informal sources. One of the GPs intimated that his wife, 
an optician, saw a number of post-operative patients who had been 
treated privately. She was concerned that they had been discharged 
too early, before their eyes were sufficiently healed. Instead of 
receiving hospital follow-up, patients were having to pay to attend 
their local optician. One or two of the GPs were unconvinced, but 
all agreed that they needed outcome measures against which to 
compare performance between hospitals. 
* Comparative Service Qualily was raised during discussions about the 
relative service quality of Yorkhill Children's Hospital compared 
with other hospitals who were prepared to perform paediatric 
procedures. The local provider had expressed an interest in doing 
more paediatric ENT, ophthalmology and dermatology procedures 
but GPs were unconvinced of the merits of moving their existing 
Yorkhill contracts. (This issue was later taken up during a meeting 
with the Trust (03) (see Chapter 6). 
* Developments in secondaty care were also discussed at the meeting, 
and GPs exchanged ideas an opinions about how these might be 
taken forward. Two such ideas were the development of a stroke 
This issue was raised during the practice-trust discussions presented in Chapter 7. 
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assessment service and the development of a cath lab. 
The absence of a stroke assessment service was described as being 
"the biggest hole in the Trust B service" (OI/GP/(7)). GPs had 
been talking for some time about this potential service and had, as a 
group, sought to put pressure on the Trust to develop it. There had 
been little progress so practices exchanged views about how they 
could progress the impasse. Some felt that it was necessary to 
continue exerting pressure on the Trust but to couple this with an 
offer of financial support. Two practices, however, felt that 
removing their contract would be the best way to stimulate a 
response. 
e The development of a cath lab in another city hospital was also 
discussed. They were aware (from a discussion with the clinical 
director) that around 180,000 might be required to fund the service 
so wondered whether (a), the Trust might subcontract the service to 
the private sector, or (b) whether between them the practices could 
offer some financial support for a lab at the Trust. Each of the 
practices indicated that they would indeed be willing in principle to 
offer development monies but their funds at that time were limited 
(the maximum any practice could offer was L4,000). The Trust had 
said it would need funds from the practices but had not indicated an 
amount. 
8.3.2 Learning and Nurtunfng 
The process of information exchange facilitated two processes: learning and nurturing. 
GPs who were more experienced as fundholders (particularly with 
contracting/purchasing), pointed out important issues for the others, explained the 
implications of what was happening in the locality and offered suggestions about 
managing practice funds. For example, one of the GPs explained the new equity model 
which was being advocated by the Community and Mental Heath Services Trust and 
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which had been accepted and adopted by the Health Board. ' He raised questions 
about the methodology on which the model was based, explaining his concerns, and 
advocated certain points which he felt the practices needed to discuss with the Trust. 
This particular GP operated as an educator to the less-informed and less-experienced 
in the group and, as it transpired during one of the group's subsequent encounters with 
the Trust (06), sometimes spoke on the group's behalf to the Trust and the health 
board. 
The same GP also encouraged practices to agree an activity level with the Trust when 
contracting, and then to pass this information (along with the agreed price) to the 
Health Board. He also endorsed them to take care in finding out how Trusts calculate 
prices because if practice budgets are to reduce in the future, it is imperative that 
practices have good baseline data now, in order to contain their expenditure levels and 
he suggested how they might do this. 
The educational / learning aspect of the development network was further illustrated 
during the interviews when interviewees indicated that they were very keen to learn 
from those who were more experienced and that they benefited from some form of 
nurturing: 
We would love to have a little group here that get together in the same way as the [other 
area] practices ... we were 
helped by [other fundholderl who were 1 V2years ahead of us and 
so we did feed off them and people did feed off us ... I/FW4/S(8,13) 
... we 've been fundholders for years, and obviously we 
had experience, and then 2 practices 
... were coming on stream ... it made sense 
if they came along with experienced people, 
we'd been negotiating with Trust B for 2 years, .. so they joined us and came along, not 
initially to be seen as 'we're a group', but we'd more experience ... LIFPM9/T(I 1) 
... [becoming a 
PCP practice] has encouraged us to communicate with other practices more 
than we would have ... we really work together 
just to help out and to pass on information 
and things like that ... 
LTPM5/PCP(7) 
' According to the model, community nursing staff will be re-distributed in a way which means this 
group of practices are net losers. 
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... [re local collaboration] we're in the early stages because a couple of the practices are fairly 
new, they're not ftdl ftmdholding yet ... so there's a lot of concerns about the people that are 
there, their negotiating skills. So what we need to try and look at is how we can pull together 
and develop ... I think the key is keeping relationships with other practices and sharing 
innovative ways of how you are actually operating ... what we do need to do is collectively 
share how we're doing things and how we see the way ahead ... LTPM7/S(3,5) 
Even where practices didn't collaborate in any structured sense, they still took the view 
that they ought increasingly to collaborate and communicate: 
I think there should probably be more collaboration with practices in an area ... [in terms 
of inter-general practice referral or advice] ... I/GP14/PCP(5) 
I think there has to be a lot more contact between clinicians in various hospitals and 
general practice ... I/GP16/S(3) 
The data presented suggest that GPs were working in an environment characterised by 
poor information provision which contributed to their uncertainty about the 
comparability of alternative hospital services and compounded any weaknesses or 
insecurities they had as immature purchasers. Inter-practice meetings served as an 
opportunity to collectively reduce some of this uncertainty through informal 
information exchange and the concomitant learning and nurturing process. 
&3.3 Outcomes of Collaboration 
Clearly it is not only the process of collaboration which is important, but the outcomes. 
The main outcomes took the form ofjoint and/or co-ordinated activities. Through 
working together, not only were practices more informed and able to learn from one 
another's experience, but they were able to pool resources (financial, human and time). 
Table 8.1 matches some of the items discussed earlier, with their outcomes. Other 
examples ofjoint activities not tackled here have been outlined in the previous chapter 
in the context of the purchaser-provider relationship. 
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Table 8.1: The Issues and Outcomes in GP Collaboration 
Issue Outcome 
Chiropody: one practice declares it will Individual Practice Action - to set up a service at introduce a practice-based service, others indicate some point. 
they may do the same. 
Locality Purchasing: the possibility of No Immediate Action - further discussion subject 
combining with all practices in the locality for to subsequent directives from SOHHD which will 
total purchasing. probably be channelled through formal structures 
(eg, the Health Board or GPFRA) 
Hand Surgery: lack of information concerning No Immediate Action 
consultant's reputation 
Qualitv 
" Death Notiflications: still not being processed 0 Group Action - to be raised with the provider 
properly at subsequent purchasing/contracting 
" Ophthalmology: lack of information for meeting. 
benchmarking providers and assessing quality 9 No Immediate Action 
" Paediatric Provision: Yorkhill Children's 
hospital versus other providers - lack of 0 No Immediate Action. 
comparative quality indicators 
" Community Nursing: Concern over the 
methodology and outcome of the resource 0 Group Action - to be raised with the provider 
allocation model at subsequent purchasing/contracting 
meeting. 
Practice Budgets and Provider Prices: practices 0 Individual Practice Action. 
need to become more aware of contract and 
activity levels in order to contain future 
expenditure. 
Secondarv Care Developments 
" Stroke Assessment Unit: a service gap which Individual Practice Action - some practices 
has been discussed for some time with the decided to move the contract elsewhere whilst 
provider. others decided to offer additional resources. 
Action was determined by the practice's 
philosophical stance. 
" Cath Lab: a new service which requires Group Action - to contact the Trust and find 
L80,000 to fund. out how much money was required. 
It is clear from the table that although the practices collaborated in terms of sharing 
information and going through some of their decision making processes about 
contracts and developments, they did not always take collective action. This proved 
to be an important aspect of the collaborative relationship and indeed, one of the 
constraints on the extent to which they could and would ultimately collaborate. The 
items noted in the table do indicate a potential preference for group action when 
dealing with secondary care providers, but the sample is too small to make any 
substantive claims of this nature. Some form of longitudinal study would be necessary 
to further study processes and their concomitant outcomes. 
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8.3.4 Constraints on Collaboration 
None of the interviewees said that they disagreed with the notion that GPs should 
collaborate and it has already been stated that even those who were not actively 
involved in collaborative groups supported the ideal of greater collaboration. 
However, as shown already, collaboration does not imply collective action as a 
standard outcome. During this study, it was clear that retaining their independent 
practice status was important to practices who felt they needed to be able to take 
individual action. As was shown in the earlier examples (Table 8.1), on occasions, 
some practices decided to move a contract whilst others in the group chose to remain 
with the provider or even to inject additional funds. The ability to act independently 
was important to each practice. During the coffee break at the away day, one fund 
manager, who was keen to collaborate, suggested that more and more practices should 
seek to combine their funds as a way of reducing what he termed "a great paper chase" 
(0 1 /FPMI(I 1)) but commented that it would be difficult to do because GPs are 
independent practitioners who like their autonomy and who do not like being told what 
to do. As one GP explained, 
it would probably be good to be part of a group for most of our standard work but perhaps 
certain things around the edge we'd want to negotiate a slightly different arrangement if it 
suits us better... I/GP12/PCP(8) 
Their independent status is one of the likely factors contributing to the capacity for 
disagreement among GPs. This was voiced as an area of concern particularly because 
of the current policy emphasis on LHCCs. 
... 
Interviewer: Do you think that GP practices will be able to agree on the kind of things that 
they want and need in an area? 
GP: No. 
Interviewer: That's what everybody keeps saying! Yet that's what the LHCCs rely on to a 
huge extent. Have you been informed how this is going to go ahead? 
GP: Haven't got a clue ... 
I'm certainly not going to get involved with cominissioning teams 
or anything like that. We'll go along to them and we'll chat about them and we'll 
look at 
what difference it makes from the point of view of practice income, ehm, 
but I've got to look 
at it from a business point of view as well ... I/GP15/S(4) 
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... 1 think this [working together in a LHCCI is a slightly more problematic area. Whereas as 
a practice you were able to make decisions, it's going to be more difficult to make them on a 
Co-op basis where you do have to have a degree of concurrence with your colleagues and it 
can be difficult enough having the practice agreeing without having different practices 
agreeing. I think the Co-ops hopefully are going to work ... I think as much as possible 
should be devolved down to practice level ... I/GP18/PCP(6) 
The likelihood of disagreement was manifest in a meeting during which a Trust asked 
one of the GPs if he would seek the views of his GP colleagues in the GPFHA and 
come to a consensus. The GP retorted, "GPs are GPs and if there's 50 GPs you'll get 
50 opinions" (06/GP/(4)). 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that these potential difficulties need not 
necessarily be seen as insurmountable for to do so would be to deny general practice 
an opportunity to develop its future role within the co-operative framework set out by 
the Government. One LHCC enthusiast who was concerned about the degree to 
which he would agree with his colleagues, felt that general practice was being faced 
with a tremendous opportunity to shape the agenda for collaboration via the LHCCs 
rather than having it thrust upon them: - 
Interviewer: You mentioned on the phone about the white paper and how you were a bit 
concerned that GPs might not be able to work together. 
GP: Well I think this is going to be a big, huge problem ... there are 
huge changes and 
you've always got to look at the positive things ... adaptability personally and professionally 
- there are remarkable changes in people's 
lives. We've already had a revolution in 1990 so 
we're having another one! So let's do this. Let's get involved. There are a 
lot of meetings. 
I think the feeling is 'right, this is going to happen, let's get ourselves organised and let's 
facilitate the shape of things by our attitude of mind rather than having it forced upon us' 
I/GP16/PCP(6) 
It is unfortunate that the Government's policy of LHCCs and enhanced co-operation 
came out late on in the field work phase because 
it meant only a few GPs were asked 
about their views on the policy and it's emphasis on co-operation. 
Nevertheless, from 
what has appeared in newspapers and 
discussions at meetings which I have 
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subsequently attended during the course of other research activities, the view 
expressed here has not yet been refuted. 
In conclusion then, it would seem from the data presented here that the general 
practice environment is (and is likely to continue to be) characterised by a cocktail of 
collaboration, joint activity and investment, some competition and a great deal of 
independence. In terms of ongoing collaboration within co-operatives, there seems to 
be the capacity for both extensive collaboration and divergent opinions and a call for 
independent activity. As one Scottish Office interviewee put it, At's actually quite a 
tricky process allowing, marrying the individuality of an individual practice, with the collectivism of 
another organisation ... I/Soa(3). Regardless of the degree to which practices ultimately 
take joint/group action as opposed to individual action, there is little to indicate that 
the requirement for a development network is likely to dissipate. 
The next section goes on now to look more specifically at the forms of information 
used by GPs as they collaborate with one another and during their interactions with 
Trusts. 
8.4 Information 
It is clear from the analysis in Chapters 7 and 8, that the exchange of information is one 
of the key processes characterising both the inter-practice and purchaser-provider 
relationships. Following the data analysis, a typology of information exchange was 
developed. Both formal and informal information was exchanged. Formal 
information was the type generally used during purchasing meetings with providers and 
is categorised as being qualitative or quantitative and as being exchanged in one of 
two modes. Informal information was mainly exchanged between practices as they 
collaborated and is identified as having four sources. 
8.5 Formal Information 
It is important to make certain distinctions concerning formal information. The first is 
that there were 2 types of information: qualitative and quantitative. The second is that 
there were two modes of exchange: synchronous and asynchronous. Some 
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information needed to be transmitted and received at the same time (synchronously), 
for example via a telephone call or face to face conversation, because of the need to 
interpret and explain it. Other information, however, required little or no 
interpretation or explanation and could readily be exchanged with some time difference 
between transmission and reception (asynchronously) eg. via email or post. (See Box 
8.2 below. ) 
Box 8.2: Types and Sources of Formal Information 
FORMAL Quantitative Qualitative 
Asynchronous 
Synchronous 
waiting times, discharge letters, 
names of results,, death 
consultants,, activity nofifications, patient 
levels information 
contract data, costs, perspective sharing, 
price breakdowns, needs analysis, 
clinical sessions, dialogue, 
volume explanation 
8.5.1 Asynchronous Information Exchange 
Waiting times, activity levels, discharge information, and death notifications can be 
easily exchanged asynchronously since little explanation is required for the information 
to be meaningful. GPs who talked about their need for and/or use of this type of 
information felt that it would be particularly helpful if it could be transmitted via 
electronic computer links direct from the hospital to the GP practice. Indeed, the 
Scottish Office have set aside considerable sums of money to ensure that practices are 
linked to hospitals so they can ultimately access waiting time/list figures, test results 
and so forth. One of the interviewees was particularly keen that online information be 
made available because it would aid the referral process: 
outcome information which is coming, comes on a Scottish-wide basis on big wide tables. 
You need to have that for all the Trusts that we might possibly refer patients to so that we 
can make the comparisons ... more than 
50% of GPs have got a computer on their desk now 
so it should be possible to have an airline booking thing. If you see someone with a 
hernia 
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you can just call up what's the current waiting lists for hernia surgery, let's look at what the 
post-operative infection and revision rates are. Then you can decide with the patient on the 
balance of where it is and all that. And I think costs as well. There should be no reason for 
not having that information there, it's just a question of putting it onto some kind of 
relational database and having an electronic link. Then people can make better decisions 
with better information ... I/GPI/S(8) 
Obtainling this form of data for subsequent distribution does) however, present Trusts 
with some problems. For example, it was clear from the meetings between Trust A 
and the local group of fundholders, that whilst data on referral rates was collected,, it 
was not possible to determine from the total figures, the proportion that were repeat 
referrals. This lack of information clearly hampered GP efforts to reduce referral rates 
and meant the Trust was not fully able to assess the impact of a change in referral 
patterns upon its own activities. 
There was also a feeling that certain (asynchronous) quantitative information is 
underdeveloped, especially information about hospital services: 
... The 
Trusts are still not very good at really telling us what services they have to offer. We 
get a booklet from the Health Board "Waiting Times for New Outpatient Referrals"... it's got 
a section at the front about which consultants have retired, who has come in. Sometimes 
reading between the lines you can work out that the surgeon Mr A is interested in this kind of 
work but nobody guides you through it. I think Trust A are about to appoint 2 new 
consultant gynaecologists to fill 2 retiral vacancies and I'd be vety surprised if we get 
communication ... that 
introduces these two consultants and says what their particular areas 
of interest are and that kind of thing. Yet I'd have thought that would have been relatively 
easy to do ... 
I/GP 12/PCP(I 0- 11) 
This problem may not be universal though in that one GP spoke of having received 
... lots of glossy brochures ... 
(I/GP13/N(3) and one of the Trust interviewees was very aware 
of the need to provide information about services: 
... 
We've tried to get our act together in that sort of situation. We've started to put directories 
of services together ... 
I don't know how much they use it - they've probably forgotten 'cause 
I think every trust did a similar sort of thing, but it was basically just to tell you what services 
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we'd got, who the consultants are, how to contact them and that sort of thing. Since then 
we've launched one or two new services. We've got a service which is called open access 
chest pain ... we put together a package which had all the referral forms in the back, how to 
access it, who to contact, all those sorts of things... I think we're learning from that ... I/TI(7) 
It is important to bear in mind that the exchange of such information is bilateral. 
Hospitals, for example, require death notifications from GPs when patients die in the 
community and require quality referral letters which aid specialist diagnosis. 
8.5.2 Synchronous Information Exchange 
Other types of quantitative and qualitative information needed to be exchanged 
synchronously. The synchronous exchange of perspectives, explanations and needs 
analysis for example have already been discussed at length in the previous chapter. 
From the discussion it was clear that there was a learning process ongoing during 
discussions between hospital and primary care clinicians which occurred during their 
face to face (synchronous) dialogue. It is unlikely that such information would be 
successfully exchanged in an asynchronous mode because it is embedded within 
cultures and contexts which need considerable explanation. 
It is perhaps less obvious that quantitative contract data was observed to be best dealt 
with in a synchronous mode. Two of the meetings observed, focused extensively on 
contract issues, particularly costs and activity levels (04 and 06), and it became 
apparent that a considerable amount of discussion was required in order to resolve the 
ambiguities over contract information. 
... The practices 
had received a breakdown of the costs from the Community Trust. There 
was a considerable problem for the practices in that there was a shortfall between the old 
prices (based on historical activity and funding) and the new prices which had increased 
significantly when based on the same activity levels. This 'anomaly' (excessive increase) 
was due to a dispute between the Trust and the Health Board in an issue over non-core and 
core pricing. The Health Board had requested pricing information from the Trust in a 
particular format (ie, a particular split between core and non-core). How the Health Board 
had interpreted that though in tenns of the funds to be allocated to fundholders was the 
anomaly . .... 
The discussion was very much taken up by and initiated by [fund manager] 
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[who] had done some detailed cross-examination of the budget offer, the prices for 1996/97 
and [prices] for 1997/98 as they related to core and non-core services ... [she] found any 
reconciliation between the data sets impossible ... the fundholders ... cannot accept the 
pricing offer if they don't have all the information to hand. The [Trust's] Contracts 
Manager mentioned an interim proposal ... The confusion is largely due to the equity model 
under which the practices represented here are net losers. [Sol The Trust were seeking to 
establish a principle: would the practices accept being billed on the basis of pre-equity 
service, thereafter, once they had decided what to do about purchasing (or not purchasing) 
additional nursing resources from the Trust they would receive a credit note to balance the 
difference between the equity bill ... and the pre-equity bill? ... (it was clear that both parties 
were seeking information from one another and struggling because of the lack of congruence 
between health board, practice and trust financial procedures )... 06/Mgt & FMP/(1-2) 
These field notes do not capture the content of the discussion which was often 
detailed, covering specific activity levels and equivalent costs. However, they 
demonstrate that there was confusion between the calculations on costs and prices 
done by the Trust and the Health Board respectively and that this caused confusion at 
a practice level. As the meeting went on, suggestions were made about having a 
'mock' contract to illustrate calculations and the way in which the proposed credit 
note scheme might operate. 
The way in which costs were calculated and apportioned at a very detailed level also 
required clarification as can be seen in the following two examples: 
e Management Costs: As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the fund 
managers was unhappy that of the 10 psychology sessions they were paying 
for, 2 were identified as 'management costs'. Considerable discussion 
ensued in order to clarify the nature and calculation of these costs. 
Mental Health: This was a particularly difficult issue. The Trust offer a 
multidisciplinary mental health team service. GPs refer patients to the team 
and the team decide whether the patient should see a psychiatrist, 
psychologist, occupational therapist (OT), community psychiatric nurse 
(CPN) or other team member. As one fund manager pointed out 
however, 
practices may refer the patient to the psychiatrist 
but the Trust's monitoring 
sheets would not identify who ultimately undertook the clinical activity. 
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This has a knock-on effect for practice costs because practices pay more for 
a clinical session with, for example, a psychiatrist than a session with a CPN. 
A personal field note read: ... watching this discussion was more like watching an inter- 
departmental costing exercise. There was little to distinguish organisational boundaries at all ... 
This comment was made because during the meeting (and so too at 04), the Trust's 
contract team seemed to empathise with the difficulties the practice was experiencing. 
There were references to members of the Trust speaking to the Health Board from the 
practice point of view, and the Trust's contract manager suggested one or two 
measures which would simplify the process for practices. Ultimately, for some of the 
practices, the deal was that the Trust would draw up the contract, fill in all the figures 
(a slight adaptation from the previous year) and all the practice needed to do was sign. 
These accounts illustrate why contract data needed to be exchanged in a synchronous 
mode and further demonstrate the partnering aspect discussed in the previous chapter. 
8.6 Informal Information 
In addition to formal sources of information, GPs drew on informal information. This 
was particularly clear during the away day (01). There appeared to be. four sources of 
informal information: individual, experiential, collegial and coincidental. 
Considerably less can be said about this form of information because there was only 
one opportunity to observe it and little was mentioned during the interviews. 
Nevertheless, the findings are indicative of some important decision making sources. 
Future research may identify the relative importance of these sources and develop the 
classification of informal sources. 
The individual source refers to the GP's own intuition, gut feeling or personal 
preference. As one GP indicated, intuition is used alongside more 
formal types of 
information: 
... 
I would say that [hospital/consultant] reputation will tell you some things very well, 
but it 
won't tell you other things all that well. It's 
intuitive- Like many professional decisions you 
have to weigh up many factors and do the best that you can 
for the person depending on the 
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various constraints and variables you're computing at the time... I/GPI/(8) 
GPs are of course trained to make independent, clinical judgement. As partners in a 
practice, they exercise autonomy over referrals, prescribing and certain business 
decisions so it is likely that they come to rely fairly heavily on their own independent 
assessments and decision making abilities. 
The second source, experiential, is that of the GP's, patients and practice's experience 
in dealing with a particular hospital. This study, and studies reviewed in Chapter 4, 
have indicated that GPs are interested in functional service quality (how their patients 
are treated when they go to hospital) and that they are influenced by patient 
preferences (eg, the desire to attend a local hospital rather than travel). They are also 
likely to be influenced by the views and experience of others in the practice (GPs, 
practice nurses, community nurses etc). 
Collegial and coincidental forms were most clearly observed during the practice away 
day. Collegial information was that which was passed on from GPs to colleagues from 
other practices (eg, expected times between original and repeat hip operations). This 
type of information, although unsubstantiated by quantitative practice investigations, 
does appear to influence the GPs' views of hospital provision. 
Coincidental information was the kind acquired during chance encounters (eg, meeting 
a surgeon in the DIY store, finding out about ophthalmology procedures and support 
through being married to a local optician, membership on hospital committees which 
gives GPs access to information and people they might not otherwise 
have occasion to 
come across). Sometimes an informal word in the fight ear of someone at the 
Trust 
during a committee meeting or educational meeting might yield the results that more 
formal purchasing negotiations do not. 
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8.7 Discussion 
8.71 Inter-Practice Competition and Collaboration 
The environment in which practices purchase secondary care and provide primary care 
has been seen here to be characterised by elements of competition and collaboration. 
Although the political impetus was to encourage practices to compete, the data 
suggest that this aim has not been fulfilled. Instead, despite competitive tensions, 
practices are collaborating and sharing information about the ways in which they intend 
to develop. They see one another as resources from whom to learn and acquire 
information. It is important, however, to bear in mind that this research looked 
specifically at the purchasing role of GPs and did not look at their role as providers of 
primary health care. The meetings observed and interview topics were selected 
specifically because of their purchasing focus. Although the findings show that inter- 
practice collaboration did extend beyond attention to the primary-secondary interface 
to include discussions about practice development, this occurred still largely within the 
purchasing context. 
8.72 Purchaser Provider Relationship 
The findings presented in this chapter support previous discussions about hospital 
efficiency / resource utilisation and x-efficiency although do not augment them. 
The concern with resource allocation was principally in terms of the equitable 
reallocation of existing community nursing resources, not with shifting resources from 
secondary to primary care. The interest expressed in offering outpatient (chiropody) 
clinics within the practice setting is consistent with the data presented in Chapters 6 
and 7 which suggest that there has been a shift of resources into primary care but that 
this is typically manifest through an increase in outreach clinics and not, for example, 
increases in minor surgery (see Chapter4). 
GPs appeared to tackle similar issues in terms of efficiency (eg, timeliness of death 
notification) as they had in purchase-provider meetings. Their discussions did, 
however, place greater emphasis on quality and in particular technical quality than 
was observed during purchaser-provider interactions. Their focus on the clinical 
outcomes for ophthalmology, hip operations and hand surgery, for example, were 
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illustrative of their appetite for more formal information in the form of clinical outcome 
measures and comparative performance. The data does further support the findings 
presented in Chapter 7 concerning the purchaser-provider relationship. Practices were 
shown to have discussed working in partnership with their provider particularly in 
terms of designing services (eg, in the development of a cath lab and stroke service). 
The educational/learning element of the purchaser-provider relationship can also be 
identified from the data in that practices recognised their need for further explanation 
and clarification by the trust of the contract prices. The purchaser-provider encounters 
during the contracting meetings (04 and 06) further illustrated the partnership 
approach. 
8.73 Information and Transactions Costs 
The issue which arose most clearly in this chapter was that of the availability and 
nature of information and the role of collaboration as a vehicle for information 
exchange. The network provides an important opportunity for practices to exchange 
both formal and informal data. Their reliance on informal sources of information 
(such as intuition, collegial and experiential data) has already been shown elsewhere to 
be a significant decision making factor (see studies by Farmer and Chesson (1998), 
Ellwood (1996) and Laing and Cotton (1996) reviewed in Chapter 4). These same 
studies have shown a lesser reliance by GPs on formal information. 
The uncertainty created by a lack of information was evident to a significant degree. 
At a practice level, there was apparent incongruence between practice and hospital 
data. The interpretation exercise performed by the Health Board had further confused 
the correlation between costs, prices and practice funds. The uncertainty about final 
prices meant that practices could not commit to specific levels of activity and so 
contracts could not be finalised. The ambiguity was further compounded by the 
difficulty in applying the equity model because prac 
I 
tices were uncertain about what 
level of community nursing provision they could expect and there were difficulties in 
paying for the service. 
Such uncertainty, according to transaction cost theory, increases the 
likely transactions 
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costs. Not only is the available information of poor quality, but there is a considerable 
degree of pertinent information which is unavailable. This compounds the human 
characteristic of bounded rationality and, when combined with small numbers, 
opportunism and uncertainty increases the transactions costs even further. This topic 
will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
8.8 Conclusions 
Inter-practice collaboration can clearly be identified as having evolved into a form of 
purchasing development network. Practices not only exchange information but 
engage in nurturing and learning as they collaborate. During their collaborations 
specific group roles such as those of educator and leader are enacted by particular 
GPs. At the same time, however, the inter-practice relationship exhibits- some 
competitive characteristics and it is clear that the ability of practices to choose whether 
to contract with providers collectively or independently is yet another manifestation of 
the importance of professional autonomy. 
The chapter has also found that inter-practice collaborations were an important source 
of informal information exchange. As chapters 3,4 and 8 have shown, reliance on 
informal information from trusted sources is a function of the social embeddedness of 
network relations. Formal information is also important but it is important to note that 
it cannot necessarily be communicated meaningfully in an asynchronous mode. For 
certain types of formal information, clarification and sense making require direct 
discussion. Although network relations enable clarification and information exchange 
between practices and with Trusts, the information currently available is neither 
sufficiently detailed nor comprehensive enough for GPs who are anxious to obtain data 
concerning service quality. 
8.9 Summary 
This chapter, the last of the empirical chapters, has examined the inter-practice 
dimension of the purchasing network. It has shown that inter-practice relationships are 
characterised by both competition and collaboration. As regards their purchasing 
activities, GPs are engaged in collaborations which, through a process of 
information 
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exchange, facilitate practice learning and nurturing. The chapter has, in its second 
section, brought together the types of information and developed a typology of formal 
information exchange and informal information sources. 
The next two chapters develop themes from chapters 6-8 by integrating them with the 
economic and social theories discussed earlier and then draw together the study's 
conclusions, implications and recommendations. 
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Introduction 
The exploratory nature of this research and its inductive dimension (see Chapter 5), 
resulted in the emergence and development of a number of issues which are of 
significance both empirically and theoretically. Whilst it is normal practice to 
reintegrate such issues with the literature review, it was decided in this case to reserve 
these themes for discussion at this point both to draw attention to them, and to 
highlight the importance of the qualitative, emergent and developmental approach of 
the research process. 
Three key issues are dealt with in this chapter. Firstly, it became apparent that there 
was an NHS ideology1culture which was a significant motive for, and 'glue" within, 
network relations. Secondly, the network relations which developed supported 
knowledge creating processes and prevented purchasers and providers from incurring 
the anticipated transactions costs. Thirdly, consideration of the group context in 
which contracts were negotiated, highlights certain limitations of TCE theory and 
identifies directions for future TCE development. The chapter concludes by 
illustrating the need for an integrated socio-economic perspective on networks and 
organisation. 
9.1 The Social Embeddedness of NHS Networks 
When the NHS market was originally established, it was envisaged that through neo- 
classical contracting, GPs would stimulate secondary care efficiencies and resource 
transfer (Department of Health 1989) (see Chapters I and 3). Policy makers took a 
dyadic perspective expecting fundholders to engage in annual contracts and to 
negotiate for low cost services 
would be largely competitive 
assumptions were not met. 
They also assumed that primary care relationships 
This study has shown, however, that these policy 
GP purchasing was instead, relational and socially embedded within sets of 
' The term 'glue' is used by Jarillo (Jarillo 1990) when describing trust as being something which 
"holds the network together" and which "organizes the economic activities going on inside". 
It is 
used here to attribute those same properties to ideology/culture. 
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collaborative relationships which developed at a primary and primary-secondary care 
level. The relationships exhibited typical network characteristics such as 
interdependence (Hakansson and Johanson 1993), longevity (Powell 199 1), mutual 
adaptation, and complementarity (Johanson and Mattsson 199 1; Hakansson and 
Johanson 1993). The relationships in this study also exhibited a strong 
ideologicallcultural dimension which is little discussed within the theory on inter- 
organisational relations and which has not previously been discussed in any detail in the 
context of NHS purchasing'. This served as a motive for, and 'glue' within, 
purchasing networks which, as this chapter goes on to discuss, were not only the locus 
for improving resource allocation and service quality (see Chapters 7,8 and 10) but 
facilitated knowledge creation and were also the locus for stimulating efficiencies by 
preventing otherwise high transactions costs' (See Figure 9.1). 
I Figure 9.1: Network Processes in Purchasing 
....... .... service 
quality 
conflict & novation in knowledge Ok collaboration 
creation 
.......... .............. ................ .................. 
resource I 
allocation transaction& 
service efficiency ............. 
2 The study by Lapsley et al (1997) found that Scottish GPs identified strongly with 
the aims of the 
NHS but did not integrate that aspect with the theories used here. 
It was also the locus for stimulating service efficiency 
(see Chapters 6,7 and 10). 
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9.1.1 Ideology / Culture 
This study (see Chapters 6 and 7) and earlier studies (see Chapter 4) have found that 
GPs' referral decisions were socially embedded. GPs were, to a degree, locked into 
purchasing with a particular provider because of an unwillingness to move, except 
when the move was to a local provider. This unwillingness to move appeared to be 
because of provider loyalty which existed on two levels: NHS system and local. 
Firstly, GPs were keen to engage with NHS providers, with private sector provision 
being sought as an unfavourable 4 last resort. Secondly, practices sought to support 
their local provider. GPs took the view that working with their local provider was 
important and actively pursued collaboration despite the obstacles. 
This ideology/culture derives from the original (historical) ideology and values of the 
National Health Service and the professional/occupational culture of medicine, and is 
embedded within a sense of local identity which was manifested through provider 
loyalty'. The historical dimension is important for the study of current relationships 
because "the structure of a relationship is at every point in time a result of its history" 
(Blankenburg Holm, Eriksson, and Johanson 1996)'. 
Such system and local ideological/cultural characteristics' have been identified 
elsewhere. System level ideologies, for example, were an important factor in the 
transformation from command to market economy in China (Boisot and Child 1996) 
and in attempts to modernise Kibbutzim (Simons and Ingram 1997). Both 
4 See notes on private provision of ophthalmology in Chapter 8 and discussions on switching in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
5 Primary and secondary care providers were also aware of patient loyalty to local services. This can 
often be seen when hospital closure (such as that of Rottenrow Maternity Hospital in Glasgow) is 
threatened and the local community fight to keep the service. 
6 The historical development of relationships between GPs and'hospital specialists is an added 
dimension to the relationship which is not tackled here but which has been discussed in sociological 
accounts of the NHS (see for example (Honigsbaum 1979,1993)). 
7 This chapter uses the terms ideology and culture together. This is to convey that the characteristic 
being considered includes an ideological dimension because of the NFIS values (eg equity and a free 
service at the point of use) that are upheld politically, nationally and professionally. 
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transformations were resisted and modified because of historically and 
ideologically/culturally embedded attitudes and behaviours. 
The regional/local level at which ideology/culture exists has been considered by, for 
example, Carnevali (1996). Carnevali found that Italian banks invested in businesses 
which originated from a close regional area and they relied on regional networks for 
information to aid their investment decisions. She notes that actors in a regional 
network "share a common history, ... share the same set of cultural points of reference 
... share physical proximity 
from a very early stage and experience collectively the 
changes to the social, economic and political fabric of the region. In other words, they 
share in the making of the history of their locality ... 
" (ibid. ). 
In the NHS,, clinicians exhibit NHS system, local and professional loyalties and 
ideological/cultural characteristics. One of the few articles to integrate these 
dimensions with economic theory does so at the institutional/professional level of 
analysis. Jones et al. (1997) introduce the term macro-culture, which they define as 
"a system of widely shared assumptions and values, comprising industry-specific, 
occupational, or professional knowledge, that guide actions and create typical 
behaviour patterns among independent entities. " (ibid). They suggest that macro- 
culture is instrumental in co-ordinating activities and is diffused through institutional 
means, such as socialization through professions and crafts, trade journals and industry 
events. Their proposition fits well with the NHS context where clinicians do consider 
their work as an art or craft, and where professional (trade) journals such as the British 
Medical Journal (BMJ), organisations such as the British Medical Association as well 
as conferences play an important role. 
An understanding of this ideological/cultural dimension is important for developing 
theories of NHS network engagement and formation. Chapters 6-8 have shown that 
ideology/culture (or macro-culture) was a driver behind the desire for GPs to work 
collaboratively with hospitals. In other words, it was a motive 
for engaging in 
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networks'. Although most studies identify the motives for collaboration as being of an 
( economic' nature (Ebers 1997)', recent review of motives for network engagement 
acknowledge that more 'social' motives are increasingly being recognised. Oliver", 
for example, identifies six motives for network formation (see Box 9.1) some of which 
reflect the importance of cultural / ideological factors and Smith Ring (1997) makes 
specific reference to culture: "Network relations are ... frequently operating in 
environments that are naturally bounded, or artificially created, by kinship, political, or 
cultural considerations ... " 
(p 116). 
Ideology/culture was also 
important though for the 
ongoing development/ 
formation of networks. 
Even where GPs had 
experienced difficulties in 
working with providers 
(and to an extent with one 
Box 9.1: Motives for Network Formation 
"(1) necessity, when organizations are mandated through law or 
regulation by higher authorities to establish relationships; 
(2) asymmetry that allows one party to exercise power or control 
over another one or its resources; 
(3) reciprocity, when through co-operation organizations can 
pursue common or mutually beneficial goals or interests; 
(4) efficiency, when through co-operation organisations can 
achieve higher input/output ratios; 
(5) stability, when through co-operation organizations can better 
forestall, forecast, or absorb uncertainty affecting their 
activities; and 
(6) legitimacy, when through co-operation organizations can 
establish or enhance their reputation, image, prestige, or 
congruence with prevailing norms. " 
(Oliver, 1990) 
another), they persisted with their collaborative efforts because of their belief in 
sustaining and developing nationally funded, locally-based, quality services. 
9.1.2 Knowledge Creation 
That purchasing relationships were socially embedded also shaped a process of 
knowledge creation, a characteristic which has previously been associated with 
networks (see for example Hakansson and Snehota 1989; Johanson and Mattsson 
8Note: it is not the purpose of this discussion to consider ideology/culture as the only motive. There 
are also 'resource' motives. GPs need access to the specialist knowledge, expertise and perspectives 
of their hospital colleagues. Hospital clinicians on the other hand rarely have any experience of 
general practice and so need access to the knowledge, expertise and perspectives of their primary care 
colleagues (see 3.14.1 and 7.3). 
9 Ebcrs' (1997) review idcnfifics two sets of commonly stated motives for collaboration: the pursuit of 
increased revenue and the pursuit of cost reduction (including reducing transactions costs and 
appropriating skills and learning). 
10 Oliver, C. 1990. 'Determinants of Interorganizational Relationships: Integration and Future 
Directions'. Academy ofManagement Journal. 33: 503-19. 
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1991; Alter and Hage 1993) but which has not previously been discussed or observed 
within the NHS purchasing context. 
Knowledge sharing was quintessential in the network relationships identified. Not 
only was the process of interaction an important source of knowledge (Johanson and 
Mattsson 1991), it was also a means by which tacit and explicit forms of knowledge 
were created. The interactions between primary care purchasers and with providers 
discussed in Chapters 6-8, demonstrate four knowledge creating processes (or 
"conversion modes") recently identified by Nonaka et al (1998) (see Figure 9.2 below). 
Figure 9.2 SECI Setf-transcending Process 
Source: Nonaka, Reinmoeller, and Senoo 1998 
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Socialization is the process of 
sharing individuals' tacit 
knowledge where "Sharing 
experiences is a key to 
understanding others' ways of 
thinking and feeling. 
Externalization is the articulation 
of tacit knowledge and its 
translation into forms understood 
by others as individuals listen and 
contribute to one another. 
Combination is the conversion of explicit knowledge into more complex sets of 
explicit knowledge. "To diffuse fragmentary knowledge, editing and systemizing such 
knowledge are the keys to this conversion mode. Here, new knowledge generated in 
the externalization stage transcends the group. " (ibid). Internalization is the 
conversion of newly created explicit knowledge into individuals' tacit knowledge. 
Learning by doing, training and exercises are important here. 
Together the inter-practice and the purchaser-provider interactions involved all four of 
the processes. Staff within practices shared experiences (face-to-face) through a 
process of socialization during which they shared tacit knowledge 
(see Chapter 8). In 
larger peer group settings (formal (eg, through total fundholding) and 
informal (see 
Chapters 7 and 8)), individual knowledge became available to the group - the process 
of extemalization. At inter-practice and purchaser-provider meetings, 
knowledge was 
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combined, providing the opportunity for the final stage where collective knowledge 
could become internalised by each individual. As Chapter 7 has discussed, this 
knowledge creating process (evidently integral to service design and learning as 
discussed in Chapter 7) often resulted in service innovations. Podolny and Page 
(1998) explain this relationship between knowledge creation and innovation as follows: 
"rather than simply facilitating the transfer of information between two nodes', the 
existence of an enduring exchange relationship may actually yield new knowledge. In 
effect the network becomes the locus of innovation rather than the nodes that 
comprise the network. " 
9.1.3 Conflict and Collaboration 
The co-existence of conflict and collaboration within NHS networks (see Chapters 7 
and 8) was an important dimension of the knowledge creation process and, it has been 
argued, is an important ingredient for cohesion in networks (Alter 1990). Conflict 
between primary and secondary clinicians was not surprising given the historical 
dynamics of the generalist / specialist relationship (Honigsbaum 1979) and the more 
recent opposition that many had to fundholding (see Chapter 2). There was also 
conflict within primary care, as GPs expected not to agree upon decisions about 
service provision (see Chapter 8). "Ist this potential for disagreement, and thus 
conflict, was voiced as a concern, there is reason to consider that it may be a necessary 
ingredient for collaborative success (Alter 1990; Dubois and Hakansson 1997). Alter 
(1990) argues that inter-organisational symbiosis marked by "concerted action" can be 
brought about only by a "necessary" combination of conflict and co-operation, ie. that 
"conflict and co-operation are system-integrative... ". 
Related to that, this study has also provided evidence that conflict can be a creative 
tension (Alter 1990; Carney 1998) which results in service innovations (see previous 
section and Chapter 8). During their meetings, GPs and hospital clinicians exhibited 
conflict when designing services because of their regard for their own 
professional/clinical autonomy. Efforts by GPs to extend the scope of their autonomy 
were met by boundary defence from hospital clinicians (and visa versa), yet their 
debates often resulted in pilot studies or service innovations. 
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9.2 Social Embeddedness and Transactions Costs 
The social embeddedness of GP purchasing relations also has a bearing on the degree 
to which transactions costs were incurred. This was due again to the 
ideological/cultural dimension of the relationship and also to the group context in 
which purchasing occurred. 
9.21 GP Purchasing and Transactions Costs 
Chapters 2 and 4 identified the likelihood of high transactions costs yet, as this chapter 
noted earlier (and as indicated in Figure 9.1), purchasing networks were found in this 
study to be the locus for stimulating efficiency and a means for preventing the 
realisation of high transactions costs. The study's findings indicate a number of ways 
in which the network relationships may have lowered transactions costs. 
Search costs were restrained by the fact that GPs were largely unwilling to 
change their supplier" not only when they were encouraged during the first 
year to maintain a steady state, but also in subsequent years. " 
* Monitoring costs were incurred when GPs met together to discuss their 
purchasing intentions and their purchasing experience. However, it is clear 
from this study and previous studies, that purchasing contracts were not 
well defined, detailed documents. Contracts rarely specified quality 
outcomes (beyond those of waiting times, timeliness of discharge letters) 
and so did not require concomitantly high levels of monitoring. By 
collaborating, practices were able to share information which reduced the 
cost to any individual practice of having to find that information in isolation, 
ie, it reduced duplication of monitoring effort. 
* Renewal Costs, the evidence suggests, were lower than expected because 
GPFHs did not consider removing contracts in under extreme 
" It could be argued that such unwillingness was due to high transactions costs, but the evidence 
presented in this study (see Chapters 6 and 7) and in the studies reviewed in Chapter 4 strongly 
suggests that unwillingness is due to provider loyalty and not search costs. 
12 In transactions cost terms, this constitutes an ex ante condition of small numbers bargaining 
because practices did not begin by setting out a range of alternative providers and considering their 
relative merits. 
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circumstances. Some negotiations did take place but were marginal, in that 
they were more often to do with clarity over existing figures rather than the 
renegotiation of prices. It seems that the subsequent process of renewing 
the contracts was straightforward and relatively costless because the Trust 
simply updates activity or pricing levels on existing contracts, prints them 
out and obtains the GPs' signatures. 
Whilst transactions costs may have been prevented, however, it is nevertheless 
important to consider that the networks were not costless. Purchasing meetings, for 
example, represented a direct cost" and an opportunity cost given what GPs, 
consultants and managers might otherwise have done with their time. Networks also 
typically incur bargaining costs, "the costs of safeguarding against possible 
opportunistic behaviour by networking partners, or conflict resolution costs" (Ebers 
and Grandori 1997) although such costs are likely to have been minimal given the 
strong ideological/cultural factors. Other network costs are associated with setting up 
and sustaining relationships and include investments in assets (eg, new computer 
systems) which often underpin new ways of working (Ebers and Grandori 1997). 
Such investments may, however, be non-marketable, ie, they cannot be deployed 
elsewhere". At this point, the analysis of network and transactions costs (and asset 
specificity in particular) becomes problematic because conventional WE analysis 
addresses a single transaction between two parties but GP purchasing is conducted in a 
group context the subject of which is a set of transactions. 
9.22 Group Buying and Asset Specificity 
TCE theory considers transactions costs and asset specific investments as they relate to 
a single buyer and a single supplier (Williamson 1985). TCE analysis then addresses a 
single transaction between these parties. Any transactions costs or non-marketable 
investments are borne by the buyer or supplier as are returns on investments. In this 
study, however, purchasing involved a group of buyers whose negotiations concerned 
13 For example, 06 involved 2 hours of time for 2 GPs, 4 ffind managers, and 7 Trust staff 
(5 of whom 
were at management or director level). 
14 This is the problem of asset specificity identified by Williamson (1985) and discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
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a set of transactions. How then should transactions costs, non-marketable investments 
and returns on investment be appropriated between the transacting parties? 
Of the five types of asset specific investments identified by Williamson (1989) (see 
Box 9.2), only human asset specificity was identified in this study". Pactices spent 
time working with providers through knowledge exchange and the creation of a shared 
understanding and language" (Williamson 1985). These activities would have 
encouraged individual 
and institutionally- 
specific trust and 
learning, reinforcing 
existing relationships 
which, Williamson 
would argue, would 
have cost-bearing 
consequences. 
However, not all 
Box 9.2: Asset Specificity 
"(1) site specificity - where successive stations are located in a 
cheek-by-jowl relation to each other so as to economize on 
inventory and transportation expenses; 
(2) physical asset specificity, such as specialised dies that are 
required to produce a component; 
(3) human asset specificity that arises in a learning-by-doing 
fashion; 
(4) dedicated assets, which are discrete investments in general 
purpose plant that are made at the behest of a particular 
customer; and 
(5) brand name capital. " 
(Williamson 1989: 143) 
practices participated to the same degree, as some took a greater role in co-ordinating 
group activities, convening meetings, and 'debating' with clinicians. It cannot 
therefore be assumed that investments and returns on investments (such as learning by 
doing) were equally apportioned and appropriated. Returns on investment may also 
differ because, as earlier discussions have pointed out, not all firms have the same 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). This is particularly likely as in this 
study practices were at different stages in their own purchasing experience (see 
Chapter 8) and were potentially less able to absorb and exploit new knowledge and 
skills. 
" Some practices did invest savings in hospital equipment but physical asset specificity did not occur 
because the equipment was neither tailored for the purchaser nor unique to the provider but 
instead 
added to the existing stock of standard machinery and was of the kind used in other 
(public and 
private) hospitals across the city. Such, investments therefore tied in neither the 
buyer nor the 
supplier. 
" NB: not all practices enjoyed collaborative, face-to-face provider encounters. 
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Consideration of the group context can therefore be seen to give rise to the following 
questions which require further research and further development of transactions costs 
theory: 
To what extent are returns on investments made to the group? 
What is the loss to an individual practice if they cease trading (ie, are 
investments non-marketable)? 
What is the loss to the group if a more 'involved' practices leaves the 
group? 
If a practice decides to buy from another provider, what are the set-up costs 
if a group purchasing arrangement already exists and the practice is free to 
join? Can the practice "piggy-back- on other practices or accelerate 
learning processes and so benefit from learning and economies already 
accrued in that setting? 
9.3 Conclusion 
The NHS networks studied here have not only exhibited characteristics generally 
associated with networks (eg. mutuality, reciprocity and conflict) but they have 
exhibited a strong ideological/cultural dimension. This ideology/culture has served as 
a powerful motive for, and 'glue' within, network relations. The network relations 
which have developed have been the locus for knowledge creation and innovations 
through a social process of collaboration and conflict. The networks have also been 
the locus for stimulating cost efficiencies via the prevention of anticipated transactions 
costs, a finding which supports the views of network proponents like Jarillo (1990) and 
Carney (1998), and studies of relational contracting (Sako 1992)" which argue that 
networks are an efficient mode of governance (see Chapter 3). Although consideration 
of the degree to which networks are efficient has been restricted because of limitations 
in TCE theory, suggestions have been made concerning future TCE theory 
development so that the costs and investments pertaining to group based negotiations 
and sets of transactions can be analysed. 
" Jones et al (1997) suggest that macro-cultures facilitate efficient exchange. 
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The discussion has also illustrated the need for an integrated socio-economic 
perspective on the NHS in particular and on inter-organisational relations more 
broadly. As regards the NHS specifically, a better understanding of the nature and 
role of ideology/culture is required in order that future policies might introduce more 
appropriate mechanisms and incentives, thereby increasing the likelihood of inducing 
desired behaviours and delivering desired outcomes. In terms of organisation theory, 
this discussion supports the views of Granovetter (1985), Powell (1991)and others (eg 
Ebers 1997; Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997) who argue against purely economic 
explanations of market activities and inter-organisational relations and endorses Jones 
et al. 's call for a better understanding of 'macro-culture' within network formation. 
9.4 Summary 
This chapter has developed certain emergent themes arising from the study and has 
considered their implications for economic and social theory and for studies of, and 
policies for, the NHS. It has offered explanations for the formation of NHS networks 
and has discussed in detail their economising and creative properties. In so doing, the 
chapter has also discussed a number of ways in which the NHS purchasing context 
presents challenges to, and informs, network and WE theories. 
This chapter was deliberately positioned after the empirical chapters in order to 
highlight the developmental and emergent qualities of qualitative research as well as to 
draw specific attention to the issues discussed, highlighting their importance within this 
study. It precedes the final chapter, Chapter 10, which now goes on to draw the 
study to its conclusion and to develop recommendations for policy makers, 
practitioners and future academic research. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this research was to explore the role that GPs are performing as 
purchasers and to identify which of the purchasing-/market-related issues are of 
particular concern to them. More specifically, it sought to consider whether GPs were 
seeking to stimulate secondary care efficiency and resource transfers from secondary to 
primary care; to understand the relationship between GPs and their providers; and to 
derive from the findings, a number of policy and managerial implications. Pursuit of 
this aim has not only confirmed the findings of previous studies but has enabled this 
study to make key contributions concerning the social embeddedness of the NHS 
purchasing process, the content of, and processes within purchasing networks and the 
motivational factors which influence GP behaviour. 
This chapter begins by drawing together thefindings from this study and then stating 
their relationship to the research aims and their contribution to the research gaps 
identified in Chapter 4. It then goes on to consider the policy and managerial 
implications which arise concerning organisational and information networks in the 
current, post-market, NHS system. The chapter then turns to the conclusions and 
implications concerning TCE and network theory and comments on certain 
methodological issues and research limitations. The chapter concludes by discussing 
directionsforfuture research. 
10.1 Understanding GP Purchasing 
The notion of an NHS market was prompted by a need to improve NHS efficiency in 
order to contain government spending (Teeling Smith 1986; Maynard 1994; 
Glennerster 1995). Its implementation followed in the wake of previous, less radical, 
administrative/structural and managerial reforms aimed also at improving NHS 
efficiency but, through non-competitive measures. Ongoing demands for increased 
government spending on health, however, resulted in a review of the NHS in the late 
1980s and recommendations for a market solution (see Chapter 1). Proponents of a 
market solution such as Enthoven (1985) and Teeling Smith (1986) believed that 
through a neoclassical contracting mechanism, purchasers (GPFHs and HAS/HBS) 
would put pressure on providers to lower prices. This would in turn 
fuel provider 
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competition and thus improve the efficiency of resource utilisation, improve service 
quality and encourage resource transfer into primary care from secondary care (see 
Chapters I and 3 for discussion). 
This study set out to explore the nature of the GP purchasing role and found that GPs 
were indeed actively involved in stimulating efficiencies and resource transfers. 
However, these policy objectives were being achieved not through a neoclassical 
contracting system as expected, but rather through a network of socially embedded, 
co-operative relationships within primary care and between primary care purchasers 
and secondary care providers. 
These networks were multiplex and were characterised by a strong ideology/culture 
which served as a motive for engaging in, and as a 'glue' for, the ongoing formation 
of, these inter-organisational networks. Purchaser provider relations involved 
learning, service design, purchasing and partnering and were supported by primary care 
networks,, which facilitated learning and nurtured less experienced purchasers. 
Purchasing networks also served as an important locus for knowledge creation, 
innovation and economising. 
As these findings have already been discussed in depth in chapter 6-9, this chapter 
draws them together in a summarised form as they relate to the research objectives of 
this study and the research gaps identified in Chapter 4. 
10.1.1 A Synthesis of the Research Objectives and Research Findings 
In order to understand the role of GPs as purchasers, this study pursued three 
objectives which were as follows: 
1. to consider whether GPs were seeking to stimulate secondary care 
efficiency; 
2. to find out whether GPs were seeking to initiate the transfer of resources 
from secondary to primary care; and 
3. to understand the relationship between GPs (as purchasers) and hospital 
Trusts (as providers). 
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The findings from this study as they relate to those objectives are stated below. 
10.1.2 Objective 1: GPs as Dtivers of Efficiency 
GPs did not set out to stimulate improved efficiencies (see 6.3) even though many 
recognised that improved efficiencies were necessary. However, when engaged in 
service design activities, GPs stimulated a number of improved efficiencies (see 7.8.1). 
These efficiencies were, therefore, the outcome of a collaborative process rather than 
an objective in themselves, a by-product of service (re)design activities. 
Rather than pursue efficiency improvements, GPs concentrated on improving service 
quality (see 6.3.3). In the early stages of purchasing their focus was on functional 
quality (operational aspects of how the service was delivered) (see 6.3.3 & 7.8.3), but 
later there was a growing interest in technical (clinical) quality (see 8.7.2). This is of 
particular importance because although practices did not intend switching provider, 
they used quality as a measure to improve deficient providers. In the absence of 
adequate formal information, informal sources played a particularly important role in 
this evaluation process. 
10-1.3 Objective 2: GP Purchasing and Resource Transfer 
GPs were pursuing and successfully initiating transfers of resource from secondary to 
primary care (see 6.5.3 & 7.8.1). The process though was problematic and there were 
more examples of changes in the locus of activity than of substantial shifts offinancial 
resource from secondary to primary care (see 6.5.2 & 6.5.3). In the short-medium 
term, efforts were being made by GPs to do more within primary care which, coupled 
with increased use and range of direct access services, would mean 
fewer resources 
being spent on secondary care services (a marginal transfer of financial resource). 
Mobilising large amounts of secondary care money though was a longer-term objective 
because this scale of resource is locked into acute hospital beds and is something which 
practices are unlikely to be able to tackle alone and in the short term 
(see 7.8.4). As 
with economies, such resource transfers were often realised through, or 
initiated as 
part of, the service (re)design process, although resource transfer was 
being more 
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deliberately pursued as a priority than was secondary care efficiency'. 
10.1.4 Objective 3: The Purchaser Provider Relationship 
As Chapters 7 and 8 have shown, the GPs in this study cannot be readily viewed as 
ineffective or impotent purchasers. Previous studies have not considered in detail the 
content of the purchaser provider relationship (see 4.6 and Table 10.1) and 
consequently have not identified the fact that, and the ways in which, GPs have been 
stimulating efficiencies (see 10.1.2), resource transfer (see 10.1.3), quality 
improvements (see 7.8.3), service innovations (see 7.4) and knowledge creation (see 
9.1.2). 
This study has found that GPs have been involved in all these processes because of the 
socially embedded, collaborative nature of the purchasing relationship they have 
developed with their providers (see Chapter 7) and with one another (see Chapter 8). 
These networks have been mutually supportive. Learning, service design, partnerships 
and purchasing at the primary-secondary interface have been supported by the primary 
care level networks within which GPs have exchanged information about secondary 
care services and through which less experienced practices have been nurtured as 
purchasers (see 8.3). 
The networks exhibit the range of characteristics generally associated with networks 
(see 3.14) such as reciprocity (see 3.14.4 and 7.5), learning and adaptation (see 3.14.6 
and 7.3) co-operation and conflict (see 3.14.1; 3.14.7; 7.2.1-7.2.2 and 9.1.3). 
However, three characteristics emerged as being of particular importance here: 
* Ideology1culture: the strong sense of loyalty to the NHS and 
comprehensive, equitable service provision combined with a professional 
culture and loyalty to local providers to serve as a strong motive for 
engaging in network relationships and contributed to the ongoing formation 
of purchasing networks through learning, service design, partnering and 
purchasing (see 9.1.1). It also contributed to the process of knowledge 
1 Greater success was being achieved in terms of reallocating resources within primary care 
(see 6-5) 
for example, by reallocating evisfing primary care resources through more cost-effective prescribing 
(see 6.5.1). 
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creation, innovation and the prevention of high transactions costs (see 9.2.1 
and below). 
* Knowledge creation: this occurred because of the face to face (synchronous) 
formal and informal information exchanges (see 8.4-8.5) and learning 
encounters between GPs and between GPs and hospital providers (see 7.3 
and 9.1.2). Such knowledge concerned service quality and service 
developments, innovations, and perspective sharing. 
4o Efficiency: two kinds of efficiencies were associated with purchasing I- 
networks. Purchasing networks were a locus for stimulating efficiencies in 
service delivery (see 10.1.2). They also prevented the expected high 
transactions costs from occurring because GPs were unwilling to switch 
provider (preventing search costs and renewal costs) and did not engage in 
detailed contracts which would require high levels of monitoring (see 9.2.1). 
At the level of the individual 'organisational units' within the networks, this study 
found that practices had a strong sense of individual identity. GPs preserved and 
sought to enhance their professional autonomy (see 6.1). This was exhibited in their 
encounters with providers (see 7.2.1) and in their decisions about when to take 
collective action in purchasing matters and when to act individually (see 8.3.3). It was 
also clear from the study that GPs collaborated for the purposes ofpurchasing rather 
than service provision and they expressed concerns about the scope for collaborating 
to provide services (see 8.3.4)2. 
10.1.5 Conhibution to Research Gaps 
These findings contribute directly to the research gaps identified earlier (see 4.6). The 
research gaps are summarised in Table 10.1 below and are paired with the findings 
from this study. 
This is discussed in more detail later (see 10.2.1). 
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Table 10.1: Research Gaps and Research Findings 
(1) Limited knowledge concerning 
rationale fo r lack of provider 
switc 
............. 
Y4%: 
.............................................................. )3 (3 Apparent lack of attention given 
to hospital efficiency but rationale for 
this is unknown. 
...................................................................................... (4) By what means are GPs 
stimulating improved service quality? 
...................................................................................... (5) To what extent are GPs seeking to 
improve x-efficiency? 
...................................................................................... (6) Is the release of secondary care 
monies for primary care developments 
. 
ýP a fi or GPs? ! ýýi 
... 
c. p. rio. rity. f 
........................................... ..... ....... .... .... (7) Is the transfer of resources both 
possible and occurring? 
(8) What are the relative strengths of 
individual and consortia purchasers? 
(9) What is the content of the 
j purchasing relationship and the nature 
of the interaction process. 
.................................................................................... (10) Are GPs concerned about the 
levels of transactions costs and are 
they trying to lower them? 
..................................................................................... 
GPs are loyal to the National Health Service and to local 
providers due to ideology/culture and are reluctant to switch 
(see 6.4 & 9.1 
.................................................................... GPs are not pursuing improved efficiencies as a primary 
objective and many are sympathetic to the pressures on 
hospitals (6.3.1). However, efficiencies are being stimulated 
.. 
as.. a.. by. -produ. ct.. of. se. rvic. e. (re)d. es. ign.. (. s. ee.. 7.. 8.1 & 1.0... 1... 2): 
.......... ............. ... .... .... ....... ............ ... ..... ...... ... ............... .... .... Improvements in functional quality were pursued as a 
specific objective (see 6.3.3) and occurred via service 
(re)design (see 7.8.3). Process improvements were regarded 
as being a dual responsibility and were sometimes reinforced 
by mutual penalties (see 7.5). Improvements in 
technical/clinical quality were only beginning to be 
addressed 8.7. ý) 
......................... ........ . ...................... Evidence that x-efficiencies had been specifically pursued 
did exist (see 6.9.3) but the evidence was limited. Such 
efficiencies were stimulated along with service (re)design but 
the evidence suggests that care should be taken to consider 
the underlying factors which contribute to what may appear 
to be x-inefficiencies (see 7.8.2). 
................................................................................................................................... GPs are pursuing resource transfer as a specific objective 
(see 6.5.3) 
............................................................................................................ : ...................... Resource transfer is being addressed directly during service 
(re)design (see 7.8.1) but efforts to release large amounts of 
resource are roving problematic (see 7.8-4). P 
It was perceived that collaboration increased fundholders' 
influence as buyers (see 6.4.1) although they were reluctant 
to exercise power (see 6.4). They also felt that other 
influences (eg HB commissioning and Scottish Office 
priorities) combined with buyer influence so it was difficult 
for them to assess their relative influence as individual 
fundholders (see 6.4.2). 
The relationship is multiplex comprising learning, service 
design, partnering and purchasing processes. it is 
characterised by knowledge creation (see 9.1.2) collaboration 
and conflict (see 9.1.3), mutuality, reciprocity and other 
ýcal' network characteristics (see 3. J. 4.. an. d.. 9:. I): ....................... 
ty 
. ...... .... .... Ther *e'"*"* w** .... a' ... uxed response to this issue Some were 
opposed to fundholding because of these costs (see 6.1.3), 
others considered them as being relatively incidental (see 
6.6.2). However, Ch 9 has discussed ways in which the 
social embeddedness of NHS purchasing actually prevented 
high transactions costs from being realised (see 9.2.1). 
............................................................................. ....................................................... 
3 This table omits research gap number 2 concerning GP prescribing due to reasons explained 
in sec 
4.6.5. 
4 Note: the concept of transactions costs encompasses, for example, search and monitoring costs 
whereas it was generally only the administrative costs of the contracting and 
fundholding systems to 
which GPs refeffed. 
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(11) Little is known about This study has focused on Glasgow and so has considered fundholding/purchasing in Glasgow GGHB purchasing in detail. The decision making 
and about the extent to which it differs characteristics and purchasing behaviour are similar to from other areas of Scotland and from accounts of GP purchasing elsewhere in Scotland although England. all the Scottish studies have differed in the degree to, and 
perspective from, which they have studied purchas ing (see 
4.5.2). 
These findings make a particularly important contribution to understanding GP 
purchasing and evaluating its impact upon efficiency and resource allocation because 
they challenges the conclusions that were inevitably drawn from the existing body of 
evidence reviewed in Chapter 4. Following the review of the empirical studies in 
Chapter 4, it would have been difficult to conclude that fundholding had been a 
mechanism through which the desired secondary care efficiencies and resource 
transfers had been stimulated. Furthermore, as fundholders had made only short-term 
improvements in their prescribing, had done little to change their referral patterns or 
specify and enforce quality improvements, and could claim only improved 
communications, it was little wonder that when reviewing a recent purchasing report' 
that Jennifer Dixon wrote that purchasing was the dog which "not only failed to bite, 
but didn't even bark loudly enough to wake up providers. " (Dixon 1998) 
The insights gained in this study, however, show that GPs were actively stimulating 
hospital efficiencies and resource transfer. These outcomes were undoubtedly 
influenced by the pressures on providers from the Health Board and Scottish Office, 
but, as this study has shown, the key means by which these outcomes were achieved 
was through socially embedded purchasing networks and the collaborations therein. 
It can therefore be said that the policy objectives of "Workingfor Patients" in terms of 
stimulating hospital efficiency and resource transfer were being met but not through a 
market form of contracting but through a network of collaborative relationships. That 
these networks have exhibited collaboration, conflict and creative and economising 
characteristics, and that network actors exhibit economically and socially motivated 
behaviours gives rise to important policy and managerial implications concerning 
5 Light Donald W. Effective Commissioning: Lessonsfrom Purchasing in American Managed 
Care. 
Office of Health Economics, 1998 
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current health policy as the next section goes on to discuss. 
10.2 Policy and Managerial Implications : Networks and Current 
Health Service Policy 
As Chapter I outlined, the Labour government's opposition to the market philosophy 
has resulted in a new organisational arrangements (see 1.5.1 and box 10.1 for 
summary). Still with the intention to contain NHS costs, the new framework is based 
upon collaborative relationships between HBs, Trusts and GPs (see 1.5.2 and 1.5.3) 
where service developments and 
priorities are agreed through a system 
of planning rather than contracting (see 
1.5.3). The findings from this study 
have implications for three types of 
network relations proposed within the 
current policy: primary care networks, 
purchaser-provider networks and 
information networks. 
Box 10.1: Main Characteristics of Post-Market 
NHS Organisation. 
the separation of planning and hospital care 
provision; 
the retention of NHS trust status; 
the abandonment of GP fundholding in favour 
of locality-based co-operative groups; 
new co-ordinated planning processes at Trust 
and HAMB levels; and 
national bodies to evaluate new technologies 
and measure performance. 
10.21 PHmary Care Networks 
The first set of implications concern primary care networks and in particular their 
purpose, formation and organisation: 
e Network Purpose: This study found that GPs worked collaboratively together in 
order to facilitate the purchasing process (see 10.1.4). Policy makers have 
recognised this spirit of collaboration which has emerged between practices and 
with providers (The Scottish Office Department of Health 1997), but have 
proposed, and are implementing primary care networks with an altogether different 
purpose, that of service provision. 
This distinction in network purpose is important because primary care provision is 
an area over which GPs have traditionally exercised considerable 
discretion and 
autonomy and as this study has further highlighted, professional autonomy is 
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something which GPs preserve and seek to enhance (see 10.1.4). There is some 
evidence of successful GP co-operation as regards out-of-hours service provision 
(Hopton and Heaney 1999) but these services do not impinge on decisions about 
prescribing, secondary care services or the day-to-day running of the practice. 
Where practices have discussed the provision of patient care, they have 
encountered considerable conflict (D'Souza 1995). It is worrying, therefore, that 
policy makers seem not to have recognised the potential differences between types 
of co-operative arrangements as the following statement from "Designed to Care 
implies: "General Medical Practitioners and their teams are increasingly aware of 
the advantages of working together to plan and deliver new services in different 
ways. Out-of-hours schemes, primary care purchasing groups and locality 
arrangements are examples of such collaborative working. " (The Scottish Office 
Department of Health 1997). 
Indications of likely conflict as well as potential collaboration need not necessarily 
be of concern because of the creative tensions and system integrative properties 
they may generate (see 9.1.3. ) However, the need for parties to cede a degree of 
autonomy when collaborating is a factor which, given the high value GPs have been 
shown to place upon their professional autonomy (see 10.1.4), perhaps presents the 
greatest challenge to GPs and managers within LHCCs and PCTs- 
Network Formation: A second important distinction is that purchasing networks 
were the result of ground level or 'bottom-up' initiatives whereas LHCCs and 
PCGs have been brought about by parliamentary design. What this may mean in 
terms of their success is unclear. As earlier chapters have discussed, networks are 
based on trust, mutuality, interdependence, ceding of autonomy and long-termism 
(among other principles) (see 3.14). The extent to which these characteristics are 
present will depend upon the degree to which the GPs themselves agree with the 
co-operative philosophy as it relates to service provision and clinical practice. 
As 
with any change initiative, if GPs have some sense of ownership of the changes, 
this 
will increase the likelihood of success. It is encouraging therefore, that some 
interviewees felt they had an opportunity to shape the future of the LHCCs and 
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PCTs and that there was an opening for GPs to set the agenda (see 8.3-4). Their 
optimism is likely to have been encouraged by the Government's stance against 
imposing any kind of LHCC blueprint (The Scottish Office Department of Health 
1997), the minimal amount of Scottish Office executive guidance, and early, 
positive accounts of Lothian LHCC experience (Hopton and Heaney 1999). 
It is important, therefore, that efforts are made to understand the motives and 
incentives that do inform GP behaviour and that GPs are given the opportunity to 
influence their own LHCC formation and activities therein otherwise they may 
become disengaged from the changes or even actively opposed to them. It is also 
important to give GPs the opportunity to share perspectives and learn from each 
other because their experiences, needs and practice populations are likely to differ 
across LHCCs. 
e Network Organisation: In whatever way inter-practice relations develop, it is likely 
that organisational. issues will be of increasing importance within LHCCs and PCTs. 
GPs will become employed by PCTs and subject to the managerial structures 
therein. Coupled with organisational issues within the LHCC, the organisational 
agenda looks set to be a significant element of daily life. Evidence from recent 
discussions with those currently involved in the new arrangements confirm that 
much time is being spent agreeing articles of association and setting up the many 
PCTALHCC committee structures. Studies of GP consortia (Laing and Cotton 
1997) confirm that new (collaborative) structures and processes are accompanied 
by organisational politics, managerial conflicts and the many other organisational 
dimensions (eg, team dynamics) which are characteristic of organisational life - 
characteristics to which general practice (particularly non-fundholders) have 
previously been only limitedly exposed. 
It is important that PCT and LHCC members ensure that the weighty organisational 
agenda does not swamp issues of service delivery and that adequate human and 
financial resources are devoted to not only maintaining existing service provision 
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within LHCCs but to improving services through the innovative capabilities which 
have been identified within the purchasing networks. 
10.2 2 Pýimary-Secondary Care Networks 
The interface for primary-secondary care relations under the new NHS structure is that 
of the annual planning process and in particular, formulation of the Joint Investment 
Fund (JIF). The JIF is to become the mechanism for stimulating innovations') 
knowledge transfer and service design and to "encourage co-ordination of services at 
the interface between primary and secondary care" (The Scottish Office Department of 
Health 1997: 18) (see 1.5.3). 
Clearly, the extent to which this is a truly interactive and fi-uitful process will depend 
upon the planning processes which are established. It is not clear at this stage in the 
PCT developments what shape this JIF planning process will take but in what may be 
an attempt to counter any accusations of unnecessary bureaucratisation, executive 
guidance (The Scottish Office Department of Health 1999) states that "making the JEF 
work.. is not a matter of drawing up formal protocols for inter-Trust negotiation. Its 
success will depend far more on developing a culture of collaboration, in which the 
voice of primary care clinicians is given equal weight to that of their secondary care 
colleagues ...... 
This collaborative culture has been found in this study not only to be of importance but 
to already be in existence. The challenge therefore, is not so much to develop a 
culture but to build on the existing culture and collaborative primary care clinician- 
secondary care clinician relationships which have developed and not to constrain them 
within a bureaucratic planning paradigm which is detrimental to creativity and thus 
service innovations, knowledge creation, service quality and ultimately patient care. 
10.23 Information Networks 
One of the central themes in current NHS policy concerns the provision of information 
and the use of IT. IT networks are being advocated as the means by which to 
improve the provision of certain 'formal' information (see 8.5). At the same time, the 
government is setting up organisations such as Scottish Health Technology 
Assessment 
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Centre (SHTAC)l to make recommendations concerning the cost-effectiveness of 
innovations in health care (this includes new drugs, therapies and procedures). 
More efficient provision of this 'formal' information is to be realised by way of the 
following: 
" an NHS-wide electronic super-highway; 
" modem computer software for GP practices; 
* integration of currently separate hospital IT systems to create consolidated 
information about patients; 
* electronic transmission of outpatient appointments, referral and discharge letters 
and test requests and results between hospitals and GPs; and 
* access for healthcare staff to email and electronic libraries of knowledge. (National 
IM&T Programme Board 1998) (see Figure 10.1) 
Figure 10.1: NHS in Scotland, Information Inftastructure 
Source: National IAMT Programme Board 1998 
patient. -related: information knowledge-related information 
Integrated 
and effective ca 
; >Integrated 
Care Services 
This will clearly be beneficial to GPs, trusts and patients and will free up the clinical 
and administrative time currently devoted to pursuing late or missing letters, records 
and test results. 
Plans concerning the potential development and exploitation of formal sources of 
information IT-based transmission should, however, take into consideration the need 
The English equivalent is NICE, the National Institute of Clinical Effectiveness. 
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for the synchronous exchange of qualitative information to make sense of formal data 
(see 8.5.2). They should also recognise the preferences indicated in this study, and in 
earlier studies, for GP preferences towards informal sources of information. As 
Chapter 4 discussed, GPs are dubious about the value of league tables (Ellwood 1996) 
and their concerns are unlikely to be readily allayed following recent studies showing 
that league tables are difficult to obtain and difficult to use for comparing clinical 
aspects (Marshall and Spiegelhalter 1998; Parry et al. 1998; Sanderson and McKee 
1998). This study (see 8.6) and those reviewed earlier (see 4.4.4) have shown that 
formal sources of information such as evidence-based publications and even the advice 
of local advisory boards tend to bear far less influence on purchasing decisions than do 
personal experience, local knowledge and other informal, often serendipitous sources. 
It follows, therefore, that the use of IT systems and the scope for their development 
must be carefully researched and evaluated. Furthermore, as GPs are heavily reliant 
on informal sources of information to guide their decision making, thought must be 
given to how such patterns of decision making can be altered so that greater use is 
made of evidence-based information. 
10.3 Network and TCE Theory: Conclusions and Implications 
In addition to the contributions made by this study to understanding NIHS purchasing, 
contributions have also been made to the use and development of organisation theory 
and research methodology. One of the central themes within organisation theory 
is 
that of seeking a greater integration of economic and social theory. This study 
has 
shown just such a 'marriage' in the formation of network relations 
for example by 
identifying the combination of economic gains (eg practice savings) with social values 
(eg professional autonomy) and by identifying econotnising and social characteristics of 
purchasing networks. Specific contributions are presented 
below. 
10.3.1 Network Theory 
This study has made four contributions to a theoretical understanding of 
networks. 
Firstly, it has identified and discussed the integration between system and 
local level 
ideology/culture (see 9.1.1). This 
finding supports the work of Jones et al (1997) who 
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identify the influence within networks of macro-culture and who call for a greater 
recognition of its existence within the theory. Secondly, it has identified 
ideology/culture not only as a motive for engaging in networks but as a powerful 
factor in the ongoing formation of network content and process even in the face of 
considerable difficulties (see 9.1.1). Thirdly, this study has added to the explanations 
previously given that networks are held together by trust which serves as a 'glue' 
between parties (Jarillo 1990) by identifying that ideology/culture may also be a 
powerful 'glue'. 
The fourth contribution lies at the intersection between network and TCE theory. 
Networks have been associated with economic efficiencies such as the lowering of 
transactions costs (see 3.15.1 and Ouchi 1991; Powell 1991). Ebers et al. (1997) 
however, recently highlighted difficulties in analysing internal and external network 
costs because of the lack of frameworks with which to do so. By drawing on a 
framework developed for the analysis of market transactions (namely the TCE 
framework), however, this study has identified ways in which network relations have 
prevented high transactions costs (see 9.2.1). Consequently, when drawn upon in 
tandem with the growing body of network studies, these findings can aid the 
development of frameworks for analysing network costs. 
10.3.2 Transactions Cost Theory 
The use in this study of TCE theory has lead to a further theoretical contribution by 
way of highlighting certain limitations within WE theory. These limitations were 
identified because of the group context in which purchasing occurred (see 9.2.2) and 
concerned the ways in which investments and returns on investments were apportioned 
and appropriated. Four key questions which were identified, and which indicate 
directions for the development of WE theory, are as follows: 
* To what extent are returns on investments made to the group? 
* What is the loss to an individual practice if they cease trading (ie, are 
investments non-marketable)? 
* What is the loss to the group if a more 'involved' practice 
leaves the group? 
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If a practice decides to buy from another provider, what are the set-up costs 
if a group purchasing arrangement already exists and the practice is free to 
join? Can the practice "piggy-back,, on other practices or accelerate 
learning processes and benefit from learning and economies already accrued 
in that setting? 
10.4 Research Methodology and Research Limitations 
Before going on to consider some areas for future research and drawing this final 
chapter to an end, it is important to reflect on certain aspects of the research 
methodology and some of the limitations of this study. 
10.4.1 The Importance of Observation 
A further contribution of this study concerns the adoption of a non-participant 
observation method of enquiry. As Chapter 5 has discussed, two approaches were 
taken in gathering data: interviews and non-participant observation. It was the 
adoption of the latter which lead to the greatest insights in this study. The interview 
data alone, for example, led to the conclusion that GPs were doing little to stimulate 
efficiencies and resource (re)allocation (see 7.8.1) and GPs made little or no mention 
of any of the processes identified in Chapters 7 and 8 during interviews unless 
prompted'. The interview material contributed to confirming much of the evidence 
from earlier studies and identified the importance of professional autonomy, but, did 
not provide in-depth insight into the nature of purchaser provider interactions. 
The observations however, provided new insights into, and allowed for a more 
informed interpretation of, provider and inter-practice interactions. The processes of 
learning, service design, partnering and knowledge creation were all identified through 
observations of purchaser provider and inter-practice meetings. This in turn amplified 
interview and material concerning conflict and collaboration. 
Had such observations not occurred, it is highly unlikely that these 
insights would have 
' it was of course only those interviewees who were interviewed 
during and after the observations 
were taking place who could be prompted to discuss processes of service 
design etc. 
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been gained. This was confirmed when feeding back the study's findings to GPs and 
contract managers as it was apparent that they had not previously appreciated the 
multiplex nature of their network relationships. This is not surprising because unlike 
an observer, they are caught up in these events and relationships and have little time to 
sit back and consider more objectively the phenomenon of which they are a part. The 
researcher as observer, however, has both the time and opportunity to reflect and is 
equip . ped with theoretical frameworks which can aid interpretation of the data, again a 
privilege not necessarily available to the subjects. As a result, both the researcher and 
the subjects can benefit from observation and feedback. As Kvale puts it, the 
qualitative researcher may, "... through conversations ... lead others to new 
understanding and insight as they, through their own story-telling, may come to reflect 
on previously natural-seeming matters of course in their culture. " (Kvale 1983: 4). 
In conclusion, as a consequence of using non-participant observation, this study was 
able not only to identify that networks exist, but to analyse them in terms of process 
and content thereby enabling the study to offer insights which go beyond the scope of 
previous studies. 
10.4.2 Research Limitations 
As with all research, there are certain limitations to the application of these research 
findings. Chapter 5 has already discussed, these limitations in terms of the interview 
and observation methods that were used (see 5.7) so this section considers the 
empirical and temporal limýitations of the study and comments on how these have been 
addressed. 
There are two specific 'empirical' concerns related to purchasing in GGHB: 
1. GGBB is an area which demonstrated a reluctant uptake of fundholding when 
compared with other areas (see 4.4.2 and 5.3.1) although PCP fundholding was 
taken up in significant numbers in 1997. As such, the fundholding, and 
hence 
purchasing profile of GGBB differs from other areas in Scotland and the rest of 
the 
UK. It is difficult to address this particular aspect. Where appropriate, reference 
has been made to similarities with other Scottish studies although comparability 
is 
limited due to the differing nature of the studies (see 4.5.2). 
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Purchasing experiences differed within GGIHB. Not aH GPs who were interviewed 
had developed such collaborative, socially embedded relationships with their 
providers (see 6.4). It cannot be assumed therefore, that efficiency improvements, 
service innovations and knowledge creation were generated city-wide. However,, 
that they expressed a desire to work with their purchasers goes to support earlier 
discussions concerning ideology/culture. 
There was also a 'temporal' limitation related to the NHS context. The NHS has been 
characterised by continual periods of change during the course of this study. Given 
that such changes take time to have an effect, it becomes difficult to identify causality. 
For example, because action is often taken to counter the effects of or to develop 
earlier policies, it is difficult to identify whether the behaviours which follow are *in 
response to this action or would have occurred anyway. As well as affecting the 
subjects' behaviour, such changes also affect their agenda. In this study, for example, 
fundholding was topical at the start, was considered to have received a 'death 
sentence' at the time this fieldwork began, and by the end of the fieldwork GPs were 
preoccupied with future LHCC developments. 
As these policy influences are not only integral to the subject under study but could not 
be avoided, the interview schedule was designed to be flexible so that changing policies 
and agendas could be taken into account. This has meant that as well as offering an 
analysis of the market mechanism this study has been able to comment on current 
health policies thereby increasing its relevance and contribution to knowledge. 
10.5 Future Research 
Following discussion of the conclusions and implications arising from this study, the 
final section of this thesis identifies two areas for future research which follow directly 
from this study. As consideration has already been given to future theory development 
(see 10.4) this section concentrates on future research directions for the study of GP 
and primary care networks. 
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10.5.1 Social Networks and the Strength of Network Ties in PHmary Care 
This study drew on network theories, to consider one specific set of network relations 
- purchasing networks. In so doing, it identified further sets of overlapping social 
networks which had an influence upon purchasing decision making and in particular, 
knowledge creation. Some of these overlapping networks are identified in Figure 
10.2. 
Figure 10.2: Formal and Informal Networks in Purchasing 
GP Cluster 1 
.1 
Trust B1 
Trust A 
The diagram identifies the 
following: 
ea social relationship 
(marriage) between one 
GP and a community 
op ician; 
9 asocial relationship 
between three practices 
because the practice 
manager in cluster I 
was formerly a 
community pharmacist and thus knew GPs in the area, some of whom joined 
Cluster 2; 
* two GPs held formal positions in the Fundholding Association 
* at least one GP from cluster I was on a hospital committee; and 
at least two of the practice managers met through the practice managers' 
association (see Chapter 8). 
Given that GPs are now organised within primary care networks (LHCCs), research is 
required concerning the role of these new 'formal' or organisational networks in 
relation to knowledge creation and service provision. The role of related social 
networks such as those indicated in Figure 10.1 and others in which GPs are involved' 
ought also to be studied in relation to knowledge creation and service provision 
because as Granovetter (1973,1982,1985) has discussed, the density of social 
' Other networks can be professional (eg BMA), organisational (eg, 
GPFHA), local (eg, LMQ, 
educational (eg PGEA training), and medico-political. 
(cg membership of hospital conunittee). 
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GP Cluster 2 
networks and the strength of the ties within them have implications for innovative 
capabilities and thus for the processes of service design and knowledge creation. 
Furthermore, in light of this study's emphasis on knowledge creation, explicit 
consideration should also be given to the ability of practices to capture, create, absorb 
and exploit knowledge this new knowledge, ie. their absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990). 
Research of this kind could also further advance understanding about the role of 
ideology/culture and knowledge in relationships and would contribute to theoretical 
development, policy direction, managerial and clinical practice. 
10.5.2 Complexity Theory 
This thesis has highlighted the influence of economic and social motives, in particular 
ideology/culture, on GP behaviour and the emergence of purchasing networks. As 
new organisations (LHCCs and PCTs) are developed, it is important to gain further 
understanding about the influence of these social and economic factors. One approach 
would be to use complexity theory to explore and explain the emergence of new 
organisational forms and network arrangements. 
Complexity theory advocates that behaviour in organisations is influenced by internal 
models, ie unstated rules or models which guide people's actions and help people to 
anticipate and predict events (Miller et al. 1998). As Miller at al go on to explain, GP 
practices "are complex adaptive systems; each practice has its own shape and is a non- 
linear web of relationships capable of self-organisation and co-evolution. But what 
creates and maintains that shape? ". 
Complexity theory seeks to explain the dynamics' of non-linear systems from a 
systemic perspective (Stacey 1996; Miller et al. 1998). Within non-linear systems 
there are existing hierarchies, rules and ways of behaving and 
feedback systems which 
influence actor behaviour and such complex adaptive systems must 
be considered as 
9 ie, the "patterns of change that a system displays over time ... and ... the conditions 
leading those 
patterns to be stable or unstable ... 
" (Stacey, 1996: 248) 
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interacting with the environment and adapting to changing conditions (Stacey 1996). 
A complexity theory approach could, therefore, ftirther inform theories about 
individual GP behaviour and could explain the evolution of different 'shapes' of 
organisational form as manifest in LHCC developments. Such a study is of particular 
relevance as it is thought that GPs in Scotland have considerable scope to develop their 
organ . isational arrangements, moreso than their English counterparts. This complexity 
perspective would also contribute to theories about individual and organisational 
learning and would enable policy makers and managers to recommend and design 
appropriate incentives and organisational structures. 
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Appendix I 
Table 1: Fundholding Status in Scotland 1990-1998 
Table 2: Fundholding and Non-jundholding by Health Board at April 1996 
Table 3: Fundholding Types within Health Board Areas at Ist April 1996 
Table 4: Fundholders in England & Wales between P April 1991 and 31" 
March 1996 
SCOTLAND 
Tahle 1: Fundholding Status 1990-1998 
990 
............ 
1: 991 
... 
...... ..... 
1992 
.. 
1993 1.904. t905ý 1996 1997 1998 
All fundholding 12 18 69 132 162 286 408 501 514 
practices 
Fundholding 1.1 1.7 6.4 12.4 15.1 226. 38.6 47.5 
practices as % of 8 
all practices 
Total purchasing x x x x x 20 21 33 18 
Standard 21 18 69 132 162 162 170 175 180 
Primary care x x x x x 104 217 293 316 
purchasing 
Patients in 1.9 2.7 10.9 18.7 22.0 33.4 45.2 53.4 x 
fundholding 
practices as % of 
all patients 
Source: ISD Scotland (General Medical Practitioner Database). 
(The data include practices in preparatory or pilot phase. ) 
' Statistic not provided by ISD with the other figures. 
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SCOTLAND 
Table 2: Fundholding and Non-fundholding by Health Board at April 1996 
.... . ..................... . ......... .. OaV :............ ... . .... ........... ............. . .............. ..................... 
........................... ....... ... ................................................... ........... ....................................... ............. ........................ ...... ................................. 
.... ....... ............................. ................ u olding .. .............. dh ............... ............................. 
.................. ...................... ................ XXX. . ............... .......... ...... ............................ .... ............ .... ............................ ............ 
Non-Fundholding 
Practice Rank 
Order 
Population 
Covered 
% 
Rank 
Order 
Practice 
% 
Population 
Covered 
% 
Ayrshire & Arran 11.1 13 11 13 88.9 89.0 
Borders 43.5 2 53.2 2 56.5 46.8 
Argyll & Clyde 24.8 11 25 11 75.2 75.0 
Greater Glasgow 27.2 9 30.9 9 72.8 69.1 
Iffighland 26.7 11 25.6 11 1 73.3 74.4 
Lanarkshire 34.4 4 42 4 65.6 58.0 
Grampian 49.4 1 66.2 1 50.6 33.8 
Orkney 0 15 0 15 100 100 
Lothian 29.6 7 31.2 8 70.4 68.8 
Tayside 35.4 3 45.9 3 64.6 54.1 
Forth Valley 30.9 5 35.3 
6 69.1 64.5 
Western Isles 13.3 12 18.6 
12 86.7 81.4 
Dumfries & Galloway 27.8 8 32.1 
7 72.2 
--- 
67.9 
Shetland 0 15 0 
15 F00 100 
Fife 30.2 6 40 
5 69.8 60.0 
TOTAL 29.23 - 35.7 70.77 64.3 
Source: Information and Statistics Division (ISD) of the Common Services. 
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ENGLAND & WALES 
Table 4: Fundholders in England & Wales between P April 1991 and 31" March 
1996 
* Represents 41% of the patient population. 
Fundholding rates vary across the country, however. For example, at IA April 1995 
there were 93 fundholders in Essex and 87 fundholders in Kent but only In Camden 
and Islington and 3 in Sunderland. 
Source: (Audit COnunission 1995) 
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Appendix H 
Original Interview Schedule 
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GP FUNDHOLDER QUESTIONS 
Practice Location Number of Patients Fundholding Date 
(1) It has long been said that resource allocation has favoured the secondary sector (particularly high-cost technologically advanced medicine). To what extent have you 
witnessed a move of resources into primary care activities? 
(2) In your experience how have you changed the pattern of provision of secondary 
care to your patients? 
(3) Why is it so important to actually have control over your own resources? (As 
opposed to eg, non-fundholding association activities advising FIB or RHA 
purchasing). 
(4) What incentives are there for you to shift resources from intervention (eg, 
prescription, or referral), to health promotion activities such as asthma clinics? 
Can you give me some examples of what you would consider 'bad' resource allocation 
under the 'centrally planned' pre-purchaser/provider split? 
Concerns have been expressed (Propper in Glennester) about the asymmetry of 
information (providers having greater access to information required by purchasers. 
What action has been taken and is still required to ensure the adequacy of information 
relating to 
(a) provider activities & costs, and 
(b) the needs of practice patients? 
What'unit of measurement' would you use as a way of demonstrating an improved use 
of resources? 
Can you give me some examples of what you would consider 'bad' resource usage 
under the 'centrally planned' pre purchaser/provider split? 
Can you give me some examples of good resource usage which you consider 
to be a 
direct result of your status as a fundholder? 
317 
influence (eg GP advised purchasing) --------------- >direct decision making 
power 
Do you think that a purchaser provider split is necessary to facilitate this? 
Would you say that some kind of market mechanism is required? 
Commentators have said that for a market mechanism of some kind to work effectively 
that there needs to be 4 key elements: - 
(a) consumer demand 
(b) a price mechanism for expressing consumer preferences 
(c) alternative sources of provision/supply 
(d) good information upon which to base decisions 
From your own experience, would you say that each of them have been present? 
Many practices believe they can contribute to strategy and purchasing decisions via 
joint HB commissioning, or locality conu-nissioning. What do you think of these 
alternative approaches? 
........ ..... 
Thelfractice as. a: SmaH. Businesg. 
Do you view your practice as a small business? If so why, if not, why not? 
You attract funding, and thereafter must allocate scarce resources. How do you do 
this? How do you prioritise? 
Is there scope for business development? 
Do you think that there is any way in which practices can differentiate themselves or 
focus their services? 
Is there evidence of competition between GPs? On what basis do they compete? 
If not, can you envisage it every being the case? 
On what basis would/could they compete? 
Does your practice have a n-ýission? 
Do you write a business/practice plan each year? 
Do you ever discuss with your partner(s) the strengths and weaknesses, 
opportumfies 
and threats relating to the practice? 
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What do you understand the phrase'Primary care-led'to mean in practice? Range: 
What is the nature of financial pressures on your practice? 
Can you foresee a time when GPs will refer patients to other practices? 
Each Health Board needs a strategy for provision of primary care services. How do 
you reconcile a need for area based needs assessment and planning, with the local or 
practice sensitive needs and knowledge? 
... . ...... 
Theý Fluture.. 
ý 
How do you anticipate that purchasing will develop in the next 2-3 years? 
Do you think that there will always be a mix of fundholders and non-fundholders? 
Do you think that some fundholders will give up their fundholding status because of 
the attraction of non-fundholding commissioning? 
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Appendix III 
flrjr- 
i nematic Interview Guide 
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Thematic Guide 
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Why? /Why Not? 
Appendix IV 
Data Maps 
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